To His Royal Highness, Monseigneur le Duc d’Orléans, Regent of the Kingdom. (continued 2)

The Diplomatic Hierarchy: Ambassadors.

Before discussing in detail the duties of negotiators, I shall describe the different titles which they receive, and the functions and privileges attached to their office. Negotiators are of two kinds: of the first and second order. Those of the first order are Ambassadors Extraordinary and Ambassadors Ordinary. Those of the second are Envoys Extraordinary and Residents. Ambassadors extraordinary receive certain honours and distinctions not accorded to ambassadors ordinary. The ambassadors extraordinary of crowned heads are lodged and entertained in France for three days, by order of the King, in residences set aside for them, while ambassadors ordinary are not so entertained by the King, though in other respects they enjoy the same honour and privileges as the former. These privileges consist in the enjoyment under international law of immunity and security, in the right to remain covered before the King in public audiences because they represent their masters, in the privilege of being borne in the King’s coach, and of driving their own coaches into the inner court of the Louvre. They have still their own dais in the audience-chamber, while their wives have a seat by the Queen; and they are permitted to drape the driving seat of their coaches with a special saddle cloth. In France the ambassadors of the Dukes of Savoy enjoyed the same honours as those of the crowned heads of Europe. Abroad the King’s ambassadors enjoy different ceremonial rights according to the customs established in different courts. The French ambassador in Rome, for instance, gives his hand to the ambassadors of certain crowned heads and of Venice, but there are certain ambassadors of other sovereigns who do not receive this courtesy, though at other courts it is accorded to them by the French ambassador. The French ambassador takes first rank in all ceremonies in Rome after the ambassador of the Emperor. These two ambassadors receive the same salary, and are treated otherwise on a footing of equality. There are several courts at which the French ambassadors give their hand to certain princes of equality in the country: in Spain, for instance, we find the Grandees; in London, the Peers of the Realm; in Sweden and in Poland the Senators and Grand Officers; but to the negotiators of the rank of envoy this courtesy is not accorded. The King does not send an ambassador to the Electorates of Germany, but conducts his negotiation with them merely by means of envoys.

Envoys Extraordinary.

Envoys extraordinary are public ministers who do not possess the right of presentation which attaches alone to the title of ambassador, but they enjoy the same security and immunity under the law of nations. They do not make a state entry into a foreign capital in the manner of ambassadors, but are presented in audiences to the King by the diplomatic usher, who fetches them from their private residence in one of the King’s coaches; they speak to his Majesty standing and uncovered, the King himself being seated and covered. The Emperor on the other hand receives the envoys of the King standing and covered, and remains in this condition throughout the entire audience, the envoy alone of all those present standing uncovered.... The title of plenipotentiary is sometimes given to envoys as well as to ambassadors according to the occasion. For instance, the ministers whom the King maintains at the Diet of Ratisbon receive the title of plenipotentiary although they are not ambassadors. Residents are also public ministers, but this title has been somewhat degraded since the distinction was drawn both at the French Court and at the Court of the Emperor between them and envoys, with the result that nearly all foreign negotiators in France who bore the title of resident have relinquished it by order of their masters, and have assumed that of envoy extraordinary. None the less the title is still found in Rome and in other courts and republics where the residents are treated as envoys.

Secret Envoys.

There are certain secret envoys who are only received in private audiences but enjoy the same immunity as public envoys, and from the moment in which they present their credentials are recognised as public ministers. There are also secretaries and agents attached to the court for various forms of public business, but they are not received in audience by the King in France; they do all their business with the Secretary of State or the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and though themselves not recorded as ministers have also enjoyed the protection and immunity under international law which is accorded to foreign ambassadors. No subject of the King can be received as minister or representative of a foreign prince, nor can they conduct his affairs in France except as agents of the Secretary of State, the only exception being the ambassador from Malta, who is usually a French Member of the Order, and to whom the King accords the right to remain covered in public audience as representative of the Grand Master of the Order, who himself is recognised as possessing sovereign rights.

Agents of Small States.

Only princes and sovereign states have the right to clothe their messengers with the character of ambassador, envoy, or resident. The agents of small states or of the free states are called deputies; they are not public ministers, and they are subject to the jurisdiction of the country like any private citizen; they do not enjoy immunity under the law of nations, though by custom deputies from provinces and from free cities are accorded immunity and security in practice during their deputation as a proof of the good faith of the prince in negotiation. In the same manner private citizens provided with passports may travel free from molestation. There are certain states in Italy which, though neither sovereign Powers nor subject to another sovereign, have yet conserved the right to send deputies with the title of ambassador to the sovereign under whose sway they live. These are the cities of Bologna and Ferrara, which send diplomatic deputations to the Pope in this manner, and the city of Messina, which retained the right of sending ambassadors to the King of Spain before the last rising. There are similarly several Spanish cities which do not now retain this right. These ambassadors of states or subject provinces resemble in some manner those whom the Roman people used to receive from their own free provinces, from the cities and colonies subject to Roman rule, to whom the name of Legati was given, a name which still occurs in all Latin diplomatic documents. There are certain free cities, such as Hamburg and Lübeck, which send commissaries to certain princes; but as a rule they are merely commercial agents engaged upon such matters of business as the purchase and sale of merchandise and the conditions of letters of exchange.

Precedence.

Now although the position of an ambassador extraordinary is something more honourable than that of the ambassador ordinary they are practically treated alike if there is an equality between the princes whom they represent. The title of extraordinary gives no other superiority over the ambassador ordinary except in pure matters of precedence. Envoys extraordinary and residents stand in somewhat of the same relation, that is to say, that the resident of a prince of higher rank takes precedence over an envoy extraordinary of a prince of lesser rank. It is not, however, the same between ambassadors and envoys. The envoy of a crowned head must yield the place of honour to the ambassador of a lesser sovereign as in the following example. An envoy of the Emperor at the French Court some years ago took his seat at a public entertainment in the place which was reserved for the ambassador ordinary of the Duke of Savoy, and asserted his right to it on the ground of the difference in rank between their respective masters; but the dispute was decided in favour of the ambassador as holding superior rank without regard to the difference in the rank of their respective princes; and the envoy of the Emperor was obliged to leave the position which he had taken and yield it to the ambassador of Savoy.

The Title of Excellency.

The title of excellency has been given to ambassadors extraordinary and ordinary, but it is not accorded to envoys unless they claim it on some other ground, as, for instance, that they are ministers of state or senators, or other high officers at a royal court. This title of excellency is not in common use at the French Court, as it is in Spain, Italy, and Germany, and the kingdoms of the north, and you will only find foreigners in France addressing the King’s ministers or other officers of the court with that title. But foreign negotiators of all kinds are addressed by that title as a mark of courtesy to the rank which they hold.

Legates, Nuncios, and Internuncios.

The Court of Rome has three different degrees of titles by which to mark the rank of her ministers in foreign courts. The first is that of Legato a latere, the second is that of Ordinary or Extraordinary Nuncio, and the third is the Internuncio. The first of these is always a cardinal, to whom as a rule the Pope gives very wide powers both for the affairs of papal diplomacy and for the administration of dispensations and other privileges of the Holy See. They are received at all Catholic Courts with extraordinary honours: in France at their presentation they are attended by the princes of the blood; they remain seated and covered in audience with the King, whereas both ambassadors and even papal nuncios speak to him standing. These legates have a further honour accorded neither to nuncios nor ambassadors in France, namely the right to eat at the King’s table at the banquet of reception given by his Majesty in their honour. The Cross is carried before them to mark their ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which, however, is strictly limited in France, and is recognised in certain specified cases for the verification of Papal Bulls at the Parliament of Paris, to which they must present them before attempting to put them into force. Nuncios both ordinary and extraordinary are usually prelates of the rank of archbishop or bishop. They are received and presented by a prince of the royal blood at their first and final audiences with the King, no difference being made between the nuncio extraordinary and the nuncio ordinary except that the former takes precedence of the latter if there are two present in the same Chamber. None the less the prelates of the Court of Rome prefer the title of nuncio ordinary at the Courts of France, Spain, and of the Emperor, because it is a shorter and a surer road to the cardinal’s hat, which is the goal of their aspirations. As regards their appointment, when the Pope desires to send a nuncio ordinary to the French Court, he presents the French ambassador in Rome with a list of several dignitaries of the Church, from which the King may exclude those who are not agreeable to him. The papal nuncios in France give their hand to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but not to bishops or archbishops received on ceremonial visits. They have no ecclesiastical jurisdiction in France in the sense in which they possess it in Vienna, in Spain, in Portugal, in Poland, and in many other Catholic states, where they are recognised as valid judges in various cases, and have the power of dispensation in the same way as the archbishops or the diocesan bishop. In France they are only entitled to receive the confession of faith of those whom the King has nominated to bishoprics and to inquire regarding their life and habits.

