Moral Science; a Compendium of EthicsPart 2 — PART II. is OF MERIT AND DEMERIT; OR OF THE OBJECTS OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT. It consists of three Sections.Reading editionChapter navigation55 reading sectionsGo to chapterChoose a chapter…Front matterPREFACEPART I.Chapter IChapter IIChapter IIIPART II.PART I.Chapter IChapter IIChapter IIIPART II.Book Third takes up the consideration of the Virtues in detail, but prefaces them with a dissertation, occupying five chapters, on the Voluntary and Involuntary. Since praise and blame are bestowed only on voluntary actions,—the involuntary being pardoned, and even pitied,—it is requisite to define Voluntary and Involuntary. What is done under physical compulsion, or through ignorance, is clearly involuntary. What is done under the fear of greater evils is partly voluntary, and partly involuntary. Such actions are voluntary in the sense of being a man's own actions; involuntary in that they are not chosen on their own account; being praised or blamed according to the circumstances. There are cases where it is difficult to say which of two conflicting pressures ought to preponderate, and compulsion is an excuse often misapplied: but compulsion, in its strict sense, is not strength of motive at all; it is taking the action entirely out of our own hands. As regards Ignorance, a difference is made. Ignorance of a general rule is matter for censure; ignorance of particular circumstances may be excused. [This became the famous maxim of law,—'Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat.'] If the agent, when better informed, repents of his act committed in ignorance, he affords good proof that the act done was really involuntary. Acts done from anger or desire (which are in the agent's self) are not to be held as involuntary. (1) If they were, the actions of brutes and children would be involuntary. (2) Some of these acts are morally good and approved. (3) Obligation often attaches to these feelings. (4) What is done from desire is pleasant; the involuntary is painful. (5) Errors of passion are to be eschewed, no less than those of reason (I.).Book Third takes up the consideration of the Virtues in detail, but prefaces them with a dissertation, occupying five chapters, on the Voluntary and Involuntary. Since praise and blame are bestowed only on voluntary actions,—the involuntary being pardoned, and even pitied,—it is requisite to define Voluntary and Involuntary. What is done under physical compulsion, or through ignorance, is clearly involuntary. What is done under the fear of greater evils is partly voluntary, and partly involuntary. Such actions are voluntary in the sense of being a man's own actions; involuntary in that they are not chosen on their own account; being praised or blamed according to the circumstances. There are cases where it is difficult to say which of two conflicting pressures ought to preponderate, and compulsion is an excuse often misapplied: but compulsion, in its strict sense, is not strength of motive at all; it is taking the action entirely out of our own hands. As regards Ignorance, a difference is made. Ignorance of a general rule is matter for censure; ignorance of particular circumstances may be excused. [This became the famous maxim of law,—'Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat.'] If the agent, when better informed, repents of his act committed in ignorance, he affords good proof that the act done was really involuntary. Acts done from anger or desire (which are in the agent's self) are not to be held as involuntary. (1) If they were, the actions of brutes and children would be involuntary. (2) Some of these acts are morally good and approved. (3) Obligation often attaches to these feelings. (4) What is done from desire is pleasant; the involuntary is painful. (5) Errors of passion are to be eschewed, no less than those of reason (I.). (continued 2)Chapter XI · bears the title, Of the difference of Manners; by manners being meant, not decency of behaviour and points of the 'small morals,' but the qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity. Felicity of life, as before, he pronounces to be a continual progress of desire, there being no finis ultimus nor summum bonum. The aim of all men is, therefore, not only to enjoy once and for an instant, but to assure for over the way of future desire. Men differ in their way of doing so, from diversity of passion and their different degrees of knowledge. One thing he notes as common to all, a restless and perpetual desire of power after power, because the present power of living well depends on the acquisition of more. Competition inclines to contention and war. The desire of ease, on the other hand, and fear of death or wounds, dispose to civil obedience. So also does desire of knowledge, implying, as it does, desire of leisure. Desire of praise and desire of fame after death dispose to laudable actions; in such fame, there is a present delight from foresight of it, and of benefit redounding to posterity; for pleasure to the sense is also pleasure in the imagination. Unrequitable benefits from an equal engender secret hatred, but from a superior, love; the cheerful acceptation, called gratitude, requiting the giver with honour. Requitable benefits, even from equals or inferiors, dispose to love; for hence arises emulation in benefiting—'the most noble and profitable contention possible, wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.' He passes under review other dispositions, such as fear of oppression, vain-glory, ambition, pusillanimity, frugality, &c., with reference to the course of conduct they prompt to. Then he comes to a favourite subject, the mistaken