PART VI MUSSOLINI THE “FASCISTA PRIME MINISTER”
Bernardo Quaranta di San Severino translation
207
MUSSOLINI THE “FASCISTA PRIME MINISTER”
We deem it superfluous to linger over a detailed analysis of the separate speeches delivered by Benito Mussolini after 1st November 1922, the day on which, by the will of the people, he rose fully equipped to the dignities and responsibilities of power.
Foreigners are to a great extent ignorant of the origin, the character and the evolution of the Fascista movement, owing to the lack of literature on the subject outside Italy. They have, however, already had the means of appreciating the qualities of strength, balance of mind, and foresight revealed from the very first by the Italian Fascista Premier. Although European public opinion may be logically entitled to an attitude of reserve in the face of the crisis of evolution and renovation through which Italy is passing, it is certain that the young President of the Council—of humble birth, and risen to power by a remarkable combination of circumstances—romantic, daring, ingenious, tempestuous—stands now the principal figure in the arena of world politics.
A NEW CROMWELL IN THE PARLIAMENT
Speech delivered in the Chamber, 16th November 1922.
Hon. Mussolini. Honourable Members,—(Signs of great attention.)—I perform to-day in this hall an act of formal deference towards you for which I do not expect any special gratitude.
I have the honour of announcing to the Chamber that His Majesty the King, by a Decree of 31st October, has accepted the resignations of the Hon. Luigi Facta from the office of President of the Council and of his colleagues, Minister and Under-Secretaries of State, and has asked me to form the new Ministry. On the same day His Majesty 208has appointed me President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs, etc.
For many years—for too many years—crises in the Government took place and were solved by more or less tortuous and underhand manœuvres, so much so that a crisis came to be regarded as a regular scramble for portfolios, and the Ministry was caricatured in the comic papers.
Now, for the second time in the brief space of seven years, the Italian people, or rather the best part of it, has overthrown a Ministry and formed for itself an entirely new Government from outside, regardless of every Parliamentary designation.
The seven years of which I speak lie between the May of 1915 and the October of 1922. I shall leave to the gloomy partisans of super-Constitutionalism the task of discoursing, more or less plaintively, about all this. I maintain that revolution has its rights; and I may add, so that everyone may know, that I am here to defend and give the greatest value to the revolution of the “black shirts,” inserting it intrinsically in the history of the nation as an active force in development, progress and the restoration of equilibrium. (Loud applause from the Left.) I could have carried our victory much further, and I refused to do so. I imposed limits upon my action and told myself that the truest wisdom is that which does not forsake one after victory. With three hundred thousand young men, fully armed, ready for anything and almost religiously prompt to obey any command of mine, I could have punished all those who have slandered the Fascisti and thrown mud at them. (Approval on the Right.) I could have made a bivouac of this gloomy grey hall; I could have shut up Parliament and formed a Government of Fascisti exclusively; I could have done so, but I did not wish to do so, at any rate at the moment. Our adversaries remained in their shelters and then quietly 209issued forth and obtained their freedom, of which they are already taking advantage to set traps for us and slander us, as at Carate, Bergamo, Udine and Muggia.
I have formed a Coalition Government, not with the intention of obtaining a Parliamentary majority, with which at the moment I can perfectly well dispense, but in order to gather together in support of the suffering nation all those who, over and above questions of party and section, wish to save her.
From the bottom of my heart I thank all those who have worked with me, both Ministers and Under-Secretaries; I thank my colleagues in the Government, who wished to share with me the heavy responsibilities of this hour; and I cannot remember without pleasure the attitude of the Italian working classes, who indirectly encouraged and strengthened the Fascisti by their solidarity, active or passive. I believe also that I shall be giving expression to the thoughts of a large part of this assembly, and certainly of the majority of the Italian people, if I pay a warm tribute to our Sovereign, who, by refusing to permit the useless reactionary attempts made at the eleventh hour to proclaim martial law, has avoided civil war and allowed the fresh and ardent Fascista current, newly arisen out of the war and exalted by victory, to pour itself into the sluggish main stream of the State. (Cries of “Long live the King!” The Ministers and a great many deputies rise to their feet and applaud.)
Before arriving here we were asked on all sides for a programme. It is not, alas! programmes that are wanting in Italy, but men to carry them out. All the problems of Italian life—all, I say—have long since been solved on paper; but the will to put these solutions into practice has been lacking. The Government to-day represents that firm and decisive will.
210
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE FASCISTA GOVERNMENT
Same speech delivered in the Chamber, 16th November 1922.
Hon. Mussolini. Honourable Members,—Our foreign policy is the business which chiefly concerns us at the present moment. I shall speak of it at once, as I think that what I am going to say will dispel many apprehensions. I shall not touch upon all the questions connected with the subject, because, in this sphere as in all others, I prefer actions to words.
The fundamental principle upon which our foreign policy is based is that treaties of peace, once signed and ratified, must be carried out, no matter whether they are good or bad. A self-respecting nation cannot follow another course. Treaties are not eternal or irreparable; they are chapters and not epilogues in history; to put them into practice means to try them. If in the course of execution they are proved to be absurd, that in itself constitutes the possibility of a further examination of the respective positions.
I shall bring before the consideration of Parliament both the Treaty of Rapallo and the Agreements of Santa Margherita, which are derived from it.
Agreed that treaties, when once perfected and ratified, must be loyally carried out, I go on to establish another fundamental principle, which is the rejection of all the famous “reconstructive” ideology. We admit that there is a kind of economic union or interdependence among European countries. We admit that this economic life 211must be reconstructed, but we refuse to think that the methods hitherto adopted will succeed in doing so. Commercial treaties concluded between two Powers—the basis of the closest economic relations between nations—are of more value in the reconstruction of the European economic world than all the complicated and confused general plenary conferences, whose lamentable history everybody knows.
As far as Italy is concerned, we intend to follow a policy which will be dignified and at the same time compatible with our national interests. (Loud applause.) We cannot allow ourselves the luxury of a policy of foolish altruism, or of complete surrender to the desires of others. Do ut des. For Italy to-day has a new importance which must be reckoned with adequately, and this fact is beginning to be recognised beyond her boundaries. We have not the bad taste to exaggerate our powers, but neither do we wish to belittle them with excessive and useless modesty.
My formula is simple: “Nothing for nothing.” Those who wish to have concrete proofs of friendship from us must give us the same. Fascista Italy, just as she does not intend to repudiate treaties for many reasons, political, moral and economic, does not intend, either, to abandon the Allies—Rome is in line with London and Paris; but Italy must assert herself and impose upon the Allies that strict and courageous examination of conscience which has not been faced by them from the time of the Armistice up to the present day.
Does an Entente still exist in the full sense of the word? What is the position of the Entente with regard to Germany and Russia? with regard to an alliance between these two countries? What is the position of Italy in the Entente, of the Italy who, not solely by reason of the weakness of her governors, lost strong positions in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, who did not obtain any colonies or raw 212materials, who is literally crushed under the load of debts incurred in order to obtain victory, and whose most sacred rights, even, were held in question? In the conversations I intend to have with the Prime Ministers of England and France, I mean to face clearly and in its entirety the question of the Entente and Italy’s position within it.
As a result of this, alternatives will arise; either the Entente, finding a way of settling her inward perplexities and contradictions, will become a really solid homogeneous body, with evenly distributed forces, with equal rights and equal duties, or her hour will have struck, and Italy, regaining her freedom of action, will turn loyally with a new policy to the work of safeguarding her interests.
I hope that the first eventuality will be realised, particularly in view of the new uprising in the East and the growing intimacy between Russia, Turkey and Germany. But, however it may be, we must get beyond conventional phrases. It is time, in fact, to abandon diplomatic expedients, which are renewed and repeated at every conference, in order to deal directly with historical fact, by which alone it is possible to decide one way or another the trend of events. Our foreign policy, which aims at protection of our interests, respect of treaties and the settling of our position in the Entente, cannot be described as adventurous and imperialist, in the vulgar sense of the word. We want to follow a policy of peace that will not, however, be at the same time suicidal.
In order to refute the pessimists who expected catastrophic results to follow upon the advent of the Fascisti to power, it is enough to remind them that our relations with the Swiss are perfectly friendly, and that a commercial treaty, already in the process of formation, will further contribute towards strengthening them when it is completed; that they are perfectly correct as regards Yugoslavia 213and Greece; we are on good terms with Spain, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Roumania, and the other Baltic States, where of late Italy has gained a great deal of sympathy, and where we are trying to make commercial agreements; and on equally good terms with the other States.
As far as Austria is concerned, Italy will keep faith as regards her promises, and will not neglect to enter into economic relations with her as well as with Hungary and Bulgaria.
We maintain, as regards Turkey, that what is now an accomplished fact ought to be recognised as such at Lausanne, with the necessary guarantees as to trade in the Straits, European interests and the interests of the small Christian communities. The situation which has arisen in Islam is going to be carefully watched. When Turkey has got what belongs to her she must not try to obtain more. There will come a day when it will be necessary to say, “Thus far and no further!” The danger of complications in the Balkans, and in consequence in Europe in general, can be avoided by firmness, which will have an increased effect in proportion to the loyalty of the Allies’ conduct. We do not forget that there are 44,000 Mohammedans in Roumania, 600,000 in Bulgaria, 400,000 in Albania, and 1,500,000 in Yugoslavia; a world which the recent victory of the Crescent has exalted, at any rate secretly.
