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Our War with Spain for Cuba's Freedom

Chapter L · (continued 2)

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The Pluton also was disabled, and headed for the shore. She was beached under a low bluff, where a heavy sea was running, and was soon pounded so that she broke in two in the middle. Only about half of the crew reached the shore alive.

Having disposed of the two destroyers the Gloucester lowered her small boats and sent them ashore to rescue the Spanish sailors. The Furor drifted about until the fire reached her magazines, and then there were two terrific explosions which shattered her hull. Her stern sunk quickly, and as it went down her bow rose until it stood almost straight up in the air, and in this position she disappeared from sight.

TEST OF BATTLESHIPS.

While the little yacht had been gaining this notable victory over the two famous destroyers the big battleships had been following the line of Spanish cruisers and pounding them with great persistence. The four Spanish cruisers were under the direct fire of the Brooklyn, and the four battleships, the Massachusetts, the Texas, the Iowa and the Oregon. It was the first time that any first-class battleship had ever been put to the test in a naval battle. The huge fighting vessels kept close after the fast cruisers and fired their big guns with deadly certainty. The American fire was so rapid that the ships were surrounded by clouds of smoke.

The Spanish gunners seemed unable to get the proper range and many of their shots were very wild, though a number of them fell dangerously near to the mark.

Two guns of the battery just east of Morro also took part in the game and their shells fell around the American ships. Many of them struck the upper works of the fleeing Spaniards and must have resulted in killing and wounding many of their men.

The Spanish ships had now reached a point about seven miles west of Morro and a mile or two beyond the place where the Furor was burning and the Pluton broken in two against the cliff.

The flagship and the Oquendo were the first to show signals of distress. Two thirteen-inch shells from one of the battleships had struck the Maria Teresa at the water line, tearing great holes in her side and causing her to fill rapidly. The Oquendo suffered about the same fate and both ships headed for a small cove and went aground 200 yards from the shore, flames shooting from them in every direction.

The Gloucester, after sending a boat ashore to the Pluton, steamed along the coast to where the armored cruisers were stranded and went to their assistance. There was danger from the magazines, and many of those on board jumped into the water and swam to the shore, though a number were unable to reach the small strip of sandy beach in the cove and were thrown against the rocks and killed or drowned. Many of the wounded were lowered into the ships' own boats and taken ashore, but this task was a most difficult one.

The Gloucester had all her boats out and one seaman swam through the surf with a line from the Maria Teresa, making it fast to a tree on the shore. By this means many on the flagship, including Admiral Cervera, lowered themselves into the Gloucester's boats. The wounded were taken to the Gloucester as rapidly as possible, and the lower deck of the yacht was soon covered with Spanish sailors mangled in limb and body by the bursting of shells.

CHASE OF THE CRISTOBAL COLON.

The Brooklyn, Oregon, Massachusetts and Texas and several smaller vessels continued the chase of the Cristobal Colon, and in less than an hour were lost to view of the burning ships on shore. The Iowa and Texas both gave assistance to the imperiled crew of the Vizcaya. Her Captain surrendered his command and the prisoners were transferred to the battleship. The Vizcaya probably lost about sixty men, as she carried a complement of 400 and only 340 were taken aboard the Iowa.

Soon after Admiral Cervera reached the shore and surrendered he was taken to the Gloucester, at his own request. There was no mistaking the heartbroken expression upon the old commander's face as he took the proffered hand of Captain Wainwright and was shown to the latter's cabin, but he made every effort to bear bravely the bitter defeat that had come to him. He thanked the Captain of the Gloucester for the words of congratulation offered on the gallant fight, and then spoke earnestly of his solicitude for the safety of his men on shore. He informed Captain Wainwright that Cuban soldiers were on the hills preparing to attack his unarmed men and asked that they be protected.

For hours after Admiral Cervera went aboard the Gloucester the Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo and Vizcaya continued to burn and every now and then a deep roar, accompanied by a burst of flame and smoke from the sides of the ships, would announce the explosion of more ammunition or another magazine.

