SPANISH POLICY IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER THE TREATY OF SAN LORENZO.

By Franklin L. Riley, Ph. D.

October 16, 1795,[1] Thomas Pinckney, in behalf of the United States and the Prince of Peace, representing His Catholic Majesty, signed at San Lorenzo el Real, a treaty which contained among other things, the following stipulations:

"The southern boundary of the United States, which divides their territory from the Spanish colonies of East and West Florida, shall be designated by a line beginning on the River Mississippi at the northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of latitude north of the equator, which from thence shall be drawn due east to the River Apalachicola," etc.

"If there should be any troops, garrisons or settlements of either party in the territory of the other according to the above-mentioned boundaries, they shall be withdrawn from the said territory within the term of six months after the ratification of this treaty, or sooner if possible."

"One Commissioner and one Surveyor shall be appointed by each of the contracting parties, who shall meet at the Natchez on the left side of the River Mississippi before the expiration of six months from the ratification of this convention and they shall proceed to run and mark this boundary according to the stipulations."

"The navigation of the said (Mississippi) River, in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean shall be free only to his (Catholic Majesty) subjects and the citizens of the United States, unless he should extend this privilege to the subjects of other Powers by special convention."

"The two high contracting parties shall____maintain peace and harmony among the several Indian nations who inhabit the country adjacent to____the boundaries of the two Floridas." "No treaty of alliance or other whatever (except treaties of peace) shall be made by either party with the Indians living within the boundary of the other."

These terms, so favorable to the United States and so destructive of Spanish interests, had long been the rock upon which all plans for an adjustment of the differences between the two powers had been stranded.[2] Nor were they finally extorted from Spain until a concurrence of unfavorable events had precipitated a diplomatic crisis. Even then his Catholic Majesty seemed to consider such stipulations as only a temporary expedient, the fulfillment of which he hoped eventually to be able to evade. The Prince of Peace himself admits that political circumstances forced Spain to consent to the treaty and intimates further that he would have made even greater concessions if they had been demanded by the United States. In writing of these negotiations, he says:

"I had taken to heart the treaty (Jay's), which unknown to us the English cabinet had negotiated with the United States of America; this treaty afforded great latitude to evil designs; it was possible to injure Spain in an indirect manner and without risk, in her distant possessions.

"I endeavored to conclude another treaty with the same states, and had the satisfaction to succeed in my object; I obtained unexpected advantages, and met with sympathy, loyalty, and generous sentiments in that nation of Republicans."

Subsequent events proved, however, that Godoy had overestimated the probabilities of a consolidation of interests between the United States and Great Britain, and that Spain had also failed to gain that ascendency over the affairs of this "nation of republicans," which she hoped to do through this treaty.[3] She was therefore no longer interested in fulfilling its stipulations. These facts are substantiated by a letter which Stoddard[4] claims was written by Governor Gayoso in June, 1796, to a confidential friend, and which came to light several years afterward. In this communication Gayoso claims that:

"The object of Great Britain in her treaty with the United States about this period, was to attach them to her interests, and even render them dependent on her, and, therefore, the Spanish treaty of limits was made to counterbalance it; but as Great Britain had totally failed in her object it was not the policy of Spain to regard her stipulations."[5]

In order to evade the treaty, she now returned to a line of policy which she had adopted several years previous[6] and which had also been tried by more than one foreign power[7] since the combined efforts of England, France and Spain to "coop up" the United States between the Alleghanies and the Atlantic, at the close of the Revolutionary War.[8] This was nothing less than a dismemberment of the United States. But the accomplishment of this bold project required time. She, therefore, resorted to her historic policy of procrastination, hoping ultimately to evade the treaty and thus regain what had been wrested from her in diplomacy. She was fully aware of the dissatisfaction the western states had expressed over the tardiness and at times the apparent indifference of the United States to the navigation of the Mississippi[9] and she also realized that the publication of the treaty "would bring her project of dismemberment to a crisis and in a manner to compel the western people to make a decided election to adhere to the Atlantic states or to embrace the splendid advantages held out to them on the Mississippi."[10] Hence, upon the announcement of the treaty in New Orleans, a Spanish emissary was immediately dispatched from that place to Tennessee and Kentucky, with authority to engage the services of the principal inhabitants in a scheme to disaffect the people towards the United States by the free use of money and promises of independence and free trade.[11] In Gayoso's letter of June, 1796, referred to above, the assertion was made that,

