MAXIMS AND OPINIONS OF HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

* * * * *

INDIA.

To offer a public reward, by proclamation, for a man's life, and to make a secret bargain to have it taken away, are very different things; the one is to be done, the other, in my opinion, cannot by an officer at the head of the troops.

Dispatch, July 8, 1800.

* * * * *

As for the wishes of the people, particularly in this country (India), I put them out of the question. They are the only philosophers about their governors that ever I met with, if indifference constitutes that character.

Dispatch, August 20, 1800.

* * * * *

In military operations time is everything.

Dispatch, June 30, 1800.

Articles of provision are not to be trifled with, or left to chance; and there is nothing more clear than that the subsistence of the troops must be certain upon the proposed service, or the service must be relinquished.

Dispatch, Feb. 18, 1801.

* * * * *

Indignant rejection of a proffered Bribe.

You inform me that the Rajah, or Dessaye of Kittoor, has expressed a wish to be taken under the protection of the British Government; and has offered to pay a tribute to the company, and to give you a bribe of 4000 pagodas, and me one of 10,000 pagodas, provided this point is arranged according to his wishes.

I cannot conceive what can have induced the Rajah of Kittoor to imagine that I was capable of receiving that or any other sum of money, as an inducement to do that which he must think improper, or he would not have offered it. But I shall advert to that point more particularly presently.

The Rajah of Kittoor is a tributary of the Mahratta Government, the head of which is an ally, by treaty, of the honourable company. It would be, therefore, to the full as proper, that any officer in command of a post within the company's territories, should listen to and enter into a plan for seizing part of the Mahratta territories, as it is for you to listen and encourage an offer from the Rajah of Kittoor to accept the protection of, and transfer his allegiance and tribute to the honourable company's government. In case you should hear anything further upon this subject from the Rajah of Kittoor, or in future from any of the chiefs of the Mahrattas on the frontier, I desire that you will tell them what is the fact, that you have no authority whatever to listen to such proposals, that you have orders only to keep up with them the usual intercourse of civility and friendship, and that if they have any proposals of that kind to make, they must be made in a proper manner to our superiors. You may, at the same time, inform them that you have my authority to say that the British government is very little likely to take advantage of the misfortunes of its ally, to deprive him, either of his territories or of the allegiance or tribute due to him by his tributaries.

In respect to the bribe offered to you and myself, I am surprised that any man in the character of a British officer should not have given the Rajah to understand that the offer would be considered as an insult; and that he should not have forbidden its renewal, than that he should have encouraged it, and even offered to receive a quarter of the sum proposed to be given him for prompt payment. I can attribute your conduct on this occasion, to nothing excepting the most inconsiderate indiscretion, and to a desire to benefit yourself, which got the better of your prudence. I desire, however, that you will refrain from the subject with the Rajah of Kittoor at all, and that if he should renew it, you will inform him, that I and all British officers consider such offers as insults on the part of them by whom made.

Letter to an officer in India, January 20, 1803.

Principle of Warfare in India.

We must get the upper hand, and if once we have that, we shall keep it with ease, and shall certainly succeed. But if we begin by a long defensive warfare, and go looking after convoys that are scattered over the face of the earth, and do not attack briskly, we shall soon be in distress.

Dispatch, Aug. 17, 1803.

* * * * *

How to avoid Party Spirit in the Army.

It occurs to me that there is much party in the army in your quarter; this must be put an end to. And there is only one mode of effecting this, and that is for the commanding officer to be of no side excepting that of the public; to employ indiscriminately those who can best serve the public, be they who they may, or in whatever service; the consequence will be that the service will go on, all parties will join in forwarding it, and in respecting him; there will be an end to their petty disputes about trifles; and the commanding officer will be at the head of an army instead of a party.

Letter to an officer, Sept. 16, 1803.

* * * * *

The power of the Sword necessary in India.

It is necessary that the political agents at the durbars of the native princes should be supposed to have a considerable degree of power. In this part of the world there is no power excepting that of the sword; and it follows that if these political agents have no authority over the military, they have no power whatever.

The natives would soon find out this state of weakness, and the residents would lose their influence over their councils. It may be argued if that is the case, the military commanding officer ought to be the resident, or political agent. In answer to this argument, I say, that the same reasoning applies to every part of the executive government; and that, upon this ground, the whole ought to be in the hands of the military. In short, the only conclusion to be drawn from all reflection and reasoning upon the subject is, that the British government in India is a phenomenon; and that it will not answer to apply to it, in its present state, either the rules which guide other governments, or the reasoning upon which these rules are founded.

Dispatch, Oct. 13, 1803.

* * * * *

Reason for the ambiguity of Treaties.

It is impossible to frame a treaty of peace in such a manner as to find in it a decision of all questions which can arise between the parties concerned; particularly when the parties have frequently been at war, and have preserved a recollection of a variety of contradictory claims arising out of the events of their wars, which they are ready to bring forward on all occasions.

Dispatch, Jan. 7, 1804.

Foundation of British Power in India in 1803.

The British government has been left by the late Mahratta war in a most glorious situation. They are the sovereigns of a great part of India, the protectors of the principal powers, and the mediators by treaty of the disputes of all. The sovereignty they possess is greater, and their power is settled upon more permanent foundations, than any before known in India; all it wants is the popularity which, from the nature of the institutions and the justice of the proceedings of the government, it is likely to obtain, and which it must obtain, after a short period of tranquillity shall have given the people time and opportunity to feel the happiness and security which they enjoy.

Dispatch, Jan. 16, 1804.

* * * * *

British "Moderation" in India.

I declare that, when I view the treaty of peace,[2] and its consequences, I am afraid it will be imagined that the moderation of the British government in India has a strong resemblance to the ambition of other governments.

[Footnote 2: After the Mahratta war.]

Jan. 29, 1804.

* * * * *

Contrast between European and Asiatic Policy.

European governments were, till very lately, guided by certain rules and systems of policy so accurately defined and generally known, that it was scarcely possible to suppose a political event, in which the interest and conduct of each state would not be as well known to the corps diplomatique, in general, as to the statesmen of each particular state. The Asiatic governments do not acknowledge, and hardly know of, such rules and systems. Their governments are arbitrary; the objects of their policy are always shifting; they have no regular established system, the effect of which is to protect the weak against the strong; on the contrary, the object of each of them separately, and of all of them taken collectively, is to destroy the weak; and if by chance, they should, by a sense of common danger, be induced for a season to combine their efforts for their mutual defence, the combination lasts only so long as it is attended with success; the first reverse dissolves it; and, at all events, it is dissolved long before the danger ceases, the apprehension of which originally caused it. The company's government in India, the other contracting party to their alliance, is one bound by all the rules and systems of European policy. The company's power in India is supposed to depend much upon its reputation; and although I do not admit that it depends upon its reputation, as distinguished from its real force, as appears to be contended by some, I may say that it is particularly desirable for a government, so constituted as the company's, never to enter upon any particular object, the probable result of which should not be greatly in favour of success.

Besides this, the company's government in India is bound by acts of parliament not to undertake wars of aggression, not to make any but defensive alliances, and those only in cases in which the other contracting party shall bind itself to defend the possessions of the company actually threatened with hostilities.

The company's government in India is also connected with his majesty's government, and, as an Asiatic power, is liable to be involved in wars with European powers possessing territories in India, whenever his majesty shall be at war with those powers.

The picture above drawn of the state of politics among Asiatic powers, proves that no permanent system can be adopted which will preserve the weak against the strong, and will keep all for any length of time in their relative situations, and the whole in peace; excepting there should be one power, which, either by the superiority of its strength, its military system, or its resources, shall preponderate, and be able to protect all.

1804.

* * * * *

It is necessary for a man who fills a public situation, and who has great public interests in charge, to lay aside all private considerations, whether on his own account or that of other persons.

March 2, 1804.

* * * * *

When war is concluded, all animosity should be forgotten.

March 12, 1804.

The British character for good faith must be preserved in India.

I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every portion of India, ten times over, in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith, and the advantages and honour we gained by the late war and the peace: and we must not fritter them away in arguments, drawn from overstrained principles of the laws of nations, which are not understood in this country. What brought me through many difficulties in the war, and the negociations for peace? The British good faith, and nothing else.

Dispatch, March 17, 1804.

* * * * *

Civil Government in India must follow immediately on Military Conquest.

I rather think that you and the Governor-General agree in opinion on the subject of the affairs of Malabar. He says, "examine and report the state of the province before you commence your military operations; define the evils, and propose a system of government which shall afford a remedy, towards the establishment of which system military operations may be directed."