courses whereinto men fall that are ignorant of natural causes and the proper signification of words. The effect of ignorance of the causes of right, equity, law, and justice, is to make custom and example the rule of actions, as with children, or to induce the setting of custom against reason, and reason against custom, whereby the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed, both by the pen, and by the sword. Again, taking up ignorance of the laws of nature, he is led on to the subject of natural Religion, and devotes also the whole of Chapter XII. to Religion and kindred topics.Chapter XVI · , closing the whole first part of the Leviathan, is of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated. The definitions and distinctions contained in it add nothing of direct ethical importance to the foregoing, though needed for the discussion of 'Commonwealth,' to which he passes. The chief points under this second great head are taken into the summary.Chapter III · treats of the Ultimate Determinations of the Will and Benevolent Affections. The question now is to find some order and subordination among the powers that have been cited, and to discover the ultimate ends of action, about which there is no reasoning. He notices various systems that make calm self-love the one leading principle of action, and specially the system that, allowing the existence of particular disinterested affections, puts the self-satisfaction felt in yielding to the generous sentiments above all other kinds of enjoyments. But, he asks, is there not also a calm determination towards the good of others, without reference to private interest of any kind? In the case of particular desires, which all necessarily involve an uneasy sensation until they are gratified, it is no proof of their being selfish that their gratification gives the joy of success and stops uneasiness. On the other hand, to desire the welfare of others in the interest of ourselves is not benevolence nor virtue. What we have to seek are benevolent affections terminating ultimately in the good of others, and constituted by nature (either alone, or mayhap corroborated by some views of interest) 'the immediate cause of moral approbation.' Now, anything to be had from men could not raise within us such affections, or make us careful about anything beyond external deportment. Nor could rewards from God, or the wish for self-approbation, create such affections, although, on the supposition of their existence, these may well help to foster them. It is benevolent dispositions that we morally approve; but dispositions are not to be raised by will. Moreover, they are often found where there has been least thought of cultivating them; and, sometimes, in the form of parental affection, gratitude, &c., they are followed so little for the sake of honour and reward, that though their absence is condemned, they are themselves hardly accounted virtuous at all. He then rebuts the idea that generous affections are selfish, because by sympathy we make the pleasures and pains of others our own. Sympathy is a real fact, but has regard only to the distress or suffering beheld or imagined in others, whereas generous affection is varied toward different characters. Sympathy can never explain the immediate ardour of our good-will towards the morally excellent character, or the eagerness of a dying man for the prosperity of his children and friends. Having thus accepted the existence of purely disinterested affections, and divided them as before into calm and turbulent, he puts the question, Whether is the selfish or benevolent principle to yield in case of opposition? And although it appears that, as a fact, the universal happiness is preferred to the individual in the order of the world by the Deity, this is nothing, unless by some determination of the soul we are made to comply with the Divine intentions. If by the desire of reward, it is selfishness still; if by the desire, following upon the sight, of moral excellence, then there must necessarily exist as its object some determination of the will involving supreme moral excellence, otherwise there will be no way of deciding between particular affections. This leads on to the consideration of the Moral Faculty.Chapter IX · , at great length, discusses the first part of the subject—the framing of primary ideas regarding the Divine Nature. He proves the existence of an original mind from design, &c., in the world; he then finds this mind to be benevolent, on occasion of which he has to deal with the great question of Evil, giving reasons for its existence, discovering its uses, narrowing its range as compared with good, and finally reducing it by the consideration and proof of immortality; he ends by setting forth the other attributes of God—providence, holiness, justice, &c.Book II. is a deduction of the more special laws of nature and duties of life, so far as they follow from the course of life shown above to be recommended by God and nature as most lovely and most advantageous; all adventitious states or relations among men aside. The three first chapters are of a general nature.Chapter XI · (concluding the work) discusses some cases connected with the duration of the 'Politick Union.'Chapter I · is on the origin of our Ideas of Right and Wrong. The actions of moral agents, he says, give rise in us to three different perceptions: 1st, Right and Wrong; 2nd, Beauty and Deformity; 3rd, Good or Ill Desert. It is the first of these perceptions that he proposes mainly to consider.Chapter II · is on 'our Ideas of the Beauty and Deformity of Actions.' By these are meant our pleasurable and painful sentiments, arising from the consideration of moral right and wrong, expressed