Volume 4 — CONTENTS OF VOLUME FOURTH. WITH THE TRANSLATORS’ NAMES.

WHY THE ORACLES CEASE TO GIVE ANSWERS.

By Robert Midgley, M.D., and Coll. Med. Lond. Cand.

Two men, Demetrius of Tarsus, from England, and Cleombrotus the Lacedaemonian, from Egypt, meet at Delphi, 3. Their conversation about what Cleombrotus had seen and heard in Egypt, 4. He had visited the oracle of Jupiter Ammon, 4. A remarkable lamp there, which was never extinguished, though its supply of oil was lessened continually, 4-6. The conversation turns on oracles: why have most of the oracles, even in Greece, become silent? 7. Formerly these oracles gave responses, 8. What responses were given, 8. Are responses now withheld, because of the great wickedness of the time? 10. The gods are not inconstant or malevolent, 11. One cause may be found in the diminished population of Greece, 12. When there were more men, there were more responses, 12. God himself has not abolished divination, 13. God is not concerned in all human affairs, 14. There are beings, called Daemons, intermediate between Gods and men, 14. These Daemons were originally human beings, 14. They are not immortal, though very long-lived, 15. A mathematical computation of the possible length of a Daemon’s life, 15-17. A Daemon resembles an isosceles triangle, 17. A Daemon compared to the moon, 17, 18. Daemons are employed by the gods as their agents and ministers in human affairs, particularly in matters of worship and religious ceremony, 18. Human sacrifices and cruel rites are required by malignant Daemons, 19. Combat between Apollo and the Dragon Python for the possession of the oracle at Delphi, 20. Daemons are appointed to have the care of oracles; when the Daemons depart, the oracles must of course fail, 21. That Daemons may be mortal, proved by a story related by one of the company: “The great god Pan is dead,” 23. Another story, about the death in Britain of a Daemon, and the terrible storm that followed, 24. Opinions of the Stoics concerning Daemons, 24. Epicureans reject the idea of Daemons, and with it the Divine Providence, 25. Story of a stranger encountered by Cleombrotus in his travels, and what he said about Daemons and oracles, 26-28. The wars of the Titans were battles of Daemons with Daemons, 27. Daemons, though not gods, like to be called gods and honored as such, 28. How many worlds are there? one hundred and eighty-three, ranged in the form of a triangle, 29. Homer says there are five worlds, 30. Plato makes but one world, 28, 31. Probably there are several worlds, 31. Reasons for this opinion, 32. There is one supreme God, but many inferior gods, 31, 33. A plurality of worlds further discussed, 34, 35. A plurality of worlds does not involve the existence of a plurality of Jupiters, 36. An infinite number of worlds is a chimera: but a certain definite number is quite probable; and Jupiter may pass from one world to another, as occasion requires, to regulate its affairs, 36-38. As there are five regular forms of solid bodies, there are probably five worlds, 38, 39. Objections to this opinion, 40. The opinion defended, 41, 42. One, or unity; two, or duality,—are the supreme principles of all things, 42. One and two make three, an odd number; three and two make five; we reckon by fives, or by twice five; all other numbers are produced from these; we have five senses, and five fingers; the earth has five zones; the heaven has five circles; for these and similar reasons it is inferred that there are five worlds and no more, 42-47. The silence of the oracles is due to the fact that the Daemons who presided over them have departed, 47. But how did the Daemons exert their power over the oracles? 47. If the Daemons, being human spirits disembodied, may foresee and foretell future events, why may not human spirits, embodied, possess a similar power? 48, 49. Our souls certainly are endued by nature with this power, 50. This power exists in certain states or dispositions of the body, assisted and enforced by certain exhalations from the earth, 51, 52. Such an exhalation issues from the earth at Delphi and other places, 53. But these exhalations are subject to changes, caused by earthquakes, &c., 53, 54. From such causes the oracle may fail, 54. A story about an oracle in Cilicia, 55. Objections to the views now expressed, 56, 57. If the prophetic faculty be a natural endowment, why do we offer sacrifice to the gods, in order to obtain a response? 57. Because all good comes from the gods; although our natural wit and reason may help in obtaining it, 58-60. Divination is from God; it is also from wit and reason; it is promoted by enthusiastic exhalations from the earth, 59. When all these things concur, the oracle gives responses; when any are wanting, the oracle is silent, 60-64.

OF ISIS AND OSIRIS, OR OF THE ANCIENT RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY OF EGYPT.

