PART XII.

After Demea's departure, Cleanthes and Philo continued the conversation in the following manner. Our friend, I am afraid, said Cleanthes, will have little inclination to revive this topic of discourse, while you are in company; and to tell truth, Philo, I should rather wish to reason with either of you apart on a subject so sublime and interesting. Your spirit of controversy, joined to your abhorence of vulgar superstition, carries you strange lengths, when engaged in an argument; and there is nothing so sacred and venerable, even in your own eyes, which you spare on that occasion.

I must confess, replied Philo, that I am less cautious on the subject of Natural Religion than on any other; both because I know that I can never, on that head, corrupt the principles of any man of common sense; and because no one, I am confident, in whose eyes I appear a man of common sense, will ever mistake my intentions. You, in particular, Cleanthes, with whom I live in unreserved intimacy; you are sensible, that notwithstanding the freedom of my conversation, and my love of singular arguments, no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind, or pays more profound adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers himself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of nature. A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes every where the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it. That Nature does nothing in vain, is a maxim established in all the schools, merely from the contemplation of the works of Nature, without any religious purpose; and, from a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also discovered its use and intention. One great foundation of the Copernican system is the maxim, That Nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most proper means to any end; and astronomers often, without thinking of it, lay this strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is observable in other parts of philosophy: And thus all the sciences almost lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author; and their authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess that intention.

It is with pleasure I hear Galen reason concerning the structure of the human body. The anatomy of a man, says he,[1] discovers above 600 different muscles; and whoever duly considers these, will find, that, in each of them, Nature must have adjusted at least ten different circumstances, in order to attain the end which she proposed; proper figure, just magnitude, right disposition of the several ends, upper and lower position of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves, veins, and arteries: So that, in the muscles alone, above 6000 several views and intentions must have been formed and executed. The bones he calculates to be 284: The distinct purposes aimed at in the structure of each, above forty. What a prodigious display of artifice, even in these simple and homogeneous parts! But if we consider the skin, ligaments, vessels, glandules, humours, the several limbs and members of the body; how must our astonishment rise upon us, in proportion to the number and intricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted! The farther we advance in these researches, we discover new scenes of art and wisdom: But descry still, at a distance, farther scenes beyond our reach; in the fine internal structure of the parts, in the economy of the brain, in the fabric of the seminal vessels. All these artifices are repeated in every different species of animal, with wonderful variety, and with exact propriety, suited to the different intentions of Nature in framing each species. And if the infidelity of Galen, even when these natural sciences were still imperfect, could not withstand such striking appearances, to what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence!

Could I meet with one of this species (who, I thank God, are very rare), I would ask him: Supposing there were a God, who did not discover himself immediately to our senses, were it possible for him to give stronger proofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of Nature? What indeed could such a Divine Being do, but copy the present economy of things; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could mistake them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions; and conceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures? Now, according to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for undisputed, when it is supported by all the arguments which its nature admits of; even though these arguments be not, in themselves, very numerous or forcible: How much more, in the present case, where no human imagination can compute their number, and no understanding estimate their cogency!

I shall farther add, said Cleanthes, to what you have so well urged, that one great advantage of the principle of Theism, is, that it is the only system of cosmogony which can be rendered intelligible and complete, and yet can throughout preserve a strong analogy to what we every day see and experience in the world. The comparison of the universe to a machine of human contrivance, is so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many instances of order and design in Nature, that it must immediately strike all unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal approbation. Whoever attempts to weaken this theory, cannot pretend to succeed by establishing in its place any other that is precise and determinate: It is sufficient for him if he start doubts and difficulties; and by remote and abstract views of things, reach that suspense of judgment, which is here the utmost boundary of his wishes. But, besides that this state of mind is in itself unsatisfactory, it can never be steadily maintained against such striking appearances as continually engage us into the religious hypothesis. A false, absurd system, human nature, from the force of prejudice, is capable of adhering to with obstinacy and perseverance: But no system at all, in opposition to a theory supported by strong and obvious reason, by natural propensity, and by early education, I think it absolutely impossible to maintain or defend.

So little, replied Philo, do I esteem this suspense of judgment in the present case to be possible, that I am apt to suspect there enters somewhat of a dispute of words into this controversy; more than is usually imagined. That the works of Nature bear a great analogy to the productions of art, is evident; and according to all the rules of good reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that their causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are also considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional difference in the causes; and in particular, ought to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause, than any we have ever observed in mankind. Here then the existence of a *DEITY is plainly ascertained by reason: and if we make it a question, whether, on account of these analogies, we can properly call him a mind or intelligence, notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed between him and human minds; what is this but a mere verbal controversy? No man can deny the analogies between the effects: To restrain ourselves from inquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible. From this inquiry, the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an analogy: And if we are not contented with calling the first and supreme cause a *GOD or *DEITY, but desire to vary the expression; what can we call him but *MIND or $THOUGHT, to which he is justly supposed to bear a considerable resemblance?

All men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes, which abound so much in philosophical and theological inquiries; and it is found, that the only remedy for this abuse must arise from clear definitions, from the precision of those ideas which enter into any argument, and from the strict and uniform use of those terms which are employed. But there is a species of controversy, which, from the very nature of language and of human ideas, is involved in perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any precaution or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable certainty or precision. These are the controversies concerning the degrees of any quality or circumstance. Men may argue to all eternity, whether Hannibal be a great, or a very great, or a superlatively great man, what degree of beauty Cleopatra possessed, what epithet of praise Livy or Thucydides is entitled to, without bringing the controversy to any determination. The disputants may here agree in their sense, and differ in the terms, or vice versa; yet never be able to define their terms, so as to enter into each other's meaning: Because the degrees of these qualities are not, like quantity or number, susceptible of any exact mensuration, which may be the standard in the controversy. That the dispute concerning Theism is of this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or perhaps, if possible, still more incurably ambiguous, will appear upon the slightest inquiry. I ask the Theist, if he does not allow, that there is a great and immeasurable, because incomprehensible difference between the human and the divine mind: The more pious he is, the more readily will he assent to the affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to magnify the difference: He will even assert, that the difference is of a nature which cannot be too much magnified. I next turn to the Atheist, who, I assert, is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in earnest; and I ask him, whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all the parts of this world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all the operations of Nature, in every situation and in every age; whether the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure of human thought, be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy to each other: It is impossible he can deny it: He will readily acknowledge it. Having obtained this concession, I push him still farther in his retreat; and I ask him, if it be not probable, that the principle which first arranged, and still maintains order in this universe, bears not also some remote inconceivable analogy to the other operations of Nature, and, among the rest, to the economy of human mind and thought. However reluctant, he must give his assent. Where then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? The Theist allows, that the original intelligence is very different from human reason: The Atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears some remote analogy to it. Will you quarrel, Gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter into a controversy, which admits not of any precise meaning, nor consequently of any determination? If you should be so obstinate, I should not be surprised to find you insensibly change sides; while the Theist, on the one hand, exaggerates the dissimilarity between the Supreme Being, and frail, imperfect, variable, fleeting, and mortal creatures; and the Atheist, on the other, magnifies the analogy among all the operations of Nature, in every period, every situation, and every position. Consider then, where the real point of controversy lies; and if you cannot lay aside your disputes, endeavour, at least, to cure yourselves of your animosity.

And here I must also acknowledge, Cleanthes, that as the works of Nature have a much greater analogy to the effects of our art and contrivance, than to those of our benevolence and justice, we have reason to infer, that the natural attributes of the Deity have a greater resemblance to those of men, than his moral have to human virtues. But what is the consequence? Nothing but this, that the moral qualities of man are more defective in their kind than his natural abilities. For, as the Supreme Being is allowed to be absolutely and entirely perfect, whatever differs most from him, departs the farthest from the supreme standard of rectitude and perfection.[2]

These, Cleanthes, are my unfeigned sentiments on this subject; and these sentiments, you know, I have ever cherished and maintained. But in proportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence of vulgar superstitions; and I indulge a peculiar pleasure, I confess, in pushing such principles, sometimes into absurdity, sometimes into impiety. And you are sensible, that all bigots, notwithstanding their great aversion to the latter above the former, are commonly equally guilty of both.

My inclination, replied Cleanthes, lies, I own, a contrary way. Religion, however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all. The doctrine of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that we never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if and temporary rewards and punishments have so great an effect, as we daily find; how much greater must be expected from such as are infinite and eternal?

How happens it then, said Philo, if vulgar superstition be so salutary to society, that all history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious consequences on public affairs? Factions, civil wars, persecutions, subversions of government, oppression, slavery; these are the dismal consequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration, we are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend it. And no period of time can be happier or more prosperous, than those in which it is never regarded or heard of.

The reason of this observation, replied Cleanthes, is obvious. The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of morality and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has become only a cover to faction and ambition.

And so will all religion, said Philo, except the philosophical and rational kind. Your reasonings are more easily eluded than my facts. The inference is not just, because finite and temporary rewards and punishments have so great influence, that therefore such as are infinite and eternal must have so much greater. Consider, I beseech you, the attachment which we have to present things, and the little concern which we discover for objects so remote and uncertain. When divines are declaiming against the common behaviour and conduct of the world, they always represent this principle as the strongest imaginable (which indeed it is); and describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence of it, and sunk into the deepest lethargy and unconcern about their religious interests. Yet these same divines, when they refute their speculative antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to be so powerful, that, without them, it were impossible for civil society to subsist; nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction. It is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems. A man's natural inclination works incessantly upon him; it is for ever present to the mind, and mingles itself with every view and consideration: whereas religious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether habitual to the mind. The force of the greatest gravity, say the philosophers, is infinitely small, in comparison of that of the least impulse: yet it is certain, that the smallest gravity will, in the end, prevail above a great impulse; because no strokes or blows can be repeated with such constancy as attraction and gravitation.

