SECT. II.

I.

MADAM,

Being come now to the Perusal of the Works of that learned Author Dr. Moor, I find that the onely design of his Book called Antidote, is to prove the Existence of a God, and to refute, or rather convert Atheists; which I wonder very much at, considering, he says himself,[1] That there is no man under the cope of Heaven but believes a God; which if so, what needs there to make so many arguments to no purpose? unless it be to shew Learning and wit; In my opinion, it were better to convert Pagans to be Christians, or to reform irregular Christians to a more pious life, then to prove that, which all men believe, which is the way to bring it into question. For certainly, according to the natural Light of Reason, there is a God, and no man, I believe, doth doubt it; for though there may be many vain words, yet I think there is no such atheistical belief amongst man-kind, nay, not onely amongst men, but also, amongst all other creatures, for if nature believes a God, all her parts, especially the sensitive and rational, which are the living and knowing parts, and are in all natural creatures, do the like, and therefore all parts and creatures in nature do adore and worship God, for any thing man can know to the contrary; for no question, but natures soule adores and worships God as well as man's soule; and why may not God be worshipped by all sorts and kinds of creatures as well, as by one kind or sort? I will not say the same way, but I believe there is a general worship and adoration of God; for as God is an Infinite Deity, so certainly he has an Infinite Worship and Adoration, and there is not any part of nature, but adores and worships the only omnipotent God, to whom belongs Praise and Glory from and to all eternity: For it is very improbable, that God should be worshipped onely in part, and not in whole, and that all creatures were made to obey man, and not to worship God, onely for man's sake, and not for God's worship, for man's use, and not God's adoration, for mans spoil and not God's blessing. But this Presumption, Pride, Vain-glory and Ambition of man, proceeds from the irregularity of nature, who being a servant, is apt to commit errors; and cannot be so absolute and exact in her devotion, adoration and worship, as she ought, nor so well observant of God as God is observing her: Nevertheless, there is not any of her parts or creatures, that God is not acknowledged by, though not so perfectly as he ought, which is caused by the irregularities of nature, as I said before. And so God of his mercy have mercy upon all Creatures; To whose protection I commend your Ladiship, and rest,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend

and Servant.

II.

MADAM,

Since I spake in my last of the adoration and worship of God, you would faine know, whether we can have an Idea of God? I answer, That naturally we may, and really have a knowledge of the existence of God, as I proved in my former letter, to wit, that there is a God, and, that he is the Author of all things, who rules and governs all things, and is also the God of Nature: but I dare not think, that naturally we can have an Idea of the essence of God, so as to know what God is in his very nature and essence; for how can there be a finite Idea of an Infinite God? You may say, As well as of Infinite space. I answer, Space is relative, or has respect to body, but there is not any thing that can be compared to God; for the Idea of Infinite nature is material, as being a material creature of Infinite material Nature. You will say, How can a finite part have an Idea of infinite nature? I answer, Very well, by reason the Idea is part of Infinite Nature, and so of the same kind, as material; but God being an Eternal, Infinite, Immaterial, Individable Being, no natural creature can have an Idea of him. You will say, That the Idea of God in the mind is immaterial; I answer, I cannot conceive, that there can be any immaterial Idea in nature; but be it granted, yet that Immaterial is not a part of God, for God is individable, and hath no parts; wherefore the Mind cannot have an Idea of God, as it hath of Infinite nature, being a part of nature; for the Idea of God cannot be of the essence of God, as the Idea of nature is a corporeal part of nature: and though nature may be known in some parts, yet God being Incomprehensible, his Essence can by no wayes or means be naturally known; and this is constantly believed, by

Madam,

Your faithful Friend,

and Servant.

III.

MADAM,

Although I mentioned in my last, that it is impossible to have an Idea of God, yet your Author is pleased to say,[1] That he will not stick to affirm, that the Idea or notion of God is as easie, as any notion else whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the world. To which I answer, That in my opinion, God is not so easily to be known by any creature, as man may know himself; nor his attributes so well, as man can know his own natural proprieties: for Gods Infinite attributes are not conceivable, and cannot be comprehended by a finite knowledg and understanding, as a finite part of nature; for though nature's parts may be Infinite in number, and as they have a relation to the Infinite whole, if I may call it so, which is Infinite nature, yet no part is infinite in it self, and therefore it cannot know so much as whole nature: and God being an Infinite Deity, there is required an Infinite capacity to conceive him; nay, Nature her self although Infinite, yet cannot possibly have an exact notion of God, by reason of the disparity between God and her self; and therefore it is not probable, if the Infinite servant of God is not able to conceive him, that a finite part or creature of nature, of what kind or sort soever, whether Spiritual, as your Author is pleased to name it, or Corporeal, should comprehend God. Concerning my belief of God, I submit wholly to the Church, and believe as I have bin informed out of the Athanasian Creed, that the Father is Incomprehensible, the Sonne Incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost Incomprehensible; and that there are not three, but one Incomprehensible God; Wherefore if any man can prove (as I do verily believe he cannot) that God is not Incomprehensible, he must of necessity be more knowing then the whole Church, however he must needs dissent from the Church. But perchance your Author may say, I raise new and prejudicial opinions, in saying that matter is eternal. I answer, The Holy Writ doth not mention Matter to be created, but onely Particular Creatures, as this Visible World, with all its Parts, as the history or description of the Creation of the World in Genesis plainly shews; For God said, Let it be Light, and there was Light; Let there be a Firmament in the midst of the Waters, and let it divide the Waters from the Waters; and Let the Waters under the Heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry Land appear; and let the Earth bring forth Grass, the Herb yielding Seed, and the Fruit-tree yielding Fruit after his kind; and let there be Lights in the Firmament of the Heaven, to divide the Day from the Night, &c. Which proves, that all creatures and figures were made and produced out of that rude and desolate heap or chaos which the Scripture mentions, which is nothing else but matter, by the powerful Word and Command of God, executed by his Eternal Servant, Nature; as I have heretofore declared it in a Letter I sent you in the beginning concerning Infinite Nature. But least I seem to encroach too much upon Divinity, I submit this Interpretation to the Church; However, I think it not against the ground of our Faith; for I am so far from maintaining any thing either against Church or State, as I am submitting to both in all duty, and shall do so as long as I live, and rest,

Madam,

Your Faithful Friend

and Servant.

IV.

MADAM,

Since your Worthy and Learned Author is pleased to mention,[1] That an ample experience both of Men and Things doth enlarge our Understanding, I have taken occasion hence to enquire, how a mans Understanding may be encreased or inlarged. The Understanding must either be in Parts, or it must be Individable as one; if in Parts, then there must be so many Understandings as there are things understood; but if Individable, and but one Understanding, then it must dilate it self upon so many several objects. I for my part, assent to the first, That Understanding increases by Parts, and not by Dilation, which Dilation must needs follow, if the Mind or Understanding of man be indivisible and without parts; but if the Mind or Soul be Individable, then I would fain know, how Understanding, Imagination, Conception, Memory, Remembrance, and the like, can be in the mind? You will say, perhaps, they are so many faculties or properties of the Incorporeal Mind, but, I hope, you do not intend to make the Mind or Soul a Deity, with so many attributes, Wherefore, in my opinion, it is safer to say, That the Mind is composed of several active Parts: but of these Parts I have treated in my Philosophy, where you will find, that all the several Parts of Nature are Living and Knowing, and that there is no part that has not Life and Knowledg, being all composed of rational and sensitive matter, which is the life and soul of Nature; and that Nature being Material, is composable and dividable, which is the cause of so many several Creatures, where every Creature is a part of Nature, and these Infinite parts or creatures are Nature her self; for though Nature is a self-moving substance, and by self-motion divides and composes her self several manners or ways into several forms and figures, yet being a knowing, as well as a living substance, she knows how to order her parts and actions wisely; for as she hath an Infinite body or substance, so she has an Infinite life and knowledg; and as she hath an Infinite life and knowledg, so she hath an infinite wisdom: But mistake me not, Madam; I do not mean an Infinite Divine Wisdom, but an Infinite Natural Wisdom, given her by the Infinite bounty of the Omnipotent God; but yet this Infinite Wisdom, Life and Knowledg in Nature make but one Infinite. And as Nature hath degrees of matter, so she has also degrees and variety of corporeal motions; for some parts of matter are self-moving, and some are moved by these self-moving parts of matter; and all these parts, both the moving and moved, are so intermixed, that none is without the other, no not in any the least Creature or part of Nature we can conceive; for there is no Creature or part of Nature, but has a comixture of those mentioned parts of animate and inanimate matter, and all the motions are so ordered by Natures wisdom, as not any thing in Nature can be otherwise, unless by a Supernatural Command and Power of God; for no part of corporeal matter and motion can either perish, or but rest; one part may cause another part to alter its motions, but not to quit motion, no more then one part of matter can annihilate or destroy another; and therefore matter is not meerly Passive, but always Active, by reason of the thorow mixture of animate and inanimate matter; for although the animate matter is onely active in its nature, and the inanimate passive, yet because they are so closely united and mixed together that they make but one body, the parts of the animate or self-moving matter do bear up and cause the inanimate parts to move and work with them; and thus there is an activity in all parts of matter moving and working as one body, without any fixation or rest, for all is moveable, moving and moved. All which, Madam, if it were well observed, there would not be so many strange opinions concerning nature and her actions, making the purest and subtillest part of matter immaterial or incorporeal, which is as much, as to extend her beyond nature, and to rack her quite to nothing. But I fear the opinion of Immaterial substances in Nature will at last bring in again the Heathen Religion, and make us believe a god Pan, Bacchus, Ceres, Venus, and the like, so as we may become worshippers of Groves and shadows, Beans and Onions, as our Forefathers. I say not this, as if I would ascribe any worship to Nature, or make her a Deity, for she is onely a servant to God, and so are all her parts or creatures, which parts or creatures, although they are transformed, yet cannot be annihilated, except Nature her self be annihilated, which may be, whensoever the Great God pleases; for her existence and resolution, or total destruction, depends upon Gods Will and Decree, whom she fears, adores, admires, praises and prayes unto, as being her God and Master; and as she adores God, so do all her parts and creatures, and amongst the rest Man, so that there is no Atheist in Infinite Nature, at least not in the opinion of,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend

and Servant.