By William Baxter, Philalethes.

The knowledge of truth man’s greatest blessing; to be sought of the gods, 65. Isis the goddess of wisdom and knowledge, 66. What makes a true priest of Isis? 67. Why do the priests of Isis shave their heads and wear linen garments? 67. Why are those priests scrupulous about their food? 68. Why is the bull Apis not watered from the Nile? 68. Why do the priests of the Sun abstain from wine, or drink it sparingly? 69. Why do the priests abstain from fish and from onions? 70. They do not sacrifice the swine, 71. They conceal their wisdom in enigmas, 72. Hence the enigmas of Pythagoras, 72. Some of the Egyptian enigmas stated, 73. The tales related of the Egyptian gods not to be taken literally, 73. A story about the birth of Osiris, 74. Another about the birth of Isis and other deities, 75. The great actions of Osiris, 75. The manner of his death, 76. His wife Isis, her lamentations, 76-78. Her search for her husband, 77. Finds the body of Osiris, 78, 79. About Maneros, the foster-son of Isis, 79. The body of Osiris torn in pieces by Typhon, his murderer, and the members scattered about, 80. The members found and interred in many places, 80. War between Typhon and Horus, the son of Osiris, 80, 81. These stories not to be literally understood, 82. These gods were not kings and mighty men, 83. Semiramis, Sesostris, Cyrus, Alexander, were human beings, not deities, 85. Isis, Osiris, and Typhon, were not divine beings, nor human, but Daemons, an intermediate genus, 86. Such also were Saturn, the giants and Titans of the Greeks, 86. This notion is sanctioned by Homer, Hesiod, Plato, Xenocrates, and Empedocles, 86, 87. Typhon was a malignant Daemon, 88. Isis and Osiris were good Daemons, afterwards changed into gods, 88. Isis is the same as Proserpine; Serapis is Pluto, 88. Osiris is identical with Serapis and with Bacchus, 89. Osiris is also identical with the bull Apis, 90. The Egyptians offer disrespect to Typhon, 91. They maltreat the ass and animals and men having red hair, because his hair was red, 91. According to some, Osiris is the Nile, and Typhon the sea; explanation, 92. The most learned hold Osiris to be the cause of generation, 94. Proofs that Osiris is the same as Bacchus, 95, 96. The Phallic rites, and how they originated, 96, 97. The Nile, and every thing humid, is the efflux of Osiris, and he is thus the cause of all things, 96, 97. The country bordering on the Nile is the body of Isis, 98. The conspiracy of Typhon explained, 99. The mourning of Isis, and her recovery of the body of Osiris explained, 100. Another explanation of Typhon, Osiris and Isis, the heavenly bodies, 101. The eclipse of the moon is the death of Osiris, 104. Worship of the dog Anubis, 77, 104. Typhon stands for the principle or cause of evil, distress, and destruction, 105. The Magian or Persian doctrine of two original independent forces or powers; one the source of light or good, the other of darkness and evil, 106. These maintain an incessant struggle, 107. The final issue will be happy, 108. The same ideas are found among the Chaldeans and the Greeks, 108. These ideas are found also among the Pythagoreans and in Plato, 109. Throughout nature we find the two discordant principles, which are represented by the names Osiris and Typhon, 109, 110. The hieroglyphics and religious rites which refer to these principles, 110-112. Isis is the feminine and productive property of Nature, 113. Horus, son of Isis, represents the world of mind, 114. He has a struggle with Typhon, 114, 115. The three constituents of the divine nature, 115. Illustrated by a triangle, 115. What Plato says of the production of love, 116, 117. Fables are doctrinal only in part, 117. The fable of Typhon further explained, 118. Supposed etymology of the words Isis, Osiris, Anubis, and others, 119-121. The sistrum, or timbrel, used at the feasts of Isis, 121. Isis and Osiris produce whatever is orderly and beneficial; Typhon is the cause of disorder and mischief, 122. These deities are not peculiar to Egypt; all mankind have them, 123. We are not to rest in the letter of the accounts given of these gods, 124. Sun, moon, earth, fire, wind, water, are not gods, but elements wielded by the gods, and by which the gods exhibit and manifest themselves, 124. We are to rise above the symbol to the thing symbolized, 125. We should not confound the true idea of God with the appearances and changes of external nature, 126, 127. The statues of the gods are not the gods, 128. The assumption of the forms of brute animals by the gods is not to be believed, 129. Yet the idolatrous worship of the Egyptians had no better foundation than this belief, 129, 130. Some reasons assigned for brute worship, 131, 132. God is to be worshiped in Nature, not Nature instead of God, 134. The sacred vestments of Isis and Osiris; their nature and use, 135. Purpose for which incense and perfumes are burnt, 136-139.