It may be mentioned as a coincidence that Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, the Commander of the Gloucester, was executive officer of the Maine at the time of the disaster, and, although he remained in Havana harbor two months after the explosion, he lived on board the dispatch boat Fern and steadfastly refused to set his foot within the city until the time should come when he could go ashore at the head of a landing party of American blue jackets. To-day it was his ship that sank two Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers and afterward received the Spanish Admiral aboard as a prisoner of war.

From his position on the bridge of the Gloucester Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright watched the flames and smoke as they enveloped the decks of the three greatest warships of the Spanish navy, which were soon to be reduced to nothing but shattered masts and twisted smokestacks protruding above the water.

The prisoners of war included the captains of both boats. None offered any resistance and all were glad to go to the Gloucester, as they feared an attack from the Cubans.

When asked to make some statement in regard to the result of the battle Admiral Cervera said: "I would rather lose my ships at sea, like a sailor, than in a harbor. It was the only thing left for me to do."

The work of the American battleships was as rapid as it was terrible. At 9:35 the first vessel headed out past Morro Castle. At 10 o'clock the two destroyers were wrecked and deserted. At 10:15 the Oquendo and Maria Teresa were encircled by the Iowa, Indiana and Texas. At 10:40 both were on the rocks. A few minutes later the Vizcaya was abandoned.

The Cristobal Colon, having the lead, ran farther along the coast before the persistent firing by the Brooklyn and Massachusetts brought her to a stop. She fought for twenty minutes. At noon she was on the rocks, perforated and tattered. Spain's greatest fleet was destroyed in about three hours.

Chief Yoeman Ellis of the Brooklyn was the only American killed In three hours of incessant fighting, while the Spanish loss reached 600 killed, 400 wounded and 1,100 taken prisoners.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following is the official report sent by Admiral Sampson to the navy department at Washington:

United States Flagship New York, First Rate, Off Santiago de Cuba, July 15, 1898.—Sir: I have the honor to make the following report upon the battle, with the destruction of the Spanish squadron, commanded by Admiral Cervera, off Santiago de Cuba on Sunday, July 3, 1898:

The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9:35 and 10 am, the head of the column appearing around Cayo Smith at 9:31 and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later. The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that moment were as follows: The flagship New York was four miles east of her blockading station and about seven miles from the harbor entrance. She had started for Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go to the front to consult with General Shafter. A discussion of the situation and a more definite understanding between us of the operations proposed had been rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff on shore the day before to arrange an interview with General Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron appeared in the channel.

The remaining vessels were in or near their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semi-circle about the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the westward in the following order: The Indiana, about a mile and a half from shore; the Oregon—the New York's place between these two—the Iowa, Texas and Brooklyn, the latter two miles from the shore west of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbor entrance was from two and one-half to four miles—the latter being the limit of day—blockading distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about eight miles.

The Massachusetts had left at 4 A. M. for Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the Iowa and the Texas. The auxiliaries Gloucester and Vixen lay close to the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large vessels, the Gloucester to the eastward and the Vixen to the westward. The torpedo boat Ericsson was in company with the flagship, and remained with her during the chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient service in rescuing prisoners from the burning Vizcaya.

The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor at a speed estimated at from eight to ten knots and in the following order: Infanta Maria Teresa (flagship), Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon and the Almirante Oquendo. The distance between these ships was about 800 yards, which means that from the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last one was out of the harbor an interval of only about twelve minutes elapsed. Following the Oquendo at a distance of about 1,200 yards came the torpedo-boat destroyer Pluton, and after her the Furor. The armored cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading vessels and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke from their guns.

The men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday "quarters for inspection." The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels, "Enemy ships escaping" and "general quarters" was sounded. The men cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within eight minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The New York turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the signal "Close in towards harbor entrance and attack vessels," and gradually increased her speed, until toward the end of the chase she was making sixteen and a half knots, and was rapidly closing on the Cristobal Colon. She was not at any time within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire of the forts in passing the harbor entrance and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the Gloucester.