Diplomatic Privileges.

Ambassadors, envoys, and residents all possess the right to exercise freely the religion of their King, and to admit to such ordinances their own nationals living in the foreign country. In matters of law diplomatists of rank are not subject to the jurisdiction of the judges of that foreign country where they reside, and both they and their household enjoy what is called extra-territoriality, their embassy being regarded as it were the house of the King himself, and as being an asylum for his nationals. But this privilege carries its corresponding duty. No blame can be too severe for those ministers abroad who abuse this right of asylum in sheltering under their roof evilly disposed persons, either those condemned to death for crime, or those who are engaged upon any business which renders them unworthy of the protection of the King. The sagacious diplomat will not compromise the authority of his master for any such odious reason as the attempt to confer immunity upon a criminal. It must suffice for him that his own right of asylum is kept inviolate, and he must never employ it except on extraordinary occasions in his master’s service, and never indeed for his own private profit. On the other hand, the King must expressly forbid his judges, bailiffs, or private citizens to violate the law of nations in the person of a foreign envoy, who is always recognised as under the protection of international law. And wherever insult is offered to a foreign envoy, the prince himself must repair it without fail in the same manner in which he would expect return for a like insult to his own minister abroad.

Abuse of Immunity.

It sometimes occurs that ministers abuse the right of free passage, which they possess for their own provisions and the equipment necessary for their establishment, to carry on a clandestine trade from which they draw large profits by lending their name to fraud. This kind of profit is utterly unworthy of the public minister, and makes his name stink in the nostrils of the King to whom he is sent as well as to his own prince. A wise minister may be well content to enjoy the large privileges to which he is entitled in every foreign country without attempting to abuse them for his own private profit, or by countenancing any fraud which is committed under the protection of his name. The Spanish Government was obliged a few years ago severely to regulate these privileges for all foreign envoys residing in Madrid, and the Republic of Genoa found it necessary to adopt the same somewhat humiliating precautions in order to prevent diplomatists from engaging in illicit traffic. The privileges conferred by the law of nations upon envoys abroad permit full freedom in their proper duty of labouring to discover all that passes in the council-chamber of his Majesty, and to take steps to form close relations with those best able to supply this information, but they are not to be interpreted as covering any attempt to form a conspiracy against the public peace; for the same international right which covers the person of a diplomatist must also be held to cover the peace and security of the kingdom to which he is accredited. Therefore the diplomatist will be on his guard against any action which may seem to lend the authority of his name or office to revolutionary plots or to other hostile acts against the peace of the realm. Should he neglect this precaution, he may find himself treated as an enemy.

Henry IV. and the Duke of Savoy.

Charles Emanuel the first Duke of Savoy maintained certain connections in France with some of the principal peers at the Court of Henry IV., and engaged with them in plots and cabals. He attended the French Court under the pretext of paying his respects to the King, but in reality with the intention of spreading his own influence and fortifying his own designs, which were to prevent Henry IV. from forcing him to restore the Marquisate of Saluse which he had usurped. The King discovered the Duke’s intrigue, and held a cabinet meeting on the matter. The Council was of opinion that the Duke had come under a false show of friendship in order to disturb the peace of the realm, that the King was therefore fully within his rights in laying hands upon him as upon an enemy, that in consequence of his own acts the Duke could claim no immunity, and that therefore the King would be justified in preventing him from leaving France until he had restored the marquisate in question. But the King did not agree with his ministers, but said: ‘The Duke came to visit me on my parole. If he has failed in his duty I do not wish to imitate so evil an example, and I have so fine a precedent in my own house that I am compelled to follow it rather than to follow the Duke.’ In this he spoke of Francis I., who in a similar case gave the Emperor Charles V. a free passage through France without insisting that he should relinquish the Duchy of Milan; and although several of the King’s counsellors at that time were of opinion that he should profit by the opportunity to compel the Emperor to restore the duchy, which indeed he had several times promised to do, Francis I. preferred to maintain his own honour above every other interest. Henry IV. acted on the same principle; he permitted the Duke of Savoy to depart unmolested after heaping honours and entertainments upon him, but the moment the Duke had returned to his own Court the King demanded the restitution of the Marquisate of Saluse according to his promise. The Duke refused, whereupon the King invaded Savoy, occupied the whole duchy, and compelled him to keep his word, not only to the extent of the marquisate but of several other parts which he was compelled to cede to the King by a treaty concluded at Lyons, on the 17th January 1601.

Reparation for Abuse of Immunity.

Those who think that one may lay forcible hands upon a sovereign who has broken his word will easily persuade themselves that in a similar case no international law can protect the person of a mere minister; but those who are really well instructed in the law of nations and in the question of sovereign rights are of opinion that a foreign envoy being subject to the laws of the country where he lives it is not possible to put into motion against him the machinery of domestic justice, that the only redress for wrongs done by him is an appeal to his master, and that if his master refuses reparation the responsibility must lie with him and not on his minister abroad who merely executes his order. This privilege, be it remembered, extends not merely to the ambassadors themselves but often to their servants, as is illustrated in the following example.

The Merargue Conspiracy.

King Henry IV., whom one may take as a model for princes, was warned by the Duke de Guise of the Merargue Conspiracy in which a Provençal squire named Merargue had entered into an arrangement with Dom Balthazar de Zuniga, the Spanish ambassador, to hand over the city of Marseilles to the Spaniards at a moment of profound peace. The King arrested not only Merargue, but also the private secretary to the Spanish ambassador, a man named Bruneau. Both were convicted of conspiracy. Merargue was executed, and the King handed over the private secretary to his own ambassador, saying that he would be glad to see Bruneau sent across the frontier, though he himself reserved the right to demand satisfaction from the Spanish King for Bruneau’s misdemeanour.

Immunity a Function of Sovereignty.

Now if princes had the right to proceed against foreign envoys at their courts, the latter would never feel themselves secure, because then it would be easy to get rid of any of them on flimsy pretexts, and the precedent once set up in a good case would surely be followed in many cases where nothing but idle suspicion could be brought against the envoy in question. This indeed would be the end of all diplomacy. Of course it is true that a minister who breaks faith cannot expect others to keep faith with him, especially if he is engaged upon conspiracies or any of those practices against the prince and safety of the realm of which I have spoken. But even in such a case the wise prince will not break the law of nations, which should always be respected. He will rather use his good offices at the court whence the erring envoy came in order to have him withdrawn. At the same time it is always permissible to place a watch upon a faithless ambassador, in order to hinder him in practices which would otherwise do harm to the state, and of course on the other part a wise ambassador will certainly avoid falling into such intrigues, for the very protection which he enjoys under the law of nations is a guarantee of his person and of his good behaviour. Benefits under it are reciprocal, and the reciprocal duties which it imposes should be scrupulously observed. If they are not, no law of nations can guarantee an intriguing ambassador for ever against the fury of the populace once they are aroused by suspicion.

Its Abuse undermines True Diplomacy.

On all these grounds the minister is to be pitied who receives commands from his master to form cabals in a foreign state, and he will need all his skill and courage to carry out such commands without being trapped in the process. It has been truly said that there is no service which a prince may not expect from good subjects and faithful ministers, but such obedience cannot be held to cover any action against the laws of God or of justice, which do not countenance for one moment attempts on the life of a prince, or against the security of the state, or any other unfriendly act committed under cover of the protecting title of ambassador. A good ambassador will always discourage plans of this kind, and if his master persists in them he may and should demand his recall, and retire into obscurity, jealously guarding his sovereign’s evil secret. In justice to most reigning sovereigns it must be said that few of them engage in designs of this kind. The vast majority of intrigues and cabals are made in their name in foreign states, or are suggested to them by their ministers or by astute diplomatists, who undertake to carry them out, and through them to confer great benefits upon the prince himself. But these diplomatists are often the first to fall into traps set by their own hand, and are then objects of pity to no man. Numerous examples of this kind can be quoted, and I think no one will challenge the truth of my observation when I say that in nine cases out of ten diplomatists who give such advice are actuated more by personal ambition or petty spite than by the true interests of the nation they serve.