CONCERNING SUCH WHOM GOD IS SLOW TO PUNISH.

By John Philips, Gent.

“Concerning those whom God is slow to punish.” This subject is discussed between Plutarch and several of his relatives, Plutarch being the principal speaker. Epicurus had just left the company uttering invectives against the justice of the Deity in the government of the world, 140. It is admitted that the delay of divine justice gives rise to perplexing thoughts, 141. Some of the objections are,—(1) Such delay seems to proceed from indifference on the part of the Deity to the desert of crime; (2) Punishment long delayed fails to restrain the commission of crime, as a speedy retribution would do; (3) It is often entirely useless as a reparation to those who have suffered from injustice; (4) It emboldens the transgressor, 141; (5) It diminishes in many minds the belief of Divine Providence; (6) Punishment long delayed fails of any good effect on the offender himself, 143. To what good purpose, then, do the millstones of the gods grind, when they grind so slowly? 143. To these objections it is answered as follows: It becomes us to enter on such inquiries with great caution and self-distrust, because our knowledge of God and of his ways is extremely narrow and imperfect, 144. We are very incompetent judges of what it is fit for God to do, 144. God only knows when, and in what manner, and how much to punish, 144. Those who are ignorant of music or of military affairs are not competent judges of those matters, 144. No one who is not properly trained can wisely administer human law, 145. The remissness of which complaint is made is true only in part, and is only apparent. So far as it is real, it may be vindicated by the following considerations: (1) The Deity, by being slow to punish, teaches us to moderate our anger, and never to punish in a passion, 146; He would lead us to imitate his own gentleness and forbearance, 147; (2) The wicked, in consequence of delay, have opportunity to repent, and are therefore spared from a desire of their reformation, 148; The summary justice, to which the passions of men incite them, excludes all regard to this object, and degenerates into the mere gratification of malice and revenge, 148; The wisdom of the divine policy, so different from this, is fully justified by the results, since history records many instances where men who, in early life, were profligate, have afterwards reformed and become useful to society, 149, 150; (3) The wicked are often permitted to live and prosper, that Providence may by them execute its justice on others, of which instances are given, 151, 152; (4) The wicked are sometimes spared that a noble and virtuous posterity, proceeding from them, may bless the world, 152; (5) Punishment is sometimes deferred for a time that the hand of Providence may be more conspicuous in inflicting it, 153. But the objection against an overruling Providence, founded on the prosperity of the wicked, assumes too much; the delay is apparent, rather than real, 154. Retribution follows hard on the steps of crime, in the shame, remorse, and inward suffering of the offender, 154. Many look with envy on wicked men who seem to enjoy high prosperity, while those men are soon to become involved in the deepest misery, 154. Wicked men suffer not a late but a long punishment; they suffer all the time, 155. What we call delay, is not such to the Deity; distinctions of time with him have no place, 155. It is not the last moment of punishment which contains all the punishment, 155. God has the offender all the while in his power, and does not suffer him to rest, 156. Instances are given of remorse suffered by the guilty, 156, 157. Were death the extinction of our being, it might still be maintained that the Deity is not remiss in punishing crime, 157. The wicked find, even here, that no real good comes from their wickedness, 158. Self-condemnation, a dread of censure, a fear of death, embitter their lives, 159. One of the company now leads the conversation to a kindred subject, the question how the conduct of Providence can be justified in punishing children for the misconduct of their parents, of which several instances are quoted, 160, 161. To this it is replied: (1) Children often derive advantage from the virtue and piety of their fathers; it is not therefore strange that they should suffer for their wickedness, 163, 164. (2) The law of cause and effect comes in here, as in other cases, though we may not fully explain it; children often inherit the diseases of their parents; the plague of Athens took its rise in far distant Ethiopia, 165. (3) The constitution of society binds one generation to another, and thus renders this retribution just, as well as inevitable; every family, as well as every state, has a separate existence, a personal identity of its own, and it is one and the same through successive ages; hence the social crime of one age may properly work out its legitimate results in another, 166-168. (4) In all cases, God deals with men according to their deserts; if children are virtuous, they are not harmed for what their ancestors have done, 169. But, says one of the company, some of your remarks imply the immortality of the soul, 168, 169. Plutarch answers, yes; and we have good reason for assuming that point; if we were like the leaves which fall from the trees in autumn, or like the hot-house plant which has no enduring root; if we were brought into existence to endure only for a day, it would be unworthy of the Deity to lavish so much care upon us, 169. The immortality of the soul, and an overruling Providence, are confirmed to us by the same argument, 170. If the soul survives the body, we may conclude that its future state will be one of reward or punishment, because life is a struggle and a probation, 170. Punishments that reach posterity often restrain the inclinations of wicked persons, 171. Children born of diseased parents need to be guarded against the hereditary disease, 172. And children of wicked parents will be themselves wicked, unless careful and timely restraints be placed upon them, 173, 174. God sees the inbred corruption if we do not, and often does not wait till the actual outbreak before animadverting upon it, 174, 175. Dormant villany may be more dangerous than open iniquity, and so may need chastisement, 175. The innocent are never punished for the guilty; but if a man tread in his father’s steps, he must succeed to his punishment, 175, 176. The argument is enforced by the story of a man who lived a dishonest and wicked life; who appeared to die; visited the world of spirits; saw the rewards and punishments there experienced; came back to life, and was greatly reformed in consequence, 177-188.