The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbor, turned to the westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy blockading vessels, which had closed in toward the Morro at the instant of the enemy's appearance and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire, well sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels and the battle developed into a chase, in which the Brooklyn and Texas had at the start the advantage of position. The Brooklyn maintained this lead. The Oregon, steaming with amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first place. The Iowa and Indiana, having done good work and not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me, in succession, at about the time the Vizcaya was beached, to drop out of the chase and resume the blockading station. The Vixen, finding that the rush of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran outside of our own column, and remained there during the battle and chase.

The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the Gloucester excited the admiration of every one who witnessed it and merits the commendation of the navy department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel—the yacht Corsair—and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was lying about two miles from the harbor entrance, to the southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the Pluton and Furor, the Gloucester was slowed, thereby gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed and was able to close at short range, where her fire was accurate, deadly and of great volume.

During this fight the Gloucester was under the fire of the Socapa battery. Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago harbor the careers of the Furor and the Pluton were ended and two-thirds of their people killed. The Furor was beached and sunk in the surf, the Pluton sank in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battleships Iowa, Indiana and the Texas, yet I think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire at close range of the Gloucester's battery. After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers the Gloucester did excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the Infanta Maria Teresa.

The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards—all steering in the same direction and in formation—removed all tactical doubts or difficulties and made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately engage and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done.

As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the blockading ships, which could not immediately work up to their best speed, but they suffered heavily in passing, and the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Oquendo were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement. It was afterwards learned that the Infanta Maria Teresa's fire main had been cut by one of our first shots and that she was unable to extinguish the fire. With large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the beach-the Infanta Maria Teresa at about 10:15 A. M. at Nima Nima, six and one-half miles from Santiago harbor entrance, and the Almirante Oquendo at about 10:30 A. M. at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.

The Vizcaya was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the Cristobal Colon had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of the leading American ships. The Vizcaya was soon set on fire, and at 11:15 A. M. she turned in shore and was beached at Aserraderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode.

When about ten miles west of Santiago the Indiana had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at Aserraderos the Iowa was signaled to "resume blockading station." The Iowa, assisted by the Ericsson and the Hist, took off the crew of the Vizcaya, while the Harvard and the Gloucester rescued those of the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Almirante Oquendo.

This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded, from the burning Spanish vessels was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete.

There remained now of the Spanish ships only the Cristobal Colon, but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the Vizcaya went ashore the Colon was about six miles ahead of the Brooklyn and the Oregon, but her spurt was finished and the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the Brooklyn and the Oregon came the Texas, Vixen and New York. It was evident from the bridge of the New York that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the Colon, and that she had no chance of escape.

At 12:50 the Brooklyn and the Oregon opened fire and got her range, the Oregon's heavy shell striking beyond her, and at 1:10 she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, forty-eight miles from Santiago. Capt. Cook of the Brooklyn went on board to receive the surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up in the New York, received his report and placed the Oregon in charge of the wreck to save her, if possible, and directed the prisoners to be transferred to the Resolute, which had followed the chase.

Commodore Schley, whose chief of staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all their personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did not modify. The Cristobal Colon was not injured by our firing, and probably is not much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure, after her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat she was pushed by the New York bodily up on the beach, the New York's stem being placed against her for this purpose—the ship being handled by Capt. Chadwick with admirable judgment—and sank in shoal water and may be saved. Had this not been done she would have gone down in deep water and would have been to a certainty a total loss.

I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer of the Cristobal Colon.

It was ascertained with fair conclusiveness that the Merrimac, so gallantly taken into the channel on June 3, did not obstruct it. I therefore maintained the blockade as follows:

To the battleships was assigned the duty, in turn, of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro—dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere—they threw a searchlight beam directly up the channel, and held it steadily there. This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel for half a mile inside of the entrance so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be detected.

