Chapter XVI · 1841–1842. (continued 2)

The rights of the weaker portions of the Union will find one of their greatest 489securities in the veto power. It would be easy to imagine interests of the deepest importance to particular sections which might be seriously endangered by its destruction. For example, not more than one-third of the States have any direct interest in the coasting trade. This trade is now secured to American vessels, not merely by a protective duty, but by an absolute prohibition of all foreign competition. Suppose the advocates of free trade run mad should excite the jealousy of the Senators and Representatives from the other two-thirds of the States against this comparatively local interest, and convince them that this trade ought to be thrown open to foreign navigation. By such a competition, they might contend that the price of freight would be reduced, and that the producers of cotton, wheat, and other articles ought not to be taxed in order to sustain such a monopoly in favor of their own ship building and navigating interest. Should Congress, influenced by these or any other consideration, ever pass an act to open this trade to the competition of foreigners, there is no man fit to fill the executive chair who would not place his veto upon it, and thus refer the subject to the sober determination of the American people. To deprive the navigating States of this privilege, would be to aim a deadly blow at the very existence of the Union.

Let me suppose another case of a much more dangerous character. In the Southern States, which compose the weaker portion of the Union, a species of property exists which is now attracting the attention of the whole civilized world. These States never would have become parties to the Union, had not their rights in this property been secured by the Federal Constitution. Foreign and domestic fanatics—some from the belief that they are doing God’s service, and others from a desire to divide and destroy this glorious Republic—have conspired to emancipate the Southern slaves. On this question, the people of the South, beyond the limits of their own States, stand alone and unsupported by any power on earth, except that of the Northern Democracy. These fanatical philanthropists are now conducting a crusade over the whole world, and are endeavoring to concentrate the public opinion of all mankind against this right of property. Suppose they should ever influence a majority in both Houses of Congress to pass a law, not to abolish this property—for that would be too palpable a violation of the Constitution—but to render it of no value, under the letter, but against the spirit of some one of the powers granted; will any lover of his country say that the President ought not to possess the power of arresting such an act by his veto, until the solemn decision of the people should be known on this question, involving the life or death of the Union? We, sir, of the non-slaveholding States, entered the Union upon the express condition that this property should be protected. Whatever may be our own private opinions in regard to slavery in the abstract, ought we to hazard all the blessings of our free institutions—our Union and our strength—in such a crusade against our brethren of the South? Ought we to jeopard every political right we hold dear, for the sake of enabling these fanatics to invade Southern rights, and render that fair portion of our common inheritance a scene of servile war, rapine, and murder? 490Shall we apply the torch to the magnificent temple of human liberty which our forefathers reared at the price of their blood and treasure, and permit all we hold dear to perish in the conflagration? I trust not.

It is possible that at some future day the majority in Congress may attempt, by indirect means, to emancipate the slaves of the South. There is no knowing through what channel the ever active spirit of fanaticism may seek to accomplish its object. The attempt may be made through the taxing power, or some other express power granted by the Constitution. God only knows how it may be made. It is hard to say what means fanaticism may not adopt to accomplish its purpose. Do we feel so secure, in this hour of peril from abroad and peril at home, as to be willing to prostrate any of the barriers which the Constitution has reared against hasty and dangerous legislation? No, sir, never was the value of the veto power more manifest than at the present moment. For the weaker portion of the Union, whose constitutional rights are now assailed with such violence, to think of abandoning this safeguard, would be almost suicidal. It is my solemn conviction, that there never was a wiser or more beautiful adaptation of theory to practice in any government than that which requires a majority of two-thirds in both Houses of Congress to pass an act returned by the President with his objections, under all the high responsibilities which he owes to his country.

Sir, ours is a glorious Constitution. Let us venerate it—let us stand by it as the work of great and good men, unsurpassed in the history of any age or nation. Let us not assail it rashly with our invading hands, but honor it as the fountain of our prosperity and power. Let us protect it as the only system of government which could have rendered us what we are in half a century, and enabled us to take the front rank among the nations of the earth. In my opinion, it is the only form of government which can preserve the blessings of liberty and prosperity to the people, and at the same time secure the rights and sovereignty of the States. Sir, the great mass of the people are unwilling that it shall be changed. Although the Senator from Kentucky, to whom I cannot and do not attribute any but patriotic motives, has brought himself to believe that a change is necessary, especially in the veto power, I must differ from him entirely, convinced that his opinions on this subject are based upon fallacious theories of the nature of our institutions. This view of his opinions is strengthened by his declarations the other day as to the illimitable rights of the majority in Congress. On that point he differs essentially from the framers of the Constitution. They believed that the people of the different States had rights which might be violated by such a majority; and the veto power was one of the modes which they devised for preventing these rights from being invaded.

The Senator, in support of his objections to the veto power, has used what he denominates a numerical argument, and asks, can it be supposed that any President will possess more wisdom than nine Senators and forty Representatives. (This is the number more than a bare majority of each body which would at present be required to pass a bill by a majority of two-thirds.) To 491this question, my answer is, no, it is not to be so supposed at all. All that we have to suppose is, what our ancestors, in their acknowledged wisdom, did suppose; that Senators and Representatives are but mortal men, endowed with mortal passions and subject to mortal infirmities; that they are susceptible of selfish and unwise impulses, and that they do not always and under all circumstances, truly reflect the will of their constituents. These founders of our Government, therefore, supposed the possibility that Congress might pass an act through the influence of unwise or improper motives; and that the best mode of saving the country from the evil effects of such legislation was to place a qualified veto in the hands of the people’s own representative, the President of the United States, by means of which, unless two-thirds of each House of Congress should repass the bill, the question must be brought directly before the people themselves. These wise men had made the President so dependent on Congress that they knew he would never abuse this power, nor exert it unless from the highest and most solemn convictions of duty; and experience has established their wisdom and foresight.