It would be useless to commence military operations upon any great scale, unless the civil officers should be prepared to take possession of the country, and to re-establish the civil government as the troops shall conquer it. If the civil government were not re-established in this manner, the rebels would rise again as soon as the troops would pass through the districts; and the effect of the operations of a large body of troops would be much the same as that of a small body. But if the civil government is to be re-established in this manner, it would be better to establish that system which is found to be good, and is to be permanent, than that which is known to be had, and which is intended should not last. Supposing that the bad system were first introduced, it must be followed afterwards by the good one; and, supposing that the bad system did not produce a rebellion of itself (which I acknowledge I do not think it would, as rebellion in Malabar is to be traced to causes entirely independent of all systems of civil government, excepting as they are connected with a strong or weak military force), the change from the bad to the good system would produce a degree of convulsion, and, possibly, momentary weakness, which it is always desirable to avoid. It is particularly desirable to avoid it in this instance, as it will not be difficult, by an examination of all that has passed in Malabar, to fix upon the general principles according to which that province ought to be governed, and to form a system accordingly, in the time which must elapse before the troops can he employed in settling the province.

March 20, 1804.

* * * * *

Principle of Relief to the Poor.

The principle, of the mode in which I propose to relieve the distresses of the inhabitants, is not to give grain or money in charity.

Those who suffer from famine may properly be divided into two classes: those who can, and those who cannot, work. In the latter class may be included old persons, children, and the sick women; who, from their former situation in life, have been unaccustomed to labour, and are weakened by the effects of famine.

The former, viz., those of both sexes who can work, ought to be employed by the public; and in the course of this letter I shall point out the work on which I should wish that they might be employed, and in what manner paid. The latter, viz., those who cannot work, ought to be taken into an hospital and fed, and receive medical aid and medicine at the expense of the public.

According to this mode of proceeding, subsistence will be provided for all; the public will receive some benefit from the expense which will be incurred, and, above all, it will be certain, that no able-bodied person will apply for relief, unless he should be unwilling to work for his subsistence, that none will apply who are able to work, and who are not real objects of charity; and that none will come to Ahmednuggur for the purpose of partaking of the food which must be procured by the labour, or to obtain which they must submit to the restraint of an hospital.

Dispatch, April 11, 1804.

* * * * *

Tactics to be pursued against Predatory Troops.

I have served a good deal in this part of India against this description of freebooter; and I think that the best mode of operating, is to press him with one or two corps capable of moving with tolerable celerity, and of such strength as to render the result of an action by no means doubtful, if he should venture to risk one. There is but little hope, it is true, that he will risk an action, or that any one of these corps will come up with him. The effect to be produced by this mode of operation is to oblige him to move constantly, and with great celerity. When reduced to this necessity, he cannot venture to stop to plunder the country, and he does comparatively but little mischief; at all events the subsistence of his army becomes difficult and precarious, the horsemen become dissatisfied, and they perceive that their situation is hopeless, and they desert in numbers daily; the freebooter ends by having with him only a few adherents, and he is reduced to such a state as to be liable to be taken by any small body of country horse, which are the fittest troops to be then employed against him.

In proportion as the body of our troops, to be employed against a freebooter of this description, have the power of moving with celerity, will such freebooter be distressed. Whenever the largest and most formidable bodies of them are hard pressed by our troops, the village people attack them upon their rear and flanks, cut off stragglers, and will not allow a man to enter their villages; because their villages being in some degree fortified, they know well that the freebooters dare not wait the time which would be necessary to reduce them. When this is the case, all their means of subsistence vanish, no resource remains excepting to separate, and even this resource is attended by risk, as the village people cut them off on their way to their homes.

Dispatch, May 27, 1804.

* * * * *

Importance of Secresy in Public Affairs.

There is nothing more certain than that of one hundred affairs ninety-nine might be posted up at the market-cross, without injury to the public interests; but the misfortune is that where the public business is the subject of general conversation, and is not kept a secret, as a matter of course, upon every occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon that occasion on which it is necessary. There is an awkwardness in a secret which enables discerning men (of which description there are always plenty in an army) invariably to find it out; and it may be depended upon that, whenever the public business ought to be kept secret, it always suffers when it is exposed to public view. For this reason secresy is always best; and those who have been long trusted with the conduct of public affairs are in the habit of never making known public business of any description that it is not necessary that the public should know. The consequence is that secresy becomes natural to them, and as much a habit as it is to others to talk of public matters; and they have it in their power to keep things secret or not, as they may think proper.

Remember that what I recommend to you is far removed from mystery; in fact, I recommend silence upon the public business upon all occasions, in order to avoid the necessity of mystery upon any.

Dispatch, June 28, 1804.

* * * * *

In all retreats, it must be recollected that they are safe and easy, in proportion to the number of attacks made by the retreating corps.

Dispatch, Sept. 12, 1804.

* * * * *

Neglect of his Services in India.

In regard to staying longer (in the Deccan), the question is exactly whether the court of directors, or the king's ministers, have any claim upon me, strong enough to induce me to do anything so disagreeable to my feelings (leaving health out of the question) as to remain, for a great length of time, in this country. I have served the company in important situations for many years, and have never received anything but injury from the court of directors, although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all governments, and in communication with all the political residents, and many civil authorities; and there is not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any of my acts, or a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill-temper from any one of the political or civil authorities in communication with whom I have acted. The king's ministers have as little claim upon me as the court of directors. I am not very ambitious, and I acknowledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations that military services in India would be considered in the scale in which are considered similar services in other parts of the world. But I might have expected to be placed on the staff in India; and yet if it had not been for the lamented death of General Fraser, General Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary. This is perfectly well known to the army, and is the subject of a good deal of conversation.

Jan. 4, 1805.

* * * * *

I mistrust the judgment of every man in a case in which his own wishes are concerned.

Feb. 3, 1805.

* * * * *

Advice to a Native Ruler in India.

Let the prosperity of the country be your great object; protect the ryots and traders, and allow no man, whether invested with authority or not, to oppress them with impunity. Do justice to every man.

March 2, 1805.

* * * * *

Without distinction of religion every man ought to be called upon to do service to the state, wherever he is particularly qualified to do that service.

House of Commons, May 11, 1808.

Control of the Navy and Army.

The navy is the characteristic and constitutional force of Britain, and may therefore be governed by regulations of the legislature; but the army is a new force, arising out of the extraordinary exigencies of modern times, and from every consideration of expediency and necessity, must be left under the control of the crown.

House of Commons, June 3, 1808.

* * * * *

The Law-breaker always Wrong.

It frequently happens that the people who do commit outrages and disturbances have some reason to complain; but he who breaks the law must be considered in the wrong, whatever may have been, the nature of the provocation which he has received.[3]

[Footnote 3: This remark, though it applies generally, was made with respect to Ireland.]

Ibid, July 7, 1808.

* * * * *

THE PENINSULA.

The Battle of Vimeiro.

The action of Vimeiro is the only one I have ever been in (1808), in which everything passed as was directed, and no mistake was made by any of the officers charged with its conduct.

Dispatch, Aug. 22, 1806.

* * * * *

Distinction between Civil and Military Responsibility.

There is a great distinction of duty between military and civil inferior situations. If, in a civil officer, the inferior differs materially from the superior, he ought to resign, but in military appointments, it is the duty of the inferior officer to assist his commander in the mode in which that commander may deem his services most advantageous.

Defence of his conduct with regard to the Convention of Cintra. House of Commons, Feb. 21, 1809.

* * * * *

Rapidity of the French Retreats accounted for.

It is obvious, that if an army throws away all its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and everything which can strengthen it, and can enable it to act together as a body; and abandons all those who are entitled to its protection, but add to its weight and impede its progress;[4] it must be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed, with any prospect of being overtaken by an army which has not made the same sacrifice.

[Footnote 4: Alluding to the rapidity of the French retreat.]

Dispatch, May 18, 1809.

* * * * *

I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure.[5]

[Footnote 5: Referring to their habits of plunder.]

Dispatch, May 31, 1809.

* * * * *

Inefficiency of Spanish Officers.

Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army, and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has by the measures which it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual, and that the business of an army should be so little understood. They are really children in the art of war, and I cannot say they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away, and assembling again in a state of nature.

Dispatch, Aug. 1809.

* * * * *

Terrorism and Force, not Enthusiasm, enabled the French Revolutionary Armies to conquer.