When all the work was done so well it is difficult to discriminate in praise. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it —the commodore in command on the second division, the captains of ships, their officers and men. The fire of the battleships was powerful and destructive and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was in great part broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own forts. The fine speed of the Oregon, enabled her to take a front position in the chase, and the Cristobal Colon did not give up until the Oregon had thrown a 13-inch shell beyond her. This performance adds to the already brilliant record of this fine battleship and speaks highly of the skill and care with which her admirable efficiency has been maintained during a service unprecedented in the history of vessels of her class.

The Brooklyn's westerly blockading position gave her an advantage in the chase, which she maintained to the end, and she employed her fine battery with telling effect. The Texas and the New York were gaining on the chase during the last hour, and had any accident befallen the Brooklyn or the Oregon, would have speedily overhauled the Cristobal Colon. From the moment the Spanish vessel exhausted her first burst of speed the result was never in doubt. She fell, in fact, far below what might reasonably have been expected of her. Careful measurements of time and distance give her an average speed from the time she cleared the harbor mouth until the time she was run on shore at Rio Tarquino—of 13.7 knots. Neither the New York nor the Brooklyn stopped to couple up their forward engine, but ran out the chase with one pair, getting steam, of course, as rapidly as possible on all boilers. To stop to couple up the forward engines would have meant a delay of fifteen minutes—or four miles—in the chase.

Several of the ships were struck, the Brooklyn more often than the others, but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being aboard the Iowa. Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the Brooklyn. It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type; but Spanish gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and by observation. The Spanish vessels, as they dashed out of the harbor, were covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily diminished in volume and soon almost disappeared. The fire from the rapid-fire batteries of the battleships appears to have been remarkably destructive. An examination of the stranded vessels shows that the Almirante Oquendo especially had suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides are everywhere pierced and her decks were strewn with the charred remains of those who had fallen.

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear Admiral United States Navy, Commander in Chief United States Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. The Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

BURNING OF THE ALFONSO XII.

Two batteries silenced; two gunboats put to flight; the Alfonso XII., a transport of 5,000 tons, loaded with ammunition, beached and burned; those were the Spanish losses in the second battle of Mariel on Wednesday, July 6. The Hawk, Prairie and Castine fought it, destroying the most valuable ship and cargo that Spanish daring employed to run into Havana's relief after the blockading squadron stationed itself before Morro.

The Hawk began the battle Tuesday night off Havana. Lieutenant Hood had taken his destroyer yacht far in under the guns to watch the western approach to the harbor. Twenty minutes before midnight he reached the eastern limit of his patrol, six miles west of Morro, and went about, swinging farther in shore as he turned. The Hawk had not finished circling when the forward lookout sighted a huge four-masted steamer creeping along in the shade of the shore a quarter of a mile nearer the beach, a mile to the westward. His "sail ho" warned the master of the steamer that he was discovered and he put about at the cry and steamed furiously away toward Mariel.

Lieutenant Hood was after him in an instant. Eastward within call lay six warships, but Lieutenant Hood wanted the steamer for his own prize, and started after her without calling for aid. Mile after mile the two vessels reeled off, the Hawk waiting to get its prey well away from the squadron before striking. Twenty miles from Morro the steamer began drawing away from the destroyer. The Hawk's men were at their quarters, and when Lieutenant Hood saw his prize slipping from his grasp his forward six-pounders began to speak. Some of the shells must have landed, for the Spaniard ran for shoal water, apparently hoping to catch the Hawk among the rocks.

Lieutenant Hood was game, however, and the light-draught Hawk kept hammering away with her rapid-fire guns and burning signals for help from the bridge. Two miles east of Mariel the hunted Spaniard broke for the narrow harbor mouth, and Lieutenant Hood's jackies, pumping steel across the moonlit waters, groaned in the fear that she might escape. The raining six-pound shells upset the pilot, however, and the fleeing ship struck hard on the bar at the west side of the entrance and stuck fast. With wild cheers the Hawk's crew tumbled into the boats and boarded the prize, but the steamer's rail was lined with riflemen and the popping Mausers drove the Hawk's tars back to their ship.