As to the Senator’s numerical argument, I might as well ask him, is it to be supposed that we are so superior in wisdom to the members of the House that the vote of one Senator ought to annul the votes of thirty-two Representatives? And yet the bill to repeal the bankrupt law has just been defeated in this body by a majority of one, although it had passed the House by a majority of thirty-two. The Senator’s numerical argument, if it be good for anything at all, would be good for the abolition of the Senate as well as of the veto; and would lead at once to the investment of all the powers of legislation in the popular branch alone. But experience has long exploded this theory throughout the world. The framers of the Constitution, in consummate wisdom, thought proper to impose checks, and balances, and restrictions on their Governmental agents; and woe betide us, if the day should ever arrive when they shall be removed.

But I must admit that another of the Senator’s arguments is perhaps not quite so easily refuted, though, I think, it is not very difficult to demonstrate its fallacy. It is undoubtedly his strongest position. He says that the tendency of the veto power is to draw after it all the powers of legislation; and that Congress, in passing laws, will be compelled to consult, not the good of the country alone, but to ascertain, in the first instance, what the President will approve, and then regulate their conduct according to his predetermined will.

This argument presupposes the existence of two facts, which must be established before it can have the least force. First, that the President would depart from his proper sphere, and attempt to influence the initiatory legislation of Congress: and, second, that Congress would be so subservient as to originate and pass laws, not according to the dictates of their own judgment, but in obedience to his expressed wishes. Now, sir, does not the Senator perceive that his argument proves too much? Would not the President have precisely the same influence over Congress, so far as his patronage extends, as 492if the veto had never existed at all? He would then resemble the King of England, whose veto power has been almost abandoned for the last hundred and fifty years. If the President’s power and patronage were coextensive with that of the king, he could exercise an influence over Congress similar to that which is now exerted over the British Parliament, and might control legislation in the same manner.

Thus, sir, you perceive that to deprive the President of the veto power, would afford no remedy against executive influence in Congress, if the President were disposed to exert it. Nay, more—it would encourage him to interfere secretly with our legislative functions, because, deprived of the veto power, his only resource would be to intrigue with members of Congress for the purpose of preventing the passage of measures which he might disapprove. At present this power enables him to act openly and boldly, and to state his reasons to the country for refusing his assent to any act passed by Congress.

Again: does not the Senator perceive that this argument is a direct attack upon the character of Congress? Does he not feel that the whole weight of his argument in favor of abolishing the veto power, rests upon the wisdom, integrity, and independence of that body? And yet we are told that in order to prevent the application of the veto, we shall become so subservient to the Executive, that in the passage of laws we will consult his wishes rather than our own independent judgment. The venality and baseness of Congress are the only foundations on which such an argument can rest; and yet it is the presumption of their integrity and wisdom on which the Senator relies for the purpose of proving that the veto power is wholly unnecessary, and ought to be abolished.

In regard to this thing of executive influence over Congress, I have a few words to say. Sir, I have been an attentive observer of Congressional proceedings for the last twenty years, and have watched its operations with an observing eye. I shall not pretend to say that it does not exist to some extent; but its power has been greatly overrated. It can never become dangerous to liberty, unless the patronage of the Government should be enormously increased by the passage of such unconstitutional and encroaching laws as have hitherto fallen under the blow of the veto power.

The Executive, indeed, will always have personal friends, as well as ardent political supporters of his administration in Congress, who will strongly incline to view his measures with a favorable eye. He will also have, both in and out of Congress, expectants who look to him for a share of the patronage at his disposal. But, after all, to what does this amount?

Whilst the canvass is proceeding previous to his election, the expectations of candidates for office will array around him a host of ardent and active friends. But what is his condition after the election has passed, and the patronage has been distributed? Let me appeal to the scene which we all witnessed in this city, at and after the inauguration of the late lamented President. It is almost impossible that one office seeker in fifty could have been gratified. 493What is the natural and necessary result of such numerous disappointments? It is to irritate the feelings and sour the minds of the unsuccessful applicants. They make comparisons between themselves and those who have been successful, and self-love always exaggerates their own merits and depreciates those of their successful rivals, to such an extent, that they believe themselves to have been injured. The President thus often makes one inactive friend, because he feels himself secure in office, and twenty secret enemies awaiting the opportunity to give him a stab whenever a favorable occasion may offer. The Senator greatly overrates the power of executive influence either among the people or in Congress. By the time the offices have been all distributed, which is usually done between the inauguration and the first regular meeting of Congress thereafter, the President has but few boons to offer.

Again: it is always an odious exercise of executive power to confer offices on members of Congress, unless under peculiar circumstances, where the office seeks the man rather than the man the office. In point of fact, but few members can receive appointments; and those soliciting them are always detected by their conduct. They are immediately noted for their subserviency; and from that moment, their influence with their fellow members is gone.

By far the greatest influence which a President can acquire over Congress, is a reflected influence from the people upon their representatives. This is dependent upon the personal popularity of the President, and can never be powerful, unless, from the force of his character, and the value of his past services, he has inspired the people with an enthusiastic attachment. A remarkable example of this reflected influence was presented in the case of General Jackson; and yet it is a high compliment to the independence, if not to the wisdom of Congress, that even he could rarely command a majority in both its branches. Still it is certain, notwithstanding, that he presented a most striking example of a powerful executive; and this chiefly because he was deservedly strong in the affections of the people.