V.

MADAM,

I cannot well conceive what your Author means by the Common Laws of Nature;[1] But if you desire my opinion how many Laws Nature hath, and what they are; I say Nature hath but One Law, which is a wise Law, to keep Infinite matter in order, and to keep so much Peace, as not to disturb the Foundation of her Government: for though Natures actions are various, and so many times opposite, which would seem to make wars between several Parts, yet those active Parts, being united into one Infinite body, cannot break Natures general Peace; for that which Man names War, Sickness, Sleep, Death, and the like, are but various particular actions of the onely matter; not, as your Author imagines, in a confusion, like Bullets, or such like things juggled together in a mans Hat, but very orderly and methodical; And the Playing motions of nature are the actions of Art, but her serious actions are the actions of Production, Generation and Transformation in several kinds, sorts and particulars of her Creatures, as also the action of ruling and governing these her several active Parts. Concerning the Pre-eminence and Prerogative of Man, whom your Author calls[2] The flower and chief of all the products of nature upon this Globe of the earth; I answer, That Man cannot well be judged of himself, because he is a Party, and so may be Partial; But if we observe well, we shall find that the Elemental Creatures are as excellent as Man, and as able to be a friend or foe to Man, as Man to them, and so the rest of all Creatures; so that I cannot perceive more abilities in Man then in the rest of natural Creatures; for though he can build a stately House, yet he cannot make a Honey-comb; and though he can plant a Slip, yet he cannot make a Tree; though he can make a Sword, or Knife, yet he cannot make the Mettal. And as Man makes use of other Creatures, so other Creatures make use of Man, as far as he is good for any thing: But Man is not so useful to his neighbour or fellow-creatures, as his neighbour or fellow-creatures to him, being not so profitable for use, as apt to make spoil. And so leaving him, I rest,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend

and Servant.

VI.

MADAM,

Your Author demands,[1] Whether there was ever any man, that was not mortal, and whether there be any mortal that had not a beginning? Truly, if nature be eternal, all the material figures which ever were, are, and can be, must be also eternal in nature; for the figures cannot be annihilated, unless nature be destroyed; and although a Creature is dissolved and transformed into numerous different figures, yet all these several figures remain still in those parts of matter, whereof that creature was made, for matter never changes, but is always one and the same, and figure is nothing else but matter transposed or transformed by motion several modes or ways. But if you conceive Matter to be one thing, Figure another, and Motion a third, several, distinct and dividable from each other, it will produce gross errors, for, matter, motion, and figure, are but one thing. And as for that common question, whether the Egg was before the Chick, or the Chick before the Egg, it is but a thred-bare argument, which proves nothing, for there is no such thing as First in Eternity, neither doth Time make productions or generations, but Matter; and whatsoever matter can produce or generate, was in matter before it was produced; wherefore the question is, whether Matter, which is Nature, had a beginning, or not? I say not: for put the case, the figures of Earth, Air, Water, and Fire, Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Animals, Vegetables and Minerals, &c. were not produced from all Eternity, yet those figures have nevertheless been in Matter, which is Nature, from all eternity, for these mentioned Creatures are onely made by the corporeal motions of Matter, transforming Matter into such several figures; Neither can there be any perishing or dying in Nature, for that which Man calls so, is onely an alteration of Figure. And as all other productions are but a change of Matters sensitive motions, so all irregular and extravagant opinions are nothing but a change of Matters rational motions; onely productions by rational motions are interior, and those by sensitive motions exterior. For the Natural Mind is not less material then the body, onely the Matter of the Mind is much purer and subtiller then the Matter of the Body. And thus there is nothing in Nature but what is material; but he that thinks it absurd to say, the World is composed of meer self-moving Matter, may consider, that it is more absurd to believe Immaterial substances or spirits in Nature, as also a spirit of Nature, which is the Vicarious power of God upon Matter; For why should it not be as probable, that God did give Matter a self-moving power to her self, as to have made another Creature to govern her? For Nature is not a Babe, or Child, to need such a Spiritual Nurse, to teach her to go, or to move; neither is she so young a Lady as to have need of a Governess, for surely she can govern her self; she needs not a Guardian for fear she should run away with a younger Brother, or one that cannot make her a Jointure. But leaving those strange opinions to the fancies of their Authors, I'le add no more, but that I am,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend,

and Servant.

VII.

MADAM,

Your Author being very earnest in arguing against those that maintain the opinion of Matter being self-moving, amongst the rest of his arguments brings in this:[1] Suppose, says he, Matter could move it self, would meer Matter with self-motion amount to that admirable wise contrivance of things which we see in the World?—All the evasion I can imagine, our adversaries may use here, will be this: That Matter is capable of sense, and the finest and most subtil of the most refined sense; and consequently of Imagination too, yea happily of Reason and Understanding. I answer, it is very probable, that not onely all the Matter in the World or Universe hath Sense, but also Reason; and that the sensitive part of matter is the builder, and the rational the designer; whereof I have spoken of before, and you may find more of it in my Book of Philosophy. But, says your Author, Let us see, if all their heads laid together can contrive the anatomical Fabrick of any Creature that liveth? I answer, all parts of Nature are not bound to have heads or tayls; but if they have, surely they are wiser then many a man's. I demand, says he, Has every one of these Particles, that must have a hand in the framing of the body of an animal, the whole design of the work by the Impress of some Phantasme upon it? or as they have several offices, so have they several parts of the design? I answer, All the actions of self-moving Matter are not Impresses, nor is every part a hand-labourer, but every part unites by degrees into such or such a Figure. Again, says he, How is it conceiveable that any one Particle of Matter, or many together, (there not existing, yet in Nature an animal) can have the Idea Impressed of that Creature they are to frame? I answer, all figures whatsoever have been, are, or can be in Nature, are existent in nature. How, says he, can they in framing several parts confer notes? by what language or speech can they communicate their Counsels one to another? I answer, Knowledg doth not always require speech, for speech is an effect and not a cause, but knowledg is a cause and not an effect; and nature hath infinite more ways to express knowledg then man can imagine, Wherefore, he concludes, that they should mutually serve one another in such a design, is more impossible, then that so many men, blind and dumb from their nativity, should joyn their forces and wits together to build a Castle, or carve a statue of such a Creature, as none of them knew any more in several, then some one of the smallest parts thereof, but not the relation it bore to the whole. I answer, Nature is neither blind nor dumb, nor any ways defective, but infinitely wise and knowing; for blindness and dumbness are but effects of some of her particular actions, but there is no defect in self-moving matter, nor in her actions in general; and it is absurd to conceive the Generality of wisdom according to an Irregular effect or defect of a particular Creature; for the General actions of Nature are both life and knowledg, which are the architects of all Creatures, and know better how to frame all kinds and sorts of Creatures then man can conceive; and the several parts of Matter have a more easie way of communication, then Mans head hath with his hand, or his hand with pen, ink, and paper, when he is going to write; which later example will make you understand my opinion the better, if you do but compare the rational part of Matter to the head, the sensitive to the hand, the inanimate to pen, ink and paper, their action to writing, and their framed figures to those figures or letters which are written; in all which is a mutual agreement without noise or trouble. But give me leave, Madam, to tell you, That self-moving Matter may sometimes erre and move irregularly, and in some parts not move so strong, curious, or subtil at sometimes, as in other parts, for Nature delights in variety; Nevertheless she is more wise then any Particular Creature or part can conceive, which is the cause that Man thinks Nature's wise, subtil and lively actions, are as his own gross actions, conceiving them to be constrained and turbulent, not free and easie, as well as wise and knowing; Whereas Nature's Creating, Generating and Producing actions are by an easie connexion of parts to parts, without Counterbuffs, Joggs and Jolts, producing a particular figure by degrees, and in order and method, as humane sense and reason may well perceive: And why may not the sensitive and rational part of Matter know better how to make a Bee, then a Bee doth how to make Honey and Wax? or have a better communication betwixt them, then Bees that fly several ways, meeting and joyning to make their Combes in their Hives? But pardon, Madam, for I think it a Crime to compare the Creating, Generating and producing Corporeal Life and Wisdom of Nature unto any particular Creature, although every particular Creature hath their share, being a part of Nature. Wherefore those, in my opinion, do grossly err, that bind up the sensitive matter onely to taste, touch, hearing, seeing, and smelling; as if the sensitive parts of Nature had not more variety of actions, then to make five senses; for we may well observe, in every Creature there is difference of sense and reason according to the several modes of self-motion; For the Sun, Stars, Earth, Air, Fire, Water, Plants, Animals, Minerals; although they have all sense and knowledg, yet they have not all sense and knowledg alike, because sense and knowledg moves not alike in every kind or sort of Creatures, nay many times very different in one and the same Creature; but yet this doth not cause a general Ignorance, as to be altogether Insensible or Irrational, neither do the erroneous and irregular actions of sense and reason prove an annihilation of sense and reason; as for example, a man may become Mad or a Fool through the irregular motions of sense and reason, and yet have still the Perception of sense and reason, onely the alteration is caused through the alteration of the sensitive and rational corporeal motions or actions, from regular to irregular; nevertheless he has Perceptions, Thoughts, Ideas, Passions, and whatsoever is made by sensitive and rational Matter, neither can Perception be divided from Motion, nor Motion from Matter; for all sensation is Corporeal, and so is Perception. I can add no more, but take my leave, and rest,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend

