Note 143 — Chapter XXVIII · THEÆTETUS. (continued 2)

In the Sophistês, the Eleate establishes (to his own satisfaction) that τὸ μὴ ὂν is not ἐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος, but ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος (p. 257 B), that it is one γένος among the various γένη (p. 260 B), and that it (τὸ μὴ ὂν κοινωνεῖ) enters into communion or combination with δόξα, λόγος, φαντασία, &c. It is therefore possible that there may be ψευδὴς δόξα or ψευδὴς λόγος, when you affirm, respecting any given subject, ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων or τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα (p. 263 B-C). Plato considers that the case is thus made out against the Sophist, as the impostor and dealer in falsehoods; false opinion being proved to be possible and explicable.

But if we turn to the Theætêtus (p. 189 seq.), we shall see that this very explication of ψευδὴς δόξα is there enunciated and impugned by Sokrates in a long argument. He calls it there ἀλλοδοξία, ἑτεροδοξία, τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν (pp. 189 A, 190 E, 193 D). No man (he says) can mistake one thing for another; if this were so, he must be supposed both to know and not to know the same thing, which is impossible (pp. 196 A, 200 A). Therefore ψευδὴς δόξα is impossible.

Of these objections, urged by Sokrates in the Theætêtus, against the possibility of ἀλλοδοξία, no notice is taken in the Sophistês either by Sokrates, or by Theætêtus, or by the Eleate in the Sophistês. Indeed the Eleate congratulates himself upon the explanation as more satisfactory than he had expected to find (p. 264 B): and speaks with displeasure of the troublesome persons who stir up doubts and contradictions (p. 259 C): very different from the tone of Sokrates in the Theætêtus (p. 195, B-C).

I may farther remark that Plato, in the Republic, reasons about τὸ μὴ ὂν in the Parmenidean sense, and not in the sense which he ascribed to it in the Sophistês, and which he recognises in the Politikus, p. 284 B. (Republic, v. pp. 477 A, 478 C.)

Socher (Ueber Platon’s Schriften, pp. 260-270) points out the discrepancy between the doctrines of the Eleate in the Sophistês, and those maintained by Sokrates in other Platonic dialogues; inferring from thence that the Sophistês and Politikus are not compositions of Plato. As between the Theætêtus and the Sophistês, I think a stronger case of discrepancy might be set forth than he has stated; though the end of the former is tied to the beginning of the latter plainly, directly, and intentionally. But I do not agree in his inference. He concludes that the Sophistês is not Plato’s composition: I conclude, that the scope for dissident views and doctrine, within the long philosophical career and numerous dialogues of Plato, is larger than his commentators admit.