by calling some actions amiable, and others odious, shocking, vile. Although, in this aspect of actions, it would seem that the reference to a sense is the suitable explanation, he still contends for the intervention of the Understanding. The character of the Deity must appear more amiable the better it is known and understood. A reasonable being, without any special sensibilities, but knowing what order and happiness are, would receive pleasure from the contemplation of a universe where order prevailed, and pain from a prospect of the contrary. To behold virtue is to admire her; to perceive vice is to be moved to condemnation. There must always be a consideration of the circumstances of an action, and this involves intellectual discernment.Chapter V · is entitled 'Of the Reference of Morality to the Divine Nature; the Rectitude of our Faculties; and the Grounds of Belief.' The author means to reply to the objection that his system, in setting up a criterion independent of God, is derogatory to the Divine nature. He urges that there must be attributes of the Deity, independent of his will; as his Existence, Immensity, Power, Wisdom; that Mind supposes Truth apart from itself; that without moral distinctions there could be no Moral Attributes in the Deity. Certain things are inherent in his Nature, and not dependent on his will. There is a limit to the universe itself; two infinities of space or of duration are not possible. The necessary goodness of the divine nature is a part of necessary truth. Thus, morality, although not asserted to depend on the will of the Deity, is still resolvable into his nature. In all this, Price avowedly follows Cudworth.Chapter VI · considers Fitness and Moral Obligation, and other prevailing forms of expression regarding morality. Fitness and Unfitness denote Congruity or Incongruity, and are necessarily a perception of the Understanding.Chapter VII · discusses the Heads or Divisions of Virtue; under which he enquires first what are virtuous actions; secondly, what is the true principle or motive of a virtuous agent; and thirdly, the estimate of the degrees of virtue.Chapter IX · is on the different Degrees of Virtue and Vice, and the modes of estimating them; the Difficulties attending the Practice of Virtue; the use of Trials, and the essentials of a good or a bad Character. The considerations adduced are a number of perfectly well-known maxims on the practice of morality, and scarcely add anything to the elucidation of the author's Moral Theory. The concluding chapter, on Natural Religion, contains nothing original.Chapter V · makes an application of these remarks to explain the difference between the Amiable and the Respectable Virtues. The soft, the gentle, and the amiable qualities are manifested when, as sympathizers, we enter fully into the expressed sentiments of another; the great, the awful and respectable virtues of self-denial, are shown when the principal person concerned brings down his own case to the level that the most ordinary sympathy can easily attain to. The one is the virtue of giving much, the other of expecting little.Chapter V · is on the Selfish Passions. He supposes these, in regard to sympathy, to hold a middle place between the social and the unsocial. We sympathize with small joys and with great sorrows; and not with great joys (which dispense with our aid, if they do not excite our envy) or with small troubles.PART II. is OF MERIT AND DEMERIT; OR OF THE OBJECTS OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT. It consists of three Sections.Chapter II · determines the proper objects of Gratitude and Resentment, these being also the proper objects of Reward and Punishment respectively. 'These, as well as all the other passions of human nature, seem proper, and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with them.' In short, a good moral decision is obtained by the unanimous vote of all impartial persons.Chapter V · sums up the analysis of the Sense of Merit and of Demerit thus:—The sense of Merit is a compound sentiment, made up of two distinct emotions; a direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent (constituting the propriety of the action), and an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of the recipient. The sense of Demerit includes a direct antipathy to the sentiments of the agent, and an indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer.Chapter I · compares the two virtues. Actions of a beneficent tendency, from proper motives, seem alone to require a reward; actions of a hurtful tendency, from improper motives, seem alone to deserve punishment. It is the nature of Beneficence to be free; the mere absence of it does not expose to punishment. Of all the duties of beneficence, the one most allied to perfect obligation is gratitude; but although we talk of the debt of gratitude (we do not say the debt of charity), we do not punish ingratitude.Chapter II · considers the sense of Justice, Remorse, and the feeling of Merit.Chapter III · gives reflections upon the utility of this constitution of our nature. Human beings are dependent upon one another for mutual assistance, and are exposed to mutual injuries. Society might exist without love or beneficence, but not without mutual abstinence from injury. Beneficence is the ornament that embellishes the building; Justice the main pillar that supports it. It is for the observance of Justice that we need that consciousness of ill-desert, and those terrors of mental punishment, growing out of our sympathy with the disapprobation of our fellows. Justice is necessary to the existence of society, and we often defend its dictates on that ground; but, without looking to such a remote and comprehensive