As far as Russia is concerned, Italy believes that the moment has come to face the question of her relations with that country in their actual reality; but this apart from internal conditions in that country, with which we, as a Government, do not wish to interfere, since in our turn we shall admit of no interference in our home affairs. In consequence we are disposed to consider the possibility of a definite solution of the situation. As regards the presence 214of Russia at Lausanne, Italy has supported the most liberal point of view and does not despair of its eventual triumph, although thus far she has only been invited to discuss the single question of the Dardanelles.
Our relations with the United States are very good, and I shall make it my care to see that they are improved, especially as regards a close economic co-operation. A commercial treaty with Canada is on the point of being signed. We are on cordial terms with the republics of Central and South America, and especially with Brazil and the Argentine, where millions of Italians live. They must not be denied the possibility of taking part in the local political life around them, which will not estrange them from, but rather bind them all the closer to their Mother Country.
As for economic and financial problems, Italy will maintain in the approaching conference at Brussels that debts and reparations form an indivisible binomial.
In order to carry out this policy of dignity and regard for our national interests, we need to have at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs a central staff competent to deal with the new necessities of the national life and of the increased prestige of Italy in the world. (Applause.)
215
THE POLICY OF FASCISMO FOR ITALY: ECONOMY, WORK AND DISCIPLINE
Same speech delivered in the Chamber, 16th November 1922.
Hon. Mussolini. Honourable Members,—The policy we shall follow as regards the country itself can be summed up in three words: economy, work and discipline. The financial problem is a fundamental one, the balancing of the State Budget must be accomplished as soon as possible by a régime of careful administration, intelligence in the use of money, the utilisation of all the productive forces of the nation and the removal of the trappings of war. (Loud applause.) For further information as regards the financial question, which, though serious, is open to rapid improvement, I refer you to my colleague Tangorra,[11] who will give you information when the financial measures are discussed.
He who talks of work, talks of the productive middle classes in the towns and in the country. It is not a question of privileges for the first or for privileges for the second, but of the safeguarding of all the interests which are in accordance with national production. The proletariat which works, and whose well-being concerns us, though not from weak demagogic motives, has nothing to fear, nothing to lose and everything to gain from a financial policy which preserves the balance of the State and prevents bankruptcy, which would have a disastrous effect, especially among the humbler classes.
Our policy as regards emigration must free itself of an excessive “paternalism,” while, at the same time, an Italian 216who emigrates must know that his interests will be securely guarded by the representatives of his country abroad. The growth of the prestige of a nation in the world is in proportion to the discipline it shows at home. There is no doubt that the internal condition of the country has improved, but it is not yet as I should like to see it. I do not intend to indulge myself in easy optimism. I am no lover of Pangloss. In the big cities, and in all the towns in general, there is peace; instances of violence are sporadic and peripheral; but, at the same time, these also must cease. The citizens, no matter to what party they belong, shall have freedom of movement; all religions shall be respected, with particular regard to the dominant faith, Catholicism; statutory liberty shall not be infringed and the law shall be made to be respected at all costs!
The State is strong and will prove its power equally where all classes of citizens are concerned, including illegal Fascismo, because it would now be irresponsible illegality and without any justification. I must add, however, that almost all the Fascisti have submitted to the new order of things. The State does not mean to abdicate for anyone, and whoever opposes it must be punished. This explicit statement is a warning to all citizens, and I know will be particularly pleasing to the Fascisti, who have fought and won in order to have a State which would make itself felt in every direction with inexhaustible energy. It must not be forgotten that, besides the minority that represent actual militant politics, there are forty millions of excellent Italians who work, by their splendid birth-rate perpetuate our race, and who ask, and have the right to obtain, freedom from the chronic state of disorder which is the sure prelude to general ruin. Since sermons, evidently, are not enough, the State will put the army it has at its disposal in order by a process of selection and improvement. 217The Fascista State will form a perfectly organised and united police force, of great mobility and with a high moral standard; while the army and navy—glorious and dear to every Italian heart—withdrawn from the vicissitudes of Parliamentary politics, reorganised and strengthened, will represent the last reserve of the nation both at home and abroad.
Gentlemen, from the last communication issued you will learn what the Fascista programme is in detail with regard to each individual Ministry. I do not wish, as long as it is possible to avoid it, to govern against the wishes of the Chamber; but the Chamber must understand the peculiar position it holds, which makes it liable to dismissal in two days or in two years. (Laughter.) We ask for full powers, because we wish to take full responsibility. Without full powers you know perfectly well that not a penny—a penny I say—would be saved. By this we do not intend to exclude the possibility of voluntary co-operation, which we shall cordially accept, whether it be from deputies, senators or single competent citizens. We have, every one of us, a religious sense of the difficulty of our task. The country encourages us and waits. We shall not give you further words but facts. Let us solemnly and formally pledge ourselves to balance the Budget, and we shall do it. We wish to have a foreign policy of peace, but, at the same time, it must be dignified and firm; and we shall have it. None of our enemies, past or present, need deceive themselves about the rapidity of our advent to power. (Laughter; comments.) Our Government has a formidable hold upon the hearts of the people and is supported by the best elements in the country. There is no doubt that in these last days an enormous step has been taken towards spiritual unity. The Italian nation has found herself again, from the north to the south, from the Continent to those generous islands which shall no more be forgotten—(Applause.)—from 218Rome to the industrious colonies of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Gentlemen, do not throw useless words at the nation; fifty-two requests to speak on my lists is too much. Let us work, rather, with pure hearts and ready brains to assure the prosperity and the greatness of the country.
And may God help me to carry my arduous task to a victorious end. (Loud applause. Many deputies come down to congratulate the President.)
219
“CONSCIENTIOUS GENERAL DIAGNOSIS OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE COUNTRY AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY”
Sitting of 27th November 1922, Senate.
Hon. Mussolini. Honourable Senators,—I have listened with deep interest and attention to all the speeches touching upon various subjects which have been delivered in this hall. The Ministers directly concerned can answer to the different individual questions. I shall limit myself to confuting some of the statements which can be said to be of a general order. Of course if the vote of the Senate be unanimous, it will please me—(Laughter.)—but you must not believe that unanimity flatters me excessively. I entertain a thorough contempt for those who have more or less clamorously sided with me in these last days. They are so often the kind of people who follow the fair wind and are ready to tumble headlong over to the other side when the wind changes direction. (Laughter.) I prefer sincere enemies to doubtful friends.
Of the speeches delivered in this hall some have a particular importance, as for instance that, generally optimistic, of Senator Conti, which reminded me of the analogous speech, also optimistic, delivered in the Chamber by the Hon. Buozzi. This favourable view of economic conditions in Italy, coming thus from a head of the proletariat and a head of the great Italian industries, is a curious coincidence and certainly of good omen.
A Neat Surgical Operation. I owe a special answer to Senator Albertini. I admire his firm faith in pure Liberalism, but I take the liberty to remind him that Constitutionalism 220in England, Liberalism in France, in fact all the ideas and doctrines which have in common the name of Liberalism, spring out of a fierce revolutionary travail without which, to-day, Signor Albertini would not, very probably, have been able to pay these tributes to pure Liberalism.
How was it possible to find a way out of this internal crisis, which every day was becoming more alarming and distressing? A temporary and transitional Ministry was no longer possible. It did not solve the problem, it hardly delayed it. Consequently in two, three or six months’ time at the most, with that mobility of opinions and desires that characterised certain Parliamentary circles, we should have found ourselves where we were at the beginning, with nothing gained but the failure which would have aggravated the crisis. (Hear, hear!)
After having thought over the matter deeply, therefore, and having clearly realised the ironic paradox, becoming every day more manifest, of the existence of two States—one the actual State itself and the other which nobody succeeded in defining—I said to myself at a certain moment that only a neat surgical operation could make one compact State of the two and save the fortunes of the nation.
Senator Albertini must not think that this decision was other than the result of long meditation; he must not think that I had not well considered all the dangers and risks of this illegal action. I willed it deliberately. I dare to say more than this—I forced it on. To my mind there was no other way except by revolution to revive a political class grown enormously tired and discouraged in all its sections; and since experience teaches something, or ought to teach something, to intelligent men, I at once set limits and established rules for my action. I have not gone beyond a certain point, I did not in the least become intoxicated by victory, nor did I take advantage of it. Who could have 221prevented me from closing Parliament? Who could have prevented me from proclaiming a Dictatorship with two or three men? Who could withstand me? Who could have withstood a movement which consisted not only in 300,000 membership cards but in 300,000 rifles? Nobody. It was I who, for love of our country, said that it was necessary to subordinate impulse, sentiment and personal ambition to the supreme interests of the nation; and it was I who put the movement at once on constitutional lines.