and Servant.

VIII.

MADAM,

Your Author is pleased to say,[1] that Matter is a Principle purely passive, and no otherwise moved or modified, then as some other thing moves and modifies it, but cannot move it self at all; which is most demonstrable to them that contend for sense and perception in it: For if it had any such perception, it would, by vertue of its self-motion withdraw its self from under the knocks of hammers, or fury of the fire; or of its own accord approach to such things as are most agreeable to it, and pleasing, and that without the help of muscles, it being thus immediately endowed with a self-moving power. By his leave, Madam, I must tell you, that I see no consequence in this argument; Because some parts of matter cannot withdraw themselves from the force and power of other parts, therefore they have neither sense, reason, nor perception: For put the case, a man should be over-powr'd by some other men, truely he would be forced to suffer, and no Immaterial Spirits, I think, would assist him. The very same may be said of other Creatures or parts of Nature; for some may over-power others, as the fire, hammer and hand doth over-power a Horse-shooe, which cannot prevail over so much odds of power and strength; And so likewise it is with sickness and health, life and death; for example, some corporeal motions in the body turning Rebels, by moving contrary to the health of an animal Creature, it must become sick; for not every particular creature hath an absolute power, the power being in the Infinite whole, and not in single divided parts: Indeed, to speak properly, there is no such thing as an absolute power in Nature; for though Nature hath power to move it self, yet not beyond it self. But mistake me not, for I mean by an absolute Power; not a circumscribed and limited, but an unlimited power, no ways bound or confined, but absolutely or every way Infinite, and there is not anything that has such an absolute power but God alone: neither can Nature be undividable, being Corporeal or Material; nor rest from motion being naturally self-moving, and in a perpetual motion. Wherefore though Matter is self-moving, and very wise, (although your Author denies it, calling those Fools that maintain this opinion)[2] yet it cannot go beyond the rules of its Nature, no more then any Art can go beyond its Rules and Principles: And as for what your Author says, That every thing would approach to that, which is agreeable and pleasant; I think I need no demonstration to prove it; for we may plainly see it in all effects of Nature, that there is Sympathy and Antipathy, and what is this else, but approaching to things agreeable and pleasant, and withdrawing it self from things disagreeable, and hurtful or offensive? But of this subject I shall discourse more hereafter, wherefore I finish here, and rest,

Madam,

Your Faithful Friend

and Servant.

IX.

MADAM,

Your Authors opinion is,[1] That Matter being once actually divided as far as possibly it can, it is a perfect contradiction it should be divided any further. I answer, Though Nature is Infinite, yet her actions are not all dilative nor separative, but some divide and some compose, some dilate and some contract, which causes a mean betwixt Natures actions or motions. Next your Author says, That as Infinite Greatness has no Figure, so Infinite Littleness hath none also. I answer, Whatsoever hath a body, has a figure; for it is impossible that substance, or body, and figure, should be separated from each other, but wheresoever is body or substance, there is also figure, and if there be an infinite substance, there must also be an infinite figure, although not a certain determined or circumscribed figure, for such a figure belongs onely to finite particulars; and therefore I am of your Authors mind, That it is a contradiction to say an Infinite Cube or Triangle, for a Cube and a Triangle is a perfect circumscribed figure, having its certain compass and circumference, be it never so great or little; wherefore to say an Infinite Cube, would be as much as to say a Finite Infinite. But as for your Authors example of Infinite matter, space or duration, divided into three equal parts, all which he says must needs be Infinite, or else the whole will not be so, and then the middle part of them will seem both Finite and Infinite. I answer, That Matter is not dividable into three equal parts, for three is a finite number and so are three equal parts; but I say that Matter being an Infinite body, is dividable into Infinite parts, and it doth not follow, as your Author says, That one of those infinite parts must be infinite also, for else there would be no difference betwixt the whole and its parts; I say whole for distinctions and better expressions sake, and do not mean such a whole which hath a certain number of parts, and is of a certain and limited figure, although never so great; but an Infinite whole, which expression I must needs use, by reason I speak of Infinite parts; and that each one of these Infinite parts in number may be finite in substance or figure, is no contradiction, but very probable and rational; nay, I think it rather absurd to say that each part is infinite; for then there would be no difference betwixt parts and whole, as I said before. Onely this is to be observed, that the Infinite whole is Infinite in substance or bulk, but the parts are Infinite in number, and not in bulk, for each part is circumscribed, and finite in its exterior figure and substance. But mistake me not, when I speak of circumscribed and finite single parts; for I do not mean, that each part doth subsist single and by it self, there being no such thing as an absolute single part in Nature, but Infinite Matter being by self-motion divided into an infinite number of parts, all these parts have so near a relation to each other, and to the infinite whole, that one cannot subsist without the other; for the Infinite parts in number do make the Infinite whole, and the Infinite whole consists in the Infinite number of parts; wherefore it is onely their figures which make a difference betwixt them; for each part having its proper figure different from the other, which is circumscribed and limited, it is called a finite single part; and such a part cannot be said Infinitely dividable, for infinite composition and division belong onely to the Infinite body of Nature, which being infinite in substance may also be infinitely divided, but not a finite and single part: Besides, Infinite composition doth hinder the Infinite division, and Infinite division hinders the Infinite composition; so that one part cannot be either infinitely composed, or infinitely divided; and it is one thing to be dividable, and another to be divided. And thus, when your Author mentions in another place,[2] That if a body be divisible into Infinite Parts, it hath an Infinite number of extended parts: If by extension he mean corporeal dimension, I am of his opinion; for there is no part, be it never so little in Nature, but is material; and if material, it has a body; and if a body, it must needs have a bodily dimension; and so every part will be an extended part: but since there is no part but is finite in its self, it cannot be divisible into infinite parts; neither can any part be infinitely dilated or contracted; for as composition and division do hinder and obstruct each other from running into Infinite, so doth dilation hinder the Infinite contraction, and contraction the Infinite dilation, which, as I said before, causes a mean betwixt Nature's actions; nevertheless, there are Infinite dilations and contractions in Nature, because there are Infinite contracted and dilated parts, and so are infinite divisions because there are infinite divided parts; but contraction, dilation, extension, composition, division, and the like, are onely Nature's several actions; and as there can be no single part in Nature that is Infinite, so there can neither be any single Infinite action. But as for Matter, Motion and Figure, those are Individable and inseparable, and make but one body or substance; for it is as impossible to divide them, as impossible it is to your Author to separate the essential proprieties, which he gives, from an Immortal Spirit; And as Matter, Motion and Figure are inseparable; so is likewise Matter, Space, Place and Duration; For Parts, Motion, Figure, Place and Duration, are but one Infinite body; onely the Infinite parts are the Infinite divisions of the Infinite body, and the Infinite body is a composition of the Infinite parts; but figure, place and body are all one, and so is time, and duration, except you will call time the division of duration, and duration the composition of time; but infinite time, and infinite duration is all one in Nature: and thus Nature's Principal motions and actions are dividing, composing, and disposing or ordering, according to her Natural wisdom, by the Omnipotent God's leave and permission. Concerning the Sun, which your Author speaks of in the same place, and denies him to be a Spectator of our particular affairs upon Earth; saying, there is no such divine Principle in him, whereby he can do it. I will speak nothing again it, nor for it; but I may say, that the Sun hath such a Principle as other Creatures have, which is, that he has sensitive and rational corporeal motions, as well as animals or other Creatures, although not in the same manner, nor the same organs; and if he have sensitive and rational motions, he may also have sensitive and rational knowledg or perception, as well as man, or other animals and parts of Nature have, for ought any body knows; for it is plain to humane sense and reason, that all Creatures must needs have rational and sensitive knowledg, because they have all sensitive and rational matter and motions. But leaving the Sun for Astronomers to contemplate upon, I take my leave, and rest,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend,

and Servant.