end, we are plunged into remorse for its violation by the shorter process of referring to the censure of a supposed spectator [in other words, to the sanction of public opinion].Chapter II · treats of the extent of this influence of Fortune. The effects of it are, first, to diminish, in our eyes, the merit of laudable, and the demerit of blameable, actions, when they fail of their intended effects; and, secondly, to increase the feelings of merit and of demerit beyond what is due to the motives, when the actions chance to be followed by extraordinary pleasure or pain. Success enhances our estimate of all great enterprises; failure takes off the edge of our resentment of great crimes.Chapter I · is 'Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation.' Having previously assigned the origin of our judgments respecting others, the author now proceeds to trace out our judgments respecting ourselves. The explanation is still the same. We approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we feel that the impartial spectator would approve or disapprove of it.Chapter IV · handles Self-Deceit, and the Origin and Use of General Rules. The interference of our passions is the great obstacle to our holding towards ourselves the position of an impartial spectator. Prom this notorious fact the author deduces an argument against a special moral faculty, or moral sense; he says that if we had such a faculty, it would surely judge our own passions, which are the most clearly laid open to it, more correctly than the passions of others.PART V. THE INFLUENCE OF CUSTOM ON THE MORAL SENTIMENTS.PART VI. THE CHARACTER OF VIRTUE.PART VII. OF SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.Chapter IV · enquires whether a moral action must proceed from a moral purpose in the agent. He decides in the affirmative, replying to certain objections, and more especially to the allegation of Hume, that justice is not a natural, but an artificial virtue. This last question is pursued at great length in Chapter V., and the author takes occasion to review the theory of Utility or Benevolence, set up by Hume as the basis of morals. He gives Hume the credit of having made an important step in advance of the Epicurean, or Selfish, system, by including the good of others, as well as our own good, in moral acts. Still, he demands why, if Utility and Virtue are identical, the same name should not express both. It is true, that virtue is both agreeable and useful in the highest degree; but that circumstance does not prevent it from having a quality of its own, not arising from its being useful and agreeable, but arising from its being virtue. The common good of society, though a pleasing object to all men, hardly ever enters into the thoughts of the great majority; and, if a regard to it were the sole motive of justice, only a select number would ever be possessed of the virtue. The notion of justice carries inseparably along with it a notion of moral obligation; and no act can be called an act of justice unless prompted by the motive of justice.Chapter V · is the Analysis of our Moral Perceptions and Emotions. This is a somewhat singular phrase in an author recognizing a separate inborn faculty of Right. His analysis consists in a separation of the entire fact into three parts:—the perception of an action as right or wrong; (2) an emotion of pleasure or pain, varying according to the moral sensibility: (3) a perception of the merit or demerit of the agent. The first is of course the main question; and the author gives a long review of the history of Ethical doctrines from Hobbes downwards, interspersing reflections and criticisms, all in favour of the intuitive origin of the sense. As illustrative parallels, he adduces Personal Identity, Causation, and Equality; all which he considers to be judgments involving simple ideas, and traceable only to some primitive power of the mind. He could as easily conceive a rational being formed to believe the three angles of a triangle to be equal to one right angle, as to believe that there would be no injustice in depriving a man of the fruits of his labours.Chapter VI · is 'Of Moral Obligation.' It is needless to follow him on this subject, as his views are substantially a repetition of Butler's Supremacy of Conscience. At the same time, it may be doubted whether Butler entirely and unequivocally detached this supremacy from the command of the Deity, a point peculiarly insisted on by Stewart. His words are these:—Chapter II · is on Justice; defined as the disposition that leads a man, where his own interests or passions are concerned, to act according to the judgment he would form of another man's duty in his situation. He introduces a criticism on Adam Smith, and re-asserts the doctrine of an innate faculty, explained as the power of forming moral ideas, and not as the innate possession of ideas. For the most part, his exposition is didactic and desultory, with occasional discussions of a critical and scientific nature; as, for example, some remarks on Hume's theory that Justice is an artificial virtue, an account of the basis of Jurisprudence, and a few observations on the Right of Property.Book II., entitled MORAL OBLIGATION, is the full development of his views. Reciting various theories of moral right and wrong, he remarks, first, that they all ultimately coincide; in other words, all the theorists agree upon the same rules of duty—a remark to be received with allowances; and next, that they all leave the matter short; none provide an adequate motive or inducement. [He omits to mention the theory of the Divine Will, which is partly his own theory].Book VI. is occupied with Politics and Political Economy. It discusses the