OF NATURAL AFFECTION TOWARDS ONE’S OFFSPRING.

By R. Brown, M.L.

The Grecians, from distrust of Grecian justice, appealed to foreign judicatures, 189. In a similar manner, philosophers, instead of appeals to human nature, have appealed to brute affection, 189. Absurdity of such an appeal, 189. Brutes, having no reason, follow blindly and implicitly the guidance of Nature, 190. All brutes love their offspring, toiling and suffering for their good, 190, 191. Let them herein be our examples, 192. Some pretend that among human beings disinterested affection does not exist, 192. This assertion is not true, 193. Nature has so ordered the circumstances in which man comes into being, as to necessitate the existence of a strong and tender love on the part of the mother, 193, 194. Parents do not love their children in the hope of benefit to be derived from them, 195. Nor from the desire of having heirs to their estates, 196. A rich man without heirs has many friends; and children, when born to him, do not augment his power, 196. Natural affection may be obscured and hindered by vice; but this disproves not its existence, 197.

CONCERNING THE FORTUNE OF THE ROMANS.

By John Oswald.

Is the grandeur and power of the Roman Empire due to Virtue, or to Fortune? 198. Virtue and Fortune, though different in nature, conspire to produce the same results, 198. Both united in rearing that stupendous structure, the Roman Empire, 199. The world was full of change, confusion, and disorder, till the power of Rome extended over the nations, 200. Virtue and Fortune now come forward in this discussion to maintain their respective claims as architects and supporters of the Roman greatness, 200. In the train of Virtue are Fabricius, Camillus, Cincinnatus, Marcellus, Scipio, and others, 201. Fortune, having deserted the Persians, Greeks and Carthaginians, comes forward leading Numa, Aemilius Paulus, Metellus, Sylla, as her favored sons, 201-203. The Romans themselves attributed their greatness to Fortune, and built many temples to it, 203, 211. Caesar relied much on Fortune, and was greatly assisted by it, 204, 205. Augustus was the favored child of Fortune, 205. Fortune was manifest in all the affairs of Rome from the beginning, as in the birth and education of Romulus, 206-208. In the long, wise, and peaceful reign of Numa, 208-210. In the birth, elevation, and prosperity of Servius Tullius, 212, 213. In the triumphs of the Romans over Philip, Antiochus, and the Carthaginians, and especially the expeditions of Pompey, 214. The favor of Fortune was constant, from age to age: it attended the Romans in all their enterprises, 215. The great overthrow at the river Allia was not fatal to Rome, 216-218. The cackling of the sacred geese, a piece of good fortune, saved Rome, 217. Alexander of Macedon was intending war against the Romans, but Fortune ordered his death just at the right time for them, 219. [The remainder of this treatise, containing the arguments in behalf of Virtue, is lost.]

OF GARRULITY, OR TALKATIVENESS.

By John Philips, Gent.