Secret Service No Abuse of Immunity.

But let me not be misunderstood, there is all the difference between the attempt to debauch the subjects of a sovereign prince in order to ensnare them in conspiracy against him, and the legitimate endeavour to use every opportunity for acquiring information. The latter practice has always been permissible, and indeed is a necessary part of diplomacy. No criticism can fall upon a foreign envoy who successfully adopts the practice; the only culprit in such a case is the citizen of a foreign state who from corrupt motives sells information abroad. Apart from considerations of international law the interest of the public peace demands the preservation of the privileges of foreign envoys, for otherwise wars would be even more frequent than they are, because no prince would permit insults to his ministers to go unavenged. They are rightly resented, and the prince may pay heavily in his own peace of mind and the repose of his subjects for a moment of passion. He need do no more, however, than demand satisfaction for the bad conduct of any foreign envoy, and if he has just cause of complaint he will probably receive it. In any case the dismissal or recall of an ambassador will be read as a pointed lesson to all his colleagues in diplomacy, who will then understand that the price of evil conduct is the humiliation of dismissal.

The Credentials of an Ambassador.

When an ambassador is sent to a foreign court, his master gives him a letter addressed to the foreign prince requesting him to give the same credence to the bearer of the letter as to its writer. This despatch is called a letter of credence, which thus establishes the identity of its bearer and stands as the hall-mark of his office. In France there are two sorts of letters of credence: one called Lettre de Cachet, which is despatched and countersigned by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and sometimes also called Lettre de la Chancellerie. The other is written by the hand of one of the royal private secretaries, and signed by the King himself; it is countersigned by any minister, and is usually handed direct in private audience to the foreign prince to whom it is addressed. The former type of letter is presented in ceremonial public audience. When a negotiator is appointed by his prince to a free state or an assembly, which for this purpose is treated as though it were a court, he does not receive letters of credence, but his character and identity are fully established in his full powers, which he must exchange with ministers on arriving. The document known as full powers is an authorisation by the prince to his representative abroad to undertake all kinds of public business, the results of which the sovereign himself agrees to accept by the proxy of his minister; but as a rule in such full powers the particular matter under discussion is carefully specified, and the authority to act is confined to it.

Full Powers.

There are two kinds of full powers: one deriving directly from the sovereign and the other from his deputies, that is to say, his ministers of state who have sufficient authority to nominate plenipotentiaries in his absence. Such powers are particularly desirable where the states lie far apart from one another. In such negotiations as those between the Court of Madrid and the Low Countries, or the different Italian states, the advantage of this procedure is obvious.... Passports are of course merely letters which establish the identity and good faith of the person as distinct from the representative of state, and they are given even in time of war in order to secure a safe passage between countries at war for ministers engaged upon negotiation which may lead to peace....

Instructions.

The instruction is a written document containing a statement of the principal intentions of the prince or the state; it is to be regarded as a general aid to memory and a general guide to conduct. It is secret and must be retained under the control of him who receives it, though of course there are occasions on which he will receive the command to communicate specific portions of it to a foreign minister or a foreign prince. Such communication is regarded as a rule as a mark of special confidence, but on the other hand it often happens that two instructions are given, one the ostensible, that is to say it is drawn up in such terms that it can be shown to other princes, and the other secret, which contains the true and final intentions of the prince himself. But even the latter type of instruction is subject to alteration by the daily despatches which the negotiator receives from home, and which ought to be read as so many new instructions drawn up in accordance with the reports which he has transmitted to his own court. It follows therefore that the manner of reports which a negotiator despatches to his home government will have a large influence upon the type of instruction which he receives from time to time.

Oral Instructions.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs may prefer not to put the instructions and intentions of his royal master into writing but to deliver them orally, because then he has a greater freedom of interpretation according to circumstances as they arise, than he would have if he were bound by the written word. There is further a danger that such instructions when committed to paper may be wittingly or unwittingly left in the hands of some foreign diplomatist belonging to the opposite party. The risks thus incurred are too obvious to need any emphasis of mine. Whereas if the instructions be left in oral form, they can at least be repudiated if a dangerous situation were to arise from their being made known to an enemy prince. There are of course occasions where it is impossible not to commit to writing instructions given to a plenipotentiary, but it is a good rule in all negotiation to delay the issue of formal and binding instructions to as late a date in the negotiations as possible, so that the general lines upon which it is likely to proceed may be present to the mind of the minister who draws them up for the guidance of the ambassador.

It is not permissible without a serious violation of the law of nations to compel a minister to show his instructions in order to prove his good faith, nor is it permissible for a minister to communicate it in any form without an express command from his master, for he can fully rely on his letter of credence to establish both his identity and his good faith; besides which he is equipped with full powers in which the business of his negotiation is always fully described.

Discretionary Freedom.

Now such instructions may be as judicious and astute as can be imagined, but their use will lie in the wise interpretation by the diplomatist himself; and, as I have pointed out, the really able negotiator will always know how best to execute his master’s commands so that the instructions received from him may be drawn up on information which is both up-to-date and adequate. Thus it is that while the final responsibility for all success or failure in diplomacy would seem to rest upon the King and his ministers at home, it is none the less true that since these ministers can only act upon information from abroad, the influence which an enlightened diplomatist can exercise upon the actions and designs of the home government is very large. Incapable men acting abroad will make nothing even of the most brilliant instructions; capable men by the accuracy and sagacity of their reports and suggestions can do much to improve even the most mediocre instructions, and therefore the responsibility for diplomatic action is in reality shared in about equal degree between the home government and its servants abroad. The home government cannot know when the opportunity for appropriate action will arise, and therefore the reports on foreign situations which are transmitted in despatches from diplomats abroad ought to be so designed as to present as far as possible an intelligent description of events.

Value of the Trained Mind.

What an astonishing diversity and inequality there is in the conduct of men. No one, not even a minister of state, would think of building a house without the assistance of the best architect and the best workmen whom he could find; but it is the commonest occurrence to find that those who are charged with the transaction of very important state business, upon which the weal or woe of the whole realm depends, never think of entrusting it to trained minds, but give it to the first comer, whether he be a cunning architect or a mere hewer of stone. Therefore ministers and other persons in authority are culpable in a high degree if they do not secure for the foreign service of the state the most capable and sagacious men. For the errors in diplomacy sometimes bring more calamitous results than mistakes in other walks of life, and unless the negotiator can intelligently discern the coming event, he may plunge himself, his master, and his native land in irretrievable disaster.

Incompetence the Parent of Disaster.

It is a crime against the public safety not to uproot incapacity wherever it is discovered, or to allow an incompetent diplomatist to remain one moment longer than necessary in a place where competency is sorely needed. Faults in domestic policy are often more easily remedied than mistakes in foreign policy. There are many factors in foreign affairs which lie beyond the control of the ministers of any given state, and all foreign action requires greater circumspection, greater knowledge, and far greater sagacity than is demanded in home affairs. Therefore the government cannot exercise too great a care in its choice of men to serve abroad. In making such a choice the Foreign Minister must set his face like a flint against all family influence and private pressure, for nepotism is the damnation of diplomacy. He is in some sense the guarantor to his Majesty of those whom he presents as diplomatists. Their good success will do him honour, their failure will fall with redoubled force upon his head, and may require herculean efforts by him in order to repair the damage it has caused. Hence it is of the first interest, both for the Foreign Minister himself and for the well-being of the state, to see that the high public offices of diplomacy are not filled by the intrigues and personal cabals which reign at every court, and which often place in the King’s hands unworthy instruments of his policy.

The Diplomatist prepares Himself for a Foreign Mission.

Now when a diplomatist has been appointed to a foreign post his first care should be to ask for the despatches of his predecessor in order that he may inform himself exactly of the state of affairs with which he will have to deal. He will thus be able to pick up the thread and to make use both of the knowledge and of the different personal relationships which have gathered round the embassy during his predecessor’s term of office. And as all public affairs are like a great network, one linked with another, it is of the first importance that a diplomatist proceeding to a foreign post should be a complete master of recent history both in regard to his own state and in regard to the relations which exist between the country of his new service and all neighbouring countries. Therefore, when the newly appointed diplomatist has read with care the despatches of his predecessor, he should make notes upon them, endeavouring to foresee the difficulties which he will meet both in such trivial matters as a novel ceremonial, or in the more weighty business of state, so that he may be able to discuss them with his own Foreign Minister, and thus receive what enlightenment he can.