X.

MADAM,

Your Author in his arguments against Motion, being a Principle of Nature,[1] endeavours to prove, that Beauty, Colour, Symmetry, and the like, in Plants, as well as in other Creatures, are no result from the meer motion of the matter; and forming this objection, It may be said, says he, That the regular motion of the matter made the first plant of every kind; but we demand, What regulated the motion of it, so as to guide it, to form it self into such a state? I answer, The Wisdom of Nature or infinite Matter did order its own actions so, as to form those her Parts into such an exact and beautiful figure, as such a Tree, or such a Flower, or such a Fruit, and the like; and some of her Parts are pleased and delighted with other parts, but some of her parts are afraid or have an aversion to other parts; and hence is like and dislike, or sympathy and antipathy, hate and love, according as nature, which is infinite self-moving matter, pleases to move; for though Natural Wisdom is dividable into parts, yet these parts are united in one infinite Body, and make but one Being in it self, like as the several parts of a man make up but one perfect man; for though a man may be wise in several causes or actions, yet it is but one wisdom; and though a Judg may shew Justice in several causes, yet it is but one Justice; for Wisdom and Justice, though they be practised in several causes, yet it is but one Wisdom, and one Justice; and so, all the parts of a mans body, although they move differently, yet are they but one man's bodily actions; Just as a man, if he carve or cut out by art several statues, or draw several Pictures, those statues or pictures are but that one man's work. The like may be said of Natures Motions and Figures; all which are but one self-active or self-moving Material Nature. But Wise Nature's Ground or Fundamental actions are very Regular, as you may observe in the several and distinct kinds, sorts and particulars of her Creatures, and in their distinct Proprieties, Qualities, and Faculties, belonging not onely to each kind and sort, but to each particular Creature; and since man is not able to know perfectly all those proprieties which belong to animals, much less will he be able to know and judg of those that are in Vegetables, Minerals and Elements; and yet these Creatures, for any thing Man knows, may be as knowing, understanding, and wise as he; and each as knowing of its kind or sort, as man is of his; But the mixture of ignorance and knowledg in all Creatures proceeds from thence, that they are but Parts; and there is no better proof, that the mind of man is dividable, then that it is not perfectly knowing; nor no better proof that it is composeable, then that it knows so much: but all minds are not alike, but some are more composed then others, which is the cause, some know more then others; for if the mind in all men were alike, all men would have the same Imaginations, Fancies, Conceptions, Memories, Remembrances, Passions, Affections, Understanding, and so forth: The same may be said of their bodies; for if all mens sensitive parts were as one, and not dividable and composeable, all their Faculties, Proprieties, Constitutions, Complexions, Appetites, would be the same in every man without any difference; but humane sense and reason doth well perceive, that neither the mind, life nor body are as one piece, without division and composition. Concerning the divine Soul, I do not treat of it; onely this I may say, That all are not devout alike, nor those which are, are not at all times alike devout. But to conclude: some of our modern Philosophers think they do God good service, when they endeavour to prove Nature, as Gods good Servant, to be stupid, ignorant, foolish and mad, or any thing rather then wise, and yet they believe themselves wise, as if they were no part of Nature; but I cannot imagine any reason why they should rail on her, except Nature had not given them as great a share or portion, as she hath given to others; for children in this case do often rail at their Parents, for leaving their Brothers and Sisters more then themselves. However, Nature can do more then any of her Creatures: and if Man can Paint, Imbroider, Carve, Ingrave curiously; why may not Nature have more Ingenuity, Wit and Wisdom then any of her particular Creatures? The same may be said of her Government. And so leaving Wise Nature, I rest,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend

and Servant.

XI.

MADAM,

To your Authors argument,[1] That if Motion belong naturally to Matter, Matter being Uniform, it must be alike moved in every part or particle imaginable of it, by reason this Motion being natural and essential to Matter, is alike every way. I answer, That this is no more necessary, then that the several actions of one body, or of one part of a body should be alike; for though Matter is one and the same in its Nature, and never changes, yet the motions are various, which motions are the several actions of one and the same Natural Matter; and this is the cause of so many several Creatures; for self-moving matter by its self-moving power can act several ways, modes or manners; and had not natural matter a self-acting power, there could not be any variety in Nature; for Nature knows of no rest, there being no such thing as rest in Nature; but she is in a perpetual motion, I mean self-motion, given her from God: Neither do I think it Atheistical (as your Author deems) to maintain this opinion of self-motion, as long as I do not deny the Omnipotency of God; but I should rather think it Irreligious to make so many several Creatures as Immaterial Spirits, like so many severall Deities, to rule and govern Nature and all material substances in Nature; for what Atheism doth there lie in saying, that natural matter is naturally moving, and wise in her self? Doth this oppose the omnipotency and Infinite wisdom of God? It rather proves and confirms it; for all Natures free power of moving and wisdom is a gift of God, and proceeds from him; but I must confess, it destroys the power of Immaterial substances, for Nature will not be ruled nor governed by them, and to be against Natural Immaterial substances, I think, is no Atheisme, except we make them Deities; neither is Atheisme to contradict the opinion of those, that believe such natural incorporeal Spirits, unless man make himself a God. But although Nature is wise, as I said before, and acts methodically, yet the variety of motions is the cause of so many Irregularities in Nature, as also the cause of Irregular opinions; for all opinions are made by self-moving matters motions, or (which is all one) by corporeal self-motion, and some in their opinions do conceive Nature according to the measure of themselves, as that Nature can, nor could not do more, then they think, nay, some believe they can do as much as Nature doth; which opinions, whether they be probable or regular, I'le let any man judg; adding onely this, that to humane sense and reason it appears plainly, that as God has given Nature a power to act freely, so he doth approve of her actions, being wise and methodical in all her several Productions, Generations, Transformations and Designs: And so I conclude for the present, onely subscribe my self, as really I am,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend,

and Servant.

XII.

MADAM,

I am of your Authors opinion, concerning self-activity or self-motion,[1] That what is Active of it self, can no more cease to be active then to be: And I have been always of this opinion, even from the first beginning of my conceptions in natural Philosophy, as you may see in my first Treatise of Natural Philosophy, which I put forth eleven years since; where I say, That self-moving Matter is in a Perpetual motion; But your Author endeavors from thence to conclude, That Matter is not self active, because it is reducible to rest. To which I answer, That there is no such thing as Rest in Nature: Not do I say, that all sorts of motions are subject to our senses, for those that are subject to our sensitive Perceptions, are but gross Motions, in comparison to those that are not subject to our exterior senses: as for example; We see some bodies dilate, others consume, others corrupt; yet we do not see how they dilate, nor how they consume, nor how they corrupt: Also we see some bodies contract, some attract, some condense, some consist, &c. yet we do not see their contracting, attracting, condensing, consisting or retenting motions; and yet we cannot say, they are not corporeal motions, because not subject to our exterior senses; for if there were not contracting, attracting, retenting or consistent corporeal self-motions, it had been impossible that any creature could have been composed into one united figure, much less stayed and continued in the same figure without a general alteration. But your Author says, If Matter, as Matter, had Motion, nothing would hold together, but Flints, Adamants, Brass, Iron, yea, this whole Earth, would suddenly melt into a thinner substance then the subtil Air, or rather it never had been condensated together to this consistency we find it. But I would ask him, what reason he can give, that corporeal self-motion should make all matter rare and fluid, unless he believe there is but one kind of motion in Nature, but this, human sense and reason will contradict; for we may observe there are Infinite changes of Motion, and there is more variety and curiosity in corporeal motions, then any one single Creature can imagine, much less know; but I suppose he conceives all corporeal matter to be gross, and that not any corporeal motion can be subtil, penetrating, contracting and dilating; and that whatsoever is penetrating, contracting and dilating, is Individable: But by his leave, Madam, this doth not follow; for though there be gross degrees of Matter, and strong degrees of Corporeal Motions, yet there are also pure and subtil degrees of Matter and Motions; to wit, that degree of Matter, which I name sensitive and rational Matter, which is natural Life and Knowledg, as sensitive Life and rational Knowledg. Again, your Author askes, What glue or cement holds the parts of hard matter in Stones and Metals together? I answer, Consistent or retentive corporeal motions, by an agreeable union and conjunction in the several parts of Metal or Stone; and these retentive or consistent motions, are as strong and active, if not more, then some dilative or contractive motions; for I have mentioned heretofore, that, as sensitive and rational corporeal motions are in all Creatures, so also in Stone, Metal, and any other dense body whatsoever; so that not any one Creature or part of Matter is without Motion, and therefore not any thing is at rest. But, Madam, I dare say, I could bring more reason and sense to prove, that sensitive and rational Matter is fuller of activity, and has more variety of motion, and can change its own parts of self-moving Matter more suddenly, and into more exterior figures, then Immaterial Spirits can do upon natural Matter. But your Author says, That Immaterial Spirits are endued with Sense and Reason; I say, My sensitive and rational corporeal Matter is Sense and Reason it self, and is the Architect or Creator of all figures of Natural matter, for though all the parts of Matter are not self-moving, yet there is not any part that is not moving or moved, by and with the mover, which is animate matter. And thus I conclude, and rest constantly,

Madam,

Your Faithful Friend

and Servant.