The Hawk guarded the prize till morning and then, seeing her fast aground, ran back to Havana to report to the fleet and to ask help in taking her. The Castine was sent down to aid in the work, but the shore batteries opened on the ships when they appeared. After two hours' fruitless fighting the Hood went back to the fleet for re-enforcements. The Prairie, manned by Massachusetts reserves, was dispatched to engage the batteries, and at 1 o'clock in the afternoon Captain Train took a position two miles from Martello tower and began pitching six-inch shells into the tower and sand batteries. Ten shells silenced the three guns in the tower and sent the artillerymen streaming back over the hill toward the city.

Two gunboats inside the harbor poured five-inch shells at the Prairie, but nine shells from that ship routed them and drove them back to the city. The sand batteries were harder to silence, but fifteen shells did that work and wrecked the barracks besides. The infantry in the rifle pits supporting the batteries were driven out by five-inch shells from the Castine, which fired during the morning and afternoon 250 shots. The Prairie used thirty-eight of her six-inch shells and about 100 six-pounders. The Castine and Hawk had taken the steamer, and the Hawk then reported to the fleet at Havana. The Spanish vessel was so badly riddled that the name could not be deciphered.

GENERAL MILES ASSUMES COMMAND IN CUBA.

On July 13 General Miles arrived at the front and assumed personal command of the army around Santiago. Negotiations for the peaceful surrender of the city had been going on for several days between General Shafter, commander of the American forces, and General Toral of the Spanish army, but it was not until the 16th that a final agreement was reached. On this date conditions of surrender were offered, the principal articles of which were as follows:

First, that all hostilities shall cease pending the agreement of final capitulation.

Second, that the capitulation includes all the Spanish forces and the surrender of all war material within the prescribed limits.

Third, that the transportation of the troops to Spain shall be furnished at the earliest possible moment, each force to be embarked at the nearest port.

Fourth, that the Spanish officers shall retain their side arms and the enlisted men their personal property.

Fifth, that after the final capitulation the Spanish forces shall assist in the removal of all obstructions to navigation in Santiago harbor.

Sixth, that after the final capitulation the commanding officers shall furnish a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war and a roster of all soldiers in the district.

Seventh, that the Spanish general shall be permitted to take the military archives and records with him.

Eighth, that all guerrillas and Spanish irregulars shall be permitted to remain in Cuba, giving a parole that they will not again take up arms against the United States unless properly released from parole.

Ninth, that the Spanish forces shall be permitted to march out with all the honors of war, depositing their arms to be disposed of by the United States in the future, the American commissioners to recommend to their Government that the arms of the soldiers be returned to those "who so bravely defended them."

By the terms of this agreement the southeastern end of Cuba—an area of about 5,000 square miles—the capital of the province, the forts and their heavy guns, and Toral's army, about 25,000 strong, passed into our possession.

The ceremony which sealed the capitulation of Santiago was simple and short. Promptly at 9 o'clock in the morning all division and brigade commanders and their staffs reported to General Shafter at his headquarters. With Major-General Wheeler at his left, General Lawton and General Kent behind, and the other officers, according to rank, following, the little cavalcade, escorted by a detachment of Rafferty's mounted squadron, rode around the base of San Juan hill and west on the royal road toward Santiago. Just about midway between the American and Spanish lines of rifle pits stands a lordly ceiba, 125 feet high to the crown, nearly 10 feet in diameter at the trunk and spreading 50 feet each way from the polished tree shaft. Under this tree General Toral and a score of his officers awaited the Americans. As General Shafter came down the slope toward the tree General Toral advanced a few feet and raised his hat. General Shafter returned the salute, and then the quick notes of a Spanish bugle, marking the cadence of a march, sounded on the other side of the hedge which bordered the road, and the king's guard, in column of twos, came into view. Before they arrived on the scene the American cavalrymen had lined up with drawn sabers at a carry, each man and horse motionless.

The Spanish soldiers came through a gap in the hedge in quick time, the Spanish flag leading the column and two trumpeters sounding the advance. The soldiers marched in excellent order, but as they passed General Shafter their eyes moved to the left and they glanced curiously at the men who had served as their targets only a few days before. About 200 soldiers and officers were in the king's guard, and the little command, after moving down the entire front of the detachment of cavalry, countermarched, and, swinging into line, halted facing the Americans, about ten yards distant.