He must study his own Foreign Office.

Now, no matter how far-seeing a minister may be, it is impossible for him to foresee everything or to give such ample and at the same time precise instructions to his negotiators as to guide them in all circumstances which may arise. It is therefore of the first importance that the newly appointed diplomatist travelling to a far country should devote all his time before his departure to the discovery of the real intentions and designs of his own Foreign Office. In a word, he should saturate his mind with the thoughts of his master. He should not only consult those who have discharged diplomatic duties at the foreign court to which he is about to proceed, but should make it his especial care to keep touch with those who have lived in the country in any quality whatsoever, and to acquire from them all the knowledge which they may possess. Even the humblest of such persons may be able to give him information which will help him to regulate his conduct abroad. And before his departure he should certainly strike up an acquaintance with the ambassador representing the country to which he is about to proceed, in order that he may get from him private letters of recommendation, and further, in order that he may persuade him of his own earnest desire to do all in his power to establish good relations between the two states. He should let it be known to the foreign ambassador in question that he will lose no opportunity of bearing witness to the success of his mission and to the esteem which he has won at home. In so doing he will be able rapidly to acquire new and powerful friends in his new sphere of labour. For it is a commonplace of human experience that men will do as they are done by: reciprocity is the surest foundation of friendship.

Choice of a Staff.

The careful diplomatist will pay the same attention to the choice of his domestics as to more important subjects. Those about him must do him credit. A well-ordered household served by reliable and well-mannered persons is a good advertisement, both of the ambassador and of the country whence he comes, and in order that they may have no excuse for ill-regulated conduct, he should set a high example before them in his own person. His choice of a private secretary is perhaps the most important of all, for if he be light-headed, frivolous or indiscreet, he may do his master irreparable harm; and if he be a person liable to get into debt, his embarrassment may be the cause of very serious trouble. Some years ago the private secretary of a French ambassador sold the private cipher of the embassy for a large sum in order to wipe out his debts. Thus the ambassador’s despatches were intercepted and read, with very grave results upon the relations between the two countries, in spite of the fact that the obvious interest of both lay in the same direction. The necessity for having faithful and able men as secretaries has given rise to the belief that it would be very useful to establish them in rank as a part of the public service of the King, and thus to restore a custom which was abolished some time ago in France. It would be a desirable practice, for thereby a large body of men might be trained in the diplomatic service of the Crown from whom ambassadors and envoys could be drawn. This is the practice in several foreign countries, and there is no doubt that it leads to the improvement of the whole diplomatic service. For if the secretaries and attachés are selected and paid by the King’s government they will tend to acquire a careful efficiency and esprit de corps which will be the best protection for his secrets. And it is obvious that as long as the choice of such persons is left to the personal decision of the ambassador alone there is always a risk that he will not be able to offer a sufficient sum to command the services of good men. Thus the adequate payment and proper official recognition of such junior diplomatists is a necessary part of any true reform of the foreign service, and it would certainly be a great relief to most ambassadors to take the responsibility of choice off their shoulders as well as the burden of paying secretaries for their services. The state will certainly be well repaid if such a policy as I suggest be adopted, for diplomacy will then become the school in which good workmen will rapidly learn the use of their tools.

First Steps at the Foreign Court.

On arrival at a foreign court a negotiator should make himself and his mission known to the proper authorities at the earliest possible moment, and request a private audience with the prince in order that he may establish contact immediately, and thus prepare the way for good relations between his master and the foreign sovereign. When he has taken the necessary steps for this purpose he should be in no hurry to embark upon any important steps but should rather study the terrain. For this purpose he should remain a watchful, silent observer of the habits of the court and of the government, and if he be in a country where the prince is really the ruler, he should study with the greatest assiduity the whole life and habits of the latter; for policy is not merely a matter of high impersonal design, it is a vast complexity in which the inclinations, the judgments, the virtues and the vices of the prince himself will play a large part. Occasions will constantly arise in which the adroit negotiator who has equipped himself with this knowledge will be able to use it with the highest possible effect. And he should test his own conclusions by comparing notes discreetly with other foreign negotiators of the same court, especially if they have had a long residence there. Up to a certain point co-operation between foreign ambassadors is not only permissible but desirable and necessary. And since no prince, not even the most autocratic, discharges the duties of government entirely by himself without confiding in one or more favoured ministers, the negotiator should make it his business to know much of the ministers and confidants surrounding the King who have his fullest confidence, for in the same manner as described above personal qualities, opinions, passions, likes, and dislikes are all relevant subjects of study, and should be carefully observed by every negotiator who means business.

Relations with Colleagues.

When a foreign envoy arrives at a court and has been received by the prince, he should inform all the other members of the Corps Diplomatique either by a squire of his suite or by a secretary. They will then pay him their first visit, but he will receive no visits until he has gone through the formality of announcing to each in turn his own arrival; and at a court where there are ambassadors of several kings, each on arrival should pay his respects first of all to the French ambassador, who everywhere takes first rank. The Spaniards, who adopted every form of chicane for a whole century in order to avoid the recognition of French precedence, which for that matter is an immemorial right of the French King, finally recognised it by the public declaration, made by Philip IV. to his Majesty in 1662 by the Marquis de la Fuente, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, which arose out of the violent dispute in London between the Count d’Estrade and the Baron de Vatville, after which no Spanish ambassador would consent to be present at any ceremony attended by the French ambassador. Various other attempts have been made to dispute French supremacy, but with no result....

Report of First Impressions.

After he has fully informed himself of all such matters and placed himself in such a position as to know immediately whether the prince has changed his mind or transferred his confidence from one servant to another, he should set all these things down faithfully in a despatch to his home government, presenting a full picture of the court as he sees it, and at the same time setting down the conclusions which he has drawn from his observations. He should not fail to indicate the methods by which he proposes to act, or the means he proposes to use, in order to carry out the commands which he has received. At the same time he will not fail to keep his own knowledge up to date, and to use it for finding and keeping open every possible avenue of approach to the prince to whom he is accredited, or to his ministers and favourites. There is no doubt that the surest and best way in which the negotiator can establish good relations is to prove to both courts that their union is of great mutual advantage. It is the essential design of diplomacy to confer such a mutual advantage, and to carry policy to success by securing the co-operation in it of those who might otherwise be its opponents. Success won by force or by fraud stands upon a weak foundation. Diplomatic success, on the other hand, won by methods which confer reciprocal benefits on both parties, must be regarded not only as firmly founded, but as the sure promise of other successes to come. I am not so foolish as to suppose, however, that this method can be applied in every situation. There are times when it is necessary for the negotiator to exploit the hatreds, passions, and jealousies of those with whom he deals, and therefore occasion will arise when it is easier and more fruitful to appeal to prejudice rather than to any estimate of the true and permanent interests of those concerned. As we have observed above, both kings and nations often plunge into reckless courses of policy under the impulse of passion, and as a rule throw overboard all consideration of their veritable interests.

Character and Whims of the Foreign Prince.

The high elevation of crowned heads does not prevent them from being human; and indeed in some ways it lays them open to certain weaknesses of which lesser men by reason of their position are largely free. There is a certain pride of position, a certain arrogant self-esteem, which is only to be found in highly placed persons, and which is most marked in kings and ministers. On this account, and on account of the actual power their exalted position puts into their hands, kings are open to persuasion and flattery in a way in which men of lower degree cannot be approached. This consideration must ever be in the mind of the good negotiator, who should therefore strive to divest himself of his own feelings and prejudices, and place himself in the position of the King so that he may understand completely the desires and whims which guide his actions. And when he has done so he should say to himself: ‘Now, if I were in the place of this prince, wielding his power, subject to his passions and prejudices, what effect would my mission and my arguments have upon me?’ The more often he thus puts himself in the position of others, the more subtle and effective will his arguments be. And it is of course not only in matters of opinion that this use of the imagination is valuable, it is more particularly in all those personal aspects where the power to give pleasure by flattery or any other means is effective.

The Use of Compliments.