In the vicissitude of human events, we shall sometimes have Presidents who can, if they please, exercise too much, and those who possess too little, influence over Congress. If we witnessed the one extreme during General Jackson’s administration, we now have the other before our eyes. For the sake of the contrast, and without the slightest disrespect towards the worthy and amiable individual who now occupies the Presidential chair, I would say that if General Jackson presented an example of the strength, the present President presents an equally striking example of the feebleness, of executive influence. I ask what has all the patronage of his high office done for him? How many friends has it secured? I most sincerely wish, for the good of the country, and for the success of his administration, that he had a much greater degree of influence in Congress than he possesses. It is for this reason that I was glad to observe, a few days ago, some symptoms of returning favor on this (the Whig) side of the house towards John Tyler. It is better, much better, even thus late, that they should come forward and extend to him a 494helping hand, than, wishing to do so, still keep at a distance merely to preserve an appearance of consistency. I am sorry to see that from this mere affectation, they should appear so coy, and leave the country to suffer all the embarrassments which result from a weak administration. [Here several of the Whig Senators asked jocosely why the Democrats did not volunteer their services to strengthen the Government.] Oh! said Mr. B., we cannot do that. What is merely an apparent inconsistency in the Whigs, would be a real inconsistency in us. We cannot go for the Whig measures which were approved by President Tyler at the extra session. We cannot support the great Government Exchequer Bank of discount and exchange, with its three for one paper currency. I think, however, with all deference, that my Whig friends on this side of the House ought not to be squeamish on that subject. I think my friend from Georgia (Mr. Berrien) ought to go heart and hand for the Exchequer Bank. It is in substance his own scheme of a “Fiscal Corporation,” transferred into the Treasury of the United States, and divested of private stockholders. Let me assure gentlemen that their character for consistency will not suffer by supporting this measure.

And yet, with the example of this administration before their eyes, the Whigs dread executive influence so much that they wish to abolish the veto power, lest the President may be able to draw within its vortex all the legislative powers of Congress! What a world we live in!

This authentic history is the best answer to another position of the Senator. Whilst he believes that there have been no encroachments of the General Government on the rights of the States, but on the contrary that it is fast sinking into the weakness and imbecility of the Confederation, he complains of the encroachments which he alleges to have been made by the President on the legitimate powers of Congress. I differ from him entirely in both these propositions, and am only sorry that the subject of the veto power is one so vast that time will not permit me to discuss them at present. This I shall, however, say, that the strong tendency of the Federal Government has, in my opinion, ever been to encroach upon the rights of the States and their people; and I might appeal to its history to establish the position. Every violent struggle, threatening the existence of the Union, which has existed in this country from the beginning, has arisen from the exercise of constructive and doubtful powers, not by the President, but by Congress. But enough of this for the present.

The Senator from Kentucky contends that, whether the executive be strong or weak, Congress must conform its action to his wishes, and if they cannot obtain what they desire, they must take what they can get. Such a principle of action is always wrong in itself, and must always lead to the destruction of the party which adopts it. This was the fatal error of the Senator and his friends at the extra session. He has informed us that neither “the Fiscal Bank” nor “the Fiscal Corporation” of that never to be forgotten session would have received twenty votes in either House, had the minds of members been left uninfluenced by the expected action of the Executive.

495This was the most severe censure which he could have passed on his party in Congress. It is now admitted that the Whig party earnestly advocated and adopted two most important measures, not because they approved them in the form in which they were presented, but for the sake of conciliating Mr. Tyler. Never was there a more striking example of retributive justice than the veto of both these measures. Whether it be the fact, as the Senator alleges, that the Whigs in Congress took the Fiscal Corporation bill, letter for letter, as it came from the President to them, I shall not pretend to decide. It is not for me to compose such strifes. I leave this to their own file leaders. Without entering upon this question, I shall never fail, when a fit opportunity offers, to express the gratitude which I feel, in common with the whole country, to the President for having vetoed those bills, which it now appears never received the approbation of any person. It does astonish me, however, that this proceeding between the President and his party in Congress should ever have been made an argument in favor of abolishing the veto power.

This argument, if it prove anything at all, sets the seal of condemnation to the measures of the late extra session, and to the extra session itself. It is a demonstration of the hasty, inconsiderate, and immature legislation of that session. In the flush of party triumph, the Whigs rushed it, before passion had time to cool down into that calm deliberation, so essential to the wise and harmonious co-operation of the different branches of the Government. They took so little time to consult and to deliberate, to reconcile their conflicting opinions and interests, and above all to ascertain and fix their real political principles which they had so sedulously concealed from the public eye throughout the contest, that none but those who were heated and excited beyond the bounds of reason ever anticipated any result but division, disaster, and defeat, from the extra session. The party first pursued a course which must have inevitably led to the defeat which they have experienced; and would then revenge themselves for their own misdeeds by assailing the veto power.

The lesson which we have received will teach Congress hereafter not to sacrifice its independence by consulting the executive will. Let them honestly and firmly pass such acts as they believe the public good requires. They will then have done their duty. Afterwards let the Executive exercise the same honesty and firmness in approving these acts. If he vetoes any one of them, he is responsible to the people, and there he ought to be left.