For a few minutes Americans and Spaniards faced each other, silent and motionless. Then the two trumpeters gave tongue to their horns again; a Spanish officer shouted a command; the Spanish colors dipped in a salute; the Spanish soldiers presented arms and the Spanish officers removed their hats. Captain Brett's quick, terse command, "Present sabers," rang over the hillside, and American swords flashed as the sabers swept downward. General Shafter removed his hat, and his officers followed his example. For half a minute—and it seemed longer—the two little groups of armed men, each representing an army, remained at "the salute." The Spanish officer in command of the king's guard was the first to break the silence. His commands put the Spaniards in motion, and they again passed before the Americans, who remained at "present arms" until the last of the guard had marched by. The Spaniards marched back toward Santiago a few hundred feet, halted, stacked their Mauser rifles and then, without arms or flags, filed back of the American lines and went into camp on the hill just west of San Juan hill.

The formal part of the proceedings came to an end with this little ceremony, then Spanish and American officers mingled, shook hands and exchanged compliments. While the king's guard and the American cavalrymen were saluting each other the 5th army corps stood on the crest of the parapet of the rifle pits, forming a thin line nearly seven miles long. Only a small part of the army could see the groups of Spanish and American soldiers under the ceiba tree, but every one of the men who had been fighting and living in our trenches strained his eyes to catch a glimpse, if possible, of the proceedings which put an end to hostilities in this part of Cuba.

ON THE WAY TO SANTIAGO.

After a few minutes of informal talk General Toral and his officers escorted General Shafter and his military family to Santiago.

General Shafter's entrance was hardly the triumphant march of a victor, for the procession of Americans and Spaniards ambled quietly and unostentatiously over the cobble and blue flag stones, around the little public circles and squares, past ancient churches and picturesque ruins of what once were the homes of wealthy Spaniards, through narrow, alleylike streets to the Plaza de Armas, with the cathedral, the Cafe de Venus, the governor-general's palace and San Carlos club facing the square.

General Toral was the first to spring from his horse, and he held out his hand and welcomed General Shafter to the "palace." This was a few minutes after 10 o'clock.

Here General Shafter received the local council and other civic officials, and the governor, seeking to do the honors properly, gave a luncheon to the general and his principal officers.

By this time the 9th infantry had marched into the square and formed two lines, facing the palace, and the band had taken its station in the center of the broad walk, with the American officers grouped in front. Just five minutes before noon General Shafter, General Wheeler, General Lawton and General Kent came from the palace and joined the officers, and Lieutenant Miley, General Shafter's chief aid-de-camp; Captain McKittrick and Lieutenant Wheeler, General Wheeler's son, swarmed over the red roof tiles to the flagstaff. Then followed five long, expectant, silent minutes. Some of the officers held watches in their hands, but most of them kept their eyes on the little ball of bunting which cuddled at the foot of the flagstaff. General McKibben, his long, slim figure erect, stood before the 9th regiment, and when the first stroke of the cathedral clock bell sounded from the tower he whirled around and gave the command "Present arms." The final word was spoken just as the flag fluttered up toward the tip of the staff, and the crash of hands meeting rifle butts and the swish of sweeping sabers came with the opening notes of the "Star-Spangled Banner," and every American there saluted our flag as the wind caught the folds and flung the red, white and blue bunting out under the Cuban sun and over a conquered Spanish city.

And when the last notes of the national air died away and the rifle butts had come to an "order" on the pavement, and the sabers had been slipped into their sheaths, men whose faces and throats were deep brown, whose cheeks were thin, whose limbs trembled with fatigue and Cuban fever, whose heads wore bandages covering wounds made by Spanish bullets, but who stood straight, with heads erect, were not ashamed to wipe from their eyes the tears which came when "old glory" spread its protecting folds over Santiago.

YELLOW FEVER IN SHAFTER'S ARMY.