People are very apt to believe that enthusiasm carried the French through their revolution, and was the parent of those exertions which have nearly conquered the world; but if the subject is nicely examined, it will be found that enthusiasm was the name only, but that force was the instrument which brought forward those great resources under the system of terror which first stopped the allies; and that a perseverance in the same system of applying every individual and every description of property to the service of the army, by force, has since conquered Europe.

Dispatch, Aug. 25, 1809.

The Spaniards and Portuguese want the true spirit of Soldiers.

We are mistaken if we believe that what these Portuguese and Spanish armies require is discipline, properly so called. They want the habits and spirit of soldiers—the habits of command on one side, and of obedience on the other—mutual confidence between officers and men; and above all, a determination in superiors to obey the spirit of the orders they receive, let what will be the consequence, and the spirit to tell the true cause if they do not.

Dispatch, Sept. 8, 1809.

* * * * *

Importance of good understanding between Negotiating Parties.

Half the business of the world, particularly that of our country, is done by accommodation, and by the parties understanding each other, but when rights are claimed they must be resisted, if there are no grounds for them; when appeal must be made to higher powers there can be no accommodation, and much valuable time is lost in reference which ought to be spent in action.

Dispatch, Sept. 20, 1809.

* * * * *

Popular Assemblies unmanageable.

I acknowledge that I have a great dislike to a new popular assembly; even our own ancient one would be quite unmanageable, and in three days, would ruin us, if the present generation had not before its eyes the example of the French revolution; and if there were not certain rules and orders for its guidance and government, the knowledge and use of which render safe, and successfully direct, its proceedings.

Dispatch, Sept. 22, 1809.

* * * * *

Distracted State of Spain.

I declare that if I were in Buonaparte's situation, I should leave the English and the Cortes to settle Spain in the best manner they could; and I should entertain very little doubt but that in a very short space of time Spain must fall into the hands of France. At the same time I must agree with you in thinking that affairs are now in so desperate a situation that they cannot be worse; that there is a real want of men of common capacity in Spain, in whose hands any form of government, intended for vigorous action, could be placed with any hope that their powers could he used to the public advantage; and that the Cortes, with all their faults, and the dangers attendant upon such an assembly, will have at least this advantage, that they will have the confidence of the country, and the prejudices of their countrymen of the lower class in our favour, and against France; the remark being perfectly well founded, that there is no prejudice or jealousy of us any where in Spain excepting by the government.

But in order to enjoy common safety under such an assembly as the Spanish Cortes, the rules and orders for their proceedings and internal government ought to be well defined, and to be, if possible, a part of the constitution of the assembly. Great care should also be taken in their formation to protect them from the effects of popular fury in the place of their sitting; but still with all these precautions I should prefer a wise Bourbon, if we could find one, for a regent, to the Cortes.

Dispatch, Sept. 22, 1809.

* * * * *

Whatever may be eventually the fate of Spain, Portugal must be a military country.

Dispatch, Sept. 24, 1809.

* * * * *

Military Value of an Armed and Friendly People.

In respect to the army and armament of the people in Spain and Portugal, there is no man more aware than I am of the advantage to be derived from these measures; and if I had not reflected well upon the subject, my experience of the war in Portugal and in Spain—(in Portugal, where the people are in some degree armed and arrayed; and in Spain, where they are not)—would have shewn me the advantage which an army has against the enemy when the people are armed and arrayed, and are on its side in the contest. But reflection, and, above all, experience have shewn me the exact extent of this advantage in a military point of view; and I only beg that those who have to contend with the French, will not be diverted from the business of raising, arming, equipping, and training regular bodies, by any notion that the people, when armed and arrayed, will be of, I will not say any, but of much use to them.

Dispatch, Oct. 11, 1809.

* * * * *

Difficulties in the Peninsular War. The Battle of Talavera.

You will have heard of all that has passed in this country, and I will not therefore trouble you with a repetition of the story. The battle of Talevera was certainly the hardest fought of modern days, and the most glorious in its results to our troops. Each side engaged lost a quarter of their numbers.

It is lamentable that, owing to the miserable inefficiency of the Spaniards, to their want of exertion, and the deficiency of numbers, even, of the allies, much more of discipline and every other military quality, when compared with the enemy in the Peninsula, the glory of the action is the only benefit we have derived from it. But that is a solid and substantial benefit, of which we have derived some good consequences already; for, strange to say, I have contrived with the little British army to keep everything in check since the month of August last; and if the Spaniards had not contrived, by their own folly and against my entreaties and remonstrances, to lose an army in La Mancha about a fortnight ago, I think we might have brought them through the contest; as it is, however, I do not despair. I have in hand a most difficult task, from which I may not extricate myself; but I must not shrink from it, I command an unanimous army; I draw well with all the authorities in Spain and Portugal; and I believe I have the good wishes of the whole world. In such circumstances, one may fail, but it would be dishonourable to shrink from the task.

Letter to Col. Malcome, Dec. 3, 1809.

* * * * *

Buonaparte's System Hollow.

The Austrian marriage is a terrible event, and must prevent any great movement on the continent for the present. Still I do not despair of seeing, at some time or other, a check to the Buonaparte system. Recent transactions in Holland shew that it is all hollow within; and that it is so inconsistent with the wishes, the interests, and even the existence of civilized society, that he cannot trust even his brothers to carry it into execution.

Dispatch, April 4, 1810.

* * * * *

Military Law the will of the General.

Military law, as applied to any persons excepting the officers, soldiers, and followers of the army, for whose government there are particular provisions of law in all well regulated countries, is neither more nor less than the will of the general of the army. He punishes either with or without trial, for crimes either declared to be so, or not so declared, by any existing law, or by his own orders. This is the plain and common meaning of the term military law. Besides the mode of proceeding above described, laws have been made in different countries at different times to establish and legalize a description of military constitution.

The commander-in-chief, or the government, has been authorized to proceed by military process—that is, by court martial or council of war—against persons offending against certain laws, or against their own orders, issued generally for the security of the army; or for the establishment of a certain government or constitution odious to the people among whom it is established.

Of both descriptions of military law, there are numerous instances in the history of the operations of the French army during the revolution; and there is an instance of the existence both of the first-mentioned description and of the last-mentioned in Ireland, during the rebellion of 1798, when the people were in insurrection against the government, and were to be restrained by force.

Dispatch, April 19, 1810.

* * * * *

Letter to a Portuguese of Rank on the Position and Duties of Persons in his station.

I have received your letter containing a complaint against——, of the quarter-master general's department, that he had ill-treated one of your servants, into which I shall make inquiry, and let you know the result.

It is impossible, however, for me to interfere in any manner with a billet, given by the magistrates of Coimbra, for an officer and his family to be quartered in your house. I must at the same time inform you, that I am not a little surprised that a person of your rank and station, and quality in the country, should object to give accommodation in your house, and should make a complaint of this officer, that he had asked you for additional accommodation, when it appears by the letter which you enclosed, and which I now return, that when you objected to give him this additional accommodation for which he asked, he acquiesced in your objection, and did not any longer require this accommodation.

The unfortunate situation in which Portugal is placed, and the desire of the insatiable enemy of mankind to force this once happy and loyal people to submit to his iron yoke, to plunder them of their properties to destroy their religion and to deprive them of their monarch, has rendered it necessary to collect in this country a large army, in order, if possible, to defeat and frustrate the designs of the enemy. It is the duty of those whose age, whose sex, or whose profession, do not permit them to take an active part in the defence of their country, to assist those employed in its defence with provisions, lodgings for officers and troops, means of transport, &c., and at all events not to oppose themselves to the granting of this description of assistance. These duties are more particularly incumbent upon the rich and high in station, who would be the first victims of, and greatest sufferers from, the enemy's success, unless, indeed, they should be of the number of those traitors who are aiding to introduce the common enemy into the country, to destroy its happiness and independence.

Under these circumstances I am not a little astonished to receive these frivolous and manifestly unfounded complaints from you, and that you should be the person to set the example of objecting to give quarters to an officer, because he is married and has children.

It is not very agreeable to anybody to have strangers quartered in his house; nor is it very agreeable to us strangers, who have good houses in our own country, to be obliged to seek for quarters here. We are not here for our pleasure; the situation of your country renders it necessary: and you, a man of family and fortune, who have much to lose, should not be the first to complain of the inconvenience of our presence in the country.

