NOTES.

NOTE I.

Anatomical Relations supposed by Gall to exist between the Organs of the External Senses, and the Organs of the Intellectual Faculties.

Page 82. According to Gall, the origin, the development, the structure and mode of termination, as to the organs of the faculties of the soul and the organs of the external senses, every thing is similar, every thing is in common.

It is known that two substances compose the nervous system—the gray matter, and the white or fibrous matter. Well, according to Gall, one of these substances produces the other. The gray matter produces the white matter.

Wherever, therefore, there happens to be any gray matter, white matter must appear; that is to say, nervous fibres,[184] nervous filaments, nerves. All the nerves in the body must arise in this way. The spinal nerves arise from the gray matter which is in the interior of the spinal marrow; the cerebral nerves from the gray matter that is in the interior of the medulla oblongata.

Hence, the nerves of the body are organs of the senses.

On the other hand, the brain and the cerebellum,[185] which are the organs of the faculties of the soul, must arise like the nerves: the brain from the gray matter of the pyramidal eminences; the cerebellum from the gray matter that surrounds the restiform bodies.

In the second place, whenever a nerve traverses a mass of gray matter, it receives from it, according to Gall, certain new nervous filaments; and in this way it grows and developes itself. The cerebrum and cerebellum will not fail therefore to grow and be developed likewise. The primitive bundles of the cerebellum, (the restiform bodies,) will grow by means of the filaments which will be imparted to them by the gray matter of the ciliary body: the primitive bundles of the cerebrum, (the pyramidal eminences,) by the filaments imparted to them by, first, the gray matter of the pons varolii; secondly, by that of the optic strata; and then by that of the olivary bodies, corpora striata, &c. &c.

Finally, in the same manner as a nerve of sense expands at its termination, and by means of such expansion forms the organ of the sense, so the primitive bundles of fibres of the brain and of the cerebellum terminate in expansions, and constitute the organs of the internal senses; that is to say, the lobes of the cerebellum and the hemispheres of the brain.[186]

Here is what I have elsewhere said upon this question, so long debated, of the instinct and understanding of animals.

“There is a most complete difference between instinct and understanding.

“In instinct all is blind, necessary, and invariable. In understanding every thing is elective, conditional, and modifiable.

“The beaver which builds its house, and the bird that constructs its nest, act only by instinct.

“The dog and the horse, that learn even the meaning of several of our words, and who pay obedience to us, do so by understanding.

“In instinct all is innate. The beaver builds without having learned to build: all that he does is from fatality. The beaver builds under the impulsion of a constant and irresistible force.

“In understanding, every thing results from experience and instruction. The dog obeys only because he has learned to obey: he is perfectly free in this respect; for he obeys only because he will obey.

“Finally, in regard to instinct every thing is particular. That admirable industry that the beaver exhibits in the construction of his hut, can be employed in no other occupation than the building of his hut. Now, in understanding every thing is general; for the dog could apply the same flexibility of attention, and of conception, which he uses in obeying, to do any other thing.

“In animals there are, therefore, two distinct and primary forces—instinct and understanding. As long as our conceptions of these forces were confused, all our views and opinions in regard to the actions of animals remained obscure and contradictory. Among these actions, some exhibited man every where superior to the brute; while others appeared to accord to the brute creation the superiority over man—a contradiction almost as deplorable as absurd! By the distinction that separates blind and necessary actions from elective and conditional ones—or, in a word, instinct from intelligence—all contradiction disappears, and order succeeds to confusion. Whatever in animals is understanding, does not in any degree approach the excellence of the human understanding; and whatsoever, under the appearance of understanding, seemed superior to the human understanding, is in fact a mere result of a mechanical and blind force.”[187]

Here is what I say as to the boundaries between the intelligence of man and of animals.

“Animals receive, through their senses, impressions similar to those that we receive through the medium of our senses; like ourselves, they retain the traces of these impressions: these impressions, when preserved, form for them, as well as for us, numerous and various associations: they combine them, they draw from them inferences, and deduce judgments from them: therefore they possess understanding.

“But the whole of their understanding stops at that point. The understanding they possess is not one that can consider itself: it cannot see itself, does not know itself. They do not possess reflection, that supreme faculty with which the mind of man is endowed, and which enables him to turn his intellectual power inwards, so as to study and know the nature of his own understanding.