Another advantage of inclination: It engages on its side all the wit and ingenuity of the mind; and when set in opposition to religious principles, seeks every method and art of eluding them: In which it is almost always successful. Who can explain the heart of man, or account for those strange salvos and excuses, with which people satisfy themselves, when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their religious duty? This is well understood in the world; and none but fools ever repose less trust in a man, because they hear, that from study and philosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts with regard to theological subjects. And when we have to do with a man, who makes a great profession of religion and devotion, has this any other effect upon several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they be cheated and deceived by him?

We must farther consider, that philosophers, who cultivate reason and reflection, stand less in need of such motives to keep them under the restraint of morals; and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are utterly incapable of so pure a religion as represents the Deity to be pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivolous observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigotted credulity. We need not run back into antiquity, or wander into remote regions, to find instances of this degeneracy. Amongst ourselves, some have been guilty of that atrociousness, unknown to the Egyptian and Grecian superstitions, of declaiming in express terms, against morality; and representing it as a sure forfeiture of the Divine favour, if the least trust or reliance be laid upon it.

But even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in direct opposition to morality; the very diverting of the attention, the raising up a new and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous distribution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most pernicious consequences, and weaken extremely men's attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity.

Such a principle of action likewise, not being any of the familiar motives of human conduct, acts only by intervals on the temper; and must be roused by continual efforts, in order to render the pious zealot satisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfil his devotional task. Many religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour, where the heart, at the time, feels cold and languid: A habit of dissimulation is by degrees contracted; and fraud and falsehood become the predominant principle. Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, that the highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being inconsistent, are often or commonly united in the same individual character.

The bad effects of such habits, even in common life, are easily imagined; but where the interests of religion are concerned, no morality can be forcible enough to bind the enthusiastic zealot. The sacredness of the cause sanctifies every measure which can be made use of to promote it.

The steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal salvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, contracted selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence.

Thus, the motives of vulgar superstition have no great influence on general conduct; nor is their operation favourable to morality, in the instances where they predominate.

Is there any maxim in politics more certain and infallible, than that both the number and authority of priests should be confined within very narrow limits; and that the civil magistrate ought, for ever, to keep his fasces and axes from such dangerous hands? But if the spirit of popular religion were so salutary to society, a contrary maxim ought to prevail. The greater number of priests, and their greater authority and riches, will always augment the religious spirit. And though the priests have the guidance of this spirit, why may we not expect a superior sanctity of life, and greater benevolence and moderation, from persons who are set apart for religion, who are continually inculcating it upon others, and who must themselves imbibe a greater share of it? Whence comes it then, that, in fact, the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with regard to popular religions, is, as far as possible, to make a saving game of it, and to prevent their pernicious consequences with regard to society? Every expedient which he tries for so humble a purpose is surrounded with inconveniences. If he admits only one religion among his subjects, he must sacrifice, to an uncertain prospect of tranquillity, every consideration of public liberty, science, reason, industry, and even his own independency. If he gives indulgence to several sects, which is the wiser maxim, he must preserve a very philosophical indifference to all of them, and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing sect; otherwise he can expect nothing but endless disputes, quarrels, factions, persecutions, and civil commotions.

True religion, I allow, has no such pernicious consequences: but we must treat of religion, as it has commonly been found in the world; nor have I any thing to do with that speculative tenet of Theism, which, as it is a species of philosophy, must partake of the beneficial influence of that principle, and at the same time must lie under a like inconvenience, of being always confined to very few persons.

Oaths are requisite in all courts of judicature; but it is a question whether their authority arises from any popular religion. It is the solemnity and importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and the reflecting on the general interests of society, which are the chief restraints upon mankind. Customhouse oaths and political oaths are but little regarded even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and religion; and a Quaker's asseveration is with us justly put upon the same footing with the oath of any other person. I know, that Polybius[3] ascribes the infamy of Greek faith to the prevalency of the Epicurean philosophy: but I know also, that Punic faith had as bad a reputation in ancient times as Irish evidence has in modern; though we cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason. Not to mention that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the Epicurean philosophy; and Euripides,[4] in a passage which I shall point out to you, has glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against his nation, with regard to this circumstance.

Take care, Philo, replied Cleanthes, take care: push not matters too far: allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration for the true. Forfeit not this principle, the chief, the only great comfort in life; and our principal support amidst all the attacks of adverse fortune. The most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for human imagination to suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which represents us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise, and powerful; who created us for happiness; and who, having implanted in us immeasurable desires of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will transfer us into an infinite variety of scenes, in order to satisfy those desires, and render our felicity complete and durable. Next to such a Being himself (if the comparison be allowed), the happiest lot which we can imagine, is that of being under his guardianship and protection.

These appearances, said Philo, are most engaging and alluring; and with regard to the true philosopher, they are more than appearances. But it happens here, as in the former case, that, with regard to the greater part of mankind, the appearances are deceitful, and that the terrors of religion commonly prevail above its comforts.

It is allowed, that men never have recourse to devotion so readily as when dejected with grief or depressed with sickness. Is not this a proof, that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow?

But men, when afflicted, find consolation in religion, replied Cleanthes. Sometimes, said Philo: but it is natural to imagine, that they will form a notion of those unknown beings, suitably to the present gloom and melancholy of their temper, when they betake themselves to the contemplation of them. Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to predominate in all religions; and we ourselves, after having employed the most exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into the flattest contradiction in affirming that the damned are infinitely superior in number to the elect.

I shall venture to affirm, that there never was a popular religion, which represented the state of departed souls in such a light, as would render it eligible for human kind that there should be such a state. These fine models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. For as death lies between the eye and the prospect of futurity, that event is so shocking to Nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the regions which lie beyond it; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of Cerberus and Furies; devils, and torrents of fire and brimstone.

It is true, both fear and hope enter into religion; because both these passions, at different times, agitate the human mind, and each of them forms a species of divinity suitable to itself. But when a man is in a cheerful disposition, he is fit for business, or company, or entertainment of any kind; and he naturally applies himself to these, and thinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to do but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge himself still deeper in affliction. It may indeed happen, that after he has, in this manner, engraved the religious opinions deep into his thought and imagination, there may arrive a change of health or circumstances, which may restore his good humour, and, raising cheerful prospects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and triumph. But still it must be acknowledged, that, as terror is the primary principle of religion, it is the passion which always predominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure.

Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusiastic joy, by exhausting the spirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of superstitious terror and dejection; nor is there any state of mind so happy as the calm and equable. But this state it is impossible to support, where a man thinks that he lies in such profound darkness and uncertainty, between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery. No wonder that such an opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the mind, and throws it into the utmost confusion. And though that opinion is seldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions; yet it is apt to make a considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people.

It is contrary to common sense to entertain apprehensions or terrors upon account of any opinion whatsoever, or to imagine that we run any risk hereafter, by the freest use of our reason. Such a sentiment implies both an absurdity and an inconsistency. It is an absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, since the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also; and, in particular, a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior.

To know God, says Seneca, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low condition of mankind, who are delighted with entreaty, solicitation, presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious demon, who exercises his power without reason and without humanity! And were that Divine Being disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly mortals, who are his own workmanship, ill would it surely fare with the votaries of most popular superstitions. Nor would any of human race merit his favour, but a very few, the philosophical Theists, who entertain, or rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his Divine perfections: As the only persons entitled to his compassion and indulgence would be the philosophical Sceptics, a sect almost equally rare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or endeavour to suspend, all judgment with regard to such sublime and such extraordinary subjects.

If the whole of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, That the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther than to the human intelligence, and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and believe that the arguments on which it is established exceed the objections which lie against it? Some astonishment, indeed, will naturally arise from the greatness of the object; some melancholy from its obscurity; some contempt of human reason, that it can give no solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and magnificent a question. But believe me, Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording some more particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and operations of the Divine object of our faith. A person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity: While the haughty Dogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system of Theology by the mere help of philosophy, disdains any further aid, and rejects this adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical Sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian; a proposition which I would willingly recommend to the attention of Pamphilus: And I hope Cleanthes will forgive me for interposing so far in the education and instruction of his pupil.

Cleanthes and Philo pursued not this conversation much farther: and as nothing ever made greater impression on me, than all the reasonings of that day, so I confess, that, upon a serious review of the whole, I cannot but think, that Philo's principles are more probable than Demea's; but that those of Cleanthes approach still nearer to the truth.

APPENDIX

TO THE

TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE.

There is nothing I would more willingly lay hold of, than an opportunity of confessing my errors; and should esteem such a return to truth and reason to be more honourable than the most unerring judgment. A man who is free from mistakes can pretend to no praises, except from the justness of his understanding; but a man who corrects his mistakes shows at once the justness of his understanding, and the candour and ingenuity of his temper. I have not yet been so fortunate as to discover any very considerable mistakes in the reasonings delivered in the preceding volumes, except on one article; but I have found by experience, that some of my expressions have not been so well chosen as to guard against all mistakes in the readers; and 'tis chiefly to remedy this defect I have subjoined the following Appendix.

We can never be induced to believe any matter of fact except where its cause or its effect is present to us; but what the nature is of that belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect, few have had the curiosity to ask themselves. In my opinion this dilemma is inevitable. Either the belief is some new idea, such as that of reality or existence, which we join to the simple conception of an object, or it is merely a peculiar feeling or sentiment. That it is not a new idea, annexed to the simple conception, may be evinced from these two arguments. First, We have no abstract idea of existence, distinguishable and separable from the idea of particular objects. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this idea of existence can be annexed to the idea of any object, or form the difference betwixt a simple conception and belief. Secondly, The mind has the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them, as it pleases; so that, if belief consisted merely in a new idea annexed to the conception, it would be in a man's power to believe what he pleased. We may therefore conclude, that belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles of which we are not masters. When we are convinced of any matter of fact, we do nothing but conceive it, along with a certain feeling, different from what attends the mere reveries of the imagination. And when we express our incredulity concerning any fact, we mean, that the arguments for the fact produce not that feeling. Did not the belief consist in a sentiment different from our mere conception, whatever objects were presented by the wildest imagination would be on an equal footing with the most established truths founded on history and experience. There is nothing but the feeling or sentiment to distinguish the one from the other.