I have formed a Ministry with men from all parties in the House. I did not hesitate to include a member of the old Cabinet. I gave importance to technical efficiency and paid no attention to political labels. I formed a Coalition Ministry and I presented it to the Chamber. I asked for its judgment and its vote and I found that Chamber a little changed. But when I found out that not less than thirty-three orators had presented thirty-six orders of the day, I said to myself that perhaps it was not necessary to abolish Parliament, but that the country would be glad to see it enjoying a holiday for a certain period. (Laughter.) I have, therefore, no intention of dismissing the Chamber, of destroying all the fruits of the Liberal revolution. I can boast of all this philosophically from a point of view which might almost be called negative. But philosophy must be silent in the face of political necessity. Let us speak frankly! What is this Liberalism, this Liberalism put into practice? Because if there is anyone who believes that, to be a true Liberal, it is necessary to give some hundreds of irresponsible people, fanatics and scoundrels, the power of ruining forty millions of Italians, I refuse absolutely to give them this power. (Applause.) Gentlemen, I have no fetishes, and where the interests of the country are concerned the Government has the right to intervene. If it did not do so, it would be inadequate the first time and the next time suicidal.
222Respect for the Constitution. I do not intend to deviate from the Constitution or to improvise. The example of other revolutions has shown me that there are some fundamental principles in the life of the people that must be respected. (Hear, hear!) I do not intend that national discipline shall be any longer merely a word. I do not intend that the law shall be any longer a blunt weapon. (Hear, hear!) I do not intend that liberty shall degenerate into licence. I do not intend, either, to remain above the fray among those who love, who work for, and who are ready to sacrifice themselves for the nation, or, on the other hand, among those who are ready to do the reverse.
It was for just such a foolish “Rolandism” that this last Government failed. One cannot remain above the fray when the moral forces which are the foundation of the national community are at stake; and nobody can say that a national policy, understood thus, is reactionary. For me all these names of Left and Right, of Conservative, Aristocracy and Democracy are so many empty academic terms. They serve occasionally to distinguish, but more often to confuse.
I shall not follow an anti-proletariat policy, for reasons national, and other than national. We do not want to oppress the proletariat; we do not want to drive it back into humiliating conditions of life. On the contrary we want to elevate it materially and spiritually; but not because we think that the masses, the populace, could create a special type of civilisation in the future. Let us leave this kind of ideology to those who profess themselves to be ministers of this mysterious religion. The reasons for which we wish to follow a policy of proletarian welfare are quite different. They lie in the interests of the nation; they are dictated by the reality of facts, by the conviction that no nation can be united and at peace if twenty millions of workmen 223are condemned to live in humiliating and inadequate conditions of life. And it may be, nay, it is certain, that our labour policy—or rather anti-demagogic policy, because we cannot promise the paradise we do not possess—will ultimately prove to be much more useful to those same working classes than the other policy which, like an oriental mirage, has hypnotised and mystified them into a vain attitude of waiting. (Approval.)
The Military Organisation of Fascismo. “What will you do with the military organisation of Fascismo?” I have been asked. This military organisation gave Rome an imposing spectacle. There were 52,000 “black shirts,” and they left Rome within the twenty-four hours prescribed by me. They obey. I dare even to go further and to say that they have the mysticism of obedience! I do not intend to disperse these exuberant forces, not only for the sake of Fascismo itself, but in the interests of the nation. What I shall impose upon Fascismo is the discontinuance of all the acts for which there is now no necessity—(Hear, hear!)—those small, individual and collective acts of violence which are rather humiliating to everyone, which are often the result of local situations and could with difficulty be associated with the big problems of the different Italian parties. I am sure that what might be called “illegal Fascismo,” now happily on the decline, will soon end altogether. This is one of the conditions of that pacification to which my friend Senator Bellini alluded; but in order that this pacification may succeed, the other side must also cease their ambushes and acts of violence.
Foreign Policy. I thank the Senate for not having dwelt too much on foreign policy. I am particularly glad that Fascismo has universally accepted with enthusiasm my firm decision as regards the application of treaties, because 224if I do not allow illegality in internal policy, still less shall I allow it in foreign affairs. (Hear, hear!) So let it be clear to all inside this hall and out. Foreign policy will be in the hands of one man alone, of the man who has the honour of representing and directing it; because there cannot be an unlimited division and diffusion of responsibility, and foreign policy is too difficult and delicate a matter to be thrown as occupation to those who have nothing better to do. (Laughter.)
I can then tell the Hon. Barzilai that I shall keep the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for myself. At bottom the Ministry of the Interior is a Ministry of Police, and I am glad to be the head of the police. I am not in the least ashamed of it. On the contrary, I hope that all Italian citizens, forgetting certain atavisms, will recognise in the police one of the most necessary forces for the welfare of our social existence. But, above all, I intend to follow a line of foreign policy which will not be adventurous, while, at the same time, it will not be characterised by self-sacrifice. (Strong approval.) Certainly miracles are not to be expected in this field, as it is impossible to cancel in a conversation, even in a dramatic one of half an hour, a policy which has been the result of other conditions and of another period of time.
I think that foreign policy should have as its supreme aim the maintenance of peace. This is a fine ideal, especially after a war that has lasted four years. Our policy, therefore, will not be that of the Imperialists who seek the impossible, while, at the same time, it will not necessarily rest upon the negative formula according to which one should never have recourse to force. It is well to keep the possibility of war in sight; it cannot be discarded a priori, because in that case we should find ourselves disarmed with the other nations in arms. (Great applause.)
225But I have no illusions, for, in accordance with my temperament, I disdain all easy optimism. People who see things through rose-coloured spectacles make me laugh; I often pity them. I think, however, I have already succeeded in something, and in no small thing either, which will have no small results. That is to say, I think I have succeeded in making the Allies and other peoples of Europe, who had not yet attained a true vision of Italy, see her as she really is. Not as something vaguely prehistoric, not the Italy of monuments and libraries—all most respectable things—but Italy as I see her born under my eyes, the Italy of to-day, overflowing with vitality, prepared to give herself a new lease of life, pregnant with serenity and beauty; an Italy which does not live like a parasite on the past, but is prepared to build up her own future with her own forces and through her own work and martyrdom.
This is the Italy which has now flashed, be it ever so vaguely, before the eyes of the representatives of other nations, who henceforward must be convinced, whether they wish it or not, that Italy does not intend to follow in the wake of others, but intends to vindicate her rights with dignity, and with no less dignity to protect her interests. (Approval.)
God and the People. I have been admonished in turn by all those who have spoken in this hall. They have said to me: “The responsibility which you take is enormously heavy.” Yes! I know it and I feel it. Sometimes, intensified by a deep and vibrating expectancy, it almost crushes me. At these times I have to gather all my force, to arm myself with all my determination, in order to keep before me the interests and the future of our country. Well I know that it is not my interests that are at stake. Certainly, if I do not succeed I am a broken man. These are not experiments 226that can be tried twice in a lifetime. But my person is of little value. Not to succeed would not mean much to me personally, but it would be infinitely serious for the nation. (Hear, hear!) I intend to take the helm of the ship, and I do not intend to yield it to anybody. But I shall not refuse to take on board all those who wish to form my crew, all those who wish to work with me, who will give me advice and suggestions, who will, in a word, give me their invaluable and indispensable co-operation.
In the other Chamber I invoked the help of God. In this—and I hope my words will not be taken as mere rhetoric—I shall invoke the Italian people. In doing this I might feel that I was walking in the steps of Mazzini, who made a union between God and the people. But if, as I hope and earnestly desire, the people will be disciplined, laborious, and proud of this their glorious country, I feel I shall not fail to arrive at my goal! (Ovation; the Ministers and many Senators advance to congratulate the orator.)
227
“I REMAIN THE HEAD OF FASCISMO, ALTHOUGH THE HEAD OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT”
Speech delivered in London, 12th December 1922, before the Fascisti.
Fascisti! You must feel that in this last month the Italian people have raised themselves considerably in the eyes of all the other nations. Everybody knows now that a new and vigorous Italy was born in those historic days of October. Remember that the revolution was great, but that it is not over, indeed that it has hardly begun. Hard tasks and heavy responsibilities await us. I remain the head of Fascismo, although the head of the Government. Beneath these official clothes, which I wear as a duty, I shall keep the Fascista uniform, just as I wore it before His Majesty when he summoned me to form a new Cabinet.
Fascista Italy, I assure you, is in very strong hands. All our enemies know that every attempt at revolt will be inexorably crushed. The old Italy is dead and will not come to life again. The men who gave their lives in the war will prevent it; those who fell in the Fascista war, no less sacred and necessary, will prevent it; the living will prevent it. We, here and everywhere, are ready for any battle so that we may uphold the foundations of our race and of our history. The time has come to face serenely the sons of other nations. The era of renunciations and obligations is past; the head of the Government tells you this. You asked me to come here upon this occasion of the inauguration of the London section of the Fascista Party. I present you with your banner; keep it as you keep alive the flame of that faith for which so many fine young men have died, keep it for the fortunes of Italy and Fascismo.