Talkativeness an inveterate disease, 220. Talkative people are very troublesome, 221. They are avoided and are not heard, 222. They never gain belief, 223. Talkativeness often results from drunkenness, 224. Silence is often a great virtue; anecdote of Zeno at a feast, 225. Loquacity shows great want of good breeding, 227. It exposes to great danger, 228. It gave Athens into the power of Sylla, 228. It prolonged the tyranny of Nero, 228, 229. The noble taciturnity of Leaena, 229, 230. Secrets are not to be revealed, even to our most intimate friends, 232, 233. Anecdote of a Roman senator and his wife, 233, 234. Mischiefs of a vain curiosity, 236. Loquacious men destroy themselves, 238. Anecdote of Dionysius and a barber, 238. Of an Athenian barber, 238, 239. Of one who robbed the temple of Minerva, 239. Of the murderers of Ibycus, 240. Great peril of an unbridled tongue, 240. A tell-tale is often a traitor, 241. To cure ourselves of so vile a habit, consider the mischiefs which arise from it, 242. Study conciseness of speech: imitate the Spartan brevity, 243. When in company questions are asked, keep silence till all the rest have refused to answer, 245, 246. Be not hasty to answer questions that are intended to ensnare you, 247. When the questioner really desires information, let there be a pause between the question and the answer, 247. Three sorts of answers to questions,—the necessary, the polite, the superfluous, 248. Beware of the third sort, 249. Beware of talking on favorite subjects, and of matters relating to your profession, 250, 251. Before you speak, consider what advantage may arise from speaking, and what mischief from holding your peace, 253.

OF LOVE.

By the Same Hand.

The scene of this discussion is laid near Thespiae, on the elope of Mount Helicon; the interlocutors are Plutarch and several of his friends, 254, 255. The occasion is a match projected between Ismenodora, a chaste, noble, and rich widow, and Baccho, a beautiful young man, both of Thespiae, 256. There are different opinions concerning the propriety of the connection, chiefly on account of the disparity of age and outward condition, 256. A discussion arises as to the true nature and foundation of love, as it actually exists in the world, 258. Does it spring from the desire of carnal gratification merely, or from some higher impulse? 258, 259. One speaker pretends that genuine love is that for beautiful boys, παιδεραστία, and condemns the love of women, 259. Another condemns male converse as contrary to nature, 260. It is of recent origin, nourished by the scenes of the palaestra, 261, 262. As Venus is not present in such scenes, there is no real love, 262. The connection of Baccho with Ismenodora is objected to by some of the speakers, on the ground that it would make him dependent on her, 264, 265. Plutarch advocates the connection, 266. Men have sometimes married wives who held them in subjection, but came to this result by their own weakness, 266, 267. There may be a positive advantage in having a wife older than one’s self, arising from her superior wisdom, 268. At this point, the company receive information that Ismenodora, with some friends, had got Baccho into her house, and was holding him there, 269. A lady warmly in love, 270. Is Love a Deity, or only a strong human passion? 272. Why should we call in question the deity of Cupid more than that of Jupiter or Minerva? 273, 274. Why admit the deity of Mars, the god of war and slaughter, and even of the nymphs and dryads, and refuse to believe that a god presides over the tenderest human affections? 275-280. The god of love is not inferior either in power, or in the benefits he confers, to any other deity, 281. Mere venereal delight may be purchased for a drachm; it is soon over, 281, 282. Love, as an affection, has a controlling power; examples, 283-287. Its power over the ancient heroes, 286. Love makes cowards brave, and covetous men liberal, 288. There are different opinions about the gods, but all confess the power of the god of love, 291. Opinions of the Egyptians concerning the god of love, 292. Resemblance between the sun and the god of love, and differences, 293, 294. True love has for its main and ultimate object the qualities of the mind and heart, 295, 296. True beauty is that of the soul, 297. Love is the scourge of proud, ill-natured people, 298. The causes of love are common to both sexes, 299. Love is a noble and generous affection, 300. In wedlock, founded on true love, there will be no “mine” and “thine,” 301. There will be mutual respect and confidence, 301. All other love will be excluded, 302. Illustrated by the story of Camma, a Galatian lady, 302, 303. A raging passion for beautiful persons, either male or female, is not true love, 305. Yet personal charms in a modest woman will fix the affection of a husband, 305. No earthly joy is so great and so lasting as that arising from the conjugal union, 307. The love of virtuous women does not cease with their youth and beauty, 308. Conjugal fidelity exemplified in the case of Sabinus of Galatia and his wife, 308-310. The discussion ends with the marriage of Ismenodora and Baccho, 311.