This, therefore, being regarded as an undoubted truth, that belief is nothing but a peculiar feeling, different from the simple conception, the next question that naturally occurs is, what is the nature of this feeling or sentiment, and whether it be analogous to any other sentiment of the human mind? This question is important. For if it be not analogous to any other sentiment, we must despair of explaining its causes, and must consider it as an original principle of the human mind. If it be analogous, we may hope to explain its causes from analogy, and trace it up to more general principles. Now, that there is a greater firmness and solidity in the conceptions, which are the objects of conviction and assurance, than in the loose and indolent reveries of a castle-builder, every one will readily own. They strike upon us with more force; they are more present to us; the mind has a firmer hold of them, and is more actuated and moved by them. It acquiesces in them; and, in a manner, fixes and reposes itself on them. In short, they approach nearer to the impressions, which are immediately present to us; and are therefore analogous to many other operations of the mind.

There is not, in my opinion, any possibility of evading this conclusion, but by asserting that belief, beside the simple conception, consists in some impression or feeling, distinguishable from the conception. It does not modify the conception, and render it more present and intense: it is only annexed to it, after the same manner that will and desire are annexed to particular conceptions of good and pleasure. But the following considerations will, I hope, be sufficient to remove this hypothesis. First, It is directly contrary to experience, and our immediate consciousness? All men have ever allowed reasoning to be merely an operation of our thoughts or ideas; and however those ideas may be varied to the feeling, there is nothing ever enters into our conclusions but ideas, or our fainter conceptions. For instance, I hear at present a person's voice with whom I am acquainted, and this sound comes from the next room. This impression of my senses immediately conveys my thoughts to the person, along with all the surrounding objects. I paint them out to myself as existent at present, with the same qualities and relations that I formerly knew them possessed of. These ideas take faster hold of my mind, than the ideas of an enchanted castle. They are different to the feeling; but there is no distinct or separate impression attending them. 'Tis the same case when I recollect the several incidents of a journey, or the events of any history. Every particular fact is there the object of belief. Its idea is modified differently from the loose reveries of a castle-builder: but no distinct impression attends every distinct idea, or conception of matter of fact. This is the subject of plain experience. If ever this experience can be disputed on any occasion, 'tis when the mind has been agitated with doubts and difficulties; and afterwards, upon taking the object in a new point of view, or being presented with a new argument, fixes and reposes itself in one settled conclusion and belief. In this case there is a feeling distinct and separate from the conception. The passage from doubt and agitation to tranquillity and repose, conveys a satisfaction and pleasure to the mind. But take any other case. Suppose I see the legs and thighs of a person in motion, while some interposed object conceals the rest of his body. Here 'tis certain, the imagination spreads out the whole figure. I give him a head and shoulders, and breast and neck. These members I conceive and believe him to be possessed of. Nothing can be more evident, than that this whole operation is performed by the thought or imagination alone. The transition is immediate. The ideas presently strike us. Their customary connexion with the present impression varies them and modifies them in a certain manner, but produces no act of the mind, distinct from this peculiarity of conception. Let any one examine his own mind, and he will evidently find this to be the truth.

Secondly, Whatever may be the case, with regard to this distinct impression, it must be allowed that the mind has a firmer hold, or more steady conception of what it takes to be matter of fact than of fictions. Why then look any farther, or multiply suppositions without necessity?

Thirdly, We can explain the causes of the firm conception, but not those of any separate impression. And not only so, but the causes of the firm conception exhaust the whole subject, and nothing is left to produce any other effect. An inference concerning a matter of fact is nothing but the idea of an object that is frequently conjoined, or is associated with a present impression. This is the whole of it. Every part is requisite to explain, from analogy, the more steady conception; and nothing remains capable of producing any distinct impression.

Fourthly, The effects of belief, in influencing the passions and imagination, can all be explained from the firm conception; and there is no occasion to have recourse to any other principle. These arguments, with many others, enumerated in the foregoing volumes, sufficiently prove, that belief only modifies the idea or conception; and renders it different to the feeling, without producing any distinct impression.

Thus, upon a general view of the subject, there appear to be two questions of importance, which we may venture to recommend to the consideration of philosophers, Whether there be any thing to distinguish belief from the simple conception, beside the feeling or sentiment? And, Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that we take of the object?

If, upon impartial inquiry, the same conclusion that I have formed be assented to by philosophers, the next business is to examine the analogy which there is betwixt belief and other acts of the mind, and find the cause of the firmness and strength of conception; and this I do not esteem a difficult task. The transition from a present impression, always enlivens and strengthens any idea. When any object is presented, the idea of its usual attendant immediately strikes us, as something real and solid. 'Tis felt rather than conceived, and approaches the impression, from which it is derived, in its force and influence. This I have proved at large, and cannot add any new arguments.

I had entertained some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it would be free from those contradictions and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world. But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. If this be not a good general reason for scepticism, 'tis at least a sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supplied) for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in all my decisions. I shall propose the arguments on both sides, beginning with those that induced me to deny the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being.

When we talk of self or subsistence, we must have an idea annexed to these terms, otherwise they are altogether unintelligible. Every idea is derived from preceding impressions; and we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual. We have, therefore, no idea of them in that sense.

Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable, and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination. All perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguishable, and separable, and may be conceived, as separately existent, and may exist separately, without any contradiction or absurdity.

When I view this table and that chimney, nothing is present to me but particular perceptions, which are of a like nature with all the other perceptions. This is the doctrine of philosophers. But this table, which is present to me, and that chimney, may, and do exist separately. This is the doctrine of the vulgar, and implies no contradiction. There, is no contradiction, therefore, in extending the same doctrine to all the perceptions.

In general, the following reasoning seems satisfactory. All ideas are borrowed from preceding perceptions. Our ideas of objects, therefore, are derived from that source. Consequently no proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to objects, which is not so with regard to perceptions. But 'tis intelligible and consistent to say, that objects exist distinct and independent, without any common simple substance or subject of inhesion. This proposition, therefore, can never be absurd with regard to perceptions.

When I turn my reflection on myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. 'Tis the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self.

We can conceive a thinking being to have either many or few perceptions. Suppose the mind to be reduced even below the life of an oyster. Suppose it to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider it in that situation. Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception? Have you any notion of self or substance? If not, the addition of other perceptions can never give you that notion.

The annihilation which some people suppose to follow upon death, and which entirely destroys this self, is nothing but an extinction of all particular perceptions; love and hatred, pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These, therefore, must be the same with self, since the one cannot survive the other.

Is self the same with substance? If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? For my part, I have a notion of neither, when conceived distinct from particular perceptions.

Philosophers begin to be reconciled to the principle, that we have no idea of external substance, distinct from the ideas of particular qualities. This must pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, that we have no notion of it, distinct from the particular perception.

So far I seem to be attended with sufficient evidence. But having thus loosened all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity, I am sensible that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings could have induced me to receive it. If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or determination of the thought to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone feels personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other. However extraordinary this conclusion may seem, it need not surprise us. Most philosophers seem inclined to think, that personal identity arises from consciousness, and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception. The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.

In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there would be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis that will reconcile those contradictions.

I shall also take this opportunity of confessing two other errors of less importance, which more mature reflection has discovered to me in my reasoning. The first may be found in Vol. I. page 85, where I say, that the distance betwixt two bodies is known, among other things, by the angles which the rays of light flowing from the bodies make with each other. 'Tis certain, that these angles are not known to the mind, and consequently can never discover the distance. The second error may be found in Vol. I. p. 132, where I say, that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different degrees of force and vivacity. I believe there are other differences among ideas, which cannot properly be comprehended under these terms. Had I said, that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different feeling, I should have been nearer the truth.

END OF VOLUME SECOND.