"It was expected that several states would separate from the union, which would absolve Spain from her engagements; because, as her contract was made with the union, it would be no longer obligatory than while the union lasted. That Spain, contrary to her expectations, was not likely to derive any advantages from the treaty, and that her views and policy would be changed, particularly if an alteration took place in the political existence of the United States. He therefore concluded, that all things considered, nothing more would result from the treaty than the free navigation of the Mississippi."[12]

A second line of policy for evading the treaty was then opened up. This was to postpone an execution of its stipulations awaiting the development of certain international complications which seemed to be inevitable. There had been a rupture in the diplomatic relation of the United States and France and hostilities between these two countries seemed to be near at hand. Mr. Pickering, who was Secretary of State from 1795 to 1800, considered this the real cause for delay on the part of Spain, after contending that the other reasons given by the Spanish authorities were "merely ostensible," he says:

"The true reason is doubtless developed by the Baron (de Corondelet)[13] in his proclamation of the 31st of May (1797). The expectation of an immediate rupture between France, the intimate ally of Spain, and the United States."[14]

By making common cause with France, in case of such a rupture, Spain evidently thought that she could recover some of the concessions she had made in the treaty, if compliance with its stipulations should not be too far effected.

In order to find time for the operation of these schemes, the Spanish officials produced, from time to time, such excuses as either the treaty or the circumstances rendered plausible. After months of fruitless delay, they determined to rest their final action upon the results of another effort to detach the western states from the Union. An emissary was again sent to Tennessee and Kentucky to confer with certain men who were former correspondents of the governors of Louisiana. He found, however, that the people were less disposed towards a change than they were ten years previous, especially since they were likely to secure the navigation of the Mississippi,—the real cause of their former disaffection—without resorting to a hazardous enterprise. After an eventful sojourn in this region, he returned to New Orleans in January, 1798, bearing the unwelcome report which convinced the Governor General that Spain had lost all hope of political prestige in the territory north of the 31st degree and east of the Mississippi.[15] Arrangements were then perfected for the execution of the treaty.

In the light of the Spanish policy as presented above, local events may be easily interpreted. As time was an indispensable condition upon which the success of this policy depended, it was gained by various pretexts. Don Yrujo, the Spanish minister, intrigued at Philadelphia, and his efforts were ably seconded by Carondelet, Gayoso[16] and a host of subordinate officials on the Mississippi.

In accordance with a stipulation of the treaty, President Washington appointed the Honorable Andrew Ellicott[17] as Commissioner to run the boundary line in behalf of the United States. He left Philadelphia for Natchez by way of the Ohio and the Mississippi, September 16, 1796. But his descent of the Mississippi had been anticipated by the Spaniards, who had prepared obstructive measures in advance of his coming. So that whenever he came in contact with Spanish officials they evinced a disposition to hinder his descent of the river, if not prevent it altogether.[18] Some of them affected ignorance of the treaty, others appeared embarrassed at the presence of the Americans, while none of them had made or were making, so far as the Commissioner could observe, any preparations to evacuate the posts according to the terms of the treaty.

Before reaching his destination, Ellicott received a communication from Governor Gayoso, expressing his gratification at the arrival of the Commissioner in those waters and requesting that the military escort accompanying him should be left at the mouth of the Bayou Pierre, sixty miles above Natchez, in order to prevent an "unforeseen misunderstanding" between the troops of the two nations. Since the treaty had provided for such an escort, this request was deemed improper by Ellicott. He yielded the point, however, for the time being, out of deference to the wishes of the Governor.[19]

Upon his arrival at Natchez, February 24, 1797, ten months after the ratification of the treaty, he found no one ready to co-operate with him in the performance of the duty assigned. To the contrary, he learned through private sources that the Baron de Carondelet, the Governor General of Louisiana, had declared that the treaty was never intended to be carried into effect, that as Commissioner on the part of Spain, he would evade or delay from one pretense or another, the running of the boundary line until the treaty would become "a dead letter," and that Louisiana either had been, or would soon be ceded to France.[20]