I do everything in my power to alleviate the inconvenience which all must suffer. We pay extravagant prices with unparalleled punctuality for everything we receive; and I make it a rule to inquire into and redress every injury that is really done by the troops under my command, as I shall that to which I have above referred, of which you complain, in the conduct of——towards your servant.

Dispatch, August 23, 1810.

* * * * *

Croaking Spirit in the British Army in Portugal.

It appears that you have had a good smart contest with the government respecting our plan of operations. They will end in forcing me to quit them, and then they will see how they will get on. They will then find that I alone keep things in their present state. Indeed the temper of some of the officers of the British army gives me more concern than the folly of the Portuguese government. I have always been accustomed to have the confidence and support of the officers of the armies which I have commanded; but for the first time, whether owing to the opposition in England, or whether the magnitude of the concern is too much for their minds and their nerves, or whether I am mistaken and they are right, I cannot tell; but there is a system of croaking in the army which is highly injurious to the public service, and which I must devise some means to put an end to, or it will put an end to us. Officers have a right to form their own opinions upon events and transactions, but officers of high rank or situation ought to keep their opinions to themselves; if they do not approve of the system of operations of their commander, they ought to withdraw from the army. And this is a point to which I must bring some, if I should not find that their own good sense prevents them from going on as they have done lately. Believe me that if any body else, knowing what I do, had commanded the army, they would now have been in Lisbon, if not, in their ships.

Dispatch, September 11, 1810.

Note—This passage from a letter to the British minister at Lisbon is one of many, which explain the difficulties Lord Wellington had to encounter from the Portuguese Government, from the opposition and the press in England, and from the want of proper military spirit in his own officers.

Conduct of the Portuguese.

If we are to go on as we have hitherto; if Great Britain is to give large subsidies, and to expend large sums in the support of a cause in which these most interested sit by and take no part; and those at the head of the government, with laws and power to force the people to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are aware of the evil, but neglect their duty and omit to put the laws into execution, I must believe their professions to be false; that they look to a little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his allies can place no confidence.

Oct. 28, 1810.

* * * * *

The National Disease of Spain.

The national disease of Spain, that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation, till they are seriously convinced that they are in no danger, then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.

Dec. 2, 1810.

* * * * *

Apathy of the Portuguese.

There exists in the people of Portugal, an unconquerable love of their ease, which is superior even to their fear and detestation of the enemy. Neither will they, or their magistrates, or the government, see that the temporary indulgence of this passion for tranquillity must occasion the greatest misfortunes to the state and hardships to the individuals themselves; and no person in the country likes to have his tranquillity and habits disturbed for any purpose, however important, or to be the instrument of disturbing those of others. Thus every arrangement is defeated, and every order disobeyed with impunity. The magistrate will not force the inhabitants to adopt a measure, however beneficial to the state and himself, which will disturb his old habits; and the government will not force the magistrate to do that which will be disagreeable to him and to the people: thus we shall go on till the end of time.

January 3, 1811.

* * * * *

Takes no Notice of Newspapers.

I hope that the opinions of the people in Great Britain are not influenced by paragraphs in newspapers, and that those paragraphs do not convey the public opinion or sentiment upon any subject: therefore I (who have more reason than any other public man of the present day to complain of libels of this description) never take the smallest notice of them; and have never authorized any contradiction to be given, or any statement to be made in answer to the innumerable falsehoods, and the heaps of false reasoning, which have been published respecting me and the operations which I have directed.

January 7, 1811.

Indolence of the Natives of the Peninsula.

There is something very extraordinary in the nature of the people of the Peninsula. I really believe them, those of Portugal particularly, to be the most loyal and best disposed, and the most cordial haters of the French, that ever existed; but there is an indolence and a want even of the power of exertion in their disposition and habits, either for their own security, that of their country, or of their allies, which baffle all our calculations and efforts.

January 16, 1811.

* * * * *

Different Constitution of the French and English Armies.

It may also be asked why should we spend our money, and why these troops should not go on as the French troops do, without pay, provisions, magazines, or any thing? The French army is certainly a wonderful machine; but if we are to form such a one, we must form such a government as exists in France, which can with impunity lose one-half of the troops employed in the field every year, only by the privations and hardships imposed upon them. Next, we most compose our army of soldiers drawn from all classes of the population of the country; from the good and middling, as well as in rank as education, as from the bad; and not as all other nations do, and we in particular, from the bad only. Thirdly, we must establish such a system of discipline as the French have; a system founded on the strength of the tyranny of the government, which operates upon an army composed of soldiers, the majority of whom are sober, well disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated.

When we shall have done all this, and shall have made these armies of the strength of those employed by the French, we may require of them to live as the French do, viz., by authorised and regular plunder of the country and its inhabitants, if any should remain; and we may expose them to the labour, hardships and privations which the French soldier suffers every day; and we must expect the same proportion of loss every campaign, viz., one-half of those who take field.

January 26, 1811.

* * * * *

Character of the Marques de la Romana.

In him the Spanish army have lost their brightest ornament, his country their most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall always acknowledge with gratitude the assistance which I received from him, as well by his operations as by his counsel, since he had been joined with this army.

January 26, 1811.

* * * * *

None but the worst men enter the Army as Privates.

In respect to recruiting the army, my own opinion is, that the government have never taken an enlarged view of the subject. It is expected that people will become soldiers in the line, and leave their families to starve, when, if they become soldiers in the militia, their families are provided for. This is an inconsistency that must strike the mind of even the least reflecting of mankind. What is the consequence? That none but the worst description of men enter the regular service.

* * * * *

But admitting the truth of the expense, I say that the country has not a choice between army and no army, between peace or war. They must have a large and efficient army, one capable of meeting the enemy abroad, or they must expect to meet him at home; and then farewell to all considerations of measures of greater or lesser expense, and to the ease, the luxury, and happiness of England. God forbid that I should see the day on which hostile armies should contend within the United Kingdom; but I am very certain that I shall not only see that day, but shall be a party in the contest, unless we alter our system, and the public feel in time the real nature of the contest in which we are at present engaged, and determine to meet its expense. I have gone a little beyond the question of recruiting; but depend upon it that you will get men when you provide for the families of soldiers in the line and not in the militia, and not before.

January 28, 1811.

Buonaparte's "disgusting Tyranny."

I am glad to hear such good accounts of affairs in the North. God send that they may prove true, and that we may overthrow this disgusting tyranny: however, of this I am certain, that whether true or not at present, something of the kind must occur before long, and, if we can only hold out, we shall yet see the world relieved.

March 23, 1811.

* * * * *

A French army in England would be the consequence of our withdrawal from the Peninsula.

I shall be sorry if government should think themselves under the necessity of withdrawing from this country, on account of the expense of the contest. From what I have seen of the objects of the French government, and the sacrifices they make to accomplish them, I have no doubt that if the British army were for any reason to withdraw from the Peninsula, and the French government were relieved from the pressure of military operations on the Continent, they would incur all risks to land an army in his majesty's dominions. Then indeed would commence an expensive contest; then his majesty's subjects discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God, they have hitherto had no knowledge; and the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants, would be destroyed: whatever might be the result of the military operations; God forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor, in the scene.[6]

[Footnote 6: At this time the clamours of the opposition regarding the expense of the war induced a fear that the government might determine to discontinue it.]

March 23, 1811.

* * * * *

The Peninsular Governments must not mind unpopularity.

I recommend to them (the Spaniards and Portuguese) to advert seriously to the nature of the task which they have to perform. Popularity, however desirable it may be to individuals, will not form, or feed, or pay an army; will not enable it to march and fight; will not keep it in a state of efficiency for long and arduous services. The resources which a wise government must find for these objects must be drawn from the people, not by measures which will render those unpopular who undertake to govern a country in critical circumstances, but by measures which must for a moment have a contrary effect. The enthusiasm of the people in favour of any individual never saved any country. They must be obliged by the restraint of law and regulation, to do those things and to pay those contributions, which are to enable the government to carry on this necessary contest.

April 9, 1811.

* * * * *

Coolness in action, not headlong bravery, is required in the Army.

The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British array; but that quality which I wish to see the officers possess, who are at the head of the troops, is a cool, discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with promptitude how far they can and ought to go, with propriety; and to convey their orders, and act with such vigour and decision, that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with alacrity.

May 15, 1811.

* * * * *

The battle of Albuera one of the most glorious in the War.