INDEX. ABASEMENT, consequence of superstition, iv. 479. Abilities, natural, merit of, ii. 398, 406. Abstract or general ideas, how formed, i. 37, 56. Abstract reasoning, objectionable, iv. 10, 182. Absurdity, not peculiar to the ancient mythology, iv. 481. Academic philosophy, excellence of, iv. 50, 175. Accession, right of, ii. 282, (Note.) Acheans, their democracy the most perfect, iii. 517 —their numbers, 481. Acquaintance, a source of attachment, ii. 95. Actions, virtuous, what constitutes, ii. 246, 361 —moral distinctions of, iv. 305, 351. Addison, iii. 101—quoted, 152, 218—iv. 204. Ælius Lampridius, iii. 467. Æschines, iii. 363, 476, 454. Æschines Socraticus, iv. 406. Ætolians, their numbers, iii. 481. Ægina, number of slaves in, iii. 478 —factions in, iv. 505. Agathocles, his cruelty, iii. 455, (Note.) Age, golden, a fiction, ii. 264—iv. 259. Agreeableness, a source of attachment, iv. 327, 339. Agriculture, iii. 293 —how best encouraged, 465. Agrigentum, number of its inhabitants, iii. 468. Agrippa, saying of, iv. 457. Alcibiades, his policy, iii. 375. Alcoran, its ethics, iii. 258. Alexander, the impostor, iv. 139. Alexander the Great, saying of, ii. 390—iv. 329 —his cruelty, iii. 479, (Note) —his toleration, iv. 477 —his emulation of Bacchus, 479. Alexandria, ancient, its size and population, iii. 488, (Note.) Allegiance, foundation of, ii. 321—iv, 278 —obligations to, ii. 325, 332 —objects of, 338, &c.—iii. 526 —measure of, 520, 534. Allegory, natural to polytheism, iv. 458. Allegory of love and Hyraen, iv. 526, Allegory of virtue and vice, iv. 520. Ambitious Stepmother, play of, iii. 254. American tribes, some without government, ii. 319. Anacharsis, an observation of, iii. 321. Anacreon, iv. 423. Analogy, a source of probability, i. 190 —use of, in reasoning, iv. 121. Analogies, their use in jurisprudence, iv. 267, 393. Anaxagoras, a theist, yet accused of atheism, iv. 456, (Note.) Ancillarioli, a term of reproach, iv. 427, (Note.) Anger, different from hatred, ii. 113—when vicious, 397. Animals, their reason, i. 232—iv. 122, &c. —their, pride and humility, ii. 63 —their affections and passions, 148 —national character of, iii. 229. Antients, their philosophy imperfect, i. 282—ii. 11 —their notions of virtue, iv. 403. Antient nations, their public treasures, iii. 391 —their bloody wars, 449. Anthropomorphites, ii. 460 —consequences of their principles, 468. Antipater, his repartee, iii. 198. Antioch, its size, iii. 488. Antoninus Marcus, his superstition, iv. 495. Appian, on the riches of the Ptolemies, iii, 364 —quoted, 417, 440, 446, 450, 453, 459, 470—iv. 415 —on the population of Gaul, iii. 498. Areopagites, iii. 114—iv. 461. Ariosto, his character as a writer, iii. 262. Aristides, the sophist, his account of Rome, iii. 483, (Note.) Aristocracy, Polish and Venetian, compared, iii. 16. Aristophanes, quoted, iii. 435 —his representations of the gods not deemed impious, iv. 452. Aristotle, quoted, iii. 241, 435, 478, 491, 404—iv. 27, 342, 404, 444. Armenians, their probity, iii. 232. Arminians in Holland, friends of liberty, iii. 70. Armstrong, Dr, quoted, iv. 402. Arnobius, quoted, iv. 453, 461. Artaxerxes, his right to the throne, ii. 343. Arts mechanical, advantageous, iii. 298. Arrian, quoted, iii. 22, 142, 391, 462—iv. 477, 479. Atheism, whether possible, iv; 174. Athensus, quoted, iii. 474, 478, (Note.) 503. Athens, its extent, iii. 290 —its wealth, 363, 462 —its population, 473, 475 —its statistics, 477, 517. Athenians, their extraordinary regard for justice, ii. 180 —their character, iii. 232—iv. 416 —their democracy, iii, 412, 461 —their tyranny, 456 —their expenses, 457, (Note.) —their vanity, iv. 337 —their law respecting marriage, iii. 207—iv. 281, 414 et seq. —their man of merit, 415. Attalus his cruelty, iii. 442. Association of ideas, i. 26—iv. 24 et seq. —of impressions, ii. 13 —influence of, on pride and humility, 15. Augustine, St, his dogmatism, iv. 489. Augustus, his age compared with that of Camillus, iii. 290 —his impiety and superstition, iv. 453, 477, 490. Aunoy, Madame de, quoted, iii. 212. Aurelius Marcus, his theism, iv. 457. Austria, house of, causes of its decay, iii. 379. Authority, perpetually opposed by liberty, iii. 41. Avarice, a proper subject for satire or comedy, iv. 533. Bacon, Lord, quoted ii. 434—iii. 58, 102, 237, 299—iv. 153, 464. Balance of trade, errors respecting, iii. 348, &c. —of power, partially understood by the ancients, 373, &c. —better known but not practised by modern states, 379. Banks and paper-currency, whether beneficial, iii. 319, 357, &c. Bank-credit, origin and nature of, iii. 359. Bartoli's plans of ancient buildings, iii. 483. Barrow, Dr, his definition of equality, i. 70. Batavians, ancient, iii. 233. Bayle, ii. 434—iv. 272, 480. Beauty, what, ii. 31—iii. 260 —why an object of pride or pleasure, ii. 8, 33, 363—iv. 207 —moral, compared with natural, iv. 373. Belgium, its population, iii. 499. Belief, what, i. 120, 135—ii. 552—iv. 60 —causes of, i. 136, &c. —influence of, 160, &c. —difference between it and fiction, iv. 58, 373. Bellarmine, Cardinal, a saying of, iv. 480. Benevolence, different from love, ii. 113 —not a motive of justice, 250 —what constitutes, 395, &c. —recommendation and merit of, iv. 247, &c. 335 —two kinds of, 381; (Note.) Bentivoglio, Cardinal, iii. 239. Berkeley, Dr, his doctrine of general ideas, i. 34 —of national character, iii. 238 —a sceptic, iv. 180. Berne, canton of, its treasurer, iii. 364 —its population, 500. Black, Dr, letter from, i. xxiii. Boccaccio, iii. 200, 282—iv. 30, (Note.) Bodily accomplishments source of pride or humility, ii, 33 —love or hatred 86—iv. 208, 320. Body, advantages of, ii. 408. Blame and praise, variableness of, ii, 369. Boileau, iv. 330. Bolingbroke, quoted, iii. 27, 47, 117 —his style, 121. Bomilcar, iv. 508. Boulainvilliers, Count de, iii. 531—iv. 467. Brahmins, their cosmogony, ii. 487. Britons, ancient, their marriages, iii. 207 —their superstition, 234. Britain, her opposition to France often injudicious and injurious, iii. 380. British government, nature of, iii. 52 —proposed improvements on, 576. Brasidas, a saying of, iv. 480. Brumoy, Pere, iv. 452. Butler, Bishop, iv. 14. Cæsar, quoted iii. 229, 306, 446, 499—iv. 452, 462 —the numbers killed in his wars, iii. 452, 470 —compared with Sylla and Marius, ii. 350 —with Cato, 400—iv. 401. Cambyses, his impiety, iv. 483. Capitolinus, quoted, iii. 529. Carlisle, Earl of, quoted, iii. 150. Cartesians, their doctrine of essence and innate ideas, i. 211, &c. —decline of their philosophy, iii. 135. Carthage, its population, iii. 492. Carthaginians, their human sacrifices, iii. 60—iv. 477. Catholics, use of their ceremonies, i. 137—ii. 290—iv. 62 —their sects, iii. 88, 454 —their intolerance, 280, 559 —absurdities and anecdotes of their religion, iv. 484, &c. Cato, de Re Rustica, iii. 436, 438. Cato of Utica, his speech to Cæsar, iii. 306. Catullus, iii. 143, 222. Caunii, their superstition, iv. 452. Cause, why necessary, i. 110, &c. —idea of, whence derived, 121, &c. —definitions of, iv. 90. Cause and effect, idea of, derived from experience, i. 170—ii. 158 —relation of, i. 224, 240 —rules by which to judge of, 228 —how we arrive at the knowledge of, iv. 35. Causes, efficacy and agency of, i. 208 —all of the same kind, 226. Causes, moral, their influence on national character, iii, 225 —physical do., 227. Causation, a principle of association, i. 99—iv. 62 —idea of, whence derived, i. 105. Cavalier, and Roundhead, parties of, iii. 72. Cervantes, iii. 218, 224. Chance, what, i. 170 —its influence on human affairs, iii. 124 —on the refined arts, 127. Characters, national, varieties of accounted for, iii. 224. Charles II. policy of, iii. 73. Charles V. his estimate of human life, ii. 508. Charles XII. of Sweden, his character, iii. 558—iv. 337. Chastity, virtue of, ii. 354—iv. 280, 314. Cheerfulness, its merit, iv. 327. China, peculiarities in its laws and customs, iii. 136, 298, 331, 353, 443. Chinese, uniformity of their character, iii. 231, 236 —their superstition, iv. 451. Christian religion, argument against its historical evidence, i. 194 —causes of its early persecution, iii. 64 —founded in faith, not in reason, iv. 153. Chrysippus, saying of, ii. 423. Cicero, quoted, i. 139—ii. 468, 508—iii. 19, 68, 104, 109, 110 —et seq. 144, 292, 377, 385, 418, 429, 452, 460, 463, 474, 486 —iv. 63, 246, 249, 260, 317, 403, 424, 488, 490, 496, 557 —his consolation for deafness, iii. 198 —his eloquence, 115, 248 —his character, 143. Claudius, Emperor, abolishes Druidism, iii. 64, (Note.) Clairault, Rousseau's Letter to, i. xli. Clarendon, Lord, iii. 253. Clark, Dr, i. 112—ii. 499. Cleanliness, a virtue, ii. 404—iv. 345. Clergy, no friends to liberty, iii, 69 —their hypocrisy, ambition, &c. 226, (Note.) Cold, greater in ancient times, iii. 493. Colonnesi and Orsini, parties in modern Rome, iii. 59. Columella, quoted, iii. 346, 423, 428, 432, 439, 440, 496. Comitia centuriata et tributa, their different powers, iii. 416. Comet, whether a world in embryo, ii. 482. Commerce, cannot flourish but under a free government, iii. 103 —source of wealth and happiness, 287 —foreign, its advantages, 296 —favourable to industry, 369 —has flourished under natural disadvantages, 385. Commodus, Emperor, cruelty and death of, iii. 528. Commonwealth, theory of a perfect, iii. 564. Commons, House of, iii. 35, 46, 543. Companionable qualities, iv. 340. Comparison, the foundation of all reasoning, i, 103 —the origin of envy, ii. 124 —of ourselves, 383 —between men and animals, ii. 234—iii. 92 —between nature and art, 177 —between ourselves and others, 201 —necessary to forming the taste, 269. Compassion, origin of, iv. 220. Complex ideas threefold division of, i. 29. Condé, Prince of, ii, 390—iii. 133—iv. 330. Confucius, his disciples deists iii 88. Congreve, iii. 220—iv. 30. Conquest, right of, ii. 341. Constant conjunction, relation between cause and effect, i. 122, 228. Constantine, his oppressive tax, iii. 388. Constitution, British, excellence of, iii. 27 —nature of, 46, 50, &c. Consuls, Roman, their powers, iii. 131. Contempt, whence it arises, ii. 140. Contrariety, a species of philosophical relation, i. 99.