228
“OUR TASK IN HISTORY IS TO MAKE A UNITED STATE OF THE ITALIAN NATION”
Speech delivered 2nd January 1923, upon the occasion of the Ministerial Reception in Palazzo Chigi at Rome, in answer to the Hon. Teofilo Rossi, Minister of Industry and Commerce, who had concluded his address to the President by saying: “The victorious Greeks returning from Troy through the storm cried: ‘Nil desperandum Teucro duce et auspice Teucro.’ We in our turn will say: ‘Nil desperandum while at the helm of the State there is a man like Benito Mussolini.’”
Dear Colleagues,—Let me first of all say how happy I am that we should have met in these magnificent rooms which furnish evidence of the strength and beauty of our race, and are also a testimony of our victory, as, if I am not mistaken, these were the apartments of an enemy’s Embassy.[12]
I was very much touched by the words spoken just now by our colleague Rossi. The nation as a whole is not deceived, and follows with brotherly sympathy the work of our Government. It is aware of the difficulties we have to overcome: difficulties which arise from the double work of demolition and reconstruction which we have undertaken simultaneously. The nation, little by little, is being restored to order. There are more than ten thousand communes in Italy, and there is no reason to fear a catastrophe because there is a quarrel, without any particular positive importance, in one of them during the critical days of Saturday and Sunday.
All this does preoccupy me, however, and I intend by every means possible to get the nation back into a state of general discipline that will be above all sects, factions and parties.
There was an Italian people who had not yet become a 229nation; the travail of fifty years of history and, above all, the last war has made them a nation. The task in history which awaits us is this: to make a State of this nation, that is to say, a moral idea which is personified and expressed in a system of individual, responsible hierarchies composed of men who, from the first to the last, feel it a pride and a privilege to fulfil their duty.
This work, seen from the standpoint of historical development, cannot be completed in two months and probably not even in two years. But this is the direction in which our Government is working, and every decision we make and every act we achieve is guided by the necessity of establishing one united State, which will be the only depositary of our history and of the future and the strength of the Italian nation.
It is a difficult and arduous undertaking. But life would not be worth living if we did not face these tasks, and if we had not the satisfaction of having met them all the more serenely for their difficulty.
No! I am certain that we shall not frustrate the legitimate hopes of the Italian people. We can and we will adopt a policy of wisdom and severity towards the people and towards ourselves. We must foster the ideals of the nation, and deal relentlessly with the slightest manifestation of lack of discipline.
I, too, should like to quote from the tales of ancient Greece. When the Spartan mothers presented their departing sons with their shields, it was with these words: “Either with this or on it.” Now I should like our programme to be inspired by this idea, for with this programme, and with this only, shall we win.
Through our efforts, our work and our suffering will rise that powerful, prosperous and peaceful Italy of which we dream, which we long for and desire to see! Long live Italy!
230
THE ADVANCE IN THE RUHR DISTRICT
Speech delivered at Rome, 15th January 1923, before the members of the Cabinet.
The Prime Minister. Honourable Colleagues,—The most important event of these last few days in the international world has been the French advance on the Ruhr. It is well to establish clearly the attitude of Italy with regard to this advance, since, for political reasons and also for reasons connected with the Stock Exchange, it has purposely not been properly estimated.
It is necessary to go back to the Conference of Paris, and the rejection of Bonar Law’s proposals on the part of Italy, France and Belgium, in order to understand the line of conduct adopted by the Italian Government. It is a fact that each one of the Powers in the Entente has taken up an attitude of its own, due to its own particular conditions. Without taking into consideration the Americans, who have withdrawn their troops from the Rhine, this is the position of the Powers.
England has not joined with France, but has not decided, at any rate up to the present, to recall her troops from German soil, nor has she changed in her friendly attitude towards France, as was set forth by the most recent communications from the Foreign Office.
France, interested in the problem of reparations, has, upon the basis of the deliberations of the Commission appointed to enquire into this question, sent into the Ruhr a Board of Control for the production of coal and, later, troops for the purpose of protection.
231Belgium has afforded France some military co-operation and undivided political support.
Italy has only given political and technical support, sending her engineers to the Ruhr. Our country could not isolate herself without committing a very grave mistake. She could not exclude herself entirely from any operation of control taking place in a region of coalfields, and, therefore, of fundamental importance in European and Italian economics.
As regards the project for a continental alliance directed against England, such an idea simply does not exist. The Italian Government never suggested such a thing, and, in any case, would never have been able to consider the possibility of a continental union against England, both on account of her importance in the economic life of the Continent and of existing relations between Italy and that country.
It is true, on the contrary, that the Italian Government had advised France to limit, as far as possible, the military character of the advance in the Ruhr district, and not to reject all possibilities of agreement in this burning question. But if this understanding, which would give peace to Europe, were to be realised, it is the opinion of Italy that it could not come about without the co-operation of England. Italy, which has no coal, cannot afford the luxury of renunciations and isolation, but it is as well to make it clear—because it is the truth—that Italian policy upon this occasion, as upon all others, is inspired by considerations of a general nature, as decided in the Memorandum of London, for the protection of Italian interests and of European economics generally. The Italian Government thinks that if there is a possibility of agreement—and it works in this direction—it would be a grave mistake on the part of Germany to refuse it.
232It seems as if a détente between the French command and some of the industrial magnates of the Ruhr district has already taken place. As for the mass of the workmen, it appears as if they do not intend to put insuperable difficulties in the way of the work of control.
The payment of the quota for the 15th January is postponed until the end of the month. There are, therefore, fifteen days of useful time, sufficient to mend the situation. It does not seem improbable that the French will support the Italian project presented at London upon the subject of reparations.
As for the attitude of the Soviet Government, it appears to be very circumspect, and has not changed from that previously manifested, though only in words, towards the German proletariat.
From Lausanne comes satisfactory news. I have the pleasure of announcing that, in some of the very delicate questions which seemed to be leading to a rupture, such as that of minorities, if an agreement has been reached, it has been due to the wise and level-headed work of the Italian Delegation.
(Without discussion, the declarations of the Prime Minister are unanimously approved.)
The Great Fascista Council. My colleagues in the Cabinet will certainly have read with attention the deliberations of the Great National Council of the Fascisti, and have noticed the importance of their character.
It is an essentially political organisation, which, however, does not encroach in any way upon the sphere of action of the Government, represented by the Cabinet. In fact none of the legislative measures passed or to be passed by the Cabinet were made the subject of discussion by the Fascista Council. All its decisions are of a purely political nature. 233Thus they have definitely settled the character of the national militia. They have constituted the organisation which is to establish relations between Fascisti and Nationalists, as well as those between Fascismo and the other parties which loyally co-operate with the Government and the organisations of employers already in existence before the formation of the analogous Fascista groups.
Important also is the vote by which the associations of ex-soldiers (including the disabled) who have entered the sphere of the State have been asked to give men for the purposes of administration. The declaration of loyal devotion to the Monarchy is both magnificent and solemn, and dispels every little misunderstanding of interested dabblers in politics on that score, for whom the warning that closed the proceedings of the Great Council came opportunely—the warning, that is to say, that the Government—note, the Government—will inexorably crush every attempt at direct or indirect opposition to its authority.
The Great Fascista Council has also sent messages to the working people of Italy, who are in the process of re-establishing active discipline amongst themselves, and who accept the provisions of the Government, even the hardest, because they are sure that they are inspired by purely national necessity.
Thus the essentially historic function of the Great Fascista Council at this moment is clearly outlined. The Council will support and safeguard the action of the Government, and perform in the party and in the nation the work of general political orientation which must serve as a base for the work of the Government itself. (The Council of Ministers approves the declarations of the Prime Minister.)
234
THE GOVERNMENT OF SPEED
Speech delivered at Rome, 19th January 1923, at the headquarters of the Motor Transport Company.
Hon. Mussolini. I warmly thank Commendatore De Cupis and all the workmen—I was going to say my colleagues—for the warm welcome I have received. If my minutes were not numbered, I should like, here in the presence of the “controllers of the steering wheel,” to sing the praises of speed, in this the epoch of speed. The times in which we live no longer allow of a sedentary egoistical life; everything must be on the go, everybody must raise the standard of his activity, both in the offices and in the factories where the work is done—(Applause.)—and the Government, which I have the honour to represent, is the Government of speed, that is to say, we get rid of all that is stagnant in our national life.
Formerly the bureaucracy dozed over deferred decisions, to-day it must proceed with the maximum of rapidity. (Applause.) If we all go ahead with this energy, good-will and cheerfulness we shall surmount the crisis, which for that matter is already partly overcome.
I am pleased to see that Rome also is waking up and can offer us sights such as these works. I maintain that Rome can become an industrial centre. The Romans must be the first to disdain to live solely upon their memories. The Coliseum and the Forum are glories of the past, but we must build up the glories of to-day and of to-morrow. We belong to the generation of builders who, by work and discipline, with hands and brains, desire to reach the ultimate and longed-for goal, the greatness of the future nation, which will be a nation of producers and not of parasites.