You will have heard of the Marshal's (Beresford) action on the 16th. The fighting was desperate, and the loss of the British has been very severe; but, adverting to the nature of the contest, and the manner in which they held their ground against all the efforts the whole French army could make against them, notwithstanding all the losses which they had sustained, I think this action one of the most glorious, and honourable to the character of the troops, of any that has been fought during the war.

May 20, 1811.

* * * * *

Portuguese Troops, better than Spanish.

What a pity it is that the Spaniards will not set to work seriously to discipline their troops! We do what we please now with the Portuguese troops; we manoeuvre them under fire equally with our own, and have some dependence on them; but these Spaniards can do nothing but stand still, and we consider ourselves fortunate if they do not run away.

May 25, 1811.

* * * * *

Disorganized state of the Peninsular Governments.

Those unfortunate governments in the Peninsula have been reduced to such a state of decrepitude, that I believe there was no authority existing within Spain or Portugal before the French invaded these countries. The French invasion did not improve this state of things; and, since what is called in Spain the revolution, and in Portugal the restoration, no crime that I know of has been punished in either, excepting that of being a French partisan. Those malversations in office—those neglects of duty; the disobedience of orders; the inattention to regulation, which tend to defeat all plans for military operation, and ruin a state that is involved in war, more certainly than the plots of all the French partisans, are passed unnoticed; and, notwithstanding the numerous complaints which Marshal Beresford and I have made, I do not know that one individual has yet been punished, or even dismissed from his office. The cause of this evil is the mistaken principle on which the government have proceeded. They have imagined that the best foundation for their power was a low, vulgar popularity; the evidence is the shouts of the mob of Lisbon, and the regular attendance at their levees, and the bows and scrapes of people in office, who ought to have other modes of spending their time; and to obtain this babble the government of Portugal, as well as the successive governments in Spain, have neglected to perform those essential duties of all governments, viz., to force those they are placed over to do their duty, by which, before this time, these countries would have been out of danger.

The other evil is connected very materially with the first. The government will not regulate their finances, because it will interfere with some man's job. They will not lay on new taxes, because in all countries those who lay on taxes are not favourites with the mob. They have a general income-tax, called 10 per cent., and, in some cases, 20 per cent., which they have regulated in such a manner as that no individual, I believe, has paid a hundredth part of what he ought to have paid. Then, for want of money, they can pay nobody, and, of course, have not the influence which they ought to have over the subordinate departments.

In addition to embarrassments of all descriptions surrounding us on all sides, I have to contend with an ancient enmity between these two nations, which is more like that of cat and dog than anything else, of which no sense of common danger, or common interest, or anything, can get the better, even in individuals.

June 12, 1811.

To write an anonymous letter is the meanest action of which any man can be guilty.

Dispatch, July 3, 1811.

* * * * *

British Officers, as well at Soldiers, require to be kept in order.

I must also observe that British officers require to be kept in order, as well as the soldiers under their command, particularly in a foreign service. The experience which I have had of their conduct in the Portuguese service has shown me that there must be authority, and that a strong one, to keep them within due bounds, otherwise they would only disgust the soldiers over whom they should be placed, the officers whom they should be destined to assist, and the country in whose service they should be employed.

October 1, 1811.

* * * * *

Money in aid of Labour better than Charity.

That which would be desirable is, if possible, to aid laborious exertions to procure a subsistence by small advances of money; and I propose to keep this principle in view in the distribution of the money entrusted to me, by which not only it will subsist those to whom it will be given for a longer period, but it may be hoped that the people will resume their habits of industry, and that they will soon again be able to provide for their own subsistence.

Oct. 11, 1811.

A General Re-action against Buonaparte predicted.

I have, however, long considered it probable, that even we should witness a general resistance throughout Europe to the fraudulent and disgusting tyranny of Buonaparte, created by the example of what has occurred in Spain and Portugal; and that we should be actors and advisers in these scenes; and I have reflected frequently upon the measures which should be pursued to give a chance of success.

Those who embark in projects of this description should be made to understand, or to act as if they understood, that having once drawn the sword they must not return it, till they shall have completely accomplished their object. They must be prepared, and must be forced, to make all sacrifices to the cause. Submission to military discipline and order is a matter of course; but when a nation determines to resist the authority, and to shake off the government of Buonaparte, they must be prepared and forced to sacrifice the luxuries and comforts of life, and to risk all in a contest, which it should be clearly understood before it is undertaken, has for its object to save all or nothing.

The first measure for a country to adopt is to form an army, and to raise a revenue from the people to defray the expense of the army: above all, to form a government of such strength, as that army and people can be forced by it to perform their duty. This is the rock upon which Spain has split; and all our measures in any other country which should afford hopes of resistance to Buonaparte should be directed to avoid it. The enthusiasm of the people is very fine, and looks well in print; but I have never known it to produce any thing but confusion. In France, what was called enthusiasm was power and tyranny, acting through the medium of popular societies, which have ended by overturning Europe, and in establishing the most powerful and dreadful tyranny that ever existed. In Spain, the enthusiasm of the people spent itself in vivas and vain boasting. The notion of its existence prevented even the attempt to discipline the armies; and its existence has been alleged, ever since, as the excuse for the rank ignorance of the officers and the indiscipline and constant misbehaviour of the troops.

I therefore earnestly recommend you, wherever you go, to trust nothing to the enthusiasm of the people. Give them a strong and a just, and, if possible, a good government; but, above all, a strong one, which shall enforce upon them to do their duty by themselves and their country; and let measures of finance to support an army go hand in hand with measures to raise it.

I am quite certain that the finances of Great Britain are more than a match for Buonaparte, and that we shall have the means of aiding any country that may be disposed to resist his tyranny. But those means are necessarily limited in every country by the difficulty of procuring specie. This necessary article can be obtained in sufficient quantities only by the contributions of the people; and although Great Britain can and ought to assist with money, as well as in other modes, every effort of this description, the principal financial as well as military effort, ought to be by the people of the resisting country.

Dec. 10, 1811.

* * * * *

The French System of Predatory War.

In the early days of the revolutionary war, the French, at the recommendation, I believe, of Brissot, adopted a measure which they called a levee en masse; and put every man, animal, and article, in their own country, in requisition for the service of the armies. This system of plunder was carried into execution by the popular societies throughout the country. It is not astonishing that a nation, among whom such a system was established, should have been anxious to carry on the war beyond their own frontiers. This system both created the desire and afforded the means of success; and with the war, they carried, wherever they went, the system of requisition; not, however, before they had, by these and other revolutionary measures, entirely destroyed all the sources of national prosperity at home.

Wherever the French armies have since gone, their subsistence, at least, the most expensive article in all armies, and means of transport, have been received from the country for nothing. Sometimes, besides subsistence, they have received clothing and shoes; in other instances, besides these articles, they have received pay; and from Austria and Prussia, and other parts of Germany and Italy, they have drawn, besides all these articles of supply for their troops, heavy contributions in money for the supply of the treasury at Paris. To this enumeration ought to be added the plunder acquired by the generals, officers, and troops; and it will be seen that the new French system of war is the greatest evil that ever fell on the civilised world.

The capital and industry of France having been destroyed by the revolution, it is obvious that the government cannot raise a revenue from the people of France adequate to support the large force which must be maintained in order to uphold the authority of the new government, particularly in the newly-conquered or ceded states; and to defend the widely-extended frontier of France from all those whose interest and inclination must lead them to attack it. The French government, therefore, under whatever form administered, must seek for support for their armies in foreign countries. War must be a financial resource; and that appears to me to be the greatest misfortune which the French revolution has entailed upon the present generation.

Jan. 31, 1812.

* * * * *

I consider the Portuguese troops, next to the British, the best in the Peninsula.

May 3, 1812.

* * * * *

It is very difficult to manage the defence of the kingdom of Portugal, the whole country being frontier.

June 11, 1812.

How to establish National Credit.

When a nation is desirous of establishing public credit, or, in other words, of inducing individuals to confide their property to its government, they must begin by acquiring a revenue equal to their fixed expenditure; and they must manifest an inclination to be honest, by performing their engagements in respect to their debts.

June 25. 1812.

* * * * *

The Spaniards cry "Viva!" but don't act.

I do not expect much from the exertions of the Spaniards, notwithstanding all that we have done for them. They cry viva! and are very fond of us, and hate the French; but they are, in general, the most incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have ever known; the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of military affairs, and above all of military affairs in their own country.

August 18, 1812.

* * * * *

Imbecility of the Spanish Leaders.

It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain should not have produced one man with any knowledge of the real situation of the country. It really appears as if they were all drunk, and thinking, and talking of any other subject but Spain.