—iv. 25. Contiguity, a principle of association, i. 27—iv. 62 —its influence, i. 138, 151—ii. 183. Contract, original, whether the foundation of government, iii. 509. Conventions, whether the foundation of justice, iv. 390. Convents, evils of, iii. 441. Conviction, its feebleness in matters of religion, iv. 491. Copernicus, his system, ii. 433, 531—iv. 50—iii. 187. Corn, quantity imported at Athens, iii. 478 —to whom distributed in Rome, 485, &c. Corneille, quoted, iii. 25, 154 —compared with Congreve, 220—iv. 542. Cornelia, her saying to her sons, ii. 83. Cornelius Nepos, quoted, iii. 434. Corpus juris civilis, quoted, ii. 286—iii. 436, (Note.) 451. Courage, how far national, iii. 240 —utility of, iv. 331. Cowley, iii. 222. Crassus, his wealth, iii. 51. Credit, public, its abuses, iii. 392, &c. Custom, its effects, i. 157—ii. 177—iv. 52. Customs, remarkable ones in the Athenian democracy, iii. 412 —in the Roman republic, 416 —in the British constitution, 419. Cynics, i. 344. Cyrus, his claim to the throne, ii. 343 —boasts of his drunkenness, iii. 242 —a wise decision of; iv. 389. Czar, of Russia, iii. 129. D'Alembert, i. cxx. Darius Hystaspes, inscription on his tomb, iii. 242. Datames, a skilful general, iii, 309. Davenport, Mr, Rousseau's host, i. xlvi, &c. Decency, its merits, whence, iv. 345. Debt, national, its advantages, iii. 395 —its disadvantages, 397 —scheme for the payment of, 405. Deformity, an object of humility, ii. 31. Deists, unite in politics with the independents, iii. 88. Deity, his nature incomprehensible, ii. 437 —his existence whether proved a posteriori, 440, 446 —a priori, 496 —moral attributes of, 509 —energy and operation of, iv. 84. Delicacy of taste, improves our sensibility, iii. 4 —favourable to love and friendship, 6. Democracy, without a representative, hurtful, iii. 16. Demosthenes, character of his oratory, iii. 116 —quoted, 363, 374, 412, 415, 426, 429, 434, 446, 474—iv. 456 —his patrimony, iii. 435, 463, 476. Descartes, iv. 86, 175. Desire and aversion, ii. 197—iv. 196. Dialogue, advantages of, ii. 420. Diodorus Siculus, quoted, iii. 22, 116, 241, 290, 375, 447, 451, 454, 458, 461, 462, 464, 468, &c.—iv. 250, 321, 449, 452, 454, 508 —on the population of ancient cities, iii. 468, 507 —list of massacres in Greece, iii, 454. (Note.) Diogenes Laertius, quoted, iii. 469—iv. 461. Diogenes, the Cynic, contrasted with Pascal, iv. 429 —a saying of, 545. Dion Cassius, quoted, iii. 345. Dionysius Halicarnassæus, quoted, iii. 216, 229, 458, 483—iv. 447, 457. Dionysius the elder, his massacres, iii. 454, 464 —his standing army, 290, 471. Discretion, excellence of, iv. 312. Distance, its effects on the mind, i. 138—ii. 346. Division of land, favourable to population, iii. 447. Divisibility, not infinite, i. 50, et seq. 68, &c. Divorce, whether allowable, iii. 213. Domestic economy, of ancients and moderns, compared, iii. 426. Domitian, iii. 194. Don Quixotte, quoted, iii. 265. Dorians and Ionians, their different characters, iii. 240. Drusus and Germanicus, ii. 346. Dryden, quoted, iv. 488. Dubos, l'Abbé, quoted, iii. 44, 246, 354, 493, 502. Duelling, a barbarous practice, iv. 422. Duration, idea of, whence derived, i. 59. Dutch, first introduced borrowing at low interest, iii. 107. Duties, connexion between civil and natural, ii. 323. Eclectics, sect of, iii. 137. Education, its influence, i. 159—iv. 287. Egypt, its traffic in slaves, iii. 441 —its population, 469, 503. (Note.) Egyptians, their gaiety, iii. 100, 236 —their intolerance and superstition, iv. 487 —similarity of their religion to the Jewish, 486, (Note.) Elizabeth, Queen, hypothesis of her resurrection to disprove miracles, iv. 151. Eloquence, its effects, ii. 182—iii. 248 —superiority of the ancients in, 110, 120 —causes of its decline, 113, &c. Emperors Greek and Roman, foundation of their authority, ii. 341. Empires great, injurious, iii. 382. Energy, mental, whether it suggests the idea of necessary connexion, iv. 76, et seq. 84. English, mixture of their character, iii. 119; 234 —their writers deficient in elegance, 102. Enthusiasm, poetical, i. 168 —religious, its origin and character, iii. 82, —friendly to civil liberty, 88. Envy, its origin, ii. 124—iv. 220 —in animals, ii. 149. Epaminondas, his character, iv. 321. Epictetus, his philosophy, iv. 404 —his superstition, 495. Epicurus an anthropomorphite, ii. 471, 509 —an atheist, iv. 157 —hypothetical defence of, 158, et seq. —how he became a philosopher, 456. Epicureans their cosmogony, ii. 489 —their theory of happiness iii. 156, &c. Epirus, population of, iii. 481. Equality, notion of, whence derived, i. 71 —of rights, impracticable, iv. 265. Ergastula, common among the Romans, iii. 428, 441. Errors in Mr Hume's reasoning, ii. 551. Essay-writing, utility of, iv. 538. Euclid, iii. 187. Euripides quoted, ii. 543—iv. 405, 448 —a woman-hater, iii. 207. Evils, possible and certain, ii. 199 —influence of, on the passions, 200. Europe, its natural advantages iii. 135, 137. Evidence, natural and moral, of the same kind, iv. 105. Exiles, in Greece, their numbers iii. 454, et seq. Existence, idea of explained, i. 95 —causes of our belief in, 245, &c.—iv. 56. Experience, nature of, i. 121, 154 —foundation of all reasoning on matters of fact, iv. 35, 128 —why we reason from, 40, &c. —often synonymous with reason, 53. (Note.) —evidence of, 130. Exposing of slaves, iii. 428—of children, 442. Extension, whether infinitely divisible, i. 50—iv. 182 —idea of, i. 55, 301 —arguments against the infinite divisibility of, 63, et seq. External existence; various systems of, examined, i. 246—280. Factions personal and real, their evils, iii. 58, et seq. —religious 63—violent among the ancients, 451. Facility, principle of, ii. 178, et seq. Fame, desire of, ii. 58—iv. 356. Fanatics in England, iv. 265. Fenelon, iv. 333. Fiction, influence of, i. 161. Flattery, influence of i. 201, et seq. —an ingredient in superstitions, iv. 465. Florence, though not a free state, produced eminent men, iii. 101. Florus, quoted, iii. 441. Flux and reflux of religions, iv. 471. Fontaine, iv. 30—his opinion of female infidelity, 427. Fontenelle, quoted, iii. 7, 198, 507—iv. 382, 452 —character of his pastorals, 221 —his theory of pleasure and pain, 247. Fortune, how far it produces esteem, ii. 409. Franks, their character, iii. 234. Free government, nursery of the arts and sciences, iii. 128, &c. French, their genius not suppressed by absolute government, iii. 101. —their eloquence, 118, (Note.) —ridiculous delicacy of, 145 —their character, 236—iv. 341 —their resemblance of the Athenians, iv. 319. Frugality, its excellence, iv. 313. Funding, a modern expedient, iii. 392. Future State, why men are so careless about, i. 155 —hypothetical argument against, iv. 165. Galen, on the structure of the body, ii. 531. Galileo, his dialogues quoted, ii, 450. Gallantry of civility, natural, iii. 148 —of intrigue, iv. 427. Gaming, passion of, ii. 217. Gamesters and sailors, superstitious, iv. 447. Garcilaso de la Vega, quoted, iii. 344. Gascons, their gaiety, iii, 232. Gauls, their character, iii. 234, 241, 499. Gaul, climate of, iii. 494 —population of, 498, et seq. (Note.) Gee, Mr, quoted, iii. 350. General rules, their influence on the judgment, i. 196 —on imagination, 260 —on pride and humility, ii. 24 —on the passions, iv. 217. Genoa, bank of, iii. 24, 358 —factions in, 359. Geometry, definitions of often indeterminate, i. 76, 100. Germanicus, his right of succession, ii. 346. Germany, population of, iii. 497. Getes, fanatics, iii. 450, 497 —their creed, iv. 470. Good-breeding, ii. 388, 423, 487, iv. 282. Good sense, how far essential to taste, iii. 212. Goodness of character, qualities essential to, ii. 395. Gorgias Leontinus, his eloquence, iii. 116. Government, origin of, ii. 312, &c.