No one will forget that crowned heads, and even their ministers themselves, are accustomed from birth to the submission of those around them, to receive their respect and praise. This unbroken experience of the obedience of others is apt to make them very sensitive to criticism, and unwilling to listen to contradiction. There are few princes to whom it is easy to speak the truth, and since it is not part of the business of the negotiator except on rare occasions to speak home truths at a foreign court, he will avoid as far as possible everything which may wound the royal pride which is the natural result of the manner in which princes are reared. On the other hand, he will never give empty praise nor applaud a reprehensible act, and where praise is given as it is deserved, the negotiator must know how to clothe it in chaste and dignified language. And since princes are accustomed to hear their praise sung constantly, they become connoisseurs in praise and good judges of a timely compliment. It is the higher art of the subtle courtier to know how to deliver a well-turned compliment to his King, and above all, if the King is endowed with real intelligence, never to praise him for qualities which he does not possess. Any fool can earn the esteem of a prince who is also a fool by indiscriminate praise. Wise men will rely on their own merits and on the good sense of the King wherever they have the good fortune to serve a monarch so endowed. To praise a King for those things which are inherent in his position, such as riches, spacious mansions, and fine clothes, is merely stupidity. A King who is worth praising will only value your praise if it is given to qualities which he knows to be praiseworthy. In this matter the negotiator must be sufficiently worldly-wise always to remember that the good favour of the ladies of the court is to be won by different means than that of his Majesty or the ministers. And since, as I have pointed out elsewhere, the approach to the King and his ministers may perhaps be most easily made through feminine influence, the negotiator will study carefully the character and weaknesses of all the ladies at the court so as to keep these useful and attractive avenues open for his use.

Craft at the Card-table.

The methods of giving pleasure, as I say, must vary. One of the most illustrious and sagacious ambassadors of our time, a friend of my own, neglected nothing, but he used to say that there was no surer road to the good-will of a sovereign than to allow him to win at the card-table, and that many a great enterprise had been conducted to success by the little pile of gold coins which passed from him to his royal opponent at the gaming-table. My friend used to say in jest that he had played the fool at foreign card-tables in order to prove that he was a wise man at home! His jest bore a truth within it which I hope every negotiator will lay to heart....

Common-sense Pleas.

The pleas which I have set out above are, I believe, applicable in most situations, but of course there are variations to be observed. It is not always easy for a negotiator on leaving home to remember how great a difference there is between his own court and that to which he proceeds. For whether the foreign country which is his new home stands on equal terms with his own or whether it be a Power of lower station in the world, the vast differences in national outlook between them must be fully understood before the negotiator can make any progress. It is therefore his first business, whatever be the magnitude and splendour of the court to which he is accredited, to win the general favour by showing a genuine and sincere interest in the welfare of his new associates, and in all the customs of the court and the habits of the people; and on his arrival he should show himself ready to share information both with his new colleagues in the Corps Diplomatique, and with the ministers of the King to whom he is sent. Let me lay some insistence on this. It will be observed that if a negotiator has the reputation of speaking freely on many subjects, it is not improbable that those who have secrets to reveal may speak the more freely to him. A negotiator of my acquaintance to whom I look with high regard once said: ‘Diplomacy is like a chain of ten links in which perhaps only one is missing to make it complete: it is the business of the diplomat to supply the tenth link.’ This is true, and I believe that the diplomatist who is least enwrapped in secrecy will most quickly and surely discover it. It is therefore important that the negotiator, being well equipped with all kinds of information, should be guided by a sound judgment in the use of it. He should realise that in all information there are only one or two items which are of the first importance, and that therefore the freedom with which he uses the rest need not in any way imperil his master’s plans. The more freely he can share such information, and the more carefully he bestows his praise upon individuals, the more surely will men say of him that he is a reliable person, and will turn to him in moments of crisis.

The Clockmaker’s Patience.

Every right-minded man desires to stand well in the eyes of those with whom he transacts business, and therefore he will give some trouble to all those devices for securing the good-will of men to which I have referred. If he finds in the course of his work that the prince himself or any one of his ministers is ill-disposed towards him or intractable in discussion, he must not on that account allow himself to imitate the fault, but must redouble his efforts in the contrary direction. Indeed he must behave as a good watchmaker would when his clock has gone out of order: he must labour to remove the difficulty, or at all events to circumvent its results. He must not be led aside by his own feelings. Prejudice is a great misinterpreter’s house in all public affairs.

A High Ideal.

It might seem that the ideal which I now set up for the negotiator is one too high for any man to reach. It is true that no man can ever carry out his instructions without a fault, but unless he has before him an ideal as a guide he will find himself plunged in the midst of distracting affairs without any rule for his own conduct. Therefore I place before him these considerations: that despite all disappointments and exasperations he must act with sang-froid; he must work with patience to remove all obstacles that lie in his path, whether they are placed there by accident or act of God or by the evil design of men; he must preserve a calm and resolute mind when the conjunctures of events seem to conspire against him; and finally, he must remember that if once he permit his own personal or outrageous feelings to guide his conduct in negotiation he is on the sure and straight road to disaster. In a word, when events and men are unkind he must never despair of being able to change them, nor again when they smile upon his efforts must he cherish the illusion that their good favour will endure for ever.

The Negotiator’s Twofold Function.

The functions of a minister despatched on a mission to a foreign country fall into two principal categories: the first to conduct the business of his master, and the second to discover the business of others. The first of these concerns the prince or his ministers of state, or at all events those deputies to whom are entrusted the examination of his proposals. In all these different kinds of negotiation he must seek success principally by his straightforward and honest procedure, for if he attempts to succeed by subtlety or by a sense of superiority over those with whom he is engaged he may very likely deceive himself. There is no prince or state which does not possess some shrewd envoy to discern its real interests. And indeed, even among people who seem to be the least refined, there are often those who know their own interests best, and follow them with the most constancy. Therefore the negotiator, no matter how able he may be, must not attempt to teach such persons their own business, but he should exhaust all the resources of his mind and wit to prove to them the great advantage of the proposals which he has to make.

Diplomacy a Commerce in Benefits.

An ancient philosopher once said that friendship between men is nothing but a commerce in which each seeks his own interest. The same is true or even truer of the liaisons and treaties which bind one sovereign to another, for there is no durable treaty which is not founded on reciprocal advantage, and indeed a treaty which does not satisfy this condition is no treaty at all, and is apt to contain the seeds of its own dissolution. Thus the great secret of negotiation is to bring out prominently the common advantage to both parties of any proposal, and so to link these advantages that they may appear equally balanced to both parties. For this purpose when negotiations are on foot between two sovereigns, one the greater and the other the less, the more powerful of these two should make the first advance, and even undertake a large outlay of money to bring about the union of interests with his lesser neighbour, for his own self-interest will show him that he has really the greater object and the larger advantages in view, and that any benefits he may confer or subsidies which he may grant to his weaker ally will be readily repaid by the success of his designs. Now, as we have said, the secret of negotiation is to harmonise the interests of the parties concerned. It is clear that if a negotiator excludes the honest and straightforward method of reason and persuasion, and adopts on the contrary a haughty and menacing manner, then obviously he must be followed by an army ready to invade the country in which he has put forth such provocative claims. Without such a display of force his claims will fall to the ground, even though by advantageous arguments they might have prevailed with the prince whom he addressed, and who might have accepted them had they been proposed in a different manner. When a prince or a state is powerful enough to dictate to his neighbours the art of negotiation loses its value, for then there is need for nothing but a mere statement of the prince’s will; but when there is a balance of force an independent prince will only decide to favour one of the two parties of a dispute if he discerns advantages to himself and good results to the prosperity of his realm.

Harmony the Ideal State.

A prince who has no powerful enemies can easily impose tribute on all neighbouring Powers, but a prince whose aim is self-aggrandisement and who has powerful enemies must seek allies among the lesser states in order to increase those friendly to him; and if possible he should be able to prove his power by the benefits which an alliance with him can confer upon them. Therefore the principal function of the negotiator is to bring about a harmonised union between his master and the sovereign to whom he is sent, or else to maintain and increase existing alliances by every means in his power. He must labour to remove misunderstandings, to prevent subjects of dispute from arising, and generally to maintain in that foreign country the honour and interests of his prince. This includes the protection and patronage of his subjects, assistance to their business enterprises, and the promotion of good relations between them and the subjects of the foreign prince to whose court he is accredited. He must always assume that there is no prince nor state in the world which does not desire to avoid a condition of crisis, and that those princes who love to fish in troubled waters will never lack the means to stir them up, but that the storms which such men conjure up are apt to overwhelm them, so that the wise negotiator will do all he can to avoid giving provocation, and will conduct himself in such a manner that no one will be able to impute reckless motives to him.