235
THE MARCH OF EVENTS ON THE RUHR THE POSITION OF ITALY
Speech delivered at Rome, 23rd January 1923, before the Cabinet.
The Prime Minister. Honourable Colleagues,—Since the last meeting of the Cabinet, the situation on the Ruhr has become more complicated, and this also from the social point of view, as the result of the closing down of the factories and the outbreak of strikes in the mines and public services of the occupied zones.
In order to understand the attitudes of the different Powers and the fact that these attitudes have not undergone any changes worthy of note, it is necessary to summarise briefly the events of these last few days of high tension, political and economic.
The period of time granted for the Moratorium having elapsed on 15th January, France and Belgium have caused a Mission of Control to be sent to the mines in the Ruhr district, escorted by protecting troops, and have extended the area of territory occupied in the Ruhr district as far as Dortmund. On 16th January the French Government gave notice that the industrial magnates on the Ruhr had declared that they had received orders from the German Government not to hand over any more coal. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs himself communicated these instructions to our Ambassador at Berlin.
France and Belgium were not, therefore, receiving any more coal, even when payment was made in advance. In the face of the German resistance, the French and Belgian 236troops have proceeded to requisition the coal deposits at the pitheads, the factories and the railway stations, and have also taken other serious steps of a political and military order. Italian experts, sent only to take part in economic operations of control, received orders to limit their co-operation to that which concerned coercive measures of a political nature.
Such an attitude was clearly faced and decided in Paris. On the strength of the decision made on 26th December by the Commission of Reparations, which reported the failure of Germany, as regards Italy also, to supply wood, France and Belgium decided to proceed to the exploitation of the Crown and Communal forests in the Rhine territory. Germany had, besides, made it known that coal supplies and cattle would be refused to France and Belgium, by way both of reparation and restitution.
The Commission of Reparations in its decision of 16th January verified this intentional failure on the part of Germany from the 12th January, and notified it to the Government. As a result of this, France and Belgium decided to take possession of the west customs frontier of Germany in the occupied zone. The Italian Government took over control of the customs and also of the forests, this being included among the measures which the Italian Memorandum had reserved as a security in the case of the concession of the Moratorium; but it asked the French Government what was going to be the extent to which the action was to be carried. The French Government replied that the occupation of the Ruhr was not of a military character, but was for the protection of French technical bodies, which were very numerous in the occupied area. The Italian Delegate, who was already on the High Commission of the Rhine, which directs the exploitation and also the control of the mines, has received orders to 237take part in those deliberations which have an economic and financial character, and to abstain from attending those which are political.
As I said before, the attitudes of the Great Powers have not altered to any great extent. England seems officially uninterested in what happens on the Ruhr, but this has not prevented the English Representative on the Rhine High Commission from declaring in the name of his Government that he will be present at the deliberations, abstaining from recording his vote when he thinks it best; but he adds, also, that his Government will not oppose the carrying out of the provisions in the zone occupied by the English troops which still remain on the Rhine. As you see, it is not England’s intention to accentuate the difference between her policy and that which is, at present, adopted by France.
Mediation on the part of Italy was spoken of, which might have led later to a direct Anglo-Italian intervention, both at Berlin and Paris. An offer of real mediation does not exist, and could not be made without the certainty that it would be accepted with a certain favour. It would be a grave mistake to expose Italian policy to a failure of this sort. It is a fact that the Italian Government did warn the Germans of the danger of the blind-alley situation in which she has voluntarily placed herself, and in which she seems determined to stay. She also called the attention of France, in a friendly manner, to the complications, not only economic but also political and social, which might arise from the occupation of the Ruhr.
The Work of the Italian Government. Matters standing thus, the Italian Government cannot at present change its attitude, because no step it took now would alter the general situation or exercise a preponderating influence in the decisions of the Governments most involved. The opinion 238of the Italian Government is that the situation on the Ruhr has not yet reached the stage at which a solution must necessarily be found, and only when that moment arrives will it be able, perhaps, to have an influence on the situation itself.
As for the Moratorium which President Poincaré has decided to propose to the Germans, in view of the fast approaching date of payment, 31st January, it is worthy of note that it will include some of the points made in the Italian Memorandum of London, namely the two years’ Moratorium and the German internal loan.
As far as America is concerned, having once withdrawn her troops from the Rhine, she has not altered her policy of neutral inactivity.
One understands that the events in the Ruhr district have caused a general uneasiness over the whole of Europe, especially in the countries which form the Little Entente. Rumours which spoke of mobilisation and the concentration of troops upon some of the frontiers have proved unfounded and exaggerated. As regards Russia, beyond reports of certain political activities on the part of the Third International, carried on with a view to taking advantage socially of the events on the Ruhr, there is no definite news of serious preparations for military intervention on a large scale. At Lausanne, the reaction of the situation on the Ruhr is being felt, and is arousing an increased intransigence on the part of Turkey.
To sum up: The policy of Italy must be inspired first of all by the defence of her own interests, though, at the same time, due note must be taken of considerations and needs of a general order. It is a question whether, by a more exact valuation of the conditions put forward in the Italian Memorandum of London, the grave complications which exist to-day would not have been avoided. At any rate 239the Italian Government will take careful and speedy measures to avoid any further difficulties and re-establish as soon as possible a release of tension throughout Europe, which might make it possible to face the problem of reparations and debts under other conditions.
(The Cabinet at the end express entire approval of the line of foreign policy adopted by the Prime Minister.)
240
THE RUHR, THE CONFERENCE OF LAUSANNE AND THE PORT OF MEMEL
Speech delivered at Rome, 1st February 1923, before the Cabinet.
The Prime Minister. With reference to foreign affairs, the situation, as far as Italy is concerned, cannot be said to have altered much in the interval which has elapsed between the last Cabinet meeting and to-day.
The German resistance on economic grounds has provoked aggravation of the measures—both military and political—which are being taken by France and Belgium, but from which Italy, following her previous line of conduct, has kept apart.
The complications which were—or could have been—feared, so far have not occurred. Fresh factors have not entered into the close duel which is being fought on the Ruhr. Russia has not altered her attitude as a State, although the dominating party continues to give clamorous verbal demonstrations of solidarity with the German proletariat.
The serious disquietude which had been manifested by the Powers of the Little Entente is diminishing. There had been rumours—more or less without foundation and spread, perhaps, with the object of producing complications—of plans for repeating in Hungary what France had done on the Ruhr, which were attributed to one State or another. These have given Italy the opportunity of confirming and clearly establishing her attitude of opposition to any movement which could extend the conflict to other zones or give the opportunity of attacking the validity of the treaties of peace already concluded.
241The Italian Government has been and is following attentively the coal situation on the Ruhr, above all as regards its reaction on other events. I can say that all internal measures, reduction of the train services, including those from abroad, and contracts for fresh supplies, have been quickly and diligently carried through, because, whatever may happen, no paralysis of our industrial activity or of our communications must result. In connection with the supplies of raw materials, I have the pleasure to announce to the Cabinet that the Italian Government has succeeded in concluding a favourable agreement with the Polish Government for oil.
As I said last time, the events on the Ruhr have had the most serious consequences in the developments at the Conference of Lausanne, which has now arrived at its last stage. The Italian Delegation has carried out successful work there with the object of obtaining peace in the East.
The Italian Government has not been among the last to recognise the legitimate rights of Turkey, and thinks to-day that it would not be in her interests to entrench herself in a position of absolute intransigence. It may be that Turkey has not realised the extensive programme that was laid down by the Grand National Assembly of Angora, but it cannot be denied that a great part of that programme has been put into execution, since the Turks from Angora have returned not only to Smyrna but to Constantinople and Adrianople, and have got their way, it can be said, in questions of the highest importance, such as that of the domination of the Straits and that of Capitulations.
Taken as a whole, although the general situation continues to be very critical, there seems to be a small ray of light upon the horizon. The action of the Italian Government is directed decidedly towards a policy of general peace.
As regards the question of Memel, the Italian Government 242has pursued a temperate policy, inspired by principles of equity and justice. It is not possible to do less than recognise the rights of Lithuania over that port, but the Lithuanian Government cannot be allowed to substitute itself for the Allied Powers in deciding its fate.
We, then, have remained in an attitude of solidarity with the Allies in the measures taken for facing the situation there. But we have, on the other hand, tried effectively to reduce those measures to the necessary minimum, avoiding those of such a nature as to provoke further complications.
243
RATIFICATION OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY OF NAVAL DISARMAMENT
Chamber of Deputies. Sitting of 6th February 1923.
The Prime Minister. Honourable Members,—I do not think that it is worth while losing time in a general discussion upon the qualities of men, good and bad, and upon the question as to whether the war of 1914 will be the last or the one before the last. That would be perfectly idle and would only lead to academic discussions. Let us, instead, turn our attention more practically to the Project of Law which I have presented.
The Convention of Washington was closed a year ago. Now the delay in the ratification of the treaty on the part of Italy has already had ambiguous and, I should almost say, unfavourable consequences in the international world. It will be a good thing, then, to proceed at once to complete this act.