Origin of Civil Government, the Duty of Submission to Government, Liberty, the Forms of Government, the British Constitution, the Administration of Justice, &c.Chapter III · —ON FOUR SANCTIONS OR SOURCES OF PAIN AND PLEASURE whereby men are stimulated to act right; they are termed, physical, political, moral, and religious. These are the Sanctions of Right.Chapter IV · is the VALUE OF A LOT OF PLEASURE OR PAIN, HOW TO BE MEASURED. A pleasure or a pain is determined to be greater or less according to (1) its intensity, (2) its duration, (3) its certainty or uncertainty, (4) its propinquity or remoteness; all which are obvious distinctions. To these are to be added (5) its fecundity, or the chance it has of being followed by other sensations of its own kind; that is pleasures if it be pleasure, pains if it be pain. Finally (6) its purity, or the chance of its being unmixed with the opposite kind; a pure pleasure has no mixture of pain. All the six properties apply to the case of an individual person; where a plurality are concerned, a new item is present, (7) the extent, or the number of persons affected. These properties exhaust the meaning of the terms expressing good and evil; on the one side, happiness, convenience, advantage, benefit, emolument, profit, &c.; and, on the other, unhappiness, inconvenience, disadvantage, loss, mischief, and the like.Chapter VII · proceeds to consider HUMAN ACTIONS IN GENERAL. Right and wrong, good and evil, merit and demerit belong to actions. These have to be divided and classified with a view to the ends of the moralist and the legislator. Throughout this, and two other long chapters, he discusses, as necessary in apportioning punishment, the act itself, the circumstances, the intention, and the consciousness—or the knowledge of the tendencies of the act. He introduces many subdivisions under each head, and makes a number of remarks of importance as regards penal legislation.Chapter XII · —OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MISCHIEVOUS ACT, is meant as the concluding link of the whole previous chain of causes and effects. He defines the shapes that bad consequences may assume. The mischief may be primary, as when sustained by a definite number of individuals; or secondary, by extending over a multitude of unassignable individuals. The evil in this last case may be either actual pain, or danger, which is the chance of pain. Thus, a successful robbery affects, primarily, a number of assignable persons, and secondarily, all persons in a like situation of risk.Chapter XII · —OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MISCHIEVOUS ACT, is meant as the concluding link of the whole previous chain of causes and effects. He defines the shapes that bad consequences may assume. The mischief may be primary, as when sustained by a definite number of individuals; or secondary, by extending over a multitude of unassignable individuals. The evil in this last case may be either actual pain, or danger, which is the chance of pain. Thus, a successful robbery affects, primarily, a number of assignable persons, and secondarily, all persons in a like situation of risk. (continued 2)Chapter III · considers the ULTIMATE SANCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY.Chapter IV · is OF WHAT SORT OF PROOF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY is susceptible. Questions about ends are questions as to what things are desirable. According to the theory of Utility, happiness is desirable as an end; all other things are desirable as means. What is the proof of this doctrine?Chapter V · is ON THE CONNEXION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND UTILITY.Chapter V · is ON THE CONNEXION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND UTILITY. (continued 2)Previous chapter ←Part 1 — Chapter V · is on the Selfish Passions. He supposes these, in regard to sympathy, to hold a middle place between the social and the unsocial. We sympathize with small joys and with great sorrows; and not with great joys (which dispense with our aid, if they do not excite our envy) or with small troubles.Next chapter →Part 2 — Chapter II · determines the proper objects of Gratitude and Resentment, these being also the proper objects of Reward and Punishment respectively. 'These, as well as all the other passions of human nature, seem proper, and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with them.' In short, a good moral decision is obtained by the unanimous vote of all impartial persons.All chapters and sections (55)Opening pagesFront matterOther sectionsPREFACEParts1Part 1 · Chapters123Parts2Part 1 · Parts1Part 1 · Chapters123Part 2 · Parts2Part 2 / Book 3 · Books33Part 2 / Book 3 · Chapters111639Part 2 / Book 2 · Books2Part 2 / Book 3 · Chapters11125679Part 1 · Chapters55Part 2 · Parts2Part 2 · Chapters251232Part 3 · Chapters14Parts567Part 7 · Chapters4562Part 7 / Book 2 · Books2Part 7 / Book 6 · Books6Part 7 / Book 6 · Chapters34712123455Section I. is, Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit.◇← Chapter V. is on the Selfish Passions. He supposes these, in regard to sympathy, to hold a middle place between the social and the unsocial. We sympathize with small joys and with great sorrows; and not with great joys (which dispense with our aid, if they do not excite our envy) or with small troubles.Chapter II. determines the proper objects of Gratitude and Resentment, these being also the proper objects of Reward and Punishment respectively. 'These, as well as all the other passions of human nature, seem proper, and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with them.' In short, a good moral decision is obtained by the unanimous vote of all impartial persons. →