XIII.

MADAM,

That Matter is uncapable of Sense, your Author proves by the example of dead Carcasses;[1] For, says he, Motion and Sense being really one and the same thing, it must needs follow, that where there is motion, there is also sense and perception; but on the contrary, there is Reaction in dead Carcasses, and yet no Sense. I answer shortly, That it is no consequence, because there is no animal sense nor exterior perceptible local motion in a dead Carcass, therefore there is no sense at all in it; for though it has not animal sense, yet it may nevertheless have sense according to the nature of that figure, into which it did change from being an animal. Also he says, If any Matter have sense, it will follow, that upon reaction all shall have the like; and that a Bell while it is ringing, and a Bow while it is bent, and every Jack-in-a-box, that School-boys play with, shall be living animals. I answer, It is true, if reaction made sense; but reaction doth not make sense, but sense makes reaction; and though the Bell hath not an animal knowledg, yet it may have a mineral life and knowledg, and the Bow, and the Jack-in-a-box a vegetable knowledg; for the shape and form of the Bell, Bow, and Jack-in-a-box, is artificial; nevertheless each in its own kind may have as much knowledg as an animal in his kind; onely they are different according to the different proprieties of their Figures: And who can prove the contrary that they have not? For certainly Man cannot prove what he cannot know; but Mans nature is so, that knowing but little of other Creatures, he presently judges there is no more knowledg in Nature, then what Man, at least Animals, have; and confines all sense onely to Animal sense, and all knowledg to Animal knowledg. Again says your Author, That Matter is utterly uncapable of such operations as we find in our selves, and that therefore there is something in us Immaterial or Incorporeal; for we find in our selves that one and the same thing, both hears, and sees, and tastes, and perceives all the variety of objects that Nature manifests unto us. I answer, That is the reason there is but one matter, and that all natural perception is made by the animate part of matter; but although there is but one matter in Nature, yet there are several parts or degrees, and consequently several actions of that onely matter, which causes such a variety of perceptions, both sensitive and rational: the sensitive perception is made by the sensitive corporeal motions, copying out the figures of forreign objects in the sensitive organs of the sentient; and if those sensitive motions do pattern out forreign objects in each sensitive organ alike at one and the same time, then we hear, see, taste, touch and smell, at one and the same time: But Thoughts and Passions, as Imagination, Conception, Fancy, Memory, Love, Hate, Fear, Joy, and the like, are made by the rational corporeal motions in their own degree of matter, to wit, the rational. And thus all perception is made by one and the same matter, through the variety of its actions or motions, making various and several figures, both sensitive and rational. But all this variety in sense and reason, or of sensitive and rational perceptions, is not made by parts pressing upon parts, but by changing their own parts of matter into several figures by the power of self-motion: For example, I see a Man or Beast; that Man or Beast doth not touch my eye, in the least, neither in it self, nor by pressing the adjoyning parts: but the sensitive corporeal motions streight upon the sight of the Man or Beast make the like figure in the sensitive organ, the Eye, and in the eyes own substance or matter, as being in the eye as well as the other degrees of matter, to wit, the rational and inanimate, for they are all mixt together. But this is to be observed, That the rational matter can and doth move in its own substance, as being the purest and subtillest degree of matter; but the sensitive being not so pure and subtil, moves always with the inanimate Matter, and so the perceptive figures which the rational Matter, or rational corporeal Motions make, are made in their own degree of Matter; but those figures which the sensitive patterns out, are made in the organs or parts of the sentient body proper to such or such a sense or perception: as in an animal Creature, the perception of sight is made by the sensitive corporeal motions in the Eye; the perception of hearing, in the Ear, and so forth. As for what your Author says, That we cannot conceive any portion of Matter, but is either hard or soft; I answer, That these are but effects of Matters actions, and so is rare, and dense, and the like; but there are some Creatures which seem neither perfectly rare, nor dense, nor hard, nor soft, but of mixt qualities; as for example, Quicksilver seems rare, and yet is dense; soft, and yet is hard; for though liquid Quicksilver is soft to our touch, and rare to our sight, yet it is so dense and hard, as not to be readily dissolved from its nature; and if there be such contraries and mixtures in one particular creature made of self-moving Matter, what will there not be in Matter it self, according to the old saying: If the Man such praise shall have; What the Master that keeps the knave? So if a particular Creature hath such opposite qualities and mixtures of corporeal motions, what will the Creator have which is self-moving Matter? Wherefore it is impossible to affirm, that self-moving Matter is either all rare, or all dense, or all hard, or all soft; because by its self-moving power it can be either, or both, and so by the change and variety of motion, there may be soft and rare Points, and hard and sharp Points, hard and contracted Globes, and soft and rare Globes; also there may be pressures of Parts without printing, and printing without pressures. Concerning that part of Matter which is the Common Sensorium, your Author demands, Whether some point of it receive the whole Image of the object, or whether it be wholly received into every point of it? I answer, first, That all sensitive Matter is not in Points; Next, That not any single part can subsist of it self; and then that one Part doth not receive all parts or any part into it self; but that Parts by the power of self-motion can and do make several figures of all sizes and sorts, and can Epitomize a great object into a very little figure; for outward objects do not move the body, but the sensitive and rational matter moves according to the figures of outward objects: I do not say always, but most commonly; But, says your Author, How can so smal a Point receive the Images of so vast or so various objects at once, without obliteration or confusion. First, I answer, That, as I said before, sensitive Matter is not bound up to a Point, nor to be a single self-subsisting Part. Next, as for confusion, I say, that the sensitive matter makes no more confusion, then an Engraver, when he engraves several figures in a small stone, and a Painter draws several figures in a small compass; for a Carver will cut out several figures in a Cherry-stone, and a Lady in a little black Patch; and if gross and rude Art is able to do this, what may not Ingenious and Wise Nature do? And as Nature is ingenious and knowing in her self, so in her Parts, and her Parts in her; for neither whole nor Parts are ignorant, but have a knowledg, each according to the motion of its own Parts; for knowledg is in Motion, and Motion in Matter; and the diversity and variety of motion is the diversity and variety of knowledg, so that every particular figure and motion hath its particular knowledg, as well as its proper and peculiar parts; and as the parts join or divide, so doth knowledg, which many times causes Arts to be lost and found, and memory and remembrance in Particular Creatures: I do not say, they are utterly lost in nature, but onely in respect to particular Creatures, by the dissolving and dividing of their particular figures. For the rational matter, by reason it moves onely in its own parts, it can change and rechange into several figures without division of parts, which makes memory and remembrance: But men not considering or believing there might be such a degree of onely matter, namely rational, it has made them erre in their judgments. Nevertheless there is a difference between sensitive and rational parts and motions, and yet they are agreeable most commonly in their actions, though not always. Also the rational can make such figures as the sensitive cannot, by reason the rational has a greater power and subtiler faculty in making variety, then the sensitive; for the sensitive is bound to move with the inanimate, but the rational moves onely in its own parts; for though the sensitive and rational oftentimes cause each other to move, yet they are not of one and the same degree of matter, nor have they the same motions. And this rational Matter is the cause of all Notions, Conceptions, Imaginations, Deliberation, Determination, Memory, and any thing else that belongs to the Mind; for this matter is the mind of Nature, and so being dividable, the mind of all Creatures, as the sensitive is the life; and it can move, as I said, more subtilly, and more variously then the sensitive, and make such figures as the sensitive cannot, without outward examples and objects. But all diversity comes by change of motion, and motions are as sympathetical and agreeing, as antipathetical and disagreeing; And though Nature's artificial motions, which are her Playing motions, are sometimes extravagant, yet in her fundamental actions there is no extravagancy, as we may observe by her exact rules in the various generations, the distinct kinds and sorts, the several exact measures, times, proportions and motions of all her Creatures, in all which her wisdom is well exprest, and in the variety her wise pleasure: To which I leave her, and rest,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend,

and Servant.

XIV.