Had this course been pursued at the extra session, Congress would have passed an act to establish an old-fashioned Bank of the United States, which would have been vetoed by the President. A fair issue would thus have been made for the decision of their common constituents. There would then have been no necessity for my friends on this side of the house to submit to the humiliation of justifying themselves before the people, on the principle that they were willing to accept something which they knew to be very bad, because they could not obtain that which they thought the public good demanded.

496This whole proceeding, sir, presents no argument against the veto power; although it does present, in a striking light, the subserviency of the Whig party in Congress to executive dictation. We may, indeed, if insensible to our own rights and independence, give an undue influence to the veto power; but we shall never produce this effect if we confine ourselves to our own appropriate duties, and leave the Executive to perform his. This example will never, I think, be imitated by any party in the country, and we shall then never again be tempted to make war on the veto power.

To show that this power ought to be abolished, the Senator has referred to intimations given on this floor, during the administration of General Jackson, that such and such acts then pending would be vetoed, if passed. Such intimations may have been in bad taste; but what do they prove? The Senator does not and cannot say that they ever changed a single vote. In the instances to which he refers, they were the declaration of a fact which was known, or might have been known, to the whole world. A President can only be elected by a majority of the people of the several States. Throughout the canvass, his opinions and sentiments on every leading measure of public policy, are known and discussed. The last election was an exception to this rule; but another like it will never again occur in our day. If, under such circumstances, an act should pass Congress, notoriously in violation of some principle of vital importance, which was decided by the people at his election, the President would be faithless to the duty which he owed both to them and himself, if he did not disapprove the measure. Any person might then declare, in advance, that the President would veto such a bill. Let me imagine one or two cases which may readily occur. Is it not known from one end of the Union to the other, and even in every log cabin throughout its extent, that the Senator from Missouri [Mr. Benton] has an unconquerable antipathy to a paper currency, and an equally unconquerable predilection for hard money? Now, if he should be a candidate for the Presidency,—and much more unlikely events have happened than that he should be a successful candidate—would not his election be conclusive evidence that the people were in favor of gold and silver, and against paper? Under such circumstances, what else could Congress anticipate whilst concocting an old-fashioned Bank of the United States, but that he would instantly veto the bill on the day it was presented to him, without even taking time to sit down in his Presidential chair? (Great laughter, in which Mr. Benton and Mr. Clay both joined heartily.) Let me present a reverse case. Suppose the distinguished Senator from Kentucky should be elected President, would he hesitate, or, with his opinions, ought he to hesitate, a moment in vetoing an Independent Treasury bill, should Congress present him such a measure? And if I, as a member of the Senate, were to assert, in the first case which I have supposed, whilst the bank bill was pending, that it would most certainly be vetoed, to what would this amount? Would it be an attempt to bring executive influence to bear on Congress? Certainly not. It would only be the mere assertion of a well known fact. Would it prove anything against the veto power? 497Certainly not; but directly the reverse. It would prove that it ought to be exercised—that the people had willed, by the Presidential election, that it should be exercised—and that it was one of the very cases which demanded its exercise.

An anticipation of the exercise of the veto power, in cases which had already been decided by the people, ought to exercise a restraining influence over Congress. It should admonish them that they ought not to place themselves in hostile array against the Executive, and thus embarrass the administration of the Government by the adoption of a measure which had been previously condemned by the people. If the measure be right in itself, the people will, at the subsequent elections, reverse their own decision, and then, and not till then, ought Congress to act. No, sir; when we elect a President, we do it in view of his future course of action, inferred from his known opinions; and we calculate, with great accuracy, what he will and what he will not do. The people have never yet been deceived in relation to this matter, as has been abundantly shown by their approbation of every important veto since the origin of the Government.

This veto power was conferred upon the President to arrest unconstitutional, improvident, and hasty legislation. Its intention (if I may use a word not much according to my taste) was purely conservative. To adopt the language of the Federalist, “it establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body” (Congress). Throughout the whole book, whenever the occasion offers, a feeling of dread is expressed, lest the legislative power might transcend the limits prescribed to it by the Constitution, and ultimately absorb the other powers of the Government. From first to last, this fear is manifested. We ought never to forget that the representatives of the people are not the people themselves. The practical neglect of this distinction has often led to the overthrow of republican institutions. Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty; and the people should regard with a jealous eye, not only their Executive, but their legislative servants. The representative body, proceeding from the people, and clothed with their confidence, naturally lulls suspicion to sleep; and, when disposed to betray its trust, can execute its purpose almost before their constituents take the alarm.

It must have been well founded apprehensions of such a result which induced Mirabeau to declare, that, without a veto power in the king, who was no more, under the first constitution of France, than the hereditary chief executive magistrate of a republic, he would rather live in Constantinople than in Paris. The catastrophe proved his wisdom; but it also proved that the veto was no barrier against the encroachment of the Legislative Assembly; nor would it have saved his own head from the block, had he not died at the most propitious moment for his fame.

I might appeal to many passages in the history of the world to prove that 498the natural tendency of legislative power has always been to increase itself; and the accumulation of this power has, in many instances, overthrown republican institutions.