“Reflection, thus defined, is then the boundary that separates human intelligence from that of the brute creation: and in fact it cannot be denied that this furnishes a strong line of demarcation between them. Thought, which contemplates itself; understanding, which sees itself and studies itself; knowledge, which knows itself; these evidently constitute an order of determinate phenomena of a decided character, and to which no brute animal can ever attain. This is, if one might so speak, a purely intellectual domain; and it appertains to man alone. In one word, animals feel, know, think; but man is the only one of all created beings to whom has been given the power of feeling that he feels, of knowing that he knows, and of thinking that he thinks.”[188]

I will quote, also, the following passage from my work sur l’instinct et l’intelligence des animaux, p. 178, et seq.

“ ... There are three facts: instinct, understanding of brutes, and human understanding; and each of these facts has its definite limits.

“Instinct acts without knowing; understanding knows in order to act; the human understanding alone knows, and knows itself.

“Reflection, closely defined, is the knowledge of thought by thought. And this power of thought over thought gives us a whole order of new relations. As soon as the mind perceives itself it judges itself; as soon as it can act upon itself it is free; as soon as it becomes free it becomes moral.

“Man is only moral because he is free.

“The brute animal follows its body; in the midst of this body, which shrouds it completely in matter, the human mind is free, and so free that it can, whenever it prefers to do so, immolate its very body.

“‘The great power of the will over the body,’ says Bossuet, ‘consists in this prodigious effect, that man is so completely master of his frame, that he can even sacrifice it for the sake of some greater good in view. To rush into the midst of blows, and plunge into a flight of arrows from a blind impetuosity, as happens among brute creatures, shows nothing superior to the body itself; but to resolve to die with understanding, and for reasons, notwithstanding the whole disposition of the body to the contrary, evinces a principle superior to the body; and among all the tribes of animals, man is the only one in whom this principle exists.’”

Gall was a practical observer. He observed and studied always, and with so much the greater success because “people never suspected that they had to do (these are his own words) with a man who knew perfectly well that the basis of human character continues to be always the same, and that merely the objects that interest us change with the progress of years.”[189]

He examined “families, schools, hospitals, &c.”[190] And he never was satisfied with appearances only. “The occupations that we pursue as our business, generally prove nothing either as to our faculties or our propensities: but those which we engage in as recreation are almost always in conformity with our tastes and our talents.”[191]

His observations on men were more serviceable to him in judging of and describing their characters, than the bumps on the skull.

“I often said to my friends, show me the fundamental forces of the soul, and I will find the organ and the seat for each one of them.[192] ... When I had become convinced that a distinguished talent, and one fully so recognised, was especially the work of nature, I examined the head of the individual, ... &c.”[193]

Gall’s progression, then, was from observation to the cranium; he first proceeded from observation to the cranium, and next from the cranium to the brain.

Furthermore, Gall began by studying the physiognomy—the features of the countenance—like Lavater.

He at first thought that a good memory was connected with a certain conformation of the eyes: “I remarked,” says he, “that they all had large projecting eyes.... I suspected, therefore, that there ought to exist some connexion between memory and this conformation of the eyes.”[194] Again he says, “It may be perceived, from the progress of these researches, that the first step consisted in the discovery of certain organs; that it was by degrees only that we allowed facts to speak in order to deduce from them general principles; and that it was subsequently, and towards the close, that we had learned to know the brain.”[195]

Thus it appears that the study of the brain came later than the doctrine; and that is the reason why the anatomy of the brain is a mere series of mistakes and conjectures—I mean here the special anatomy, the secret anatomy, the phrenological anatomy; I mean the anatomy made out to suit the doctrine. I have already sufficiently discriminated between it and the real anatomy.[196]

Broussais explains every thing by the word irritation, just as Gall explains every thing by the word faculties, and as Malebranche explained them by animal spirits.

After serving Descartes, the animal spirits were in the service of Malebranche; they served all the authors of the seventeenth century.

Malebranche commences one of his chapters with these words: “Every body agrees that the animal spirits....”[197] He had no idea that every body would agree some day, that the animal spirits is mere nonsense.