MADAM,

If there be any sense and perception in Matter, says your Author,[1] it must needs be Motion or Reaction of one part of matter against another; and that all diversity of sense and perception doth necessarily arise from the diversity of the Magnitude, Figure, Posture, Vigour and Direction of Motion in Parts of the Matter; In which variety of perceptions, Matter hath none, but such, as are impressed by corporeal motions, that is to say, that are perceptions of some actions, or modificated Impressions of parts of matter bearing one against another. I have declared, Madam, my opinion concerning Perception in my former Letters, that all Perception is not Impression and Reaction, like as a Seal is printed on Wax: For example, the corporeal rational motions in the mind do not print, but move figuratively; but the sensitive motions do carve, print, engrave, and, as it were, pencil out, as also move figuratively in productions, and do often take patterns from the rational figures, as the rational motions make figures according to the sensitive patterns; But the rational can move without patterns, and so the sensitive: For surely, were a man born blind, deaf, dumb, and had a numb palsie in his exterior parts, the sensitive and rational motions would nevertheless move both in body and mind according to the nature of his figure; for though no copies were taken from outward objects, yet he would have thoughts, passions, appetites, and the like; and though he could not see exterior objects, nor hear exterior sounds, yet no question but he would see and hear interiously after the manner of dreams, onely they might not be any thing like to what is perceiveable by man in the World; but if he sees not the Sun-light, yet he would see something equivalent to it; and if he hears not such a thing as Words, yet he would hear something equivalent to words; for it is impossible, that his sensitive and rational faculties should be lost for want of an Ear, or an Eye; so that Perception may be without exterior object, or marks, or patterns: for although the sensitive Motions do usually pattern out the figures of exterior objects, yet that doth not prove, but they can make interior figures without such objects. Wherefore Perception is not always Reaction, neither is Perception and Reaction really one thing; for though Perception and Action is one and the same, yet not always Reaction; but did Perception proceed from the reaction of outward objects, a blind and deaf man would not so much as dream; for he would have no interior motion in the head, having no other exterior sense but touch, which, if the body was troubled with a painful disease, he would neither be sensible of, but to feel pain, and interiously feel nothing but hunger and fulness; and his Mind would be as Irrational as some imagine Vegetables and Minerals are. To which opinion I leave them, and rest,

Madam,

Your Faithful Friend

and Servant.

XV.

MADAM,

Your Author is pleased, in Mirth, and to disgrace the opinion of those which hold, that Perception is made by figuring, to bring in this following example:[1] Suppose, says he, one Particle should shape it self into a George on Horse-back with a Lance in his hand, and another into an Inchanted Castle; this George on Horse-back must run against the Castle, to make the Castle receive his impress and similitude: But what then? Truly the Encounter will be very Unfortunate, for S. George indeed may easily break his Lance, but it is impossible that he should by justling against the Particle in the form of a Castle, conveigh the intire shape of himself and his Horse thereby, such as we find our selves able to imagine of a man on Horse-back; which is a Truth as demonstrable as any Theorem in Mathematicks. I answer, first, That there is no Particle single and alone by it self; Next, I say, It is more easie for the rational matter to put it self into such figures, and to make such encounters, then for an Immaterial mind or substance to imagine it; for no imagination can be without figure, and how should an Immaterial created substance present such Figures, but by making them either in it self or upon matter? For S. George and the Castle are figures, and their encounters are real fighting actions, and how such figures and actions can be in the mind or memory, and yet not be, is impossible to conceive; for, as I said, those figures and actions must be either in the incorporeal mind, or in the corporeal parts of matter; and if the figures and motions may be in an incorporeal substance, much more is it probable for them to be in a corporeal; nay if the figures and their actions can be in gross corporeal matter, why should they not be in the purest part of matter, which is the rational matter? And as for being made known to the whole body, and every part thereof, it is not necessary, no more then it is necessary, that the private actions of every Man or Family should be made known to the whole Kingdom, or Town, or Parish: But my opinion of self-corporeal motion and perception, may be as demonstrable as that of Immaterial Natural Spirits, which, in my mind, is not demonstrable at all, by reason it is not corporeal or material; For how can that be naturally demonstrable, which naturally is nothing? But your Author believes the Mind or rational Soul to be individable, and therefore concludes, that the Parts of the same Matter, although at great distance, must of necessity know each Particular act of each several Part; but that is not necessary; for if there were not ignorance through the division of Parts, every man and other creatures would know alike; and there is no better proof, that matter, or any particular creature in nature is not governed by a created Immaterial Spirit, then that knowledg is in parts; for the hand doth not know what pain the head feels, which certainly it would do, if the mind were not dividable into parts, but an individable substance. But this is well to be observed, that some parts in some actions agree generally in one body, and some not; as for example, temperance and appetite do not agree; for the corporeal actions of appetite desire to join with the corporeal actions of such or such other parts, but the corporeal actions of temperance do hinder and forbid it; whereupon there is a faction amongst the several parts: for example, a Man desires to be drunk with Wine; this desire is made by such corporeal actions as make appetite; the rational corporeal motions or actions which make temperance, oppose those that make appetite, and that sort of actions which hath the better, carryes it, the hand and other parts of the body obeying the strongest side; and if there be no wine to satisfie the appetite, yet many times the appetite continues; that is, the parts continue in the same motions that make such an appetite; but if the appetite doth not continue, then those parts have changed their motions; or when by drinking, the appetite is satisfied, and ceases, then those parts that made the appetite, have altered their former motions. But oftentimes the rational corporeal motions may so agree with the sensitive, as there may be no opposition or crossing at all, but a sympathetical mutual agreement betwixt them, at least an approvement; so that the rational may approve what the sensitive covet or desire: Also some motions of the rational, as also of the sensitive matter, may disagree amongst themselves, as we see, that a man will often have a divided mind; for he will love and hate the same thing, desire and not desire one and the same thing, as to be in Heaven, and yet to be in the World: Moreover, this is to be observed, That all rational perceptions or cogitations, are not so perspicuous and clear as if they were Mathematical Demonstrations, but there is some obscurity, more or less in them, at least they are not so well perceivable without comparing several figures together, which proves, they are not made by an individable, immaterial Spirit, but by dividable corporeal parts: As for example, Man writes oftentimes false, and seldom so exact, but he is forced to mend his hand, and correct his opinions, and sometimes quite to alter them, according as the figures continue or are dissolved and altered by change of motion, and according as the actions are quick or slow in these alterations, the humane mind is setled or wavering; and as figures are made, or dissolved and transformed, Opinions, Conceptions, Imaginations, Understanding, and the like, are more or less; And according as these figures last, so is constancy or inconstancy, memory or forgetfulness, and as those figures are repeated, so is remembrance; but sometimes they are so constant and permanent, as they last as long as the figure of the body, and sometimes it happens not once in an age, that the like figures are repeated, and sometimes they are repeated every moment: As for example; a man remembers or calls to mind the figure of another man, his friend, with all his qualities, dispositions, actions, proprieties, and the like, several times in an hour, and sometimes not once in a year, and so as often as he remembers him, as often is the figure of that man repeated; and as oft as he forgets him, so often is his figure dissolved. But some imagine the rational motions to be so gross as the Trotting of a Horse, and that all the motions of Animate matter are as rude and course as renting or tearing asunder, or that all impressions must needs make dents or creases. But as Nature hath degrees of corporeal matter, so she hath also degrees of corporeal motions, Matter and Motion being but one substance; and it is absurd to judg of the interior motions of self-moving matter, by artificial or exterior gross motions, as that all motions must be like the tearing of a sheet of Paper, or that the printing and patterning of several figures of rational and sensitive matter must be like the printing of Books; nay, all artificial Printings are not so hard, as to make dents and impresses; witness Writing, Painting, and the like; for they do not disturb the ground whereon the letters are written, or the picture drawn, and so the curious actions of the purest rational matter are neither rude nor rough; but although this matter is so subtil and pure, as not subject to exterior human senses and organs, yet certainly it is dividable, not onely in several Creatures, but in the several parts of one and the same Creature, as well as the sensitive, which is the Life of Nature, as the other is the Soul; not the Divine, but natural Soul; neither is this Soul Immaterial, but Corporeal; not composed of raggs and shreds, but it is the purest, simplest and subtillest matter in Nature. But to conclude, I desire you to remember, Madam, that this rational and sensitive Matter in one united and finite Figure or particular Creature, has both common and particular actions, for as there are several kinds and sorts of Creatures, and particulars in every kind and sort: so the like for the actions of the rational and sensitive matter in one particular Creature. Also it is to be noted, That the Parts of rational matter, can more suddenly give and take Intelligence to and from each other, then the sensitive; nevertheless, all Parts in Nature, at least adjoyning parts, have Intelligence between each other, more or less, because all parts make but one body; for it is not with the parts of Matter, as with several Constables in several Hundreds, or several Parishes, which are a great way distant from each other, but they may be as close as the combs of Bees, and yet as partable and as active as Bees. But concerning the Intelligence of Natures Parts, I have sufficiently spoken in other places; and so I'le add no more, but that I unfeignedly remain;

Madam,

Your faithful Friend

and Servant.

XVI.