Our system of representative Democracy, Heaven’s last and best political gift to man, when perverted from its destined purpose, has become the instrument of the most cruel tyranny which the world has ever witnessed. Thus it is that the best things, when perverted, become the worst. Witness the scenes of anarchy, confusion, and blood, from which humanity and reason equally revolt, which attended the French Revolution, during the period of the Legislative Assembly and National Convention. So dreadful were these scenes, all enacted in the name of the people, and by the people’s own representatives, that they stand out in bold relief, from all the records of time, and are, by the universal consent of mankind, denominated “the reign of terror.” Under the government of the Committee of Public Safety—a committee of the National Convention—more blood was shed and more atrocities committed, than mankind had ever beheld within the same space of time. And yet all this was done in the name of liberty and equality. And what was the result? All this only paved the way for the usurpation of Napoleon Bonaparte; and the people sought protection in the arms of despotism from the tyranny and corruption of their own representatives. This has ever been the course in which republics have degenerated into military despotisms. Let these sacred truths be ever kept in mind: that sovereignty belongs to the people alone, and that all their servants should be watched with the eyes of sleepless jealousy. The Legislative Assembly and the National Convention of France had usurped all the powers of the government. They each, in their turn, constituted the sole representative body of the nation, and no wise checks and barriers were interposed to moderate and restrain their action. The example which they presented has convinced all mankind of the necessity of a senate in a republic; and similar reasons ought to convince them of the necessity of such a qualified veto as exists under our Constitution. The people cannot interpose too many barriers against unwise and wicked legislation, provided they do not thereby impair the necessary powers of the Government. I know full well that such scenes as I have just described cannot occur in America; but still we may learn lessons of wisdom from them to guide our own conduct.

Legislative bodies of any considerable number are more liable to sudden and violent excitements than individuals. This we have all often witnessed; and it results from a well known principle of human nature. In the midst of such excitements, nothing is more natural than hasty, rash, and dangerous legislation. Individual responsibility is, also, diminished, in proportion to the increase of the number. Each person, constituting but a small fractional part of the whole mass, thinks he can escape responsibility in the midst of the crowd. The restraint of the popular will upon his conduct is thus greatly diminished, and as one of a number he is ready to perform acts which he would not attempt upon his own individual responsibility. In order to check 499such excesses, the Federalist tells us that this veto power, or reference of the subject to the people, was granted.

Again, sir, highly excited political parties may exist in legislative assemblies, so intent upon grasping or retaining power, that in the struggle they will forget the wishes and the interests of the people. I might cite several examples of this kind in the history of our own legislation; but I merely refer to the odious and unconstitutional alien and sedition laws. Led on by ambitious and eloquent men who have become highly excited in the contest, the triumph of party may become paramount to the good of the country, and unconstitutional and dangerous laws may be the consequence. The veto power is necessary to arrest such encroachments on the rights of the States and of the people.

But worst of all is the system of “log-rolling,” so prevalent in Congress and the State legislatures, which the authors of the Federalist do not seem to have foreseen. This is not a name, to be sure, for ears polite; yet, though homely, it is so significant of the thing, that I shall be pardoned for its use. Now, sir, this very system of log-rolling in legislative bodies is that which has involved several of the States in debts for internal improvements, which I fear some of them may never be able to pay. In order to carry improvements which were useful and might have been productive, it was necessary to attach to them works of an opposite character. To obtain money to meet these extravagant expenditures, indulgence was granted to the banks at the expense of the people. Indeed, it has been a fruitful source of that whole system of ruinous and disastrous measures against which the Democracy have been warring for years. It has produced more distress in the country than can be repaired by industry and economy for many days to come. And yet how rarely has any Executive had the courage to apply the remedy which the veto power presents?

Let us, for a moment, examine the workings of this system. It is the more dangerous, because it presents itself to individual members under the garb of devotion to their constituents. One has a measure of mere local advantage to carry, which ought, if at all, to be accomplished by individual enterprise, and which could not pass if it stood alone. He finds that he cannot accomplish his object, if he relies only upon its merits. He finds that other members have other local objects at heart, none of which would receive the support of a majority if separately considered. These members, then, form a combination sufficiently powerful to carry the whole; and thus twenty measures may be adopted, not one of which separately could have obtained a respectable vote. Thanks to the wisdom and energy of General Jackson, this system of local internal improvements which threatened to extend itself into every neighborhood of the nation, and overspread the land, was arrested by the veto power. Had not this been done, the General Government might, at the present day, have been in the same wretched condition with the most indebted States.

But this system of “log-rolling” has not been confined to mere local affairs, as the history of the extra session will testify. It was then adopted in 500regard to important party objects, and was called the “great system of measures of the Whig party.” It was openly avowed that the majority must take the system in mass, although it is well known that several of the measures, had they stood alone, would have been rejected in detail. We are all perfectly aware that this was the vital principle of the extra session. By means of “log-rolling” the system was adopted. That the passage of the Distribution bill was the price paid for the Bankrupt bill, was openly avowed on this floor. By what mutual compensations the other measures were carried we are left to infer, and therefore I shall not hazard the expression of any opinion in this place on the subject. The ingredient, which one member could not swallow alone, went down easily as a component part of the healing dose. And what has been the consequence? The extravagant appropriations and enormous expenses of the extra session have beggared the Treasury.

It is to check this system, that the veto power can be most usefully and properly applied. The President of the United States stands “solitary and alone,” in his responsibility to the people. In the exercise of this power, he is emphatically the representative of the whole people. He has the same feeling of responsibility towards the people at large, which actuates us towards our immediate constituents. To him the mass of the people must look as their especial agent; and human ingenuity cannot devise a better mode of giving them the necessary control than by enabling him to appeal to themselves in such cases, by means of the veto power, for the purpose of ascertaining whether they will sanction the acts of their representatives. He can bring each of those measures distinctly before the people for their separate consideration, which may have been adopted by log-rolling as parts of a great system.

