G. E. MOORE, Litt.D. (continued 8)

For these reasons I think there are serious objections to the view that the idea of moral obligation is merely a psychological idea.

But now let us briefly consider the idea of "good," in Aristotle's sense, or intrinsic value.

As regards this idea, there is again a difference of opinion among those who hold that it is a psychological idea, as to what idea it is. The majority seem to hold that it is to be defined, somehow, in terms of desire; while others have held that what we are judging when we judge that one state of things is or would be intrinsically better than another, is rather that the belief that the one was going to be realized would, under certain circumstances, give more pleasure to some man or set of men, than the belief that the other was. But the same objections seem to me to apply whichever of these two views be taken.

Let us take desire. About whose desires am I making a judgment, when I judge that one state of things would be better than another?

Here again, it may be said, first of all, that I am merely making a judgment about my own. But in this case the view that my judgment is merely about my own psychology is, I think, exposed to an obvious objection to which Westermarck's view that my judgments of moral obligation are about my own psychology was not exposed. The obvious objection is that it is evidently not true that I do in fact always desire more, what I judge to be better: I may judge one state of things to be better than another, even when I know perfectly well not only that I don't desire it more, but that I have no tendency to do so. It is a notorious fact that men's strongest desires are, as a rule, for things in which they themselves have some personal concern; and yet the fact that this is so, and that they know it to be so, does not prevent them from judging that changes, which would not affect them personally, would constitute a very much greater improvement in the world's condition, than changes which would. For this reason alone the view that when I judge one state of things to be better than another I am merely making a judgment about my own psychology, must, I think, be given up: it is incredible that we should all be making such mistakes about our feelings, as, on this view, we should constantly be doing. And there is, of course, besides, the same objection, as applied in the case of moral obligation: namely that, if this view were true, no two men could ever differ in opinion as to which of two states was the better, whereas it appears that they certainly sometimes do differ in opinion on such an issue.

My judgment, then, is not merely a judgment about my own psychology: but, if so, about whose psychology is it a judgment? It cannot be a judgment that all men desire the one state more than the other; because that would include the judgment that I myself do so, which, as we have seen, I often know to be false, even while I judge that the one state really is better. And it cannot, I think, be a judgment merely about the feelings or desires of an impartial spectator in my own society; since that would involve the paradox that men belonging to different societies could never differ in opinion as to what was better. But we have here to consider an alternative, which did not arise in the case of moral obligation. It is a notorious fact that the satisfaction of some of our desires is incompatible with the satisfaction of others, and the satisfaction of those of some men with the satisfaction of those of others. And this fact has suggested to some philosophers that what we mean by saying that one state of things would be better than another, is merely that it is a state in which more of the desires, of those who were in it, would be satisfied at once, than would be the case with the other. But to this view the fundamental objection seems to me to be that whether the one state was better than the other would depend not merely upon the number of desires that were simultaneously satisfied in it, but upon what the desires were desires for. I can imagine a state of things in which all desires were satisfied, and yet can judge of it that it would not be so good as another in which some were left unsatisfied. And for this reason I cannot assent to the view that my judgment, that one state of things is better than another is merely a judgment about the psychology of the people concerned in it.

This is why I find it hard to believe that either the idea of moral obligation or the idea of intrinsic value is merely a psychological idea. It seems to me that Moral Philosophy cannot be merely a department of Psychology. But no doubt there may be arguments on the other side to which I have not done justice.