FIVE TRAGICAL HISTORIES OF LOVE.

By Sir A. I.

1. Aristoclia, of Haliartus in Boeotia, is sought in marriage by two young men; on her wedding-day she is slain, 312, 313. 2. Archias of Corinth, enamoured of a young man named Actaeon, endeavors by force to obtain possession of his person; resistance being made, Actaeon is slain, 313-315. 3. Two virgins of Leuctra in Boeotia having been ravished and murdered by two young Spartans, their father goes to Lacedaemon to obtain redress; failing in the attempt, he invokes the vengeance of the Furies upon that city, and slays himself; not long after, the Lacedaemonians receive a signal defeat at Leuctra, 315-319. 4. Phocus, the father of a beautiful virgin, refusing to give her in marriage, is murdered; the murderers escape, but are at length taken, and put to death, 319, 320. 5. Alcippus of Lacedaemon, a virtuous citizen, being unjustly banished, his wife and daughters are not permitted to follow him; his wife slays herself and daughters, and a terrible earthquake follows, 320-322.

A DISCOURSE TO AN UNLEARNED PRINCE.

By Mr. J. Kersey

Difficulty of giving advice to princes, 323. A prince in the first place, should learn to govern himself, 324. He should feel that he is God’s minister for good to his subjects, 325. He should not affect the power or the absolute sovereignty of God, 326. He should be more afraid of doing than of suffering ill, 327. He should vigilantly guard the welfare of his subjects, 327. His wisdom and justice should reflect the wisdom and justice of God, 328. His power should be restrained by sound reason, 329.

OF HERODOTUS’S MALICE.

By A. G., Gent.

Plutarch feels under obligation to defend his countrymen and others from the ungenerous representations of Herodotus, 331. Some signs of a malicious narrative, 332. To put the worst construction on actions; to relate faults having no connection with the story; to omit the relation of laudable actions; when the same action has been related in two different ways, to prefer the more unfavorable; to assign bad motives for an action of which the true motive is unknown: these things are signs of malice, 332-334. Many misrepresentations occur in Herodotus: as in the story of Io; the cause of the Trojan war; and that the Greeks derived their religious worship from the Egyptians, 335, 336. Also that the Persians learned the castration of boys from the Greeks, 336. That Hercules came from Egypt, and Thales from Phœnicia, 337. That the Alcmaeonidae were guilty of treason, 338. That Othryadas was not truly a hero, 338. He is inconsistent in his account of Croesus, 339. He misrepresents the Athenians in the affair of the Milesians, 339. And the Lacedaemonians in their expedition against Polycrates of Samos, 340. And the Corinthians in the affair of the 300 boys from Corcyra, 341. He calumniates Clisthenes, the deliverer of Athens, Aristogiton, and the Lacedaemonians, for their share in the expulsion of Hippias, 343. He gives an incorrect and defective account of the burning of Sardis by the Athenians and Eretrians, 344. He falsifies the history of the Persian invasion of Greece, 345, et seq. He defames the Alemaeonidae and the Argives, for their conduct in that affair, 347-349. He indulges a malignant spite against the Thebans, 351-356. He does injustice to Leonidas, 354. He misrepresents the retirement of the Greek fleet after the battle of Artemisium, 356-358. He is unfair towards those of the Greeks who were compelled to submit to the overwhelming power of the Persians, 351, 352, 360. He misrepresents the Naxians, 360, 361. He is unjust to Themistocles, and to Adimantus, the Corinthian admiral, in respect to their conduct at Salamis, 361-364. He unfairly represents the battle of Plataea, and the part taken in it by several of the confederate States, 366-369. The summing up of the case, 370.

OF COMMON CONCEPTIONS, AGAINST THE STOICS.

By S. White, M.D.