The veto power has long been in existence in Pennsylvania, and has been often exercised, and yet, to my knowledge, it has never been exerted in any important case, except in obedience to the public will, or in promotion of the interests of the people. Simon Snyder, whose far-seeing sagacity detected the evils of our present banking system, whilst they were yet comparatively in embryo, has rendered himself immortal by his veto of the forty banks. The system, however, was only arrested, not destroyed, and we are now suffering the evils. The present governor has had the wisdom and courage repeatedly to exercise the veto power, and always, I believe, with public approbation. In a late signal instance, his veto was overruled, and the law passed by a majority of two-thirds in both Houses, although I am convinced that at least three-fourths of the people of the State are opposed to the measure.

In the State of Pennsylvania, we regard the veto power with peculiar favor. In the convention of 1837, which was held for the purpose of proposing amendments to our Constitution, the identical proposition now made by the Senator from Kentucky was brought forward, and was repudiated by a vote of 103 to 14. This convention was composed of the ablest and most practical men in the State, and was almost divided between the two great 501rival parties of the country; and yet, in that body, but fourteen individuals could be found who were willing to change the Constitution in this particular.

Whilst the framers of the Constitution thought, and thought wisely, that in order to give this power the practical effect they designed, it was necessary that any bill which was vetoed should be arrested, notwithstanding a majority of Congress might afterwards approve the measure; on the other hand, they restrained the power, by conferring on two-thirds of each House the authority to enact the bill into a law, notwithstanding the veto of the President. Thus the existence, the exercise, and the restraint of the power are all harmoniously blended, and afford a striking example of all the mutual checks and balances of the Constitution, so admirably adapted to preserve the rights of the States and of the people.

The last reason to which I shall advert why the veto power was adopted, and ought to be preserved, I shall state in the language of the seventy-third number of the Federalist:

“This propensity (says the author) of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers of the other departments, has been more than once suggested. The insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon, and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defence, has been inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable principles results the propriety of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the Executive, upon the acts of the legislative branches.”

The Executive, which is the weaker branch, in the opinion of the Federalist, ought not be left at the mercy of Congress, “but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defence.” It ought to be able to resist encroachments on its constitutional rights.

I admit that no necessity has ever existed to use the veto power for the protection of the Executive, unless it may possibly have been in a single instance; and in it there was evidently no intention to invade his rightful powers. I refer to the “Act to appoint a day for the annual meeting of Congress.” This act had passed the Senate by a majority of 34 to 8; but when it was returned to this body by General Jackson with his objections, the majority was reversed, and the vote stood but 16 in favor to 23 against its passage.

The knowledge of the existence of this veto power, as the framers of the Constitution foresaw, has doubtless exerted a restraining influence on Congress. That body have never attempted to invade any of the high Executive powers. Whilst such attempts have been made by them to violate the rights of the States and of the people, and have been vetoed, a sense of justice, as well as the silent restraining influence which proceeds from a knowledge that the President possesses the means of self-protection, has relieved him from the necessity of using the veto for this purpose.

Mr. President, I did not think, at the time of its delivery, that the speech of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky was one of great power; though we all know that nothing he can utter is devoid of eloquence and interest. I 502mean only to say that I did not then believe his speech was characterized by his usual ability; and I was disposed to attribute this to the feeble state of his health and consequent want of his usual buoyancy of spirit. Since I have seen it in print, I have changed my opinion; and for the first time in my life I have believed that a speech of his could appear better and more effective in the reading than in the delivery. I do not mean to insinuate that anything was added in the report of it; for I believe it contains all the arguments used by the Senator and no more; but I was astonished to find, upon a careful examination, that every possible argument had been urged which could be used in a cause so hopeless. This is my apology for having detained the Senate so long in attempting to answer it.

[Mr. Clay observed that he never saw the speech, as written out by the reporter, till he read it in print the next morning; and, although he found some errors and misconceptions, yet, on the whole, it was very correct, and, as well as he could recollect, contained all the arguments he did make use of, and no more.]

Mr. Buchanan. I did not intend, as must have been evident to the Senator, to produce the impression that anything had been added. My only purpose was to say that it was a better speech than I had supposed, and thus to apologize to the Senate for the time I had consumed in answering it.

I shall briefly refer to two other arguments urged by the Senator, and shall then take my seat. Why, says he, should the President possess the veto power for his protection, whilst it is not accorded to the judiciary? The answer is very easy. It is true that this power has not been granted to the judiciary in form; but they possess it in fact to a much greater extent than the President. The Chief Justice of the United States and his associates, sitting in the gloomy chamber beneath, exercise the tremendous and irresponsible power of saying to all the departments of the Government, “hitherto shalt thou go, and no further.” They exercise the prerogative of annulling laws passed by Congress, and approved by the President, whenever in their opinion, the legislative authority has transcended its constitutional limits. Is not this a self-protecting power, much more formidable than the veto of the President? Two-thirds of Congress may overrule the Executive veto; but the whole of Congress and the President united, cannot overrule the decisions of the Supreme Court. Theirs is a veto on the action of the whole Government. I do not say that this power, formidable as it may be, ought not to exist: on the contrary, I consider it to be one of the wise checks which the framers of the Constitution have provided against hasty and unconstitutional legislation, and is a part of the great system of mutual restraints which the people have imposed on their servants for their own protection. This, however, I will say, and that with the most sincere respect for the individual judges; that in my own opinion, the whole train of their decisions from the beginning favors the power of the General Government at the expense of State rights and State sovereignty. Where, I ask, is the case to be found upon their records, in which they have ever decided that any act of 503Congress, from the alien and sedition laws until the present day, was unconstitutional, provided it extended the powers of the Federal Government? Truly they are abundantly able to protect their own rights and jurisdiction against either Congress or the Executive, or both united.

