Book IV. Analytica

In contrast to the ten long chapters of III, IV is divided into forty-two short ones: i-v, analytica in general; vi-viii, demonstrativa; ix-xx, the progress of knowledge: sensus, imaginatio, prudentia, ratio, intellectus; xxi-xxiii, hypothetica, sophistica; xxiv-xlii, critical review: objectors to Aristotle the place of logica in teaching, typical conceptions of ratio, and of truth and error, the relation of ratio to veritas.

This last book iterates the importance of correlation (xxviii. 982 B). “But though logica is useful generally, he who is ignorant of other arts[37] is not so much helped by it toward philosophy as he is hindered by a habit of verbosity and presumption. For logica is almost useless if it be alone. It stands out when it shines by the power of correlated studies.”

John’s slighting of rhetoric cannot be explained merely by his preoccupation with logic. Why was he thus preoccupied in a consistent and progressive scheme of the whole Trivium? He begins with a logica embracing all studies of words; he devotes a whole book to grammatica; in his last pages he is speaking of an organon that shall be a minister to eloquentia. Yet rhetorica he merely mentions when he must. That he was aware of its ancient importance in such a scheme as his is evident from his large use of Quintilian’s Teaching of Rhetoric. No other medieval writer gave this work more attention. The much-quoted chapter (I. xxiv) on prælectio uses not only Quintilian’s ideas, but his very words;[38] and other correspondences are no less significant. The following list, though not complete, is typical.

QUINTILIAN, INST. ORAT. METALOGICUS

I. iii. 3-5 Illud ingeniorum ... decrescit. II. viii. 865 B-C Hoc est quod ... decrescit.

I. viii. 13-14 In prælegendo grammaticus ... memoriam agitet. I. xxiv. 853 D-854 A In prælegendo grammaticus ... memoriam auditorum.

17-21 Præcipue vero illa ... aliqua nescire. 855 B-D Id quoque inter prima ... aliqua ignorare [with substitution of Augustine for Didymus, who is relegated to 864 C].

The correspondences above, verbatim for considerable stretches, involve here and there transpositions or other variations. The following are quotations or adaptations.

I. iv. 5-6 Quo minus sunt ferendi ... quam ostentationis. Ne quis igitur ... scientiam possit. I. xxv. 856 D in libro De institutione oratoris ... Ait ergo: “Ne quis [and the two sentences are quoted in reverse order].”

II. iii. 3 Propter quod Timotheum ... II. vii. 864 D Refert Quintilianus [quotation with slight verbal variation].

II. iv. 5-7 Nec unquam ... quod exculpi. IV. xxviii. 932 B Teneræ tamen ætati ... improbitas conquiescat [correspondence evident in idea, occasionally in word].

X. i. 83 Quid Aristotelem?... clariorem putem. II. ii. 859 A quid de eo dicat Quintilianus: “Quid Aristotelem?... [exact quotation].”

X. i. 125-131 Ex industria Senecam ... quod voluit efficit. I. xxii. 852 B [Discusses Quintilian’s view (“ut pace Quintiliani loquar”) with occasional reminiscence of his words.]

Even if these correspondences were confined to Quintilian’s first and second books, there would still be no sufficient ground for the inference that John, consulting him primarily for grammatica and further for his general ideas on education, did not think of him as a rhetorician. For Quintilian not only presents rhetoric from the beginning; he frequently in these first books cites and quotes Aristotle as a rhetorician. But the matter seems to be put beyond doubt by the use of Book X. It is only fair to assume of so careful a scholar reading the first books and one of the last, and occupied with Quintilian’s idea of educational sequence, that he read the whole work.[39]

Having read and admired one of the chief ancient works on rhetoric, why did he leave rhetoric out of his own scheme? The answer is probably in the contemporary conditions to which the Metalogicus is adjusted, and especially in the contemporary state of rhetoric. It seems not to have been in the twelfth century worth more than mention from a John of Salisbury seeking a vital sequence of studies. It lacked what he sought above all, vital relations. If he had known Aristotle’s Rhetoric, he might conceivably have sought to recall the ancient study to its better ancient aim. What he found vital in Quintilian’s rhetoric he transferred to grammatica or to dialectica, partly, no doubt, because the transfer was actually going on, partly, one may think, because he saw in these other studies the real opportunities of his time for composition. The current lore of ornament which passed for rhetoric could hardly detain his consideration.

What he discerns in grammatica, and had found in the teaching of Bernard, is of course training in precision. But though he makes much of this, he does not slight the value of concreteness for presentation; he sees the importance of studying style by imitation; and he adopts from Quintilian a word not common in medieval treatises, œconomia. All these point to composition; and composition seems to have been one of the essential applications of the master’s analysis. The prælectio as John describes it is tinged with Quintilian because it realizes fully the ancient function of grammatica with the poets.

In the rapidly expanding teaching of dialectica also he sees opportunity for composition. To this end, very likely, he urges repeatedly that the debates of the schools keep touch with reality by insisting on subject matter through correlation with other studies. Above all he desires that language studies be unified and progressive, that they call for expanding correlation of inventio and iudicium. The study that in his time actually demanded and exercised these was not rhetorica, which was by way of ignoring both; it was dialectica.