About this time a suggestive and characteristic event occurred which gives an insight into the temper of both the Spanish Governor and the American Commissioner. About two hours after the flag of the United States had been hoisted over the Commissioner's camp, Gayoso requested that it be lowered. This request met with a flat refusal, and though there were rumors of parties being formed to cut it down, "the flag wore out upon the staff."[21] Gayoso explained, a fortnight later, that his objection to the flag was not prompted by a desire to show a discourtesy to the United States, but to prevent any unbecoming conduct on the part of the Indians.[22] This explanation, however, seems to have been an after-thought. Suffice it to say, when it was offered the Indians had become so troublesome that Ellicott had determined to send for his escort. The Governor, after declaring that he would construe their descent as an insult to his master,[23] and then suggesting that they might with propriety join the Commissioner at Loftus Cliffs, near Clarksville, finally consented that they go into camp at Bacon's Landing, a few miles below town.[24] This put an end to the efforts of the Spaniards to draw Ellicott away from Natchez, the place designated by the treaty for the meeting of the commissioners.[25]

After the lapse of a fortnight from the time of his arrival, Ellicott was informed that the Spanish Commissioner, the Baron de Carondelet, was detained in New Orleans in the discharge of duties incident to the war then waging between Spain and Great Britain, and that in his absence the business of the survey would devolve upon Governor Gayoso.[26] March 19, had been settled upon as the time when the commissioners would begin operation, but with this change of commissioner, Gayoso gave notice that it would be impossible to proceed at the time appointed. He promised, however, to be ready at an early day. But, before these preparations were perfected, Spanish finesse had discovered a new reason for delay. This in turn was followed by others until May 11, when Ellicott was finally informed that the business upon which he had come was postponed indefinitely, awaiting further orders from the ministers of the two powers concerned.[27] These pretexts having varied from time to time, it would be well to present them in one view.[28]

I. NECESSITY OF AWAITING THE RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR SECURING THE INHABITANTS IN THE POSSESSION OF THEIR LANDS.

This reason was first given in a proclamation issued by Governor Gayoso on the 28th of March, 1797, but bearing the Gate of the day following. It was reiterated in a second proclamation of the same date. Yet, when the Secretary of State, two and a half months later, received from Commissioner Ellicott a notice of this reason for delay, he declared that no such negotiation had existed and that it was the first time these objections to the evacuation of the posts had been heard of.[29] Two months later still he observed that,

"As____the great body of the inhabitants (of the territory) appear not to desire the patronage of the Spanish Government to secure it (their real estate); as the Government of the United States must be at least as anxious as that of Spain to protect the inhabitants in their rights when (they) become citizens of the United States ... there can be no difficulty in deciding whether this is a reason or a pretense. Besides, the negotiation ... has never existed; nor even been proposed or hinted either to or by the Government of the United States."[30]

Orders were promptly issued, however, by the President and the Secretary of War to assure Governor Gayoso that no person would be "disturbed in his possession or property, till an opportunity had been afforded to apply to Congress," and that they might "rely upon their claims being adjusted upon the most equitable principles."[31]

II, DESIRE OF FIRST ESTABLISHING FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INDIANS AND THE INHABITANTS OF THE TERRITORY TO BE CEDED[32].

On this subject Gayoso asserted that it was "impossible for His Catholic Majesty to leave unprotected so many of his faithful subjects and expose other settlements to the revengeful disposition of discontented Indians." He therefore felt justified in retaining possession of the country until he might be sure the savages would be pacific.[33] The Secretary of State contended that such a reason would warrant the assertion, that "the Governor meant, for an indefinite period to avoid an evacuation of the posts: for, while a tribe of Indians existed in that quarter, the Governor could not be sure that they would be pacific."[34] He observed further, that,

"Upon a view of the whole correspondence ... submitted to the President, it appears that there is but too much reason to believe ... that an undue influence has been exercised over the Indians by the officers of His Catholic Majesty to prepare them for a rupture with the United States, those suspicions corresponding with other intelligence recently received by the Secretary of War and by me."[35]