—iii. 37, 510, 515 —advantages of ii. 317, et seq.—iii. 132 —all at first monarchical, ii, 320 —resistance to, seldom justifiable, 335 —British, compared with the Roman, iii. 10 —modern improvements in, 105 —theory of a perfect, 565, et seq. Gracchi, laws of, iii, 440. Grecian colonies, dispute betwixt, ii. 280, (Note.) Greek faith, ii. 543. Greece, its natural advantages, iii. 134, 137 —extremely populous, 447, 482 —violent factions and wars in, 450, &c. —military force of, 482 —number of its inhabitants, 473. Greeks, modern, character of, iii. 233 —ancient, iv. 425. Grotius quoted, iv. 391, (Note.) Guelf and Ghibelline parties, iii. 60. Guicciardin quoted, ii. 126—iii. 307—iv. 224, 297 —his character of Pope Alexander VI., 405. Gustavus Vasa, iii. 70. Happiness, nature of, iii. 157 —the universal wish, 167 —what constitutes, 189. Happiness of states, depends not on money, iii. 324. Hanoverian succession, advantages of, iii. 550 —disadvantages of, 553. Hardouin, Pere, quoted, iii. 485. Harrington, quoted, iii. 50, 102 —defects of his Oceana, 563. Hatred, object and causes of, ii. 68. Heliogabalus, image of, iv. 461. Helotes, iii. 289, 478. Helvetia, size and population of, iii. 500. Henry IV. of France, character of, iii. 15—iv. 336 —a saying of, iii 409. Henry IV. and VII. of England, their title, iii. 517. Hereditary right, importance of, iii 548 —preferable to a parliamentary, 556. Heresy, nature of, iv. 482. Heroic and burlesque, incompatible, ii. 127—iv, 225. Heroism, different views of, ii. 391. Hero-worship, iv. 458, Herodian, quoted, iii. 22, 489, 498, 529—iv. 461. Herodotus, quoted, iii. 462, 469, 474, 481 —iv. 333, 452, 471, 476, 500, 505. Hertha, a Saxon goddess, iv. 462. Hesiod, quoted, ii. 480, 487—iii. 437—iv. 444, 454, 459, 468. Hiero, king of Syracuse, his policy, iii. 378. History, study of, recommended, iv, 528. Hirtius, quoted, iii. 453, 500. Hobbes, i, 111—ii, 154—iv, 260, 380. Homer, quoted, iii. 258, 279—iv. 30, 452, 460, 468. Honesty, excellence of, iv. 314. Honour, violations of, inexcusable, i. 202. Hope and fear, passions of, ii. 202, et seq. —degrees of, 207—iv. 197, et seq. Horace, quoted, ii. 191, 206 —iii. 102, 128, 143, 144, 151, 219, 276, 434, 489, 493 —iv. 200, 294, 423. Hospitals, whether beneficial, iii. 444. Hostis, its primitive signification, iii. 292, (Note.) Huet, Monsieur, ii. 434. Huygens, on the figure of the ship, iii. 562. Human nature, different views of, iii. 90, et seq. Human life, different sentiments on, iii. 180 —how to render it happy; 190 —influence of philosophy on, 194, et seq. Humility, causes and object of, ii. 7, 29—iv. 203, 215 —whether an innate passion, ii. 18, et seq. —a Christian virtue, 390. Hunting and philosophy, parallel betwixt, ii. 212. Hutcheson, Mr, his theory of morals, iv. 13. Hutchison, Mr, his scheme for paying the national debt, iii. 405. Hyde de religione Persarum, quoted, iv. 470, 476. James I., anecdote of, iii. 551, (Note.) Jansenists, their character, iii. 89.—iv. 145. (Note.) Ideas, definition and origin of, i. 15, Sec.—iv. 18 —qualities which connect them, i. 26—iv. 25 —of space and time, whether infinitely divisible, i. 46, 62—94 —of time, whence derived, 56 —of space, 60 —of external existence, explained, 97 —whether innate, iv. 23. Identity, philosophical, i. 98, 260 —personal, 319, et seq. Idolatry, origin of, iv. 443, &c. Jesuits, their character, iii. 89, 232—iv. 272, (Note.) Jews, iii. 232—iv. 490, 502, (Note.) Images, worship of, not allowed by Jews and Mahometans, iv. 473. Imagination, in what different from memory; i. 119 —lively, allied to madness, 166 —how it influences belief, 271 —cooperates with the passions, ii. 79, 179 —how affected by distance, &c. 184. Immaculate conception, mystery of, iv. 467. Impieties, in false religions, iv. 498. Impressions, defined, i. 15—iv. 118 —two kinds of, i. 22—ii. 3 —three kinds of, conveyed by the senses, i. 250. Impotence and barrenness, iv. 322—iii. 436; (Note.) Incest, crime of; ii. 233—iv. 281. Incredulity, different from belief, i. 131. Independents, iii. 84. Indians, treatment of, iv. 262. Indolence, ii. 375. Industry, merit of, iv. 313. Ingratitude, ii. 232. Injury, idea of, whence, ii. 93. Intention, requisite to excite love or hatred, ii. 90. Interest, rate of, depends not on the quantity of the precious metals, iii. 333 —high, causes of, 335 —how affected by commerce, 341 —low, symptom of national prosperity, 342 —mistakes concerning, 343, et seq. Jonson, Ben, his Volpone, iii. 443. Josephus, quoted, iii. 488, (Note)—503, (Note.) Joy, explained, ii. 23—iv. 196—cause of, ii. 197. Iphicrates, a saying of, iv. 343. Isocrates, quoted, iii. 435, 456, 457. Ireland, barbarous state of, iii. 454; (Note)—iv. 333. Italians, their degeneracy, iii. 309, 501. Italy, its population, iii. 501—climate of, 493, 495. Judgments, erroneous; whether immoral; ii. 226; (Note.) Julian, quoted, iii. 470. Justice, not a natural but a conventional virtue, ii. 244, 258, 267, 303 —iv. 390—origin of, ii. 253 —regulated by utility, 257 —why a virtue, 269 —necessary to society, iv. 253. Justin, quoted, iii. 482, 501. Justus Lipsius, quoted, iii. 437. Juvenal, quoted, iii. 143, 149, 238, 493—iv. 247, 427, 497. Lacedemonians, their superstition, iv. 453. Language, national character of, iii. 237. Languedocians, iii. 232. Laplanders, their deities, iv. 452. Latin, preserved by the Popes, ii, 478. Laws, positive, ii. 344 —of nature, ii. 295, 302 —of nations, 322, 351—iv. 279 —of the twelve tables, iii. 131, 451 —of justice—iv. 264 —of society, 283. Legislators; greatest honour due to, iii. 57. Leibnitz, ii. 503. Liberty, civil, compared with despotism, iii. 99 —friendly to arts and sciences, 100, 128. Liberty, two kinds of, ii. 160 —doctrine of, why more prevalent than that of necessity, 162, et seq. —moral, defined, iv. 111. Liberty and necessity, examination of, ii. 151 —a dispute of words, iv. 95 —mode of reconciling it, 109 —both essential to morality and religion, 115 —effects not man's responsibility, 117, et seq. Liberty of the press, why peculiar to Britain, iii. 8 —advantageous, 11. Liquor, love of, why peculiar to northern nations, iii. 241. Livy, quoted, iii. 25, 60, 233, 290, 364, 377, 446, 450, 454, 461, 479, 481, 500—iv. 505 —his character of Hannibal, 405 —his superstition, 494. Locke, Mr, quoted, i. 113, 208—ii. 434—iii. 102, 235 —iv. 6, 23, 67, 75, 86, 380, 532. Longinus, iii. 100, 111, 115—iv. 329, 452. Louis XIV, number of his armies, iii. 307—epigram on, iv. 488. Love and hatred, object and causes of, ii. 68, 89—iv. 218. Lucan, quoted, iii. 441. Lucian, quoted, iii. 199, 443, 479 —iv. 156, 318, 418, 452, 454, 494, 500, 501. Lucretius, quoted, ii. 384, 467—iii. 143, 220—iv. 149, 460, 533. Lucullus, first brought cherry-trees to Europe, ii. 478. Luxemburg, Duke of, ii. 90. Luxury, definition of, iii. 302 —its advantages, 304 —effects falsely ascribed to, 310 —its evils, 313 —why regarded a vice, iv. 251. Lycurgus, iii. 359. Lysias, genius of his eloquence, iii. 121 —quoted, 452, 456, 457, 462, 469, 473, 476—iv. 425. Macedon, wealth of, iii. 364. Machiavel, quoted, iii 21, 98, 278, 376, (Note.) 564—iv. 313 —his reflexions on Christianity, iv. 480. Magians, their faith, iv. 469. Magistracy, foundation of, ii, 338. Magistrates, whence their authority, ii. 328 —whom lawful, 336. Maillet, Monsieur, his account of Egypt, iii. 441, 496. Malebranche, quoted, i. 210—ii. 438—iv. 86, 269. Malezieu, an argument of, i. 51. Malice, what, ii. 114 —origin of, 121—iv. 220, &c. Man, social by necessity, ii. 95, 253 —active, iii. 166—iv. 7. Mandeville, Dr, quoted, iii. 315. Manicheans, their theory of good and ill, ii 526—iv. 301. Manilius, quoted, iv. 452. Mantinea, its size and population, iii. 480. Marcellinus, Ammianus, quoted, iii. 488. Marcus Brutus, ii. 370. Marriage, different modes of, iii. 206 —European mode preferable, 217. Marshall, Lord, friend of Rousseau, i. xxxvii. Martial, quoted, iii. 222, 433, 440, 502—iv. 427. Massacres ancient, account of, iii. 455, (Note.) Mathematics, advantages of, in reasoning, iv. 71. Maximilian, Emperor, nickname of, iii. 325. Maurice, Prince, saying of, iv. 343. Mediocrity, advantages of, iv. 551, &c. Melon du Tot, Monsieur, quoted, iii. 288, 324, 394. Memory, ideas of, more lively than those of fancy, i. 24, 119 —character of, ii. 405 —importance of, iv. 317. Menander, quoted, iii. 226, (Note.) Merchants origin of, iii. 338. Merit, influence of, on the passions, iv. 206 —personal, 242, 347. Metaphysics, nature and use of, iv. 8. et seq. Milton, quoted, ii. 506 —criticised, iii. 237—iv. 31, 439. Misery, human, universal complaints on, ii. 503 —why permitted, 515, &c. Miracles defined, iv. 133 —incapable of proof from testimony, 135 —can never prove the truth of any religion, 150. Moderation, in parties, recommended, iii. 26. Modesty, female, ii. 355—character of, iv. 341. Moliere, iii. 154. Molinists character of their religion, iii. 89—iv. 146. Monarchy, elective, ii. 342 —absolute, preferable to a republic in Britain, iii. 55 —compared with republic, 139. Money, disadvantages of, iii. 318 —favourable to industry, 322 —level of, 351 —accumulation of, injurious, 361. Montaigne, quoted, iv. 269, 342. Montesquieu, quoted, iii. 213, 424, 504—iv. 269. Montgeron, Mons. his book on Miracles iv. 145. Moors civil wars of, iii. 61. Morals, not founded on reason, ii. 221 —nor on the fitness of things, 228 —origin of, 362 —systems of reducible to two, 378 —of princes 352 —disputes concerning, iv. 239, &c. —principles of, discussed, 366. Moral duties, two kinds of, iii. 524. Moral sense, an innate sentiment, ii. 236. Moral reasoning, iv. 192—sentiment, 356. Motives, determine the quality of actions, ii. 245. Muscovites, their marriages, iii. 150, 243. Nature, definition of, ii. 241 —state of, fictitious, 253, 263—iv. 253 —various hypotheses on, 260. Natural evils, ii. 504, 520. Natural religion, whether proved from reason, ii. 429 —from works of creation, 446, 465 —from the structure of animal bodies, 455, 469 —from the condition of human life, 502. Necessity, idea of, how formed, i. 206—iv. 96 —definitions of, i. 220—ii. 162—iv. 113 —not subversive of religion, ii. 163—iv. 114 —various theories of, confuted, ii. 75, 77, 80 —whence it arises, 88. Necessity of a cause, theory of Hobbes, Clarke and Locke, examined, i. 111—arguments concerning analyzed, 117. Negroes, an inferior race, iii. 236. Newton, perpetuity of his philosophy, iii. 135—iv. 86, (Note) 277, 555. Newton, Locke, Clarke, Arians or Socinians, iv. 496. Nicolas, St, a favourite of the Muscovites, iv. 467. Nine, curious property of, ii. 500. Nisus, suggests not the true idea of power, iv. 79. Northern nations, their swarms, no proof of populousness, iii 497. Numitianus, the poet, his contempt of Christianity, iv. 489. Oaths, different kinds of, ii. 543. Obedience, passive, proper limits of, iii. 534. Occupation, a right of property, ii. 277 —several kinds of, 278, (Note.) Oliver Cromwell, ii. 90 —his military force, iii. 472. Olympiodorus, quoted, iii. 486. Opinion, foundation of all government, iii. 31 —changeableness of, 54, Orange, Prince of, accession of, ii. 350 —partisans of, iii. 70. Orators, modern, inferiority of, iii. 110, 113, &c. —causes of this decline, 114 —French, 118, (Note.) Original contract, the best but seldom the sole foundation of government, iii. 518 —theory of, erroneous, 532, Ostracism and Petalism, iii. 375. Ovid quoted, iii. 6, 127, 143, 429, 494, 454—iv. 454, 504. Pain and pleasure, chief springs of human actions, i. 160—ii. 360. Painters, often unhappy in their subjects, iii. 254. Painting, may flourish under tyrannical governments, iii. 101. Paris, L'Abbé de, his miracles, iv. 145, (Note.) Parents and children, relation between, ii. 98, et seq. Parliament, how far it should be independent, iii. 47. Parliament, of love, iv. 283. Parnell, Dr, iii. 222. Parties, court and country, iii. 42, (Note.) 62 —among the ancients, 59 —ecclesiastical, 64, 68 —first rise of, in England, 70. Pascal, his character, iv. 147, 430. Passions, direct and indirect, ii. 5 —their object, 9 —transition of, 129 —calm and violent, 173 —contrariety of, 199 —sympathy of, 396 —selfish and benevolent, iv. 13 —how affected by good or evil, 195 —by general rules, 217 —by reason, 226. Passions, amorous, ii. 144—iii. 148—iv. 221. Pausanias, quoted, iii. 481. Pay, military, of the ancients, iii. 445. Penetration of bodies, impossible, i. 63. Perceptions, two kinds of, i. 15—iv. 18 —on the continued existence of, i. 271, et seq. Pericles, his eloquence, iii. 122 —saying of, iv. 246 Peripatetic philosophy, i. 285—ii. 464—iii. 135—iv. 309. Persecution, religious, causes of, iii. 64, et seq. Persians, ancient, their manners, iii. 21, 22, (Note), 236, 242. Personification, origin of polytheism, iv. 446. Petrarch, quoted, iii. 281. Petronius, quoted, iii. 454, 494—iv. 423. Phædrus, quoted, iii. 145:—iv. 280. Philip of Macedon, anecdote of, iii. 145, 199 —his armies, 482 —his character, 377—iv. 332. Philips, Mr, his poem on Cider, ii. 102. Philosophy, false suggestions of, iii. 195 —the obvious and abstruse, iv. 4. Phocion, a saying of, iv. 330. Physical causes, their influence on population, iii. 423. Pity, what, ii. 114—peculiarities of, 116. Plato, quoted, iii. 99, 275, 391, 532—iv. 260, 280, 313, 406, 456, 495, 497. Platonists, their opinion of the Deity, ii. 457—iii. 137 —of the creation, ii, 487 —their doctrines, iii. 175. Plautus, quoted, iii. 476. Pliny, quoted, iii. 64, 142, 149, 252, 331, 346, 364, 432, 439, 440, 447, 471, 484,502—iv. 443, 474, 490, 568, 576. Plutarch, quoted, iii. 146, 147, 196, 197, 198, 232, 242, 321, 391, 413, 428, 435, 440, 442, 451, 461, 506—iv. 132, 420, 476, 500. Poetry, effects of, i. 166—rules of, iv. 28. Poisoning, frequent among the ancients, ii. 25. Poland, state of, iii. 311. Politeness, causes of, iii. 142—character of, iv. 339, Political customs of antients and modems compared, iii. 444. Pollia and Papiria, Roman factions, iii. 59. Polybius, quoted, ii. 543—iii. 20, 22, 48, 145, 292, 331, 363, 376, 378, 446, 469, 480, 490, 497, 504—iv. 316, 402, 406 —his theory of morals, 288. Polygamy, evils of, iii. 210. Polytheism, the most ancient religion, iv. 436, &c. —forms of, 458. Pompey, his superstition, iv. 490. Pope, Mr, iii. 14, 197, 215, 220—iv. 537 Population, checks to, among the ancients, iii. 428 —comparison of, among ancients and moderns, 426, 444, 448, 466 —false statements of, 468. Possession, stability of, ii. 274 —what constitutes, 278 —a source of authority, 338 —right of, iv. 393. Power, idea of whence, i. 217—iv. 76 —what, ii. 46—iv. 73 —an ambiguous term, 91, (Note.) Praise, pleasure arising from, ii. 61. Prejudice, iii. 270—moral; iv. 543. Presbyterians, their attachment to the family of Orange, iii. 70, 79, (Note.) Presence real, absurdity of, iv. 484. Prescription, right of, ii. 281. Priests, their character, iii. 83, 226, (Note) —their origin, 85. Priestcraft, ii. 435. Pride, cause of, ii. 19, 37 —when vicious; 386 —when essential; 389 —merit of, whence, 391. Prior, Mr, his Alma and Solomon, ii. 127 —quoted, iii. 159. Priority, relation of, i. 106. Probable reasoning, what, i. 142. Probability, two kinds of, i. 170, 238—ii. 103—iv. 67, 198 —influence of, on the passions, ii. 198 —on belief, iv. 70. Proclus and Sabinus, curious dispute between, ii. 287. Promise, what, and whence its obligation, ii. 290, 297, 302 —whether the foundation of allegiance, 324. Proof, what, iv. 67. Property, a source of pride, ii. 44 —idea of, whence, 260 —right of, explained, 282, (Note) —transference of, 288—nature of, 303—iv. 212 —on the origin of, 391. Providence, particular, hypothetical arguments against, iv. 158. Protestant succession, advantages and disadvantages of, iii. 548, et seq. Public interest, how far a motive to justice, ii. 248. Punic faith, ii. 543. Pyrrhonians, their scepticism, ii. 427—iv. 188. Pyrrhus, his saying of the Romans, iii. 309. Quakers, iii. 84. Qualities, occult, i. 286 —sensible and primary, 294 —often in the mind and not in the object, iii. 103. Queen of Spain, anecdote of, iii. 212. Quintilian, quoted, ii. 363—iii. 111, 115, 223, 238—iv. 299, 343. Quintus Curtius, quoted, iii. 242, 391—iv. 453, 572. Racine, his character, iii. 220—quoted, 281—iv. 247. (Note,) 542. Raleigh, Sir Walter, iii. 552. Ramsay, Chevalier, quoted, iv. 502. (Note.) Reason, as opposed to passion, ii. 166 —its influence on action, 222 —twofold object of, iv. 32 —whether the source of morals, 238, 366 —contrasted with taste, 376. Reasons of state, iv. 279. Reformers, character of, ii. 434. Refinement in writing, rules for, iii. 220 —excess of, in taste, 223. Relation, philosophical, seven kinds of, i. 98—iv. 25. Relics, why coveted by the superstitious, i. 139—iv. 63. Religion natural, doubts upon, ii. 424 —consequences falsely ascribed to, 538 —excess of joy and terror in, 544—iii. 81—iv. 498 —origin of, 436. Resemblance, a principle of association, i. 99, 151—iv. 61 —how far a source of pride, ii. 37. Respect, whence it arises, ii. 140. Retz, Cardinal, de, quoted, i. 203—iii. 572—iv. 143. Revolution of 1688, ii. 346—iii. 74 —reflexions on, ii. 349 —did not recognise the principle of popular contract, iii. 517 —at Athens and Rome, 452. Rhamadan, the Turkish Lent, iv. 506. Rhodes, population of, iii. 479. Riches, why a source of pride and pleasure, ii. 50, 101—iv. 213 —determine the different ranks of men, ii. 106 —why esteemed, iv. 323. Rochefoucault, quoted, ii. 177—iv. 399. Rochester, Lord, iii. 143. Rollin, quoted, ii. 181. Rome, ancient, state of learning in, iii. 100, 505 —its size and population, 483, et seq. (Note) —name of its tutelar deity concealed, iv. 474, (Note.) Roman soldiers, pay of, iii. 318, (Note), 446 —Greek, 445. Roman history, partly fabulous, iii. 376, (Note.) Roman empire, when most flourishing, iii. 502. Roman law, a remarkable subtlety of, ii. 285, (Note.) Rousseau, refuses a pension from the King of England, i. lviii, xcv —quoted, iii. 142. Sadder, morality of, iv. 505. Sallee, Prince of, quoted, iv. 