The Search for Information.

His second function being the discovery of all that is happening at court and in the cabinet, he should first of all take steps to learn from his predecessor all that he knows regarding the state of affairs in the country to which he is about to proceed and to acquire from him those hints and suggestions which may be of use. He should take up the friends and acquaintances left behind by his predecessor, and should add to them by making new ones. It would be no bad practice in this matter to imitate the established rule of the Venetian Republic, which obliges an ambassador returning from a foreign court to render a detailed account in writing of the country, both for the information of the public and for the instruction of his successor at the embassy. The diplomatists of Venice have drawn great advantage from this practice, and it has been often remarked that there are no better instructed negotiators in Europe than those of Venice.

Freemasonry of Diplomacy.

The discovery of the course of events and the trend of policy in a foreign country is most natural when one knows both the personnel and the political habits of the country, and a negotiator for the first time in such a country must neglect no source of information. In addition to those mentioned above, he may very probably find that his colleagues in the Corps Diplomatique will be of use to him, for since the whole diplomatic body works for the same end, namely to discover what is happening, there may arise—there often indeed does arise—a freemasonry of diplomacy by which one colleague informs another of coming events which a lucky chance has enabled him to discern. Such collaboration is possible in all cases except those in which their sovereigns are at variance. As regards the information which can be drawn from the people of the country itself, the surest and shortest method is to make a confidant of some one already in the counsels of the foreign prince, but this must be done only by such means as will enable the negotiator to keep a check upon his correspondent, and thus prevent any damage to his master’s plans. This action is very necessary, for in diplomacy as in war there are such things as double spies paid by both parties. The cleverest of these will begin by giving true information and good advice in order the more thoroughly to deceive the negotiator at a later date. There have even been princes subtle enough to see the advantage of permitting their confidants to behave thus, and I know of cases where the confidant of a sovereign, under the appearance of a secret liaison with a foreign envoy, gave the latter true and false information at the same time, and thus effectively masked the designs of his master. An ambassador must always be on his guard against such deception.

The Foolish Dutchman.

There was in England in 1671 a Dutch ambassador who was so easily persuaded by certain privy counsellors of King Charles II. that their master had no intention to go to war with the States General that in his despatches home he gave the most explicit assurance that there was nothing to fear from England, treating with ridicule the opinion that London had resolved to attack them; and we have since learned that these English counsellors had been deliberately detailed by the King to play upon the credulity of the Dutch ambassador. There have been in our time ambassadors of other countries who have done the same.

All News must be tested.

Now the astute negotiator will not likely believe everything he hears, nor accept advice which he cannot test; he must examine the origin of information, as well as the interest and the motives of those who offer it him. He must attempt to discover the means by which they themselves have acquired it, and he must compare it with other information to see whether it tallies with that part which he knows to be true. There are many signs by which a discerning and penetrating mind will be able to read the truth by placing each link of information in contact with another. For this purpose no rules can be drawn up for the guidance of a diplomat in such a matter, for unless a man be born with such qualities he cannot acquire them, and to those who do not possess them I might as well speak to the deaf as write these observations.

The Flair for Secrets.

A negotiator can discover national secrets by frequenting the company of those in authority, and there is not a court in the world where ministers or others are not open to various kinds of approach, either because they are indiscreet and often say more than they should, or because they are discontented and ready to reveal secrets in order to satisfy their jealousy. And even the most practised and reliable ministers are not always on their guard. I have seen highly trained and well-proven statesmen who none the less in the course of conversation, and by other signs, allowed expressions to escape them which gave important clues to their policy. And there are courtiers at every court who, though not members of the King’s Council, know by long practice how to discover a secret, and who are always prepared to reveal it in order to show their own importance and their penetration. It is almost impossible to conceal from an active, observant, and enlightened negotiator any important design of public policy, for no departure of state can ever be made without great preparation which entails the sharing of many secrets by many persons, and this is a danger against which it is almost impossible to guard even by those who take the greatest precautions.

On the Transmission of Information.

Now in the transmission of information of this kind the negotiator must give an exact account of all the circumstances surrounding it, that is to say, how and by whom he acquired it; and he should accompany it with his own comments and conjectures in order that the prince may be fully informed, and may be able to judge whether the conclusions drawn from all the circumstances are well or ill founded. There are certain things which a clever minister will discover for himself, and of which he must give an exact account to his master, for such knowledge is often a sure clue even to the most secret designs. Thus he can by his own observation discover the passions and ruling interests of the prince to whose court he is sent: whether he is ambitious, painstaking, or observant; whether he is warlike or prefers peace; whether he is the real ruler of the country, and if not by whom he is ruled; and in general what are the principal inclinations and the interests of those who have most influence over him. He must also inform himself exactly of the state of the military forces both on land and sea, of the number and strength of fortified places, whether they are always kept in a high state of efficiency and well supplied with ammunition, of the condition of the sea-ports, of his vessels of war, and of his arsenals, of the number of troops which he can put into the field at once, both of cavalry and of infantry, without stripping his fortresses bare of their garrisons. He must know the state of public opinion, whether it is well disposed or discontented; he must keep in his hands the threads of every great intrigue, knowing all the factions and parties into which opinion is divided; he must know the leanings of ministers and other persons in authority in such matters as religion. He should not even neglect the observation of the King’s personal household, of the manner in which his domestic affairs are conducted, of his outlay, both on his household and on his military establishments, of the time spent in them, etc. He must know the alliances, both offensive and defensive, concluded with other Powers, especially those which appear hostile in design; he must be able to describe at any moment the attitude of all the principal states towards the court to which he is accredited, and to give an account of the diplomatic relations which exist between them.

Action Appropriate to Democratic States.

He must pay the prince assiduous attention, and thus acquire a sufficient familiarity with him to be able to see and speak to him frequently without ceremony, so that he may be always in a position to know what is going on, and to insinuate into the prince’s mind what is favourable to his master’s design. If he lives in a democratic state he must attend the Diet and other popular assemblies. He must keep open house and a well-garnished table to attract the deputies, and thus both by his honesty and by his presence gain the ear of the ablest and most authoritative politicians, who may be able to defeat a hostile design or support a favourable one. If people of this kind have a freedom of entrée to the ambassador, a good table will greatly assist in the discovery of all that is going on, and the expense laid out upon it is not merely honourable but extraordinarily useful if only the negotiator himself knows how to profit from it.

The Value of Good Cheer.

Indeed it is in the nature of things that good cheer is a great conciliator, that it fosters familiarity, and promotes a freedom of exchange between the guests, while the warmth of wine will often lead to the discovery of important secrets. There are several other functions for the employment of public ministers, as for instance that of informing a prince of good or evil tidings regarding his own master, or that of conveying compliments or condolences in a similar case to the prince himself. A negotiator who knows his business will not neglect even the least of such opportunities, and he will perform his function in such a manner as to show that his master is truly interested in all that passes at the foreign court. Indeed the best negotiator is he who forestalls even the orders of his own master, and shows himself so apt a negotiator of his intentions that he is able to act in advance of each event of the kind, and thus present his master’s sentiments in appropriate language before any other foreign diplomatist has even begun to consider the matter. And when he actually receives his master’s orders on the subject, should they turn out to be of a somewhat different character than the expressions he has already used, his own adroitness will enable him to bridge the apparent difference. The diplomatist’s functions cease automatically on the death of his master or on the death of the prince to whom he is accredited, and are not revived until new letters of credence are received. They also come to an end on his withdrawal or upon a declaration of war, but it should be noted that the privileges attached to the office of ambassador under the law of nations continue unbroken, notwithstanding any declaration of war or other interpretation of his functions, and these privileges remain in force until he reaches his own national territory.

The Conduct of Negotiations.