The views of Chrysippus, the Stoic, opposed, 372, et seq. He and the Stoics in general pervert the common conceptions, 373, 374. Do they agree with Nature who make all natural things indifferent? 375. Natural things,—health, vigor, comfort, &c.,—are necessary, if we would live according to Nature; but the Stoics deny this, 375. An intelligent and wise man will estimate every thing at its true value, 376. When deprived of good things, a wise man feels the loss, 377. It is a common experience that a man has joy in exchanging a state of great evil for a state of great good; but the Stoics do not admit this, 377. The Stoics do not admit that the continuance of a good thing increases its value, contrary to the common apprehension and belief, 378. They maintain that virtue and happiness, when present, may not be perceived by him who enjoys them; which is a great absurdity, 378, 379. Is the difference then so small between health and sickness, wisdom and folly? 379. It is repugnant to the common conception, that all men who are not wise are equally foolish, wicked, and unjust; and yet the Stoics assert this, 380. They say that a man possessing all good things may find it convenient to commit suicide; and that a man destitute of all good may find it fitting to live, 381, 382. Chrysippus inconsistent with himself, 383. He maintains that vice is not wholly useless; that it is indispensable to the existence of virtue, 384. Must we then pray that wickedness may always continue? 385. God has no need of thieves, murderers, and other evil-doers, nor is wickedness pleasing to him, 386. The Stoics say that prudence could not exist in the utter absence of evil, 387. But good and evil do not exist that there may be place and opportunity for prudence, 388. Suppose evil to cease to exist: would any harm arise from the lack of prudence? 388. Our taste would not be lost, if all bitter things were wanting, 389. If good only existed, might there not be an apprehension of evil? 389. If vice were absolutely necessary, might not a few examples suffice? 389. The Stoics say that no vicious man receives benefit from any source; has no benefactors, and does not slight benefactors: of course, then, he is never ungrateful, 391. What is utility?? 392. According to the Stoics, it is a gathering and keeping of useless and indifferent things, 393. To live virtuously and according to nature is the true happiness, 394. The Stoics, in practice, sanction this idea; but their philosophy rejects it, 394. The end is more important and valuable than the means, though both may be good; but the Stoics allow no good or evil thing to be greater or less than another good or evil thing, 395. It is against common sense to say, with Chrysippus, that there may be two ends or scopes proposed of life, and that all we do is not to be referred to one, 396. That which is first by nature is to be first chosen, 396. The Stoics say that the obtaining of natural things is not the end of aiming after them, 397. Chrysippus says a man may be indifferent to good and evil before he understands the nature of good or evil: which is utterly impossible, 398. The Stoics reason in a circle, 399, 400. Absurdities of their philosophy, 402. It is self-contradictory, 403. According to them the universe is nothing and nowhere, 404. Their conceptions of God are confused and erroneous, 404. They believe none of the gods to be immortal, but Jupiter alone, 405. They admit the providence of God, but do not allow that he bestows good things, 406. They make God the author of evil, 408. They hold a final conflagration, and an absorption of all things into God, 405, 409. They say there is but one quality in two substances, 410. They think that one body may mix with another through its whole extent, so that a drop of wine may extend through the whole Atlantic Ocean, 411, 412. Their philosophy concerning the equality and inequality of bodies leads to absurdity, 412-416; and so when they say that nothing touches another, 416, 417. They also absurdly say that time may be past or future, but not present, 418-420. They say that nothing can overtake another: a swift horse cannot overtake a slow tortoise, because the interval between can be divided into infinite spaces, 420. They say that every man has two bodies precisely alike, one being substance, the other quality, 421, 422. They make the virtues and vices, the fancies, impulses, and operations of the mind to be distinct bodies and animals, 423. They make God himself to be an intellectual body, not incorporeal, 425. They make qualities to be bodies, and yet say that matter is void of quality, 426.

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE STOICS.

By E. Smith, M.A.