Again: the Senator asks, why has not the veto been given to the President on the acts of conventions held for the purpose of amending our Constitutions? If it be necessary to restrain Congress, it is equally necessary, says he, to restrain conventions. The answer to this argument is equally easy. It would be absurd to grant an appeal, through the intervention of a veto, to the people themselves, against their own acts. They create conventions by virtue of their own undelegated and inalienable sovereignty; and when they speak, their servants, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, must be silent. Besides, when they proceed to exercise their sovereign power in changing the forms of their Government, they are peculiarly careful in the selection of their delegates—they watch over the proceedings with vigilant care, and the Constitution proposed, by such a convention, is never adopted until after it has been submitted to the vote of the people. It is a mere proposition to the people themselves, and leaves no room for the action of the veto power.

[Here Mr. Clay observed, that Constitutions, thus formed, were not afterwards submitted to the people.]

Mr. Buchanan. For many years past, I believe that this has always been done, as it always ought to be done, in the States: and the Federal Constitution was not adopted until after it had been submitted to a convention of the people of every State in the Union.

So much in regard to the States. The Senator’s argument has no application whatever to the Federal Constitution, which has provided the mode of its own amendment. It requires two-thirds of both Houses, the very majority required to overrule a Presidential veto, even to propose any amendment; and before such an amendment can be adopted, it must be ratified by the legislatures, or by conventions, in three-fourths of the several States. To state this proposition, is to manifest the absurdity, nay, the impossibility of applying the veto power of the President to amendments, which have thus been previously ratified by such an overwhelming expression of the public will. This Constitution of ours, with all its checks and balances, is a wonderful invention of human wisdom. Founded upon the most just philosophical principles, and the deepest knowledge of the nature of man, it produces harmony, happiness, and order, from elements which, to the superficial observer, might appear to be discordant.

On the whole, I trust not only that this veto power may not be destroyed, but that the vote on the Senator’s amendment may be of such a character as to settle the question, at least during the present generation. Sir, of all the executive powers, it is the one least to be dreaded. It cannot create; it can originate no measure; it can change no existing law; it can destroy no existing institution. It is a mere power to arrest hasty and inconsiderate changes, until the voice of the people, who are alike the masters of Senators, Representatives 504and President, shall be heard. When it speaks, we must all bow with deference to the decree. Public opinion is irresistible in this country. It will accomplish its purpose by the removal of Senators, Representatives, or President, who may stand in its way. The President might as well attempt to stay the tides of the ocean by erecting mounds of sand, as to think of controlling the will of the people by the veto power. The mounting waves of popular opinion would soon prostrate such a feeble barrier. The veto power is everything when sustained by public opinion; but nothing without it.

What is this Constitution under which we live, and what are we? Are we not the most prosperous, the most free, and amongst the most powerful nations on the face of the earth? Have we not attained this pre-eminence, in a period brief beyond any example recorded in history, under the benign influence of this Constitution, and the laws which have been passed under its authority? Why, then, should we, with rude hands, tear away one of the cords from this wisely balanced instrument, and thus incur the danger of impairing or destroying the harmony and vigorous action of the whole? The Senator from Kentucky has not, in my opinion, furnished us with any sufficient reasons.

And after all, what harm can this veto power ever do? It can never delay the passage of a great public measure, demanded by the people, more than two, or at the most, four years. Is it not better, then, to submit to this possible inconvenience, (for it has never yet occurred,) than to destroy the power altogether? It is not probable that it ever will occur; because if the President should disregard the will of the people on any important constitutional measure which they desired, he would sign his own political death warrant. No President will ever knowingly attempt to do it; and his means of knowledge, from the ordeal through which he must have passed previous to his election, are superior to those of any other individual. He will never, unless in cases scarcely to be imagined, resist the public will when fairly expressed. It is beyond the nature of things to believe otherwise. The veto power is that feature of our Constitution which is most conservative of the rights of the States and the rights of the people. May it be perpetual!

It was during the summer of 1842 that the treaty negotiated at Washington, between Mr. Webster and Lord Ashburton, settled various long standing and somewhat perilous controversies between the United States and England, for which Mr. Webster had remained in office under President Tyler. Mr. Buchanan was one of those who opposed the ratification of this treaty when it came before the Senate, in August, 1842. His speech in the secret session was very elaborate in its criticisms upon the whole negotiation, but it does not need to be reproduced now.

505The debates on the treaty were not published until the following session of Congress, which began in December, 1842. In February, 1843, Mr. Buchanan received the following letter from Mr. Jared Sparks, the distinguished historian:^[72]

[JARED SPARKS TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

Cambridge, Feb. 11th, 1843.

My Dear Sir:—

I have received the copy of your speech, which you were so kind as to send me, and for which I beg you will accept my thanks. I have read it with much interest, for although I am, on the whole, a treaty man, yet there are two sides, and you have presented one of them in a striking and forcible light. I am not well satisfied with the way in which the Caroline affair is allowed to subside. It was a gross outrage, in spite of all the soft words about it, and it demanded a round apology. I could wish also that there had been some express declaration of the sense of the Government against the pretended right of search. It is idle to dally on such a subject. There is no such right, there never was and there never ought to be; and I should be glad to have the point settled, in regard to the United States, by a positive declaration, in a formal manner, that it can in no case be admitted.