Instructions were issued by the Secretary of War to assure the Spanish Commandant that effort would be made "to preserve a continuance of the pacific dispositions of the Indians within our limits, towards the subjects of His Catholic Majesty or his Indians; and to prevent their commencing hostilities (of which there is no appearance) against either."[36]

III. NECESSITY OF CONSULTING THE KING CONCERNING THE CONDITION IN WHICH THE FORTS WERE TO BE SURRENDERED.[37]

The treaty failed to specify whether the posts should be surrendered with the buildings and fortifications intact, or whether they should first be dismantled. Gayoso declared that a treaty with the Indians required a demolition of the post at Walnut Hill and that orders had been issued to that effect, but that owing to their unsettled dispositions he had received counter orders to prevent the fortifications from being injured.[38] General Wayne took the position that the posts should be left standing.[39] President Adams, however, left the matter entirely to the discretion of the Spanish officials, and thus at once brought an end to the validity of this excuse.[40] On this sub-Secretary Pickering maintained:

"It is probably the first time that to 'withdraw,' or retire from a place, has been imagined to intend its destruction. If, at the formation of the treaty, the demolition of the posts had been intended, it would assuredly have been expressed."[41]

When the Spaniards had really decided to surrender the district, no further mention was made of this subject, showing that, notwithstanding their treaty with the Indians, they considered the demolition of the forts of no consequence whatever.

IV. EXPECTATION OF AN ATTACK UPON LOUISIANA BY A BRITISH FORCE FROM CANADA.

Suspicion to this effect, though based upon reports more or less vague, had been expressed by the Spanish Minister as early as the February preceding; and had been reiterated by him from time to time,[42] until at the expiration of three months, it had developed into a pretext for delaying the execution of the treaty. In fact, the Baron de Carondelet asserted in a proclamation of May 24, that further delay in surveying the boundary line and in evacuating the forts was then occasioned only by the imperious necessity of securing Lower Louisiana, in case the British should become masters of the Illinois country[43] and that such apprehensions had caused him to put the post at Walnut Hills "in a respectable but provisional state of defence."[44] Secretary Pickering not only considered these suspicions groundless, but contended further that,

"If the posts of the Natchez and Walnut Hills 'are the only bulwarks of Lower Louisiana, to stop the course of the British,' as the Baron alerts and if, therefore, Spain is justifiable in holding them, she may retain them, without any limitation of time, for her security in any future war, as well as in that which now exists."[45]

Before the appearance of the Baron's proclamation containing this reason for delay, the Spanish Minister had been informed that the Secretary of State saw no reasons for such suspicions and the British Minister had been notified that the Government of the United States would suffer neither British nor Spanish troops to march through its territory for the purpose of hostility of one against the other.[46] The Spanish Minister replied[47], however, that he knew to a certainty that the English had made a proposition to General Clarke of Georgia in order to secure his influence in that State in a proposed attack against Florida. At the request of Mr. Pickering, this report was investigated by the District Attorney of Georgia. He replied that he could not find any one who knew of the matter or who entertained a belief of the report; and that from General Clark's known violent antipathies to the English and other circumstances, he doubted the truthfulness of it altogether.[48]

When the attention of Mr. Liston, the British Minister, was directed to the subject, he pointedly denied that his government either had intended or was then intending to invade Louisiana.[49] A few days later, however, he admitted that a plan for attacking the Floridas and other Spanish possessions adjoining the United States had been submitted to him by other persons, whom he declined to name, but stated it was discountenanced by him because its success depended upon a violation of the neutrality of the United States and an enlistment of the Indians. According to this plan, the expedition was to be undertaken by a British sea force, which would be joined by such volunteers of the United States as would join the king's standard when raised on Spanish soil.[50]