MADAM,

Sensation in corporeal motion is first, and Perception follows, sayes your Author:[1] to which opinion I give no assent, but do believe that Perception and Sensation are done both at one and the same time, as being one and the same thing without division, either in reason or sense, and are performed without any knocks, or jolts, or hitting against. But let me tell you, Madam, there arises a great mistake by many, from not distinguishing well, sensitive Motion, and rational Motion; for though all motions are in one onely matter, yet that matter doth not move always in the same manner, for then there could be no variety in Nature; and truly, if man, who is but a part of Nature, may move diversly, and put himself into numerous postures; Why may not Nature? But concerning Motions, and their variety, to avoid tedious repetitions, I must still referr you to my Book of Philosophical Opinions; I'le add onely this, that it is well to be observed, That all Motions are not Impressions, neither do all Impressions make such dents, as to disturb the adjoyning Parts: Wherefore those, in my opinion, understand Nature best, which say, that Sensation and Perception are really one and the same; but they are out, that say, there can be no communication at a distance, unless by pressing and crowding; for the patterning of an outward object, may be done without any inforcement or disturbance, jogging or crowding, as I have declared heretofore; for the sensitive and rational motions in the sensitive and rational parts of matter in one creature, observing the exterior motions in outward objects, move accordingly, either regularly or irregularly in patterns; and if they have no exterior objects, as in dreams, they work by rote. And so to conclude, I am absolutely of their opinion, who believe, that there is nothing existent in Nature, but what is purely Corporeal, for this seems most probable in sense and reason to me,

Madam,

Your Faithful Friend

and Servant.

XVII.

MADAM,

Outward Objects, as I have told you before, do not make Sense and Reason, but Sense and Reason do perceive and judg of outward objects; For the Sun doth not make sight, nor doth sight make light; but sense and reason in a Man, or any other creature, do perceive and know there are such objects as Sun, and Light, or whatsoever objects are presented to them. Neither doth Dumbness, Deafness, Blindness, &c. cause an Insensibility, but Sense through irregular actions causes them; I say, through Irregular actions, because those effects do not properly belong to the nature of that kind of Creatures; for every Creature, if regularly made, hath particular motions proper to its figure; for natural Matters wisdom makes distinctions by her distinct corporeal motions, giving every particular Creature their due Portion and Proportion according to the nature of their figures, and to the rules of her actions, but not to the rules of Arts, Mathematical Compasses, Lines, Figures, and the like. And thus the Sun, Stars, Meteors, Air, Fire, Water, Earth, Minerals, Vegetables and Animals, may all have Sense and Reason, although it doth not move in one kind or sort of Creatures, or in one particular, as in another: For the corporeal motions differ not onely in kinds and sorts, but also in Particulars, as is perceivable by human sense and reason; Which is the cause, that Elements have elemental sense and knowledg, and Animals animal sense and knowledg, and so of Vegetables, Minerals, and the like. Wherefore the Sun and Stars may have as much sensitive and rational life and knowledg as other Creatures, but such as is according to the nature of their figures, and not animal, or vegetable, or mineral sense and knowledg. And so leaving them, I rest,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend

and Servant.

XVIII.

MADAM,

Your Author denying that Fancy, Reason and Animadversion are seated in the Brain, and that the Brain is figured into this or that Conception:[1] I demand, says he, in what knot, loop or interval thereof doth this faculty of free Fancy and active Reason reside? My answer is, that in my opinion, Fancy and Reason are not made in the Brain, as there is a Brain, but as there is sensitive and rational matter, which makes not onely the Brain, but all Thoughts, Conceptions, Imaginations, Fancy, Understanding, Memory, Remembrance, and whatsoever motions are in the Head, or Brain: neither doth this sensitive and rational matter remain or act in one place of the Brain, but in every part thereof; and not onely in every part of the Brain, but in every part of the Body; nay, not onely in every part of a Mans Body, but in every part of Nature. But, Madam, I would ask those, that say the Brain has neither sense, reason, nor self-motion, and therefore no Perception; but that all proceeds from an Immaterial Principle, as an Incorporeal Spirit, distinct from the body, which moveth and actuates corporeal matter; I would fain ask them, I say, where their Immaterial Ideas reside, in what part or place of the Body? and whether they be little or great? Also I would ask them, whether there can be many, or but one Idea of God? If they say many, then there must be several, distinct Deitical Ideas; if but one, Where doth this Idea reside? If they say in the head, then the heart is ignorant of God; if in the heart, then the head is ignorant thereof, and so for all parts of the body; but if they say, in every part, then that Idea may be disfigured by a lost member; if they say, it may dilate and contract, then I say it is not the Idea of God, for God can neither contract nor extend; nor can the Idea it self dilate and contract, being immaterial; for contraction and dilation belong onely to bodies, or material beings: Wherefore the comparisons betwixt Nature and a particular Creature, and between God and Nature, are improper; much more betwixt God and Natures particular motions and figures, which are various and changeable, although methodical. The same I may ask of the Mind of Man, as I do of the Idea in the Mind. Also I might ask them, what they conceive the natural mind of man to be, whether material or immaterial? If material, their opinion is rational, and so the mind is dividable and composable; if immaterial, then it is a Spirit; and if a Spirit, it cannot possibly dilate nor contract, having no dimension nor divisibility of parts, (although your Author proves it by the example of Light; but I have exprest my meaning heretofore, that light is divisible) and if it have no dimension, how can it be confined in a material body? Wherefore when your Author says, the mind is a substance, it is to my reason very probable; but not when he says, it is an immaterial substance, which will never agree with my sense and reason; for it must be either something, or nothing, there being no medium between, in Nature. But pray mistake me not, Madam, when I say Immaterial is nothing; for I mean nothing Natural, or so as to be a part of Nature; for God forbid, I should deny, that God is a Spiritual Immaterial substance, or Being; neither do I deny that we can have an Idea, notion, conception, or thought of the existence of God; for I am of your Authors opinion, That there is no Man under the cope of Heaven, that doth not by the light of Nature, know, and believe there is a God; but that we should have such a perfect Idea of God, as of any thing else in the World, or as of our selves, as your Author says, I cannot in sense and reason conceive to be true or possible. Neither am I against those Spirits, which the holy Scripture mentions, as Angels and Devils, and the divine Soul of Man; but I say onely, that no Immaterial Spirit belongs to Nature, so as to be a part thereof; for Nature is Material, or Corporeal; and whatsoever is not composed of matter or body, belongs not to Nature; nevertheless, Immaterial Spirits may be in Nature, although not parts of Nature. But there can neither be an Immaterial Nature, nor a Natural Immaterial; Nay, our very thoughts and conceptions of Immaterial are Material, as made of self-moving Matter. Wherefore to conclude, these opinions in Men proceed from a Vain-glory, as to have found out something that is not in Nature; to which I leave them, and their natural Immaterial Substances, like so many Hobgoblins to fright Children withal, resting in the mean time,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend,

and Servant.

XIX.

MADAM,

There are various opinions concerning the seat of Common Sense, as your Author rehearseth them in his Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul;[1] But my opinion is, That common sense hath also a common place; for as there is not any part of the body that hath not sense and reason, so sense and reason is in all parts of the body, as it is observable by this, that every part is subject to pain and pleasure, and all parts are moveable, moving and moved; also appetites are in every part of the body: As for example, if any part itches, it hath an appetite to be scratched, and every part can pattern out several objects, and so several touches; and though the rational part of matter is mixt in all parts of the body, yet it hath more liberty to make variety of Motions in the head, heart, liver, spleen, stomack, bowels, and the like, then in the other parts of the body; nevertheless, it is in every part, together with the sensitive: but they do not move in every part alike, but differ in each part more or less, as it may be observed; and although every part hath some difference of knowledg, yet all have life and knowledg, sense and reason, some more, some less, and the whole body moves according to each part, and so do all the bodily Faculties and Proprieties, and not according to one single part; the rational Soul being in all parts of the body: for if one part of the body should have a dead Palsie, it is not, that the Soul is gone from that part, but that the sensitive and rational matter has altered its motion and figure from animal to some other kind; for certainly, the rational Soul, and so life, is in every part, as well in the Pores of the skin, as in the ventricles of the brain, and as well in the heel as in the head; and every part of the body knows its own office, what it ought to do, from whence follows an agreement of all the parts: And since there is difference of knowledg in every part of one body, well may there be difference between several kinds and sorts, and yet there is knowledg in all; for difference of knowledg is no argument to prove they have no knowledg at all. Wherefore I am not of the opinion, that that which moves the whole body, is as a Point, or some such thing in a little kernel or Glandula of the Brain, as an Ostrich-egge is hung up to the roof of a Chamber; or that it is in the stomack like a single penny in a great Purse; neither is it in the midst of the heart, like a Lady in a Lobster; nor in the blood, like as a Menow, or Sprat in the Sea; nor in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, as a lousie Souldier in a Watch-tower. But you may say, it is like a farthing Candle in a great Church: I answer, That Light will not enlighten the by Chappels of the Church, nor the Quest-house, nor the Belfrey; neither doth the Light move the Church, though it enlightens it: Wherefore the Soul after this manner doth not move the corporeal body, no more then the Candle moves the Church, or the Lady moves the Lobster, or the Sprat the Sea as to make it ebb and flow. But this I desire you to observe, Madam, that though all the body of man or any other Creature, hath sense and reason, which is life and knowledg, in all parts, yet these parts being all corporeal, and having their certain proportions, can have no more then what is belonging or proportionable to each figure: As for example; if a Man should feed, and not evacuate some ways or other, he could not live; and if he should evacuate and not feed, he could not subsist: wherefore in all Natures parts there is ingress and egress, although not always perceived by one creature, as Man; but all exterior objects do not enter into Man, or any other Creature, but are figured by the rational, and some by the sensitive parts or motions in the body; wherefore it is not rational to believe, that exterior objects take up any more room, then if there were none presented to the sensitive organs: Nor is there any thing which can better prove the mind to be corporeal, then that there may be several Figures in several parts of the body made at one time, as Sight, Hearing, Tasting, Smelling, and Touching, and all these in each several organ, as well at one, as at several times, either by patterns, or not; which figuring without Pattern, may be done as well by the sensitive motions in the organs, as by the rational in the mind, and is called remembrance. As for example: a Man may hear or see without an object; which is, that the sensitive and rational matter repeat such figurative actions, or make others in the sensitive organs, or in the mind: and Thoughts, Memory, Imagination, as also Passion, are no less corporeal actions then the motion of the hand or heel; neither hath the rational matter, being naturally wise, occasion to jumble and knock her parts together, by reason every part knows naturally their office what they ought to do, or what they may do. But I conclude, repeating onely what I have said oft before, that all Perceptions, Thoughts, and the like, are the Effects, and Life and Knowledg, the Nature and Essence of self-moving Matter. And so I rest,