The Conference at Washington shared the fate of all the conferences. It opened with great hopes, flashing before our eyes the possibility of eternal peace. Then the concrete results frustrated these hopes. I confess that I do not believe in perpetual and universal peace. In the life of the peoples, notwithstanding ideals—noble and worthy of respect—there exist the permanent factors of race, and the greatness and decadence of nations, which lead to differences often only settled by a recourse to arms. Now it is not a case of weighing these conventions with a view to peace; they represent a breath, a pause, and it is useless to enquire if they have been laid down for idealistic or for 244business reasons. In any case I declare that Italy did well to adhere to this Convention. If she had not done so, we should have appeared in the eyes of the world as Imperialists and jingoists, which is far from what we have in our hearts and minds. The fact that the Government asks the Chamber for this ratification gives an idea of the general trend of the Fascista foreign policy. (Applause.)
(The ratification of the Treaty is approved of without discussion, only the Communists being against it.)
245
MESSAGE FROM THE HON. MUSSOLINI TO THE ITALIANS IN AMERICA UPON THE OCCASION OF THE SIGNING OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE LAYING OF CABLES BETWEEN ITALY AND THE AMERICAN CONTINENT
The National Government, which has worked indefatigably for three months to set the country going upon the path to better fortunes, has in these days signed the Convention for the laying of cables which are to put our country into communication with you, who represent it in the numerous, rich and patriotic colonies beyond the Atlantic.
The enthusiasm for this work, so necessary to our life as a great nation, seemed at one time to have died down, but to-day with the rise of youth upon the scenes of Italian politics, that which it seemed would be relegated to some remote future has been transformed into a concrete and almost immediate reality. It is not you, who suffer almost more than any the pangs of homesickness for our adored country, who need to be shown the usefulness and necessity of this undertaking, which will be carried through in the shortest space of time possible. It will render frequent, daily and, above all, free the communications between the forty million Italians who live in our beautiful peninsula and the six millions who live beyond the ocean. All the Italians who can give financial and moral support must co-operate so that the undertaking may succeed. The Italian Government does not appeal in vain to its emigrant 246citizens, because it knows that distance makes the love of their country stronger and more intense.
The cables, which in two or three years will bind together Italy and the Americas across the boundless ocean, are like a gigantic arm which the country stretches out to her distant sons to draw them to her and to make them share more intimately her griefs and her joys, her work, her greatness and her glory.
Mussolini.
Rome, 6th February 1923.
247
FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF THE TREATY OF RAPALLO
Prefatory remarks to the Deputies, 8th February 1923, accompanying the Project of Law presented by the Hon. Mussolini, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister. Honourable Members,—Last November I began my statement to Parliament of the programme of the National Government as regards foreign policy with the following words:
“The fundamental principle upon which our foreign policy is based is that treaties of peace, once signed and ratified, must be carried out whether they are good or bad. A self-respecting nation cannot follow another course. Treaties are not eternal or irreparable; they are chapters and not epilogues in history; to put them into practice means to try them. If in the course of execution they are proved to be absurd, this in itself may constitute the new element which may open the possibility of a further examination of the respective positions.”
The preceding Government had undertaken to present to Parliament the Agreements concluded at Santa Margherita, and signed at Rome on the 23rd October last. This undertaking I now fulfil.
These Agreements, contrary to what has been stated by someone, do not contain any new political pledges on the part of Italy, but regulate the relations between the Commune of Zara and the surrounding territory of Dalmatia, make clear some recognised rights on the part of citizens who are Italian by option, and endeavour, by means of 248friendly agreements, to find a possibility of giving and assuring a peaceful and industrious life to the troubled city of Fiume.
Owing to the way in which it is drawn up—whether on account of its diffuseness in those clauses which touch upon territorial questions, and its brevity in others, or whether on account of the seeming precedence given to the task of the commissions which ought, according to the letter of the treaty itself, to proceed exclusively to the settlement of territorial questions, while for the commissions to which were entrusted the settlement of other questions, limits were established, a priori, of a certain amplitude (Art. VI.)—the Treaty of Rapallo has given Yugoslavia the opportunity of maintaining that it was necessary first to effect the evacuation of the territories over which the sovereignty of the Serbo-Croat-Slovak Kingdom had been recognised, and then of proceeding to the stipulations of the agreements for the regulation of the new relations between the two countries.
They tried to justify this with arguments of a political nature. That is to say, they saw, in the first place, that the opposition met with in various Italian political spheres to the transactions concluded at Rapallo had stirred up the discontent and opposition of the Yugoslavs to the treaty; secondly, that the suspended execution of the Territorial Clauses, evidently attributed to some Italian parties, had given the impression to the Yugoslavs that Italy did not want to proceed to the carrying out of the treaty; thirdly, that, in consequence, the parliamentary opposition to a policy of friendliness towards Italy had become very marked, and rendered extremely difficult the adoption of direct provisions for the favourable regulation of these relations; and lastly, that if, instead, the prearranged course had been followed—that of proceeding, say, first to the evacuation 249of the territories—a radical change of position would have been realised, which would have allowed of the conclusion of more favourable agreements.
In Italy, on the other hand, the discontent was increased by an idea, entertained by many, that the new State, which had also arisen as the result of Italy’s victorious war, ought to give to the citizens, and in Italian interests, privileges no less great than those granted by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, not taking into account that a national State, newly formed, may have particular exigencies and susceptibilities. The contrast of such opposite tendencies ended by creating in the relations between the two countries an atmosphere of uneasiness, which has at times reached an acute stage. And in Italy, the intransigence of some circles found justification, above all, in the weakness of the Governments, inasmuch as they had ground for fearing that all our rights would be trodden underfoot the moment we no longer had tangible securities in our hands. By the Agreements which are now handed to us, the Government of Belgrade has recognised the necessity of determining the régime which will have to regulate the reciprocal relations of the new boundaries before passing to the definite execution of the Territorial Clauses.
As for the substance of the Agreements, it is my conviction that their greater or less efficacy will depend upon the spirit in which they are carried out, because never, perhaps, has it been so true, as in this case, that the most perfect pacts become empty formulas if a doubtful or hostile spirit is brought to their execution.
I observe, in conclusion, that the uncertainty which has been manifested in the foreign policy of Italy as regards the Treaty of Rapallo has created a situation unfavourable to her, often preventing her from taking a decided attitude, which would have been in her interest, in most essential 250questions of a general nature, and making her appear in a light contradictory to her position as a Great Power.
My intense, though brief, experience of Government has shown me that it is not possible to carry out a strong foreign policy without having decisive and clearly defined attitudes as regards the other States.
Italy must get away from this weak situation, must regain her full liberty and efficiency of action also in this sphere. We shall, therefore, carry out the treaty resolutely and loyally, exacting its scrupulous observance. We shall watch over this as is our right and duty. And we wait for time to pass definite judgment upon the soundness and the fate of to-day’s Conventions.
With this understanding, I ask you, Honourable Members, to approve of the following Project of Law:
“Full and entire execution is given to the Agreements and Conventions signed at Rome on 23rd October 1921, between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes for the execution of the Treaty of Rapallo of 12th November 1920.”
251
THE AGREEMENTS OF SANTA MARGHERITA, ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA
Chamber of Deputies. Sitting of 10th February 1923.
The Prime Minister. Honourable Members,—With the approval of the Agreements of Santa Margherita, there came to an end what might be called “the Foreign Policy week” of the Italian Government; a week that might also be called pacific, since it began with the ratification of the Convention of Washington, which represents a pause in the great naval armament, and ends with the approval of the Agreements of Santa Margherita, which are the consequence of the Treaty of Rapallo already ratified and partly carried out.
In closing this week of the life of Parliament, I realise that the Chamber has done good work, and that it has during this session undoubtedly raised, in some ways, its prestige in the country. (Comments.) The questions with which the Chamber has dealt are large; they are not concerned with treaties and bills of minor importance, as some have said.
I refuse to embark, as was attempted on the Left, upon the usual discussions of a general character which do not conclude anything. While I am on this bench, the Chamber will not be changed into an electoral meeting.
No Discussion. There is nothing to discuss as regards home policy; that which happens, happens because it is my direct and clear desire and in accordance with my precise orders, and for which I naturally assume full personal responsibility. (Comments.)
252It is useless, therefore, to go to the police officials, because the orders are mine. It does not affect me to know of the existence of a plot, in the sense usually attributed to that word; this will be settled by competent authorities. But there are those who thought that they would fight with impunity against the State and Fascismo. By now they must be disillusioned; and they will be more so in the future. The difference between the Liberal and Fascista States consists precisely in this: that the Fascista State does not defend itself only, but attacks, and those who intend to slander it abroad and to undermine its authority at home must be warned that their manœuvres bring with them unforeseen consequences. The enemies of the Fascisti must not be surprised if I treat them severely as enemies.