Yellow fever broke out in the army on July 11, spreading with frightful rapidity among the men, but it fortunately proved to be of a mild type, and in comparatively few instances was the dreaded disease attended with fatal results.

When the landings at Baiquiri and Juragua were made there were many men to be handled, the facilities were limited and the landings were made in great haste. No building was burned, no well was filled, no sink was dug. Several of the enthusiastic young aids seized pretty vineclad cottages as headquarters for their respective generals. Cubans and Americans filed into the empty houses of the town without inquiry as to their antecedents.

Major LeGarde, in charge of the beach hospital, recommended earnestly on landing that every building be burned. Major Wood and Colonel Pope indorsed this, but the recommendation went by default. The camp was established in the heart of the Spanish town and the first yellow-fever case was that of Burr McIntosh, the actor and newspaper man, who had been sleeping at General Bates' headquarters in one of the pretty vine-covered cottages mentioned.

Dr. Lesser and his wife, "Sister Bettina," the New York workers of the Red Cross, were among the first victims, and Katherine White, another Red Cross nurse, was also sent to the yellow-fever camp.

After the fever was discovered every effort was made to check it and stamp it out, but the camp had already been pitted with it. Cases were taken out of the surgical wards of the hospital tents and out of the officers' tents, General Duffield being one of the victims.

Owing to the unhealthful climate and the lack of proper food, medicines, clothing, and shelter, the army was soon threatened with an epidemic of disease, and it was evident that the detention of the troops in Cuba would result in loss of life to thousands of brave men. In order that the authorities at Washington might have a thorough understanding of the situation, the officers of the 5th army corps united in the following letter which was addressed to General Shafter, and which was transmitted by him to the war department in Washington:

We, the undersigned officers commanding the various brigades, divisions, etc., of the army of occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army should be at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some point on the northern seacoast of the United States; that it can be done without danger to the people of the United States; that yellow fever in the army at present is not epidemic; that there are only a few sporadic cases; but that the army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a condition to be practically destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever which is sure to come in the near future.

We know from the reports of competent officers and from personal observation that the army is unable to move into the interior and that there are no facilities for such a move if attempted, and that it could not be attempted until too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities of the island say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season without losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever.

This army must be moved at once or perish. As the army can be safely moved now the persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives.

Our opinions are the result of careful personal observation, and they are also based on the unanimous opinion of our medical officers with the army, who understand the situation absolutely.

J. FORD KENT, Major-General Volunteers, Commanding First Division Fifth Corps.

J. C. BATES, Major-General Volunteers, Commanding Provisional Division.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE, Major-General Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.

SAMUEL S. SUMNER, Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding First Brigade Cavalry.

WILL LUDLOW, Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding First Brigade, Second Division.

ADELBERT AMES, Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding Third Brigade, First Division.

LEONARD WOOD, Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding the City of Santiago.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT, Colonel, Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.

As a result arrangements were completed as quickly as possible for the transportation of the troops to the United States, and immunes were sent to Santiago for garrison duty in their places.

ANOTHER NAVAL ENGAGEMENT.

On the morning of July 18 the vessels on blockade duty in the vicinity of Manzanillo approached the harbor of that city from the westward. The Wilmington and Helena entered the northern channel towards the town, the Scorpion and Osceola the mid-channel, and the Hist, Hornet and Wampatuck the south channel, the movement of the vessels being so timed as to bring them within effective range of the shipping at about the same moment. An attack was made on the Spanish vessels in the harbor, and after a deliberate fire lasting about two and a half hours, three transports, El Gloria, Jose Garcia and La Purrissima Concepcion, were burned and destroyed.

The Pontoon, which was the harbor guard and storeship for ammunition, was burned and blown up. Three gunboats were destroyed, one other was driven ashore and sunk, and another was entirely disabled. No casualties occurred on board any of the American vessels. The Spanish loss was over 100 in killed and wounded, and the Delgado, Guantanamo, Ostralia, Continola and Guardian, gunboats of the Spanish navy, were sent to join Cervera's fleet.

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