D. Thirteenth Century Surveys

1. The Anticlaudianus of Alain de Lille

The allegorical survey entitled by Alain[40] Anticlaudianus has but superficial likeness to the De nuptiis philologiæ et Mercurii[41] of Martianus Capella. Each presents the seven liberal arts in allegory; each is in nine books; but there is no real resemblance, nor any indication of Alain’s having used Martianus except as a stock source. The allegory of Martianus is confined to his first two books, and is purely decorative; the allegory of Alain pervades his whole work as a controlling idea. That idea is the function of education in the redemption of mankind. The sub-title “de officio viri boni et perfecti” is akin to Hugh’s[42] “animæ perfectio.” The consistent, elaborate theological symbolism shows some force of conception and, in spite of occasional excursions into style, some ardor and elevation. The four thousand hexameters are usually above the medieval fatal fluency in this verse. The survey, though it has not Hugh’s originality and does not attempt John’s unification, is equally serious.

The seven arts are summoned to provide Prudentia with a chariot for her quest on behalf of man. Grammatica supplies the pole; Logica, the axle, which Rhetorica adorns with gems and gold; the Quadrivium, the four wheels. The horses, the five senses, are then harnessed by Ratio. When the upward journey has reached the term of human powers, Prudentia, leaving her chariot, is conducted by Theologia into the empyrean, to the saints, to Mary, to God himself. Obtaining of God the formation of the new man, Prudentia returns to seek gifts for the anima creata. Natura gives it a body. Concordia and Pudicitia, Ratio and Honestas, coöperate in gifts with the seven arts. The dubious gifts of Fortuna are assisted by Ratio. Thereupon the vices declare war, which is concluded by the victory of the opposed virtues.

Alain incidentally defines the character of each of the seven arts, and summarizes its scope. Each has its function—except rhetorica. The other members of the Trivium[43] provide the car of Prudentia with essential pole and axle; the Quadrivium supplies essential wheels; but all that Rhetorica has to offer is quite unessential adornment. Though Alain rehearses the traditional parts of her ancient lore,[44] he sums up her actual occupation in two lines of cardinal significance.

In other words, rhetoric is not operative as composition, but only as style after the fact. Her gifts to the soul are only colores, decor, clausula.

Alain’s own use of rhetoric is consistent with this point of view. Each of his allegorical figures is introduced with the conventional descriptive ecphrasis; and his diffuseness arises from the idea that poetica involves decorative dilation by those colores of which Cicero and Vergil are equally patterns.

2. The Speculum Doctrinale of Vincent of Beauvais

The vast Speculum of Vincent of Beauvais[45] is a compend of all knowledge. Its second part, Speculum doctrinale, Mirror of Teaching, devotes two books to the Trivium. Grammatica,[46] including metric, follows Isidore. The following book[47] devotes ninety-eight chapters to logic (logica), ten to rhetoric, twenty-three to poetic. The proportion is significant; and poetica, taken from under the ægis of grammatica, appears as a separate, coördinate section. For rhetoric Vincent, still following Isidore,[48] repeats the classical definition and division. The following chapters (101-108) deal briefly with the elements of a speech, the ideals of oratory, the types of cases, status, syllogisms, loci rhetorici, style.

Vincent then goes on to poetica,

which Alphorabius[49] in his book on the division of the scientiæ puts last among the parts of logica, and which in his book on the origin of the scientiæ he describes thus: “Poetica is the lore of ordering meters according to the proportion of words (dictiones) and the times of feet and of their rhythms (numeri).” Again he says in the former book: “It belongs to poetica to make the hearer through its locutions image something as fair or foul which is not so,[50] that he may believe and shun or desire it. Although certainly it is not so in truth, nevertheless, the minds of hearers are roused to shun or desire what they image.” Moreover poetry has seven species: comedia, tragedia, invectio, satyra, fabula, historia, argumentum.[51] Comedia is poetry reversing a sad beginning by a glad end; but tragedia is poetry lapsing from a glad beginning to a sad end (109). The function, then, of the poet is in this, that with a certain beauty he converts actual events into other species by his slanting figures (end of 110).

Except meter, which belongs under grammatica, and the two forms of drama, which are not thought of as forms of composition, there is nothing to distinguish this poetic from rhetoric.

3. St. Bonaventure de Reductione Artium ad Theologiam

St. Bonaventure[52] distinguishes four “lights”: (1) the exterior light of a manual art, illuminating with regard to artistic form; (2) the inferior light of knowledge through the senses, illuminating with regard to the patterns of nature; (3) the interior light of philosophical knowledge, illuminating with regard to truth comprehended intellectually; (4) the superior light of grace and revelation, illuminating with regard to truth as a means of salvation.[53] For (3), the “interior light,” his division is stated first in its commonest form. Philosophia is: (a) rationalis (i.e., sermonum), (b) naturalis (i.e., rerum), (c) moralis (i.e., morum). This division[54] he then repeats in another form and order:

(a) physica, for knowing the causes of being;

(b) logica, for knowing the theory of understanding;

(c) practica, for knowing the conduct of living.