November 1, 1812.

Evils of uncontrolled popular Legislatures.

The theory of all legislation is founded in justice; and, if we could be certain that legislative assemblies could on all occasions act according to the principles of justice, there would be no occasion for those checks and guards which we have seen established under the best systems. Unfortunately, however, we have seen that legislative assemblies are swayed by the fears and passions of individuals; when unchecked, they are tyrannical and unjust; nay, more, it unfortunately happens too frequently, that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most popular. Those measures are particularly popular which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties under the pretence of the public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain, there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting the justice of a legislative assembly possessing supreme powers.

January 29, 1813.

* * * * *

Ingratitude of the Portuguese to the British Army.

I must say, that the British army, which I have the honour to command, have met with nothing but ingratitude from the government and authorities in Portugal for their services; and that everything that could be done has been done by the civil authorities, lately, to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in their power. I hope, however, that we have seen the last of Portugal.

July 20, 1813.

* * * * *

Jealousy of the interference of foreigners in their internal concerns, is the characteristic of all Spaniards.

July 12, 1813.

* * * * *

Sound sense is better than abilities.

August 8, 1813.

* * * * *

Basis of military operations against the United States from the side of Canada.

Any offensive operation founded upon Canada must be preceded by a naval superiority on the lakes. But even if we had that superiority, I should doubt our being able to do more than secure the points on those lakes at which the Americans could have access. In such countries as America, very extensive, thinly peopled, and producing but little food in proportion to their extent, military operations by large bodies are impracticable, unless the party carrying them on has the uninterrupted use of a navigable river, or very extensive means of land transport, which such a country can rarely supply.

I conceive, therefore, that were your army larger even than the proposed augmentation would make it, you could not quit the lakes; and, indeed, would be tied to them the more necessarily in proportion as your army would be large.[7]

[Footnote 7: The letter from the Duke the above is taken was written in reply to an application by the home government for his opinion. We frequently find the Duke applied to for his opinion on political matters at home, while serving in the Peninsula.]

February 22, 1814.

* * * * *

The Morale of an Army important to Discipline.

No reliance can be placed on the conduct of troops in action with the enemy, who have been accustomed to plunder, and those officers alone can expect to derive honour in the day of battle from the conduct of the troops under their command, who shall have forced them, by their attention and exertions, to behave as good soldiers ought in their cantonments, their quarters, and their camps.

March 5, 1814.

* * * * *

English officers are very strictly instructed, and those who mean to serve their country well must obey their instructions, however fearless they may be of responsibility. Indeed, I attribute this fearlessness very much to the determination never to disobey, as long as the circumstances exist under which an order is given.

April 16, 1814.

* * * * *

French Feelings about the Slave Trade.

You (Mr. Wilberforce) judge most correctly regarding the state of the public mind here upon this question. Not only is there no information, but, because England takes an interest in the question, it is impossible to convey any through the only channel which would be at all effectual, viz., the daily press. Nobody reads anything but the newspapers; but it is impossible to get anything inserted in any French newspaper in Paris in favour of the abolition, or even to show that the trade was abolished in England, from motives of humanity. The extracts made from English newspapers upon this, or any other subject, are selected with a view, either to turn our principles and conduct into ridicule, or to exasperate against us still more the people of this country; and therefore the evil cannot be remedied by good publications in the daily press in England, with a view to their being copied into the newspapers here.

* * * * *

I must say that the daily press in England do us a good deal of harm in this as well as in other questions. We are sure of the king and his government, if he could rely upon the opinion of his people. But as long as our press teems with writings drawn with a view of irritating persons here, we shall never be able to exercise the influence which we ought to have upon this question, and which we really possess.

Letter to Mr. Wilberforce, October 8, 1814.

* * * * *

The real power in Spain is in the clergy.

October 20, 1814.

* * * * *

Les choses neuves, surtout quand elles sont compliquees, ne vont pas bien.

Letter to Doumouriex, November 3, 1814.

FRANCE.

Effects of Buonaparte's Government of France.

Ce qu'il y a de pis c'est le mecontentement general, et la pauvrete universelle. Cette malheureuse revolution et ces suites ont ruine le pays, de fond en comble. Tout le monde est pauvre, et, ce qui est pis, leurs institutions empechent qu'aucune famille devienne riche et puissante. Tous doivent donc necessairement viser a remplir des emplois publics, non, comme autrefois, pour l'honneur de les remplir, mais pour avoir de quoi vivre. Tout le monde donc cherche de l'emploi public.

Buonaparte laissa une armee de million d'hommes en France, outres les officiers prisonniers en Angleterre et en Russie. Le roi ne peut pas en maintenir le quart. Tous ceux non employees sont mecontens. Buonaparte gouvernait directement la moitie de l'Europe, et indirectement presque l'autre moitie. Pour des causes a present bien develloppees et connues, il employait une quantite infinie de personnes dans ses administrations; et tous ceux employes, ou dans les administrations exterieures, civiles, ou dans les administrations militaires des armees, sont renvoyes, et beaucoup des ceux employes dans les administrations interieures; a cette classe nombreuse ajouter la quantite d'emigres, et de personnes rentres, tous mourant de faim, et tous convoitant de l'emploi public afin de pouvoir vivre, et vous trouverez que plus des trois quarts de la classe de la societe, non employee a la main d'oeuvre ou a labourer la terre, sont en etat d'indigence, et, par consequence, mecontens. Si vous considerez bien ce tableau, qui est la stricte verite, vous y verrez la cause et la nature du danger du jour. L'armee les officiers, sourtout, sont mecontens. Ils le sont pour plusieurs raisons inutiles a detailler ici, mais ce mecontentement pourra ce vaincre en adoptant des mesures sages pour ameliorer l'esprit.

Letter to Doumouriex, November 26, 1814.

* * * * *

Re-establishment of the Bourbons necessary to the Peace of Europe.

I have frequently told your highness, and every day's experience shews me that I am right, that the only chance of peace for Europe consists in the establishment in France of the legitimate Bourbons. The establishment of any other government, whether in the person of——, or in a regency in the name of young Napoleon, or in any other individual, or in a republic, must lead to the maintenance of large military establishments, to the ruin of all the governments of Europe, till it shall suit the convenience of the French government to commence a contest which can be directed only against you, or others for whom we are interested. In this contest we shall feel the additional difficulty, that those who are now on our side will then be against us, and you will again find yourself surrounded by enemies. I am convinced that the penetration of your highness will have shewn you the danger of all these schemes to the interests of the emperor, and that you will defeat them all by adhering to that line of conduct (in which you will find us likewise) which will finally lead to the establishment in France of the legitimate government, from which alone can Europe expect any genuine peace.

May 20, 1815.

* * * * *

Effects of Waterloo.

I may be wrong, but my opinion is, that we have given Napoleon his death-blow: from all I hear, his army is totally destroyed, the men are deserting in parties, even the generals are withdrawing from him. The infantry throw away their arms, and the cavalry and artillery sell their horses to the people of the country, and desert to their homes. Allowing for much exaggeration in this account, and knowing that Buonaparte can still collect, in addition to what he has brought back with him, the 5th corps d'armee, under Rapp, which is near Strasbourg, and the 3rd corps, which was at Wavre during the battle, and has not suffered so much as the others, and probably some troops from La Vendee, I am still of opinion that he can make no head against us—qu'il n'a qu'a se pendre.

June 23, 1815.

* * * * *

Some of the regiments (the new ones I mean) are reduced to nothing; but I must keep them as regiments, to the great inconvenience of the service, at great expense; or I must send them home, and part with the few British soldiers I have.

I never was so disgusted with any concern as I am with this; and I only hope that I am going the right way to bring it to an early determination some way or other.

June 25, 1815.

* * * * *

Waterloo described to a Soldier.

Notre Bataille du 18 a ete une de geans; et notre succes a ete complet, comme vous voyez. Que Dieu me favorise assez pour que je n'en aie plus, parceque je suis desole de la perte de mes anciens amis et comrades.

Mon voisin et collaborateur (Bluecher) est en bonne sante quoique un peu souffrant d'une chute qu'il a faite d'un cheval blesse sous lui dans la bataille du 16.

Letter to Doumouriex, June 26, 1815.

* * * * *

If Buonaparte is to be put to Death, he will not be his Executioneer.