As regards the speech of Filippo Turati, my old fighting scent did not deceive me when a few days ago I refused the advances which came to me from that quarter through Gregorio Nofri, who, having been in Russia, felt the overpowering necessity of becoming anti-Bolshevist. Strayed sheep do not enter my fold. I am still faithful to my old tactics. I do not seek anybody. I do not refuse anybody. I put faith above all in my own forces. This is why, lately—after the meeting of the Great Fascista Council—I desired that there should be a closer union with those parties with which, fighting on national ground, friendly relations can be established for common work. But all this, let it be said at once, has not been done for parliamentary purposes, but for the sake of cohesion, unity and the pacification of the country.
I agree wholly with that which the Hon. Cavazzoni said yesterday with regard to the eight-hour day. I declared, before a meeting of eight hundred printers, that the eight-hour day represents an inviolable conquest on the part of the working classes. To-day there are those who dream of 253setting on foot a long discussion because opposing ideas are attributed to this and that member of the Cabinet. I give definite notice that the Government, in one of its forthcoming meetings, will decide once and for all the question of the eight-hour day. This having been said, and I hope that everybody will understand also the sense of all I have not said, I pass on to the subject of foreign policy.
A Circumspect Policy of Activity. In the meantime, I cannot accept the statement of the Hon. Lucci, who makes out that I am original. In the first place, he must give me time. In the second, there is no originality in foreign affairs, and I refuse to be original, if this originality would result in the slightest damage to my country. (Applause.) And I cannot accept, either, his too idealistic point of view. I see the world as it really is, that is to say, a world of unbounded egoism. If the world was Arcadia, it would be pleasant to amuse oneself with nymphs and shepherds; but I do not see anything of all this, and even when the more or less respectable standards of great principles are displayed, I see behind them interests which seek for a footing in the world. If all foreign policy were brought into the region of pure idealism, it would certainly not be Italy who would refuse to join in. But it is not so; hence all that the Hon. Lucci says belongs to the music of the most distant spheres. (Laughter.)
When I first took up my position on this bench, there was a moment of trepidation in certain sections of international politics. It was thought that the advent to power of Fascismo would mean, at the very least, war with Yugoslavia. After a few months, international opinion is fully reassured. The foreign policy of Fascismo cannot be, especially in these historic times, other than extremely circumspect, though at the same time very active.
254The nation, having issued from the splendid and blood-stained travail of the war, is now fully intent on the work of building up its political, economic, financial and moral life. To compel it to make an effort which was not absolutely necessary, would be to follow an anti-national and suicidal policy. At London, as at Lausanne, Italian foreign policy has pursued this direction; at Lausanne, above all, the work of the Italian Delegation has been highly appreciated. If peace was not concluded there, it was not the fault, in any way, of Italy.
On the other hand, it is not good to speak too pessimistically of the development of affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean. It must not be thought that a certain harmless showing of teeth, sometimes the result of reciprocal restlessness, means the beginning of a war. I think that if Greece is prudent and the Entente remains firmly united—as in the case of their ships in the port of Smyrna—that Turkey too, since she has realised a large part of the programme laid down at Angora, will become reasonable. There is no reason, therefore, to fear military complications in Europe. Still Italy will keep a careful look-out that the disturbances resulting upon the events in the Ruhr district shall not have serious consequences among the countries of the Danube basin.
The situation on the Ruhr is stationary. I declare once again that Italy could not have followed a different line of policy. The time for fine gestures is past, as they are useless. The attitude which was advocated by certain elements on the Left would have been equally useless. We could not have prevented the French from marching on the Ruhr, and we might have encouraged the German resistance. Also the other plan of our mediation could not have been carried out, because no mediation of any kind is possible if it is not asked for and welcomed. (Applause.) Besides, England 255has limited herself to non-technical participation in the operations on the Ruhr, but has not pushed her difference of opinion with France to the point of withdrawing her troops from the Rhine. It is opportune to add that France has not asked us, up to now, for formal and concrete assistance. Should this happen, it is evident that Italy should reserve to herself the right of exposing all the complex system of the relations between the two countries. (Loud applause.)
The Last Phase of the Adriatic Drama. As to the Agreements of Santa Margherita, of which the Chamber is asked to approve, they represent the last phase of our sad and lamentable Adriatic drama. I could here reply in detail, I could show the Hon. Chiesa, for example, how only yesterday, 9th February, I received a telegram from Belgrade to this effect: “The Ministry of Yugoslavia communicates that orders have been sent to the authorities of Spalato that the premises of the school shall be evacuated and put at the disposal of the school itself, and that the house which adjoins the Church of Santo Spirito shall be emptied and handed over.” I could correct other inaccuracies, but it is not my business, it is not worth while to descend to the discussion of detail. I am always of the opinion that this Convention must be carried out in order to test it. At the same time, I do not feel like defending, at too great a length, a treaty of which I did not approve when it was concluded, and which I still hold to be, as regards a great many of its clauses, absurd and harmful to Italian interests. But matters, to-day, stand thus: either the treaty must be definitely enforced or denounced. Since, in present conditions, it cannot be denounced, for that would mean the reopening of all difficulties, there remains nothing but its loyal and scrupulous application on our part, as loyal and scrupulous as the application on the part of Belgrade will have to be. (Applause.)
256To wait indefinitely for events which may occur is the worst of systems at this moment. It is necessary to put an end to a situation which has become unbearable and which gave us all the disadvantages without assuring us of what might be the advantages of clearly defined relations. Moreover it is difficult to understand why the Treaty of Rapallo, of all the treaties which have been made from the beginning of history, should be the only one irreparable and perpetual. No treaty has ever withstood new conditions of affairs developed by the progress of time. The essential thing, to my mind, is to place ourselves in such a position that an eventual revision will enable us to vindicate our eternal rights with dignity and power. (Applause.)
The Government in favour of Fiume and Zara. By the application of the Agreements of Santa Margherita the Fascista Government gives a solemn proof of its probity, its spirit of decision and of absolute loyalty. Belgrade must do the same. Yugoslavia must take into account the intrinsic value of this act, and follow, where the Italians who remain in Dalmatia are concerned, a policy of freedom and judicious action; as a policy which would tend to suppress the Italian element in Dalmatia would not be tolerated by the Fascista Government. (Applause.) By the ratification of these Agreements the Government offers Yugoslavia the opportunity of furthering the economic relations between the two countries.
The Government, which has already done all it can, within the limits of its possibilities, for Fiume and Zara, will continue to work with the utmost energy and diligence for these two cities. The evacuation of Susak having been carried out—and of Susak only, because the Delta and Porto Baros will still be occupied by our troops until Fiume has become juridically a perfect State—Italy will continue 257to interest herself in the fate of Fiume, so that she may be restored in a short time to her ancient splendour.
As for Zara, her destiny is serious and difficult, and I, for one, understand the tragedy of that city and the suffering of all the Italians scattered in Dalmatia up as far as Cattaro. But Zara, the sentinel of Dalmatia, is ready to bear, with the spirit of absolute national discipline, the completion of the last act of the Adriatic drama.
The Government will meet its needs immediately, because Zara must live, because Zara beyond the Adriatic represents one of the most vital portions of the Italian people. And the people of Zara and Dalmatia may be sure that the Government will watch over their fate with the most loving care. These are not merely words spoken to help them through this difficult time; deeds will follow them.
As for public, national opinion, it is unanimous in feeling that these Agreements had to be applied in order that Italy might be free in the ever closer international competition, free to carry out a policy of defence of her interests and free to influence with increasing activity the course of events. I think that the best part of the Italian people agree in this line of home and foreign policy. (Applause.)
258
QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE THE SENATE. THE RUHR; FIUME; ZARA AND DALMATIA
Sitting of the Senate, 16th February 1923.
The Prime Minister. Honourable Senators,—After having written the prefaces and the introductions to the Bills, and after the speech made in the other branch of Parliament, I do not think that there remains much to say.
The very rapidity of the discussion itself bears witness to the fact that all these treaties and agreements are already, in a certain sense, superseded. By this I do not wish to deny their importance, but it is a question of treaties and conventions of some time back, and life to-day moves at a very great rate. I do not disguise the fact that in continuing the eternal theory of conferences, people have reason to show a certain scepticism about the likelihood of results. (Laughter.)
Why Italy intervenes. Senator Crespi tried to carry the discussion on to general ground—the burning ground of debts and reparations. He demands new pacts; but there are none. Perhaps there cannot be any. With reference to a recent appeal for Italy’s intervention in this matter, if responsible members of Governments, and especially those engaged or interested in the conflict, turned to Italy, the only nation in the world which, at this moment, is following a policy of peace—(Applause.)—I should not hesitate one moment in answering the appeal.
There is a new factor, Senator Crespi, which it would be a good thing to take into consideration, though it is one which tends to stifle rather than arouse enthusiasm. It is that England and the United States have come to an agreement. 259England has undertaken to pay her debts to America. It is no good, therefore, for us to entertain too many illusions about the likelihood of a cancellation of our debts. It would be perfectly just, I think, from the strictly moral point of view; but the criteria and principles of absolute morality do not as yet guide the relations of the peoples. (Approval.)
It was said in a foreign Parliament that Italy had attempted to mediate between France and Germany. No such attempt was ever made. My duty was to make investigations in the European capitals, and I have done so. But having gathered that there was no possibility of proceeding in that direction, I drew back, as to continue would have been a great mistake. I think, however, that the crisis has reached its culminating point. It is a question now of knowing whether the Entente still exists and still will exist. (Comments.)