486. Sallust, quoted, ii. 400—iii. 104, 143, 310, 453, 486 —iv. 322, 401, 497, 509. Saint Evermond, quoted, iv. 312, 329. Sannazarius, his pastorals, iv. 296. Saracens, their conquests, iii. 230. Satire, character of, i. 201. Scapulaire, religious use of, iv. 470. Sceptics, compared with the Stoics, ii. 427 —their disputes with the Dogmatists, 537. Scepticism, with regard to reason, i. 236—iv. 181 —the senses, i. 280—iv. 176 —to knowledge and religion, ii; 428, &c. —philosophy, iv. 32 —different kinds of, 175 —objections of, 186. Sciences, mathematical and moral compared, iv. 71. Scriptures, quoted, iv. 255, 404. Scriptural and traditional religion compared, iv. 492. Scythians, barbarity of, iv. 333. Seamen, pressing of, a barbarous and illegal practice, iii. 419. Seleucia, population of, iii. 492. Self, object of pride or humility, ii. 36. Self-love, whether the origin of morals, iv. 289, 293 —whether consistent with benevolence, 397. Selfishness, as opposed to justice, ii. 264 —a natural propensity, 294—iii. 95. Seneca quoted, i. cxix—ii. 546,—iii. 429, 438, 442—iv. 386, 453, 563. Sentiment, how far the source of morals, iv. 238, 366. Senses, whether they suggest the idea of external existence, i. 246, 250. Sensibility, iii. 3—a source both of happiness and misery, ib. Sextus Empiricus quoted, iii. 442—iv. 250, 280, 497. Shaftesbury, Lord, quoted, i. 324—iii. 42, 95, 101, 147, 415. Shakespeare quoted, iii. 251—iv. 328. Sight, informs us not of material existence, i. 249. Simonides, his answer to Hiero, ii. 448. Simple ideas, whence derived, i. 18. Simplicity in writing, iii. 220. Slavery, among the ancients, iii. 428 —hurtful to population, 440. Smith, Dr Adam, letter from, i. xvi. Sneezing, god of, iv. 444. Society, political, ii. 317 —advantages of, 254—iv. 263, 278. Socrates, his character, iv. 334. Soil, fertile, not always beneficial, iii. 300. Soldier, character of, iii. 225. Solidity, idea of whence derived, i. 295. Sorbonnists, creed of, iv. 486. Sophocles, his character as a writer, iii. 220. Soul, immateriality of, i. 300 —doctrine of, leads to atheism, 312 —metaphysical arguments for, inconclusive, 318. Soul, immortality of, not proved by abstract reasoning, iv. 569 —a doctrine of revelation, 577. Spain, population of, iii. 500. Spaniards, character of, iii. 233 —politeness of, iv. 340. Sparta, prosperity of, iii. 289 —laws of, 291 —population of, 477, 481. Spartian, quoted, iii. 486—iv. 490. Spencer quoted, iv. 333. Spinoza, his principles examined, i. 307, et seq. Sportula, bad tendency of, iii. 502. Stanian, quoted, iii. 364. States, increased by trade, iii. 293 —small, advantageous, 444. Stoics, erroneous maxims of, ii. 427—iii. 137 —philosophy of, 165 —their views of natural evil, iv. 118 —their superstition, 494. Strabo, quoted, iii. 392, 432, 472, 473, 474, 483, 488, 497, 505 —iv. 449. Strength of mind, importance of, iv. 315. Stuart dynasty, fatal to the peace and prosperity of the country, iii. 554, 558. Substance, idea of, i. 33—what, 299. Succession, right of, ii. 283, 342 —relation of, between cause and effect, i. 107. Suetonius, quoted, iii. 20, 64, 428, 432, 478, 573—iv. 453 —compared with Tacitus, iv. 299. Suevi, a peculiarity of their character, iv. 332. Suicide, defended, iv. 558 —not prohibited in Scripture, 567. Suidas, quoted, iii. 122, 503, (Note.) Superstition, contrasted with philosophy, i. 343 —sources of, iii. 81 —favourable to priestly power, 83 —with regard to meats, dresses, &c. iv. 270. Surprise, its connexion with fear, ii. 205. Swift, Dr, a polished writer, iii. 102 —quoted, 350, 366, 459. Sybaris, number of its inhabitants, iii. 468. Sycophant, origin of the name, iii. 348. Sympathy, nature and effects of, ii. 52, 134, 362, 381—iv. 294 —its influence on pride and humility, ii. 57, 385 —on our esteem for the rich, 103, 107 —on human happiness, 108 —on animals, 149 —on virtue and vice, 379 —chief source of all moral distinctions, 412. Syracuse, its size and population, iii. 473. Tacitus, quoted, iii. 10, 20, 70, 130, 147, 408, 432, 437, 439, 450, 520 —iv. 142, 331, 332, 462, 486, 493, 564. Tasso, quoted, iii. 161. Taste, delicacy of, iii. 4 —varieties of, 256 —general principles of, 264 —improvement of, 268 —changes of 276. Taxes, advantages and disadvantages of, iii. 365, 387 —a cause of the destruction of the Roman Empire, 388 —cannot be imposed by the Turkish Emperor, 389. Temple, Sir William, quoted, iii. 240, 386, 472. Terence, iii. 147, 220, 222, 275, 278. Tertullian, quoted, iii. 502. Testimony, evidence of, iv. 130. Thebes, population of, iii. 479. Thebans, their character, iii. 232. Theism, dispute concerning, ii. 535 —origin of, iv. 463 —compared with polytheism, 474, &c. Theists, ancient, their anima mundi, ii. 475. Themistocles, project of, ii, 180—saying of, iv. 415. Theocritus, iii. 469. Theology, Pagan, ii. 480. Thinkers, shallow and abstruse, iii. 285. Thucydides, quoted, iii. 22, 200, 290, 363, 373, 446, 454, 463 —iv. 142, 297, 479. Tillotson, his argument against transubstantiation, iv. 127. Time, idea of, whence derived, i. 56. Timoleon, his policy, iii. 447, Timon of Athens, a saying of, iv. 301. Timotheus, his hymn to Diana, iv. 500. Toleration, why generally disallowed, iii. 12, (Note) —permitted in Paganism, iv. 475. Tonquin, peculiar marriages at, iii. 206. Tory party, iii. 73 —conduct of, at the Revolution, 75 —properly none in Scotland, 77, (Note.) —theory of their principles, iv. 441, 548. Tournefort, quoted, iii. 211, 495. Tragedy, why a source of pleasure, iii. 248. Tranquillity, iv. 333. Transubstantiation, doctrine of, monstrous, ii: 301.—iv. 273, (Note.) Tribonian, decision of, ii. 287. Truth, two kinds of, ii. 208—love of, 213. Turks, their jealousy, iii. 211 —bravery, 233, 236 —government, 389. Turkish ambassador, anecdote of, iii. 210. Tycho Brahe, iii. 224. Tyrannicide, extolled by the ancients, iv. 250. Tyranny, how far it exempts from allegiance, ii. 331, 334. Tyrants, ancient, their cruelty, iii. 454. Tyrians, their superstitions, iv. 453. Uncertainty, a cause of fear, ii. 206. Understanding, errors concerning it, i. 132 —its office, ii. 167 —differences in, iv. 124. Union, principles of, among ideas, i. 29, 127—iv. 25. Union of 1708, advantages of, iii. 354. Unity, necessarily indivisible, i. 51 —essential in poetry and history—iv. 26. (Note.) Ustariz*, Geronimo de, quoted, iii. 426. Usurpation, the foundation of almost all governments, iii. 518, 522. Utility, merit of, iv. 248—pleasure derived from, 285—whether the origin of morals, 253, 293, 306. Utrecht, peace of, iii. 380. Vacuum, idea of, possible, i. 80. Vain man, description of a, ii. 45. Valerius Maximus, quoted, iii. 483. Vanity, sources of, ii. 40, &c.—iv. 208 —a bond of union, ii. 261 —allied to virtue, iii. 97 —when blameable, ii. 387—iv. 344. Varro, quoted, iii. 432, 439. Vasa, Gustavus, iii. 70. Vauban, Mareschal, quoted, iii, 356. Velleius Paterculus, iii. 364. Venetians, their government, iii. 16 —inferiority of their genius, 101. Verdelin, Marchioness de, i. xl. Verna, family slave, iii. 433, (Note.) Verney, Paris de, quoted, iii. 324. Vespasian, a miracle of, iv. 142. Vice and virtue, distinction betwixt, ii. 28, 270 —not founded on reason but feeling, 238 —whence it arises, 392 —often confounded with talents and defects, iv. 397. Victor, Aurelius and Publius, quoted, iii. 485, 486, (Note.) Virgil, quoted, ii. 191—iii. 145, 187, 220, 275—iv. 386, 501. Virgin Mary, favourite Saint of the Catholics, iv, 466. Virtues, natural, ii. 365 —heroic, 391 —social, iv. 287, 361, 380 —excellence of, 360, 363. Vis inertiæ, iv. 86, (Note.) Vitellius, Emperor, a saying of, iv. 330. Vitruvius, quoted, iii. 483, (Note.)?484. Voltaire, quoted, iii. 10. Vopiscus, quoted, iii. 480, 485, 489, 490. Vossius, quoted, iii. 485, (Note), 424. Wallace, Rev. Dr, on the numbers of mankind, iii. 421. (Note) Waller, the poet, iii. 117, 154. Walpole, Horace, letter of, to Rousseau, i. lii, cxiv. Walpole, Sir Robert, character of, iii. 30. (Note.) Whigs, iii. 73—a theory of their principles, 539. Will, definition of, ii. 150 —error of metaphysicians respecting, 172 —how far influenced by reason; 166 —by passion, 195 —its power over the body, iv. 77 —in promises, 272. Wisdom, why valued, ii. 403. Wit, true and false, ii. 29—iv. 207 —agreeable, ii. 379, 404 —definition of, iv. 340. Wolsey, Cardinal, his insolence, iii. 146. Women, timorous and superstitious, iv, —better judges of polite writing than men, 541. Woolaston, Mr, iv. 260, (Note.) World, not eternal, ii. 479 —conjectures concerning its origin, 491, 490—iv. 454. Writing, observations on, iii. 142, 220, 261, Xenophon, quoted, iii. 22, 29, 107, 151, 375, 438, 445, 456, 465, 476, 480, 497—iv. 415, 453, 475—his superstition, iv. 495, (Note.) Xerxes, his reward for a new pleasure, iii. 157 —numbers in his armies, 496. Zaleucus, his laws, iv. 504. Zamolxis, iv. 470. Zealots in religion, ii. 541. Zeno, school of, ii. 428. Zopyrus, a general under Darius, iii. 22. Zoroaster, his religion, iv. 250. FINIS.