THE END

INDEX Abstractions, "illegitimate" 15 Agnosticism, 5, 30, 151 "Analytic" truths, 30-31 Apprehension, direct, 173-174, 176 Aristotle's Ethics, 323-326 Attention, 176 Awareness, 25-26, 29 "Being" and "Reality" 199-201, 214-218 Berkeley, 19, 30, 58, 73 Bradley, F, H., 197-218, 276, 278 Causal connection, 154-156, 161-163 necessity, 267-268 Consciousness, 17-18, 20-21, 23-25 "Content" 21-24, 26 Deduction, 40, 291, 303 Difference, numerical and qualitative, 262-263, 285-287, 307-308 intrinsic, 261-265 Direct apprehension 173-174, 176 observation, 148 perception, 67-71 Duty and Wrong, 312-313 "objectivity" of, 237-238, 332-337 Entails, 291 and "implies" 300-301, 303-306 Esse and percipi, 7-12, 72-77, 180-181 Existence, 72-78 and "reality," 199-201, 214-218 of physical objects, 190-191 "Experience," ambiguity of, 177, 179-180. External objects and facts, 152-154 relations, 270-272, 276-309 Fact, matters of, 148, 302-303 "Follows," 40, 284-285, 291, 300-301, 303-306 "Given," ambiguity of, 174 "Good," ambiguity of, 253, 326 objectivity of 255-257, 337-339 "for man," 323-325 Hegel, 16 Hume, 53, 58, 147-167 "I." 174-175. 333 Idealism, 1-3 Ideas, 20-26 Identity of Indiscernibles, 307-308 "Implication," 295-297 Indiscernibles, Identity of, 307-308 Induction, conditions necessary for, 61-67 Internal relations, dogma of, 270-272, 284-286, 286-289, 288, 290, 303, 307-309 two senses of, 286 Intrinsic difference, 261-265 nature, 260-265 predicates, 272-275 value, 259-260, 327-328, 337-339 James, William, 97-146 Joachim, H. H., 276 Kant, 12, 30, 317 Knowledge, 24-30 and belief 33-34 by description, 234, 247 Leibniz, 302 "Manifestation of," 249-250 Material objects or things, 30, 89-90, 153, 221-225, 228, 250-252 Mill. J. S., 19, 224, 250-252 Minds, "in our," 176-177 "Modify," 278-280, 282-284 Moral rules, two kinds of, 320-322 Necessary truths, 12, 302-303 Necessity, three senses of, 265-270 logical, 271-272, 275 unconditional, 271-272, 274-275 "Objectivity," ambiguity of, 255-259 of kinds of value, 329-339 Objects, external, 152-153 material, 30, 89-90, 221-223, 250-252 physical, and sensibles, 185-196, 221-223 Observation, 53-54, 67-71, 148 Organic unities, 15 "Ought," two meanings of, 319 objectivity of, 332-337 and "wrong" 312-313 Part, physical, 237-239 and whole, 288-289 "Perception," ambiguity of, 174, 225-228 direct, 67-71 Percipi and esse, 7-12, 72-77, 180181 Physical objects and sensibles, 185-196, 221-223 Pickwickian senses, 190, 193, 194 "Possible," three senses of, 265-270 Pragmatist theory of truth, 143-146 "Presented," ambiguity of, 174 Reality, 72-78, 199-201, 211-218 Reason, "dictates of," 330 Reasons, 35-41 Reid, T., 57, 59, 86, 89 Relational properties, 281-282 Relations, dogma of internal, 270-272, 284-286, 288, 290, 303, 307-309 external, 270-272, 276-309 internal, 286-289 Right, objectivity of, 257, 332-337 Russell, B., 224, 234, 250-252, 278, 303, 304, 308 "See," ambiguity of, 187-188 "Seems," 245-246 Sensations, 17-26, 231-232 proper, 168 Sense-data, 168-171, 231-232 Sensibles, 168-171 Solipsism, 29 Spiritual, 1-2 Strachey, O., 304 "Subjective," 253-254 "Synthetic" truths, 12-13 Taylor, A. E., 8 "Time," 209-211 Truth, and mutability 129-138 pragmatist theory of, 143-146 and utility, 108-129 and verification, 100-107 of words, 134-136 Truths, "analytic" and "synthetic" 12-13 "man-made" 138-143 necessary 12, 302-303 Value, intrinsic, 259-260, 327-328, 337-339 objectivity of, 255-259, 329-339 Westermarck, E., 332, 334-335 "Wrong," objectivity of, 332-337 and "ought," 312-313