General——has been here this day to negociate for Napoleon's passing to America, to which proposition I have answered, that I have no authority. The Prussians think the Jacobins wish to give him over to me, believing that I will save his life.—— wishes to kill him; but I have told him I shall remonstrate, and shall insist upon his being disposed of by common accord. I have likewise said that, as a private friend, I advised him to have nothing to do with so foul a transaction; and that he and I had acted too distinguished parts in these transactions to become executioners, and that I was determined that, if the sovereigns wished to put him to death, they should appoint an executioner, which should not be me.

June 26, 1815.

* * * * *

The "Pounding Match."

You will have heard of our battle of the 18th. Never did I see such a pounding match. Both were what the boxers call "gluttons." Napoleon did not manoeuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style. The only difference was that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both with an enormous quantity of artillery.

I had the infantry for some time in squares, and we had the French cavalry walking about as if they had been our own. I never saw the British infantry behave so well.

Letter to Marshal Beresford, July 9, 1815.

* * * * *

Blucher's Vandalism averted.

To Marshal Prince Blucher.—Several reports have been brought to me during the evening and night, and some from the government, in consequence of the work carrying on by your highness on one of the bridges over the Seine, which it is supposed to be your intention to destroy.

As this measure will certainly create a good deal of disturbance in the town, and as the sovereigns when they were here before, left all these bridges, &c., standing, I take the liberty of suggesting to you to delay the destruction of the bridge, at least till they should arrive; or, at all events, till I can have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow morning.

July 8, 1815.

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The destruction of the bridge of Jena is highly disagreeable to the king and to the people, and may occasion disturbance in the city. It is not merely a military measure, but is one likely to attach to the character of our operations, and is of political importance. It is adopted solely because the bridge is considered as a monument of the battle of Jena, notwithstanding that the government are willing to change the name of the bridge. Considering the bridge as a monument, I beg leave to suggest that its immediate destruction is inconsistent with the promise made to the commissioners on behalf of the part of the army, during the negociation of the convention, viz., that the monuments, museums, &c., should be reserved for the decision of the allied sovereigns.

All that I ask is, that the execution of the orders given for the destruction of the bridge may be suspended till the sovereigns shall arrive here, when, if it should be agreed by common accord that the bridge ought to be destroyed, I shall have no objection.

July 9, 1815.[8]

[Footnote 8: The Duke rarely writes or speaks twice, when once will do. On this occasion he was anxious; and—successful.]

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Summary Justice.

To the Sous-Prefet de Pontoise.—J'ai ordonne qu'on vous fasse prisonnier, parceque, ayant envoye une requisition a Pontoise pour des vivres, vous avez repondu que vous ne les donneriez pas, sans qu'on envoie une force militaire assez forte pour les prendre.

Vous vous etes mis dans les cas des militaires, et je vous fais prisonnier de guerre, et je vous envoie en Angleterre.

Si je vous traitais comme l'usurpateur et ses adherens ont traite les habitans des pays ou ils ont fait la guerre, je vous ferais fusiller; mais, comme vous vous etes constitue guerrier, je vous fais prisonnier de guerre.

July 13, 1815.

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Characteristic Letter to Marshal Beresford.

The battle of Waterloo was certainly the hardest fought that has been for many years, I believe, and has placed in the power of the allies the most important results. We are throwing them away, however, by the infamous conduct of some of us; and I am sorry to add that our own government also are taking up a little too much the tone of their rascally newspapers. They are shifting their objects; and, having got their cake, they want both to eat it and keep it.

As for your Portuguese concerns, I recommend you to resign, and come away immediately. It is impossible for the British government to maintain British officers for the Portuguese army, at an expense even so trifling as it is, if the Portuguese government are to refuse to give the service of the army in the cause of Europe in any manner. Pitch them to the devil, then, in the mode which will be most dignified to yourself, and that which will have the best effect in opening the prince's eyes to the conduct of his servants in Portugal; and let the matter work its own way. Depend upon it, the British government must and will recall the British officers.

August 7, 1815.

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SPEECHES IN PARLIAMENT.

Praise of Lord Hastings and the Indian Army.

He professed his entire concurrence in the tribute of approbation bestowed on the Marquis of Hastings, for his conduct of the late war in India. There could not remain a doubt in the minds of those acquainted with the facts, but that the wisdom of the plan on which it was commenced, and the vigour of its execution, merited the highest praise. The noble Duke said, he was pleased that an opportunity, like the present, had occurred to do justice to the services and gallantry of our troops in India, which were often neglected or disallowed. No troops in the world performed their duty better, or observed a more steady discipline. They had evinced their good qualities in all their late transactions, whether acting in great masses or small detachments. In all situations they had nobly performed their duty.

House of Lords, March 9, 1819.

Impossibility of granting Catholic Emancipation.

The whole question turned upon the degree of security which could be given to the Protestant religion as by law established in Ireland. To consider this, it was necessary to consider how the reformation had been established in Ireland. It was not necessary for him to recall to their lordships remembrance that the unreformed religion had been established in Ireland at the point of the sword, and by means of confiscations. All this was repeated at the revolution, and was fresh in the recollection of the people of Ireland. Keeping in view that the Irish Roman Catholic church, under all oppressions, continued in the same state—the pope having the same influence over the clergy, the clergy the same power over the people; in this state of things, he would ask, whether it was possible that Roman Catholics could be safely admitted to hold seats in parliament? The influence of the priesthood over the people was fostered by the remembrance of the events to which he had alluded; and the idea of unmerited and mutual suffering; and no doubt could be entertained, from their present feelings, that if the Roman Catholics were admitted to the enjoyment of political power, their first exertion would be to restore their religion to its original supremacy; and to recover the possessions and property of which they had been stripped by the reformation. It was, however, said, that securities were offered on the part of the Roman Catholics.

The pope, it seemed, had in the appointment of bishops, relinquished all to the crown, except the mere conferring of a spiritual blessing. But how had that concession been received by the people of Ireland? It had excited the utmost discontent, and was regarded as an abandonment of the essential principles of their religion, and an attack on their national independence. Did that arise from the people of Ireland having a less clear idea of national independence than other people? No; but they felt if the executive power possessed any control over the appointment of the Roman Catholic bishops, some security would be thereby obtained for the Protestant church. Considering, then, that the whole question turned on the degree of security which could be given, and looking at the various securities which had at several times been proposed, he had never yet seen anything that came up to his notion of that which ought to be required. As to what had been said of the domestic nomination of bishops, he did not see how the laws of the country could operate upon it, so as to make it an adequate security. Then as to the oath of allegiance which the bishop was to take, of what avail could it be, that the law required this oath from a bishop, appointed God knows how, or by whom? When all these circumstances were considered, the state of the Irish Catholic church, the way in which the reformation had been effected, the rivalry and enmity between the Catholics and the established church, and the inadequacy of all securities which had been proposed, there was in his opinion, enough to decide the question; for, the first and greatest duty of the legislature was, to secure the establishments as settled at the revolution.

House of Lords, May 17, 1819.

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County meetings if properly regulated, are a fair constitutional mode of taking the sense of the county; but this cannot be the case if they are attended by a mob for the express purpose of supporting one side.

House of Lords, January 26, 1821.

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The Porte our ancient Ally.

The Ottoman Porte is the ancient ally of this country. It forms an essential part of the balance of power in Europe. The preservation of the Ottoman Porte has been an object of importance not merely to England but also to the whole of Europe; and the changes of possession which have taken place in the east of Europe within the recollection of all who hear me, render its existence as an independent and powerful state, necessary to the well being of this country.

In the late war, had it not been for the influence of the councils of England over the Porte, I may safely say that the disaster which finally led to the establishment of Europe as it now is, would not have occurred to the extent it did in 1812. Under these circumstances I think we may term the Ottoman Porte the "ancient ally" and friend of this country, even though the treaties upon which our alliance is founded are not of a hundred years standing.

House of Lords, Jan. 29, 1828.

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Battle of Navarino an untoward Event. Sir E. Codrington acquitted of all blame.

There is one other subject to which I shall address myself, I mean the sense in which the word "untoward" has been used. It was intended by "untoward" to convey, that the event referred to was unexpected—was unfortunate. The sense in which the word was used was this: in the treaty which is not yet before the house, and which cannot, therefore, regularly come under discussion, though all of us have read it, it is mentioned as one stipulation, that the execution of it, if possible, shall not lead to hostilities; and therefore, when the execution of it did lead to hostilities, it was a consequence which the government did not anticipate, and which it has, therefore, a right to call untoward.