Madam,

Your Faithful Friend

and Servant.

XX.

MADAM,

I am not able to conceive how the Mind of Man can be compared to a Table-book, in which nothing is writ;[1] nor how to a Musician, who being asleep, doth not so much as dream of any Musick, but being jogg'd and awakend by another, who tells him two or three words of a Song, and desires him to sing it, presently recovers himself, and sings upon so slight an Intimation: For such intimations are nothing else but outward objects, which the interior sense consents to, and obeys; for interior sense and reason doth often obey outward objects: and in my opinion there is no rest in Nature, and so neither in the Mind or natural Soul of Man, which is in a perpetual motion, and needs therefore no jogging to put it into any actual motion; for it hath actual motion and knowledg in it self, because it is a self-moving substance, actually knowing, and Material or Corporeal, not Immaterial, as your Author thinks: and this material or corporeal Mind is nothing else but what I call the rational matter, and the corporeal life is the sensitive matter. But this is to be observed, that the motions of the corporeal Mind do often imitate the motions of the sensitive Life, and these again the motions of the mind: I say oftentimes; for they do it not always, but each one can move without taking any pattern from the other. And all this I understand of the Natural Soul of Man; not of the Divine Soul, and her powers and faculties, for I leave that to Divines to inform us of; onely this I say, that men not conceiving the distinction between this natural and divine Soul, make such a confusion betwixt those two Souls and their actions, which causes so many disputes and opinions. But if Nature hath power from God to produce all kinds of Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, Animals, and other sorts of Creatures, Why not also Man? Truly if all Creatures are natural Creatures, Man must be so too; and if Man is a natural Creature, he must needs have natural sense and reason, as well as other Creatures, being composed of the same matter they are of. Neither is it requisite, that all Creatures, being of the same matter, must have the same manner of sensitive and rational knowledg; which if so, it is not necessary for Corn to have Ears to hear the whistling or chirping of Birds, nor for Stones to have such a touch of feeling as animals have, and to suffer pain, as they do, when Carts go over them; as your Author is pleased to argue out of Æsopes Tales; or for the Heliotrope to have eyes to see the Sun: for what necessity is there that they should have humane sense and reason? which is, that the rational and sensitive matter should act and move in them as she doth in man or animals: Certainly if there must be any variety in nature, it is requisite she should not; wherefore all Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, and Animals, have their proper motions different from each others, not onely in their kinds and sorts, but also in their particulars. And though Stones have no progressive motion to withdraw themselves from the Carts going over them, which your Author thinks they would do, if they had sense, to avoid pain: nevertheless they have motion, and consequently sense and reason, according to the nature and propriety of their figure, as well as man has according to his. But this is also to be observed, that not any humane Creature, which is accounted to have the perfectest sense and reason, is able always to avoid what is hurtful or painful, for it is subject to it by Nature: Nay, the Immaterial Soul it self, according to your Author,[2] cannot by her self-contracting faculty withdraw her self from pain. Wherefore there is no manner of consequence to conclude from the sense of Animals to the sense of Minerals, they being as much different as their Figures are; And saying this, I have said enough to express the opinion and mind of,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend

and Servant.

XXI.

MADAM,

Your Author endeavours very much to prove the existency of a Natural Immaterial Spirit, whom he defines to be an Incorporeal substance, Indivisible, that can move it self, can penetrate, contract and dilate it self, and can also move and alter the matter. Whereof, if you will have my opinion, I confess freely to you, that in my sense and reason I cannot conceive it to be possible, that these is any such thing in Nature; for all that is a substance in Nature, is a body, and what has a body, is corporeal; for though there be several degrees of matter, as in purity, rarity, subtilty, activity; yet there is no degree so pure, rare and subtil, that can go beyond its nature, and change from corporeal to incorporeal, except it could change from being something to nothing, which is impossible in Nature. Next, there is no substance in Nature that is not divisible; for all that is a body, or a bodily substance, hath extension, and all extension hath parts, and what has parts, is divisible. As for self-motion, contraction and dilation, these are actions onely of Natural Matter; for Matter by the Power of God is self-moving, and all sorts of motions, as contraction, dilation, alteration, penetration, &c. do properly belong to Matter; so that natural Matter stands in no need to have some Immaterial or Incorporeal substance to move, rule, guide and govern her; but she is able enough to do it all her self, by the free Gift of the Omnipotent God; for why should we trouble our selves to invent or frame other unconceivable substances, when there is no need for it, but Matter can act, and move as well without them and of it self? Is not God able to give such power to Matter, as to an other Incorporeal substance? But I suppose this opinion of natural Immaterial Spirits doth proceed from Chymistry, where the extracts are vulgarly called Spirits; and from that degree of Matter, which by reason of its purity, subtilty and activity, is not subject to our grosser senses; However, these are not Incorporeal, be they never so pure and subtil. And I wonder much that men endeavour to prove Immaterial Spirits by corporeal Arts, when as Art is not able to demonstrate Nature and her actions; for Art is but the effect of Nature, and expresses rather the variety, then the truth of natural motions; and if Art cannot do this, much less will it be able to express what is not in Nature, or what is beyond Nature; as to trace the Visible (or rather Invisible) footsteps of the divine Councel and Providence,[1] or to demonstrate things supernatural, and which go beyond mans reach and capacity. But to return to Immaterial Spirits, that they should rule and govern infinite corporeal matter, like so many demy-Gods, by a dilating nod, and a contracting frown, and cause so many kinds and sorts of Corporeal Figures to arise, being Incorporeal themselves, is Impossible for me to conceive; for how can an Immaterial substance cause a Material corporeal substance, which has no motion in it self, to form so many several and various figures and creatures, and make so many alterations, and continue their kinds and sorts by perpetual successions of Particulars? But perchance the Immaterial substance gives corporeal matter motion. I answer, My sense and reason cannot understand, how it can give motion, unless motion be different, distinct and separable from it; nay, if it were, yet being no substance or body it self, according to your Authors and others opinion, the question is, how it can be transmitted or given away to corporeal matter? Your Author may say, That his Immaterial and Incorporeal spirit of Nature, having self-motion, doth form Matter into several Figures: I answer, Then that Immaterial substance must be transformed and metamorphosed into as many several figures as there are figures in Matter; or there must be as many spirits, as there are figures; but when the figures change, what doth become of the spirits? Neither can I imagine, that an Immaterial substance, being without body, can have such a great strength, as to grapple with gross, heavy, dull, and dead Matter; Certainly, in my opinion, no Angel, nor Devil, except God Impower him, would be able to move corporeal Matter, were it not self-moving, much less any Natural Spirit. But God is a Spirit, and Immovable; and if created natural Immaterial participate of that Nature, as they do of the Name, then they must be Immovable also. Your Author, Madam, may make many several degrees of Spirits; but certainly not I, nor I think any natural Creature else, will be able naturally to conceive them. He may say, perchance, There is such a close conjunction betwixt Body and Spirit, as I make betwixt rational, sensitive, and inanimate Matter. I answer, That these degrees are all but one Matter, and of one and the same Nature as meer Matter, different onely in degrees of purity, subtilty, and activity, whereas Spirit and Body are things of contrary Natures. In fine, I cannot conceive, how a Spirit should fill up a place or space, having no body, nor how it can have the effects of a body, being none it self; for the effects flow from the cause; and as the cause is, so are its effects: And so confessing my ignorance, I can say no more, but rest,