Diplomacy is a matter for orally conducted and for written communications. The first is the common method where one is dealing with a royal court, the second is usual in republics and those states in which assemblies, such as the Diet of the Empire of Switzerland, are the repositories of power. It is always the custom where states are assembled in France to exchange statements of policy in writing. But it is always more advantageous for the practised diplomatist to negotiate face to face, because by that means he can discover the true intentions of those with whom he is dealing. His own skill will then enable him both to act and to speak in an appropriate and apt fashion. Most men in handling public affairs pay more attention to what they themselves say than to what is said to them. Their minds are so full of their own notions that they can think of nothing but of obtaining the ears of others for them, and will hardly be prevailed on to listen to the statements of other people. This fault is peculiar to those lively and impatient nations like ours, who find it difficult to bridle impetuous temperaments. It has often been noticed that in ordinary conversation Frenchmen speak all at one time, and interrupt one another incessantly, without attempting to hear what each has to say.

The Apt Listener.

One of the most necessary qualities in a good negotiator is to be an apt listener; to find a skilful yet trivial reply to all questions put to him, and to be in no hurry to declare either his own policy, still less his own feelings; and on opening negotiations he should be careful not to reveal the full extent of his design except in so far as it is necessary to explore the ground; and he should govern his own conduct as much by what he observes in the faces of others as by what he hears from their lips. One of the great secrets of diplomacy is to sift the real from the trivial, and so to speak, to distil drop by drop into the minds of your competitors those causes and arguments which you wish them to adopt. By this means your influence will spread gradually through their minds almost unawares. In acting thus the negotiator will bear in mind that the majority of men will never enter upon a vast undertaking, even though advantageous to themselves, without they can see beforehand the whole length of the journey upon which they are asked to embark. Its magnitude will deter them. But if they can be brought to take successfully one step after another they will find themselves at the end of the journey almost unawares. Herein is to be found the importance of not revealing vast designs except to a few chosen spirits whose minds are properly attuned to them.

Diplomacy a Bowling Green.

A truth of this kind applies to friend and foe alike. Thus in the approach to difficult negotiations the true dexterity of diplomacy, like a good bowler using the run of the green, consists in finding the existing bias of the matter. As Epictetus, the ancient philosopher, said in his manual: ‘There are in every matter two handles, the one by which it is easy to carry, the other difficult. Do not take it by the difficult end, for if you do so you will neither be able to lift it nor carry it. But if you take it by the right side you will carry it without trouble.’ Now the easiest way to find the right bias is to make each proposition which you put forward appear as a statement of the interests of those with whom you are negotiating, for since diplomacy is the attempt to find a basis of common action or agreement, it is obvious that the more the opposing party can be brought to see your designs in their own light and to accept them thus, the more surely will their co-operation for any action be fruitful alike to themselves and to you.

The Bias of Human Nature.

Now, of course there are few men who will entirely divest themselves of their own sentiments in favour of those of others, or who will confess that they were wrong, especially if the matter be conducted in an acrimonious discussion in which the negotiator meets all arguments freely by contradiction. But none the less the astute diplomatist will know how to exploit human nature in such a manner as to cause even the most stiff-necked opponents gradually to relax their hold upon certain opinions; and this may be most easily attained by abandoning the approach which caused the original dispute, and taking up the matter from another aspect. Thus by flattery of his amour-propre, or by some other device which may put him in a good humour, the competitor in a negotiation may be brought to consider the matter in a new light, and to accept at the end of the negotiation that which he repudiated with violence at its commencement. And, however unreasonable the majority of mankind is, it will always be observed that men retain so much respect for reason that they will always hope to be judged by the other man as acting upon reasonable grounds. The negotiator will know how to exploit this subtle form of intellectual pride. And especially where there is more than one party to the negotiation the astute diplomatist will be able to exploit the foibles of each of the other two parties, and yet to flatter each in turn for his reasonable and statesmanlike attitude.

Ce n’est que le premier pas qui coûte.

Above all, at the commencement of a negotiation, as I have said, it is necessary in any long and complicated business to present the matter in hand in its easiest and most advantageous light, and so to speak to insinuate all parties into it so that they may be well launched upon the whole enterprise before they are aware of its magnitude. For this purpose the negotiator must appear as an agreeable, enlightened, and far-seeing person; he must beware of trying to pass himself off too conspicuously as a crafty or adroit manipulator. The essence of skill lies in concealing it, and the negotiator must ever strive to leave an impression upon his fellow diplomatists of his sincerity and good faith. And he should beware of attempting to force a decision, or to ride roughshod over difficulties that are raised, for if he behaves thus he will not fail to draw upon himself the aversion of those with whom he is dealing, and thus to bring prejudice upon his master’s designs. It would be better for him to pass for less enlightened than he really is, and he should attempt to carry his own policy to success by good and solid reasons rather than by pouring contempt upon the policy of others. The opposite fault is equally to be avoided. The negotiator must not let himself pass under the influence of other men, especially of those powerful personalities whose wont it is to sway the minds of all whom they meet.

Diplomacy does not thrive upon Menaces.

The more powerful the prince, the more suave should his diplomatist be, for since power of that kind is likely to awaken jealousy in his neighbours, the diplomat should let it speak for itself, and rather use his own powers of persuasion by means of moderation to support the just rights of his prince than to vaunt his power or the extent of his dominions. Menaces always do harm to negotiation, and they frequently push one party to extremities to which they would not have resorted without provocation. It is well known that injured vanity frequently drives men into courses which a sober estimate of their own interests would lead them to avoid. Of course when a prince has real subjects of complaint against another, especially against an inferior, in circumstances where it is necessary to make an example of the delinquent, the blow must fall immediately after the threat is given, so that the delinquent cannot be in a position, either by the delays of diplomacy or by any other means, to shield himself from just punishment. The longer the delay is between the threat and its fulfilment, the more likely it is that the culprit will be able to form alliances with other Powers, and thus avoid the just chastisement of the prince whom he has wronged.

The Good Christian.

The wise and enlightened negotiator must of course be a good Christian, and he must let his character appear in all his speeches, in his way of living, and must forbid evil and loose-living persons to cross his threshold. Justice and modesty should govern all his actions; he should be respectful to princes; affable and approachable with his equals; considerate to his inferiors, and civil and honest with everybody.

At Home in the Foreign Country.

He must fall into the ways and customs of the country where he lives without showing repugnance or expressing contempt for them, as is frequently done by diplomatists who lose no opportunity of praising their own country and decrying all others. The diplomatist must bear in mind once for all that he is not authorised to demand that a whole nation shall conform to his way of living, and that it is more reasonable, and in the long run greatly to his own comfort, to accommodate himself to foreign ways of living. He should beware of criticising the form of government or the personal conduct of the prince to whom he is accredited. On the contrary he should always praise that which is praiseworthy without affectation and without flattery, and if he properly understands his own function he will quickly discover that there is no nation or state which has not many good points, excellent laws, charming customs as well as bad ones; and he will quickly discover that it is easy to single out the good points, and that there is no profit to be had in denouncing the bad ones, for the very good reason that nothing the diplomatist can say or do will alter the domestic habits or laws of the country in which he lives. He should take a pride in knowing the history of the country, so that he may be able to give the prince pleasure by praising the great feats of his ancestors, as well as for his own benefit to interpret current events in the light of the historical movements of the past. When it becomes known that the negotiator possesses such knowledge and uses it aptly, his credit will certainly rise, and if he is adroit enough to turn his conversations at court to those subjects of which he is a master, he will find that his diplomatic task is greatly assisted, and that the pleasure he gives to those around him is amply repaid to him in the smoothness of negotiation.

The Secret of Success.

The diplomatist must, however, bear constantly in mind both at work and at play the aims which he is supposed to be serving in the foreign country, and should subordinate his personal pleasure and all his occupations to their pursuit. In this matter the two chief aims which the able negotiator places before himself are, as I have said, to conduct the affairs of his master to a prosperous issue, and to spare no pains to discover the designs of others. And since the means to be employed in both cases are the same, namely by acquiring the esteem, friendship, and confidence of the prince himself and of those in authority around him, there is no surer way of employing them than by becoming personally agreeable. It is marvellous how a persona grata may contrive to uproot even the deepest suspicions and wipe out the memory of the gravest insults. If the diplomatist be looked upon with disfavour at the court he is not a true servant of his master’s interests; for one who is out of favour will not be in a position to know what is going on, and will therefore be but a poor guide to his home government in assisting them to frame their policy. The responsibility for placing the wrong kind of diplomatist in a good position rests of course with the minister who appoints him, but there are many cases in which an ill-fitting appointment has been redeemed by the dauntless assiduity and unfailing courtesy of the diplomatist himself; but since this imposes an unnecessary strain upon the ambassador, the Foreign Minister should ever have a care to appoint suitable men to all foreign posts.