It was hoped by the former government, that the treaty could be executed without risk of commencing hostilities; and that is rendered quite indisputable, not merely by the treaty, but by the force which the contracting parties sent into the Mediterranean to superintend its operation.

The late administration entertained hopes that those treaties could be carried into execution without hostilities, as your lordships must have perceived from what you have seen of those treaties themselves, as well as from the nature of the force sent to see them carried into execution; and when it was ultimately found that hostilities were likely to ensue, every one must look upon it as an untoward event which could give rise to such a state of things.

When the news of the affair which took place at Navarino reached Constantinople, it was apprehended that a war would ensue, and therefore every one was justified in looking upon it as an untoward event.

It is gratifying, however, to find from his majesty's speech, that those appearances of hostility have ceased to exist, and that hopes are entertained that no impediment will present itself to an amicable adjustment of the question; this, however, does not deprive the transaction of the character of "untowardness" which it originally possessed.

But in making this statement, do I make the slightest charge, do I cast the most distant imputation upon the gallant officer who commanded at Navarino? Certainly not. That gallant officer, in doing as he has done, discharged what he felt to be his duty to his country. His majesty's government have taken that gallant officer's conduct into consideration, and have acquitted him of all blame; and, therefore, it would ill become me to cast the slightest imputation on the distinguished action he performed. It should be recollected, that the gallant admiral was placed in a situation of great delicacy as well as difficulty. He was placed in the command of a combined squadron, in conjunction with two foreign admirals; and his conduct was such, that they placed the most implicit confidence in him, and allowed him to lead them to victory. My lords, I should feel myself unworthy of the situation which I hold in his majesty's councils, if I thought myself capable of uttering a single syllable against that gallant admiral, admiring, as I do, the intrepid bravery with which he conducted himself in a moment of much danger and difficulty.

House of Lords, January 29, 1828.

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Reason for being Prime Minister.

When I received his majesty's commands to give my opinion respecting the formation of a ministry, it was far from my wish to place myself at its head, or to take any office, other than that which I already held; but finding, in the course of the negotiation which arose out of the commands of his majesty, a difficulty in getting another individual to fill the place, and that it was the unanimous wish of those who are now my colleagues, that I should take it, I determined to accept it; but having so determined, I resigned the office of commander-in-chief.

House of Lords, January 29, 1828.

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The Doctrine of Non-interference.

Much has been said here and elsewhere, at various times, on the question of interference by one state in the affairs of another. I do not admit the right of one country to interfere with the internal affairs of another country, except where the law of necessity or great political interests may render interference absolutely necessary. But I say that non-interference is the rule, and interference the exception. This is the ground of the policy on which this country acts. She disdains a daily interference with the affairs of other countries.

House of Lords, February 11, 1828.

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No Personal or Political Hostility to Canning.

I rise to protest against any such imputation being cast upon me, as that I ever entertained any personal hostility to Mr. Canning. On a former occasion I stated distinctly to your lordships, why I did not think proper to remain in the government of which Mr. Canning was the head. The communications that passed between me and Mr. Canning have, unfortunately, I must be allowed to say, been made public enough, and I defy any man to point out anything like personal feelings in those communications. It is true, that when I found it necessary to withdraw from the government, I also thought it my duty to lay down the military office which I hold; but I beg leave to call your lordships' recollection to the explanation which I gave at that time, and to my subsequent conduct. After I left the government, I always met Mr. Canning in the way in which I had been accustomed to meet him, and did not depart from those habits which had marked our previous intercourse. But I will go further and say, that I had no hostility towards Mr. Canning's government. I did, it is true, propose that a clause should be added to the corn-bill, but did I not at the same time beg of the government to adopt that clause, or something like it, and not to abandon the bill? I must again repeat, that to the day of his death I felt no personal hostility to Mr. Canning; and that I am equally free from the imputation of having entertained any political hostility towards him. To whatever persons the declaration of the right honourable gentleman (Mr. Huskisson) was intended to apply.[9] I claim to myself the right of not being included in the number of Mr. Canning's enemies.

[Footnote 9: Referring to an angry speech of that gentleman in the Commons.]

House of Lords, February 25, 1828.

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Corn Law of 1828, Principle on which founded.

Your lordships are all aware that a variety of opinions exist throughout the country respecting the introduction of foreign corn; one class of persons maintaining that its importation should be prohibited; while others contend for its free introduction into the markets of the country. I have considered it my duty, and my colleagues also have considered it theirs, in the measure which they are about to propose to parliament, to endeavour to steer their course between the two extremes, and to propose a measure which shall have the effect of conciliating all parties, be at the same time favourable to the public, and shall be permanent. Your lordships will recollect, notwithstanding the difference of opinion which exists on this subject, all parties agree, generally, that the corn growers of this country ought, in some measure, to be protected.

The number of individuals, either in parliament or out of it, who maintain that foreign corn should be altogether free of duty, are very few indeed. Some persons, undoubtedly, think that a small fixed duty ought to be imposed; and I, my lords, should certainly say here, that if any such fixed duty were imposed, it ought to be a very small one; but I repeat, that whatever may be the particular doctrines or opinions of one class of persons or another, all agree that some protection ought to be afforded to the agriculture of this country. This opinion is founded on the great burden of taxation upon the country generally, as well as on the particular burdens on the land; and on the fact that the labouring classes here are better fed, clothed, and lodged, than the people of the same class in other countries. It is admitted by those who entertain this opinion in favour of a low duty, that their expectation and intention are, that the poorer lands of this country, which have been brought into cultivation by the application of great labour, and by the expenditure of large capital, should at once be thrown out of cultivation; and even the richer lands would become, comparatively, unprofitable in consequence of the adoption of their system. I will maintain that this country has been brought to its present high state of cultivation, and consequent internal wealth, by the fostering protection which has invariably been given to agriculture, and which has induced gentlemen to lay out their capital in redeeming waste lands and bringing them into cultivation. The result of such a system would be—to throw out of cultivation the land thus redeemed from waste; to reduce the extent of cultivation of the richer lands, consequently to lessen the productive power of the country; and finally to throw us for subsistence and support on the resources of foreign nations. My lords,—I will not exaggerate the effects likely to be produced by the pursuing of a system such as that to which I have alluded; but I beg your lordships to reflect on the consequences which must result, if the powers, from whose dominions these resources are generally drawn, should think proper to lay a heavy tax on the export of such corn, or that it should be subject to such an operation by any other state, in its transit to this country. I entreat your lordships to consider what must be the consequences of such a measure in its results to this country; a measure, too, in which I may say, that foreign states might, from circumstances, be highly justified. But supposing such moderation on the part of those states, that they should continue to allow us to draw our supplies from their dominions; supposing we could be supplied from other countries—America, for instance; yet I entreat your lordships to observe, that this country would be constantly, under the proposed system of fixed duty, placed in the state in which it found itself in years of famine and scarcity, which occurred in both the last and present century, and would of consequence be exposed to the highest possible prices for wheat. This, my Lords, I say, would be the inevitable consequence.

The cost of production, in Poland, for instance, would not be increased; but the prices would be regulated here, not by the prices of that country, but by the scarcity price of this country, and by the profits of all those who might be, directly or indirectly, concerned in the contemplated importation of corn, in such a state of things as that to which I have alluded. Under these circumstances, a low duty would not be productive of a reduction in price; indeed, so far from diminution, I am confident it would produce an enormous increase. But, my Lords, I would ask, even supposing it were otherwise, whether it would be proper to adopt such a measure, in reference to its probable effect in other respects? My Lords, look to Ireland, and consider what must by the inevitable consequence if agriculture is not to be encouraged in that country—a country, which, during the last year supplied England with more than 2,000,000 quarters of grain. The quantity of wheat alone imported from Ireland last year, was no less than 400,000 quarters. I do therefore, beg your Lordships to consider what must be the consequence of cutting off from that country nearly the only source of industry—the only manufacture, with one exception, which is established in that country. No man, whether connected with that country or not, can for a moment think of imposing such a sacrifice on that country. On the contrary, I am disposed to think, that many of your Lordships will be ready to make considerable sacrifices to procure for the people of Ireland a share of that plenty their industry affords us. But, my Lords, I speak not only with reference to Ireland, but with reference to this country. I am ready to state that the gentlemen of this country have, by the extent of their capital, and the labour which they have employed on their estates, raised the agriculture of this kingdom to its present prosperous condition; and nothing would be more unjust than to take from them that protection by which they have been enabled to bring cultivation to the state in which it now is, and to deprive them of those profits which are so justly their due, on account of the capital laid out by them.