I do not think that I shall be revealing secrets if I say here what meets the eye of anyone who reads the daily news in the papers. Not a single event has occurred, not a single question arisen, without the problem of the unity of action of the Entente having been brought forward. Of necessity in this political situation there can be no improvised action and still less originality. All foreign policies, not excluding that of Russia, which is simply terrifying in form and method, are of a cautious and circumspect nature at this moment. There is no reason why Italy should follow a different course. When it is a question of the interests of our nation and of forty million inhabitants who have the right to live, it is necessary to be careful about improvisations, and it is necessary to take into account that, besides our wishes, there are also the wishes of others.
If we had coalfields; if we had in some way solved the problem of raw materials; if we could dispose of large 260reserves of gold in order to keep up the value of our money, we could follow a given policy, even one of generosity towards Germany. But we cannot afford the luxury of prodigality and generosity when we have to toil to carry on life, when we have to summon all our energies to avoid falling into the abyss.
And so you will agree with me, Honourable Members, that Italy could not keep aloof from that which is taking place on the Ruhr, could not deprive herself of participation in an economical and technical capacity. It is always better, in my opinion, to be present, because sometimes complicated problems find unexpected solutions. It was not possible to run the risk capriciously of not being present, in the event—not at all improbable—of an economic agreement, as regards iron and coal, between Germany and France. (Applause.)
Zara and Dalmatia. Coming to the Agreements of Santa Margherita, I understand perfectly the grief and anguish expressed in the words of Senators Tamassia and Tivaroni. Undoubtedly sentiment is a great spiritual force, both in the lives of individuals and of peoples, but it cannot be the one dominating influence of foreign policy.
It is necessary to have the courage to say that Italy cannot remain for ever penned up in one sea, even if it is the Adriatic. Beyond the Adriatic there is the Mediterranean and other seas which can interest us. The Treaty of Rapallo was, in my opinion, a lamentable transaction, which was the result of a difficult internal situation and of a foreign policy which was not marked by its excessive autonomy. And here allow me to repeat that a strong and dignified foreign policy cannot be carried out if the nation does not present a daily example of iron discipline. (Approval.) I do not think that these Agreements of 261Santa Margherita sign the death warrant of Zara and Dalmatia. With the last concessions we have saved the use of the Italian language for our brothers there. Now I think it was Gioberti who said that where the language is spoken there is the nation. For this reason, if these brothers of ours can speak, write and learn in their mother tongue, I think that already one of the foundations of their Italian nationality is saved.
For a decade the Italians of Zara and Dalmatia have resisted the furious attempts at denationalisation made by the Hapsburg Monarchy. In those days Italy could not give active assistance to those brothers; now you see that she has another realisation of herself. Those brothers of ours, who might have felt themselves forgotten if the Agreements of Santa Margherita were applied by another nation, cannot feel the same when the definite and necessary application of the Treaty of Rapallo is carried out by the Government over which I have the honour of presiding and of which the members are those who won the victory. (Applause.) We firmly believe that the strict and scrupulous application of the Agreements of Santa Margherita on our part, as well as on the part of Yugoslavia, will save the Italian character of Zara and Dalmatia. There is no need for me to repeat that treaties are transactions, and are like the steps of an equilibrist. No treaty is eternal and perpetual; all that is happening to-day under our eyes gives us clear warning.
The Question of Fiume. We shall then carry out these Agreements immediately and loyally. It must not be thought that the Third Zone is a kind of vast continent, and that in it we have immense forces. It is a question of the territory round Zara and a group of islands; all told, we have only 120 policemen, 18 custom-house guards, and 20 soldiers. 262At Susak we have a battalion of infantry. It will be a case of turning them back to the line of Eneo, because until it is known what is to become of Fiume, Porto Baros and the Delta, they will remain under the control of Italian troops. (Applause.) What is this Arbitration Commission? It represents an attempt to bring about the existence of that more or less vital creature, first conceived at Rapallo, known as the Independent State of Fiume. (Laughter.) One thing is certain, at any rate, and that is that there are three Italians on the Commission. And another thing is certain, and that is that it is not absolutely necessary for Fiume to become a new province of the realm. That there should actually be a prefect at Fiume is to me a secondary matter; the important thing is that Fiume shall keep her spirit sound and intact, that she shall remain Italian, and that such means shall be found that shall make her a city which lives in itself and for itself and not only through the largess of the Italian State. (Loud applause.)
The Government, which sometimes makes deeds precede words, has already taken steps for the provision of Zara, economically, politically and spiritually. The same has been done for Dalmatia. It is necessary to admit frankly that since the coming of the Fascista Government the Yugoslavs have been less intransigent with regard to us. There is no doubt that the definite carrying out of the Treaty of Rapallo is the cause of great grief to the citizens of Fiume and Zara, of Dalmatia and many in the old kingdom.
(Cries of “It is true.”)
Mussolini. At other times there might perhaps have been difficulties. But the Government over which I have the honour of presiding does not hesitate; it faces difficulties, I was almost going to say seeks them. I intend to regulate as soon as possible all that more or less successful heritage of foreign policy left me by my predecessors. It is no good 263being alarmed by what happens. I have what I dare to call a Roman conception of history and life. Things must never be thought to be irreparable. Rome did not believe in the irreparable, even after the battle of Cannæ, when she lost the flower of her generation. On the contrary, you will remember that the Senate went out to meet Terentius Varro, who, having wished to undertake the battle against the advice of Paulus Æmilius, was certainly one of those responsible for the defeat. Rome fell, and rose up again; she marched slowly, but she marched; she had a goal to reach, and she intended to reach it. Italy, our Italy, the Italy which we carry in our hearts, and which is our pride, must be like this; the Italy which accepts her destiny when it is imposed, by hard necessity, but only while she prepares her spirit and her forces to overcome it some day. (Loud and prolonged applause, many Senators advance to congratulate the Prime Minister. Silence being once more established, Mussolini continues.)
I propose that the Senate, having concluded the discussion suspended yesterday evening, should be adjourned. I do not know for how long. The Government must be left free to work and to prepare work for the Chamber and the Senate.
Meanwhile, I feel the necessity of thanking the President, who has directed the proceedings with that tact and high wisdom for which he is known. I am glad that the Senate, in approving of these political and commercial treaties—which are two aspects of the same policy—has thus brought to a conclusion a part of our foreign policy. I beg the President to accept the expression of my profound admiration.
Tittoni, President of the Senate, replies, reciprocating the words of the Prime Minister and praising his spirit and his patriotic faith. He pays tribute to the way in which the Hon. Mussolini has assumed, with a firm hand, the direction of public interests.
264
A REVIEW OF EUROPEAN POLITICS IN THEIR RELATION WITH ITALY
Speech delivered before the Cabinet, 2nd March 1923.
The Prime Minister. Honourable Colleagues,—The situation on the Ruhr has remained stationary during these last weeks. While the two disputants seem to settle themselves more rigidly in their respective positions of passive resistance on the part of Germany and active pressure on the part of Belgium and France, England has not changed her attitude of benign disapproval and Italy has neither increased nor reduced the number of technical experts representing her on the Ruhr. So far there has not arisen the new factor which would lead, in one sense or the other, to the solution of the crisis. This new factor could consist either in a direct proposal made by one disputant to the other, or in a request for mediation, or in the modification, on a political basis, of the aims which France says she has in view—aims of an economic nature, which so far have not gone beyond the limit of the payment of reparations—or else in an increase of the opposition of England which would lead to the withdrawal of her troops from the Rhine.
It seems, however, clear—notwithstanding the solicitations of an element of the advanced democracy—that England maintains her attitude of circumspect waiting, without impatience or precipitation. The war, which at the present moment has for its theatre the basin of the Ruhr, is one of attrition, and it may yet last for some time, in spite of the general expectation all over Europe of a 265rapid conclusion. As I have already said both in the Senate and the Chamber, Italy will not refuse her assistance in any attempt that may be made to render normal the situation in Central Europe as soon as possible, and of this she has given tangible proof in the help afforded, before any other country, to Austria. The solidarity which Italy was bound to show towards France upon the common ground of reparations, has given rise to projects of greater importance, which might have been interpreted in certain circles as having been directed against other Powers or to the exclusion of some one of them. An official declaration on the part of the Government has established the truth of the matter. The campaign in certain papers has not been approved of and still less authorised. That it is very opportune that friendly and cordial relations should exist between Italy and France is the sincere conviction of my Government. It is very much to be desired that the economic relations between these two neighbouring countries shall be intensified and strengthened, and the Government has worked in this direction in concluding the recent commercial agreement. But this has nothing to do with a real treaty of alliance, as has been suggested in certain sections of public opinion. The Fascista Government intends on the whole to follow a line of foreign policy as far as possible autonomous, and it could never adhere to alliances which did not protect the interests of Italy in the highest degree and which did not constitute a solid guarantee of peace and prosperity for Italy in particular and Europe in general.