Support from Home.

I have already described those characteristics which compose suitability; I will but add here that no diplomatist can succeed in his foreign task unless he is well supported by his own government and given every opportunity to understand its policy. By this means he will be in a position to exploit every situation as far as may be to advantage, and he will also be able to deny false rumours set afloat by the enemy. This support from his home government implies a complimentary application on his part, for it is of the highest importance that he should keep himself apprised of all contemporary movements in his own country; that he should know intimately the personal character both of the sovereign and of his Foreign Minister, so that in moments of doubt he may be able to guess shrewdly what is in the mind of those who employ him. Without such knowledge he will certainly go astray, and without a constant contact with his home government the conduct of diplomacy cannot possibly prosper in his hands.

Good Faith the Best Weapon.

As regards the relations which the diplomatist maintains in a foreign country, we must observe that while his success will partly depend upon his affability to all men, he must use the utmost discretion in all his more intimate relationships, and, above all, he should try to form professional friendships on the basis of mutual advantage and respect. There is no permanence in a relationship begun by promises which cannot be redeemed, and therefore, as I have said before, the use of deceit in diplomacy is of necessity restricted, for there is no curse which comes quicker to roost than a lie which has been found out. Beyond the fact that a lie is unworthy of a great minister, it actually does more harm than good to policy because, though it may confer success to-day, it will create an atmosphere of suspicion which will make success impossible to-morrow. No doubt an ambassador will receive a great deal of information which it is his duty to transmit; but if he is not in a position to test it he will merely pass it on without comment or guarantee of its truth. In general it should be the highest aim of the diplomatist to gain such a reputation for good faith with his own government and also abroad that they will place reliance both upon his information and upon the advice which he gives.

The Value of a Candid Report.

In this respect he should take good care in reporting the course of negotiations to his master from time to time not to hold out prospects of success before success itself is in his grasp. It is much better that he should depict the difficulties of the case and the improbability of success even when he is virtually sure in his own mind that he will succeed. He will acquire vastly greater credit by success in an undertaking of which he himself promises little than he will in one upon which he has reported favourably throughout. It is always good for the credit of a negotiator if good reports of him arrive from different sources, for such independent proof of the value of a diplomatist’s services must be highly prized by every prince, and will redound to the benefit of the diplomatist himself. It is obvious that the more successful he is in the relationships which he forms at a foreign court, the more surely will the diplomatist receive such independent testimony to his merit. But let him not seek such testimony by unworthy means. For this purpose he should neither bribe the servants of others, nor take natives of a foreign court into his own service. It is too obvious that they will probably be spies.

On Accepting Gifts.

He himself ought never to consent to accept gifts from a foreign court except with the express knowledge and permission of his master, or in such cases as are commonly permitted by the usage of the court, such as those given on the arrival or departure of an ambassador. He who receives gifts on any other condition may be accused of selling himself, and therefore of betraying the prince whom he serves. Unless he preserves his independence he cannot possibly represent his own master or maintain the high dignity of his office. This dignity must be kept beyond suspicion. It is indispensable to every ambassador, though it need not be carried out at all times and at all places, for the diplomatist will readily understand that at certain times he can win the good grace of those around him by living in an easy, affable, and familiar manner among his friends. To wrap oneself in official dignity at all times is mere preposterous arrogance, and the diplomatist who behaves thus will repel rather than attract.

The Tale of Don Estevan de Gamarre.

There are many important occasions when the diplomatist will require all his wit and all his prudence. It will often happen that he has to tell bad news or give unpalatable advice to a prince accustomed to be flattered by his ministers, who for various private reasons usually conceal bad news from him. Let me give an example of what I mean: Don Estevan de Gamarre had served the King of Spain for many years with zeal and fidelity both in war and in diplomacy, particularly in the Low Countries where he had been ambassador for a long time. He had a relative in the King’s Council fully disposed to put the ambassador’s services in the best light, and yet he received no reward, while late-comers of all kinds received advancement to high offices both at home and abroad. He resolved to go to Madrid to discover the cause of his evil fortune. He complained to his relative the minister, giving a number of instances in which important services which he had rendered had been passed over and forgotten. The minister having heard him, quietly replied that he had no one to blame but himself, and that if he had been as good a courtier as he was a brilliant diplomatist and faithful subject, he would have received the same advancement as those whose deserts were less, but that his sincerity was an obstacle to his good fortune, for his despatches were always full of distasteful truths which set the King’s teeth on edge. The King’s Teeth on Edge. For instance, when the French gained a victory he told the story faithfully and without regard for Spanish feelings in his despatches. Or if they set siege to a town, he would predict its certain fall unless help were sent. Or in another case, where an ally had expressed displeasure because the Spanish Court seemed likely not to keep faith with it, he insisted that the King should keep his word in language which was neither diplomatic nor persuasive, and all the while other Spanish negotiators in other parts of France, with better eye to their own interests, were informing the King that the French were decadent, that their armies were undisciplined and quite incapable of effective campaigning, and so on: to which the minister himself added that the King in Council could not too highly reward those who sent such good news, nor too readily forget a man like himself who never wrote anything but the unpalatable truth.

Deceit in Favour in Madrid.

Thereupon Don Estevan de Gamarre, in his surprise at this picture of the Court of Spain drawn for him by his relative, replied: ‘Apparently fortune in Madrid favours the deceiver and the favour of the Court may be won by mendacity. I have no longer any qualms about my future.’ He then returned to the Low Countries, where he profited so easily by the advice of his relative, that, to employ a Spanish term, he won several mercedes, and he saw his own affairs prosper in the measure in which he succeeded in inventing reasons why the affairs of the enemy must come to nought. From this one may conclude that the Court of Spain wished to be deceived, and gave its ambassadors a free rein to make their own fortunes at the expense of the true interests of the monarchy. There is a moral here both for ministers at home and for ambassadors abroad, on which I need not insist. The truth requires two agents, one to tell and another to hear.

On Treaties and their Ratifications.

Between sovereign states there are many kinds of treaty, the principal of which are treaties of peace, armistices, commercial treaties, and those which regulate alliances or guarantee neutrality. There are both public and secret treaties. There are even contingent treaties, so called because their success depends upon future events. When the ministers of two equal Powers sign a treaty they make two copies of it which are called a double instrument. In each copy the ambassador who draws it up places the name of his own prince at the head and signs his in order at the foot, thereby indicating that neither he nor his master relinquishes his claim to the first place in Europe. And since all new treaties are based upon the precedent of old ones, and probably refer to measures taken under previous treaties, they are always drawn up in the same form, and often in the same number of articles. Now in drawing up a treaty it is the duty of the enlightened diplomat to see that the statement of policy contained in the document in hand does not conflict with or injure some other enterprise of his government. He must also see that the conditions are laid down so clearly that they cannot be subject to diverse interpretations. It is obvious from this that the negotiator must be master of the language in which the negotiation is conducted, and especially that in which the treaty itself is written, otherwise he will find himself in endless difficulties and complications. The meaning of a treaty may easily turn on a single word, and unless the diplomatist is thoroughly at home in the language in question he will not be in a position to judge whether the words proposed to be used are suitable. Ignorance of foreign languages indeed is perhaps the most serious drawback with which diplomacy can be afflicted. Now though princes and sovereign states entrust negotiations to diplomatists armed with full powers, none the less they never conclude or sign treaties except upon their own explicit ratification given with their own hand and sealed with their own seal, and the treaties are never published until they have been ratified, and cannot take effect until they are published except in cases specially provided for, where certain articles and sometimes the whole treaty is deliberately kept secret.

On Writing Despatches.

While the art of handling a foreign court is the principal part of diplomacy, it is no less important that the diplomatist himself should be able to give an exact and faithful account in writing of his own court, both in respect of the negotiations in his charge and in respect of all other business which arises. The letters which a diplomatist writes to his prince are called despatches, and should be stripped of verbiage, preambles, and other vain and useless ornaments. They should give a complete account of his actions, beginning with his first démarche on arrival at the foreign court, describing in detail the manner in which he was received, and thereafter proceeding to report step by step the ways in which he proposes to arrive at an understanding of all that goes on around him. Thus the despatches of a really adept diplomatist will present a picture of the foreign country, in which he will describe not only the course of the negotiations which he himself conducts, but a great variety of other matters which form the essential background and setting of his political action.