There were animal spirits of all sorts; as Gall had faculties of all sorts: there were agitated[198] animal spirits, languid animal spirits.[199] There were even libertine animal spirits.

“Wine is so spirituous,” says Malebranche, “that it is animal spirits almost completely formed, but libertine spirits.”[200]

The animal spirits seemed to have become the ultima ratio of the philosophers.

The author of a book, in other respects to be esteemed, thus defined imagination: “Imagination is a perception of the soul’s caused by the internal motion of the animal spirits.”[201]

That author had no doubt that he was saying something.

Broussais does not adopt merely the general ideas of the phrenologists—he adopts even the smallest of them.

Gall had located the instinct of murder in a given part of the brain; and he supposed, be it understood, that this part existed only in the brain of the carnivorous animals. But see, it is found in the brain of the herbivora; and one would suppose that the phrenologists would be in trouble about it. Don’t deceive yourself, the instinct of murder is the instinct of destruction. Spurzheim denominates it destructivity; and the herbivorous animals must possess it, for they eat plants and consequently destroy them.

“The herbivora” says Broussais, “effect a real destruction among plants.[202] An attempt has been made to turn these ideas into ridicule, even in an Academy.... It was in a learned society of this kind considered ridiculous in the phrenologists to compare the destruction of vegetables to that of animals. For my own part I do not see why the idea should be rejected, if the fundamental object of the organ be to procure the means of alimentation, which seems to be quite certain.”[203]

Gall imagines an organ for religion; he thinks it peculiar to man, and denominates it the Organ of Theosophy. The same organ is found quite down in the scale as low as the sheep;[204] and do not suppose that Broussais is at all shocked by the discovery. If necessary he will go further than all the phrenologists taken together.

“The phrenologists” says he, “have denied that this sentiment (the sentiment of veneration) belongs to the animals. I am not of that opinion. A certain shade of veneration exists in many species, among the vertebrate, that choose their leaders, and march according to a signal given by their chiefs and obey them. Thus even among the sheep you may see a chief.”[205]

Who would have believed it? Broussais finds Gall too timorous.

“There is,” says he, “no central organ. This is considered as one of the most powerful objections to Gall. As far as I know he never answered it. As for me, I shall be more frank, perhaps more bold: I shall say it is impossible that there should be one, &c.”[206]

He assigns it to every tissue. Haller attributed this property to the muscles alone, “but it is a common property of the tissues.”[207]

He explains every thing by means of it: every thing, even innervation itself. But he is constrained to add: “Doubtless something more occurs in the interior of the nervous tissue; doubtless we are unacquainted and ignorant as to how that other thing is connected with the motions in question, and how it may employ them in the act of innervation,” &c.[208]

So we perceive, in the first place, contractility explains innervation; and then, that something more is wanting. And as nervous contractility is nothing but a mental fiction (a nerve never moves, never contracts, when it is touched) the whole matter tapers down to this something more, or to that other thing.

See how very far from being rigorous are those who construct systems.

He found that the medullary substance of the brain was fibrous throughout;[209] he saw the fibres of the medulla oblongata decussate before they form the pyramidal eminences,[210] those of the corpora olivaria, &c.; that is to say, all the ascending fibres of the medulla oblongata across the pons varolii, thalami nervor opticorum, and the corpora striata, as far as the vault of the hemispheres; he saw the bundles formed by these fibres increased in magnitude at each of these passages; he distinguished the fibres which go out in order to expand in the hemispheres, from those that go in in order to give birth to the commissures: many nerves that were regarded as coming out immediately from the brain, were by him traced even into the medulla oblongata, &c.

And I repeat that all these facts, with the discovery of which he has enriched the science of anatomy, all of them are the results of a happy thought of his—the idea of tracing the fibres of the brain, or to use a common expression, of substituting in the dissection of the brain the method of developments for that of sections.

Those of Gall’s opinions which it seems ought not to be adopted, are: that in which he supposes the nerve fibres to be born (he understands the word to the letter) of the gray matter; that in which he contends that the convolutions of the brain are merely foldings of the medullary fibres, and can therefore be unfolded; that in which he compares the rete mucosum of the skin to the gray matter of the encephalon, &c., &c.

Gall had a mind which impelled him to the formation of hypotheses; and even in his real anatomy there is a decided smack of a system-author.

THE END.