The life of every man, especially of every philosopher, should agree with what he believes and teaches, 428. The lives of Chrysippus, Zeno, and other Stoic philosophers, did not agree with their doctrines, 429, et seq. It has been so when any of them have managed state affairs, 429. And in regard to the worship of the gods, 430. They represent virtue as one indivisible quality of the mind, and yet admit several virtues, 431. They say that students should first learn logic, secondly ethics, then physics, and then say that natural science should come first, 432, 433. Chrysippus has written on both sides of the same question; he has opposed his own doctrines, 434-436. They say that the law commands good actions and forbids evil actions; and yet wicked men cannot do good, 437. Chrysippus says that nothing properly belongs to a bad man, or is profitable to him; that no one vice or sin is greater than another, nor any good deed better than another; and then contradicts himself, 438-441. He disparages the fear of divine wrath as a motive to virtue, and yet commends it, 442. In one place he allows pleasure to be a good; in another place he denies that it is so, 443. In one place he asserts that he who injures another injures also himself, and in another place says this is absurd, 444. He often asserts that vice is the essence of unhappiness; but elsewhere says that it is profitable for a bad man to live rather than to die, although he never become good, 446. He says it is sometimes meet for the happy to make away with themselves, and for the unhappy to continue to live, 447. He says that good things are totally and necessarily different from bad; and yet that a man may change from one to the other without perceiving it, 447. He maintains that a prudent man meddles not with public affairs; and also says that a wise man willingly takes upon him a kingdom, 448. He makes a wise man indifferent to wealth, and yet eager to receive pay, 449. In one place he justifies unclean practices from the example of brute animals, and in another place condemns them, 452. When two things are exactly alike, and there is a necessity to choose between them, the mind chooses: which Chrysippus in one place calls an effect without a cause, but in another place thinks there may be a hidden cause, 452, 453. He highly commends Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, for what they delivered on dialectics, and yet opposes their views, 454. He says that to have been happy a long time is to be no more happy than to be happy only for a moment; and yet that momentary happiness is worth nothing, 455. He allows ornament to be desirable in a discourse, and yet says that blemishes and solecisms in speaking are not to be regarded, 456. He applies to the gods terms of high praise, but makes them the authors of slaughter and carnage, 460. If the gods are the authors of war they are also the authors of vice and wickedness, contrary to what Chrysippus says, 461. He says nothing can be contrary to Nature, and even vicious practices are according to Nature and the laws established by the Deity: yet he says God, and man too, punishes vice, 462-464. He says all the gods are nourished except Jupiter and the World; he also says the World is nourished, 466, 467. He contradicts himself in regard to the generation of the soul; the nature and qualities of the air; a vacuum, &c., 468-473. His doctrine of things possible is contrary to his doctrine of Fate, 473. Fate he declares to be an invincible, absolute cause; yet admits that there are obstacles and hindrances to particular motions and actions, 474-477.

OF THE WORD ΕΙ ENGRAVEN OVER THE GATE OF APOLLO’S TEMPLE AT DELPHI.

By R. Kippax, M.A.

It is not probable that this word was placed there by chance, 479. It is doubtless an enigma, like many other things in the temple of Apollo, 480. What then is the meaning? 480. Does it point to the number of the wise men of Greece, of whom Thales was one? 480. Has it an astronomical meaning referring to the sun, the second of the planets, as ε is the second of the vowels? 481. Does it denote a form of prayer to the god, εἰ standing for a wish? 482. As Apollo is skilled in logic, does εἰ refer to that science, denoting the dependence of consequent or antecedent, or the connection of one thing with another? 482-484. Has it a relation to mathematics, ε being the fifth letter of the alphabet, five being the sum of two and three, the even and odd numbers, and five or its double being that number by which we reckon? 484-486. Or does it point to music and its five symphonies, or the five positions of the tetrachords? 488. Or may we suppose it refers to five worlds, or to five elements of matter, or to the five geometrical solids? 489. Or to the five portions of the world, or to the five species of animated beings? 490. Or to the five principal beginnings? 491. The true answer is,—By the word εἶ, we are to understand the verb εἶ, Thou art, as an address to Apollo; signifying thereby the actual and permanent existence of God, in contrast with our fleeting, transitory existence, 493-495. God is: he exists, not in time but in eternity, an ETERNAL, CHANGELESS NOW, 495. God is One, and not many, though there are many manifestations of him, 495, 496. The word εἶ, Thou art, then, testifies of this one God, as eternal and unchangeable, and challenges for Him our worship, 497, 498.

WHETHER VICE IS SUFFICIENT TO RENDER A MAN UNHAPPY.

By S. White, M.D.

Men cannot enjoy wealth by reason of trouble; yet men earnestly seek it, 499. Vice is sufficient of itself to produce misery; it needs no aid from instruments, 500. Poverty, slavery, war, external calamity of every sort, even death in cruel forms, may be borne by a heroic spirit, 501. In India, widows burn with joy on the funeral pile of their husbands, 502. All the ills of Fortune cannot produce misery, without Vice; but Vice ruins and destroys, 503.

WHETHER THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL OR DISEASES OF THE BODY ARE WORSE.

By the Same Hand.

Man is the most unhappy of all creatures, 504. The body has many diseases, and they are readily perceived, 505. But the soul does not readily perceive its own maladies; it even mistakes them for indications of soundness, 506. The man diseased in body willingly yields to the care of the physician, 506. The unruly passions of the soul resist a cure, and are therefore more fatal, 507, 508.

INDEX

PLUTARCH’S MORALS.

VOL. IV.

PLUTARCH’S MORALS.