IV (continued 2)

Two years after the end of the war R. Poincaré wrote that the League of Nations would lose its best possibility of lasting if, un jour, it did not reunite all the nations of Europe. But he added that of all the conquered nations—Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey and Germany—the last-mentioned, by her conduct during the War and after the peace, justified least a near right of entry. It would be incontestablement plus naturel (of how many things does nature occupy herself!) to let Austria enter first if she will disavow the policy of reattachment—that is, being purely German, renounce against the principle of nationality, in spite of the principle of auto-decision, when she cannot live alone, to unite herself to Germany; Bulgaria and Turkey as long as they had a loyal and courteous attitude towards Greece, Rumania and Serbia. The turn of Germany will come, but only after Turkey, when she will have given proof of executing the treaty, which no reasonable and honest person considers any more executable in its integrity.

The most characteristic facts of this peace which continues the War can be recapitulated as follows:

1. Europe on the whole has more men under arms than before the War. The conquered States are forced to disarm, but the conquering States have increased the armaments; the new States and the countries which have come through the War have increased their armaments.

2. Production is very tardily being taken up again because there is everywhere, if in a different degree, a lesser desire for work on the part of the working classes joined with a need for higher remuneration.

3. The difficulties of trade, instead of decreasing in many countries of Europe are increasing, and international commerce is very slowly recovering. Between the States of Europe there is not a real commerce which can compare with that under normal conditions. Considering actual values with values before the War, the products which now form the substance of trade between European countries do not represent even the half of that before the War.

As the desire for consumption, if not the capacity for consumption, has greatly increased, and the production is greatly decreased, all the States have increased their functions. So the discredit of the paper money and the Treasury bills which permit these heavy expenses is in all the countries of Europe, even if in different degrees, very great.

The conquering countries, from the moment that they had obtained in the treaties of peace the acknowledgment of the conquered that the War was caused by them, held it to be legitimate that they should lose all their disposable goods, their colonies, their ships, their credits and their commercial organization abroad, but that the conquered should also pay all the damages of the War. The War, therefore, should be paid for by the conquered, who recognized (even if against their will) that they were alone responsible. That forms henceforth a certain canon of foreign politics, the less a thing appears true the more it is repeated.

Although the treaties oblige Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey to pay the damages of the War, it is, however, certain that they are not able to pay anything and not even the expenses of the victors on their territory. "Cantabit vacuus coram latrone viator," said Juvenal ("Who has nothing can give nothing"), and Austria, for her part, instead of giving is imploring food succour.

So the problem remains limited to Germany. Can she pay the indemnity indicated in the treaty? Can she pay for the damages and indemnify the victors? After having given up her colonies, her ships, her railway material, all her disposable credits abroad, in what form can she pay?

The fundamental controversy reduces itself henceforth only to this point, which we shall try if possible to make clear, since we desire that this matter shall be presented in the clearest and most evident form.

From now on it is not the chancelleries which must impose the solutions of great problems; but it is the mass of the public in Europe and America.