Finally he considers it in a third aspect. The domain of moralis is motive; of physica is self-limited and self-sufficient; of sermocinalis is interpretation. The last item he subdivides into:

grammatica, for expression, regarding reason as apprehension, seeking the appropriate;

logica, for instruction, regarding reason as judgment, seeking the true;

rhetorica, for persuasion, regarding reason as motive, seeking the ornate.[55]

Bonaventure does not use the word dialectica. His word for this, not for the whole Trivium,[56] is logica. Though his movendum and motivam suggest association of rhetoric with morals, and remind one of Aristotle’s conception, and Cicero’s, and Quintilian’s, he is content to give rhetoric the narrow and barren field of ornatus, assigning docendum and verum to logic.

4. The Trésor of Brunetto Latini

The Old French Trésor of Brunetto Latini[57] devotes a far larger proportion of space than Vincent’s Speculum to rhetoric. Book I, surveying the seven arts,[58] includes history, geography, and the zoölogy of the bestiaries. Book II adds to Aristotelian ethics a collection of moral apothegms.[59] Book III opens politics with rhetoric.

Here begins the third book of the Treasure, which speaks of the teachings of good speech and of the government of towns and cities.... Cicero says that the highest lore for governing a city is rhetoric.[60] 467.

They are mistaken who think that to tell fables or old stories ... is matter of rhetoric.... [Rather rhetoric is concerned with] what is said by word of mouth or sent by letter to induce belief, to praise or blame, to advise ... in something that demands decision. 471.

The following chapters present the ancient division into five parts and the lore of status and quæstio.[61] But at this point the distinctive ancient function of rhetoric begins to fade. After saying that the main division of all expression is into prose and rime, he adds that “the teachings of rhetoric are common to both,” save for the restrictions of meter.[62] The section on dispositio, the ordering of a speech, takes from Martianus Capella not his sober survey, but a single passage which Brunetto perverts by subdivision and by transfer to narrative.

To exploration of the material [of a speech], with discernment of its value for persuasion, is to be joined the ordering of the points, which is the part commonly called dispositio.... The scheme may be either the natural order or devised by the orator’s artifice; natural, when after the beginning comes the statement of facts, then the division, proposition, proof, conclusion and epilogue; by the orator’s artifice, when the things that must be said have been distributed through the parts of the speech.[63]

Here Martianus is apparently extending to the whole plan of a speech the commonplace of ancient rhetoric that the narratio (statement of facts) might be either continuous as a single, distinct part, or distributed for the sake of giving salience to its separate items. Brunetto’s further extension is not his own; it is common stock of the contemporary artes poeticæ.[64] These manuals make much of “natural” and “artificial” order, subdivide each, and apply both to narrative. Brunetto is typical.

“Order [means] everything in its place; but this order is in two manners, one which is natural and another artificial.... The artificial order is divided into eight manners”:

(1) to say at the beginning what was at the end,

(2) to begin with what was in the middle,

(3) to base your story on the beginning of a proverb,

(4) to base it on the middle of the proverb,

(5) to base it on the end of the proverb,

(6) (7) (8) so for three uses of an example. 482.

The mechanical division reflects a wide abeyance in theory, not only of poetic shaping and movement, but even of the dispositio of ancient rhetoric; for its real concern is not with composition at all, whether in prose or in verse, but with the phrasing of certain patterns.

Brunetto’s preoccupation with style, and with style mainly as decorative dilation, soon appears in “how to dilate one’s tale in eight ways ... which are called colors of rhetoric.”[65] Among these colores, under demonstrance (demonstratio), is his celebrated, but entirely conventional, ecphrasis on Yseult.

The traditional parts of a speech (exordium, etc.) are used[66] as an approach to dictamen, of which Brunetto appears to be thinking through much of what follows. The concluding chapters on statecraft are far from a discussion of politics. Rather they set forth the conduct of a seigneur. Thus they fail to carry out the relations of rhetoric to government which in his opening he borrows from Cicero. Book III, then, of the Trésor lapses further and further from the ancient conception of rhetoric with which it begins. The rhetoric which it actually presents, and which it applies to poetry as well as to dictamen,[67] is a meager, though pleasant, review of style.[68]

What rhetoric appears in these surveys to lack most is distinct function. Writers as different as John of Salisbury and Brunetto Latini seem to think of it as polishing, decorating, especially dilating, what has been already expressed. It comes in after the real job is done; it has lost its ancient function of composing. The ancient lore of inventio kept rhetoric in contact with subject matter and with actual presentation. This had so much less scope in feudal society that the lore easily lapsed, or was perverted. The only large field for its exercise was preaching. Education, therefore, naturally threw its weight on grammatica for boys, on dialectica for men. Between the two rhetoric was crowded into narrow room. Whether it would still have vindicated itself if it had been the rhetoric of Aristotle, or oftener the rhetoric of Quintilian, can be only conjectured. Actually it was the rhetoric of De inventione and ad Herennium, and inculcated the sophistic of Sidonius. That may explain why there was no medieval rhetorician who really advanced the study.

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