The noted conspiracy of Senator Blount of Tennessee then came to light[51] and precipitated a spirited discussion between the Spanish Minister and Mr. Pickering. The former contended that the plot had been revealed and that no one any longer doubted that the expedition was to have taken place,[52] while the latter maintained that there could have been no connection between Blount's scheme and either the expedition from Canada,[53] or the project attributed to General Clarke.[54] The Secretary argued in support of his position that Blount's expedition was to have been formed in one of the states south of the River Ohio; that it was destined against the Floridas, and perhaps Lower Louisiana; that Blount himself expected to be at the head of it; that it was not to be undertaken but in conjunction with a British force; and that "on the proposal of the expedition to the British Government, it was totally rejected."[55] He maintained further that the suspicion of a British invasion from Canada was groundless for the following reasons:—(1) Preparations for such an expedition would have attracted attention and rendered satisfactory proofs attainable; (2) the troops of the United States, stationed along the Canadian border, were in position to protect the frontier, as well as to get information of any warlike preparations and communicate the same to the Secretary of War, yet no such communications had been made; (3) the British did not have on the lakes a force adequate to such an enterprise; (4) the routes suggested for such a campaign would have interposed great difficulties for the transportation of troops, equipage, provisions, etc., even if they could have been taken without violating the territory of the United States; and (5) the British Minister, after inquiring of the Governor General of Canada and of "the British Secretary of State," denied that his Government either had intended or was then intending such an expedition.[56]

V. FEAR OF AN ATTACK FROM THE UNITED STATES.

In the Spring of 1797, certain American troops were sent from the Ohio into Tennessee for the purpose of preventing a forced settlement upon the Cherokee lands. Orders were also given the Cumberland militia to hold itself in readiness to prevent similar encroachments.[57] These facts were seized upon by Carondelet, who asserted in a proclamation of May 31, that since the United States was at peace with all the savages, these movements must concern the Spanish provinces. To make this pretext more plausible, the proclamation also made mention of "the anterior menaces" of the representatives of the United States at Natchez;[58] of the expected rupture between that Power and France, the intimate ally of Spain; and of the recognition by the United States of the right of England to navigate the Mississippi, which, the Baron adds, "appears to annul" the treaty with His Catholic Majesty, by which the United States acknowledged that "no other nation can navigate upon the Mississippi without the consent of Spain."[59]

Secretary Pickering regarded the expectation of a rupture between the United States and France as the real cause of the delay in running the boundary and in evacuating the posts.[60] With reference to any hostile intentions on the part of the United States, he wrote,

"Never, perhaps, was conceived a more absurd idea, than that of marching troops from the Ohio to the State of Tennessee, and thence to the Natchez, in the whole a tedious, difficult and expensive route of many hundred miles, chiefly through a wilderness; when, if the United States had any hostile views, they had only to collect their troops to the Ohio, and suffer them to be floated down that river and the Mississippi, almost without labor, with great expedition, and at small expense, to the county to be attacked."[61]

These pretexts were usually accompanied by a profusion of promises and explanations which rendered them more or less plausible. Besides this, the Spaniards on more than one occasion made appearances of beginning the evacuation.[62] Although declaring that nothing could prevent the religious fulfilment of the treaty, they were, at the same time, strengthening their fortifications and augmenting their forces on the river. Under such circumstances, the presence of American soldiers and officers was not desired. This fact explains the efforts of Governor Gayoso to prevent Ellicott's escort from reaching Natchez and the attempts to entice the Commissioner himself away from that place.[63]

He had scarcely failed in these schemes, however, when he heard of the descent of Lieutenant Pope with a small detachment of American troops to take charge of the posts upon their evacuation. He then sent Ellicott an open letter directed to Pope, in which it was stated that "for sundry reasons it would be proper and conduce to the harmony of the two nations" for these troops to remain at a distance until the posts were evacuated, which would be completed in a few days. But instead of complying with the Governor's request to second this effort at harmony, Ellicott wrote to Pope that there was evidence to show that an evacuation was not really intended in any reasonable time and that in his opinion the sooner the American troops reached Natchez the better.[64] Upon receiving the Governor's letter Pope stopped his detachment at the Walnut Hills. April 17, Ellicott wrote a second letter stating that a rupture with the Spanish authorities at Natchez was near at hand and that in his opinion the Lieutenant could better serve his country at Natchez than at any other point on the river.[65] In response to this letter, Pope and his command resumed their descent, the Governor finally consenting, and reached Natchez April 24, 1797.[66]

Such are the general outlines of the contest that was waged between the representatives of the two powers over the dilatory policy of Spain. Subsequent diplomatic discussion centered on the navigation of the Mississippi and the affairs at Natchez assumed the form of a popular outbreak against the established government in the district.