I observe that you deal out heavy blows upon my poor Paris map. I can assure you that it has not been by my knowledge or good will that it has fallen into the hands of the Senate. The information came accidentally into my possession, and, after much reflection, I thought it a duty to communicate it to the Department of State; but I never anticipated for a moment that I was thus running the hazard of having my name bandied about in the Senate; nor did it occur to me that any public use could be made of it. I do not complain of the result, but I consider it unfortunate to me personally, and I wish it could have been avoided.

You have made a slight mistake in regard to the character of this map. You represent it as an old map, with old boundary lines marked upon it. This is not a true description. It is a map of “North America,” with no boundary line marked upon it between Canada and the English colonies. The red mark is drawn by hand,—manuscript mark,—not following any engraved line. It is drawn with remarkable precision and distinctness, around the United States, even running out to sea and following the windings of the coast from the St. Mary’s to the St. Croix. There are no other colored lines on the map. It carries with it the evidence of having been drawn with great care; and from the head of the St. Croix to the mountains north of the sources of the Penobscot it winds along with an evident caution 506to separate the head waters of the streams which flow into the St. John’s from those which run to the south. I am here only stating facts, having no theory on the subject, nor, least of all, any desire to weaken our claim, which, till lately, has seemed to me unassailable. This map answers fully to that described in Franklin’s letter; and if he actually drew the line, it does seem to settle the question, for he could not be mistaken, at that time, as to the meaning of the commissioners.

The copy of Mitchell’s map, obtained from Baron Steuben’s library, has a manuscript boundary line drawn in exact accordance with this supposed line of Franklin. But I do not see any allusion to this map in the debates. There is a tradition that it once belonged to Mr. Jay, but I believe no evidence of this fact has been adduced.

But, after all, the thing which has weighed the most heavily on my mind as adverse to our claim, is the perfect silence of Mr. Jay and Mr. John Adams on the subject. Both these commissioners lived many years after the treaty of Ghent. Why should they not have declared, by some formal and public instrument, the facts of the case, and confirmed our claim, if they knew it to be just? Such a declaration would have been conclusive, even with an arbiter; and it would almost seem to have been a duty to their country to make it, of their own accord, when they saw such vast interests at stake. But no record of their opinion has ever been brought to light.

Mr. Woodbury has fallen into the same mistake as yourself, in regard to my unfortunate Paris map. Will you have the goodness to show him this letter; and believe me, with sincere respect and regard,

Your friend and most obedient servant,

Jared Sparks.

On the 7th of April, 1842, Mr. Buchanan addressed the Senate in opposition to a measure advocated by the Whigs, which proposed to pledge and appropriate the proceeds of the public lands to the payment of the interest and principal of the public debt. It must be remembered that this speech was made under very peculiar circumstances, and it is not necessary to reproduce it.

In the spring of the year 1844, it seemed that the old story of “bargain and corruption” in the election of John Quincy Adams in 1825 was about to be revived. General Jackson had again become excited on this subject by persons who wished at once to injure Mr. Clay and Mr. Buchanan. The following letter from Governor Letcher of Kentucky, an ardent admirer of Mr. Clay, informed Mr. Buchanan of what was impending:

507[GOVERNOR LETCHER TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

(Private.) Frankfort, June 20, 1844.

My Dear Sir:—

Mr. Clay is very much provoked with General Jackson and other malicious persons for attempting to revive against him that old vile, miserable calumny of “bargain and sale.” It is, I must confess, as you and I both know, a most villanous outrage, and well calculated to excite the ire of any man upon earth. I am not at all surprised that he should feel indignant upon the occasion.

I am told he is resolved upon “carrying the war into Africa.” Indeed I saw him for a few minutes shortly after he returned from Washington, when he alluded in some such terms to the subject. He was quite unwell at the time, and the conversation was very brief. It seems now (I was so informed an evening or two ago) he threatens to make a publication in vindication of his own character. What else he may do or say, I do not know. This much I learn, he will call upon me to give a statement of the conversation which took place between you and himself in my room in reference to the contest then pending between Adams and Jackson.

I shall regret exceedingly if any such call is made upon me. Many years ago, as you remember, a similar call was made, and on my part refused. I do not at present perceive any good reason why I should change my opinion. The truth is, if my recollection serves me, after several interviews with you in regard to the matter, I told you explicitly I did not feel at liberty to give the conversation alluded to, and would not do so under any circumstances, without your express permission. Am I not right in my recollection?

I do not think I shall or can be convinced that my decision as heretofore made is not perfectly correct.

With great regard,

R. P. Letcher.

How Mr. Clay proposed “to carry the war into Africa,” is to be explained by an occurrence which took place in January, 1825, at the lodgings of Mr. Letcher in Washington, he being then a member of Congress from Kentucky. The persons present were Mr. Clay, Mr. Letcher, Mr. Buchanan, and Mr. Sloan of Ohio. The subject of the election of a President by the House of Representatives was talked of jocosely; but in the course of the conversation Mr. Buchanan expressed his conviction that General Jackson would be chosen, adding, that “he would form the most splendid cabinet the country has ever had.” Mr. Letcher asked: “How could he have one more distinguished than that of Mr. Jefferson, in which were both 508Madison and Gallatin? Where would he be able to find equally eminent men?” Buchanan replied, looking at Mr. Clay, “I would not go out of this room for a Secretary of State.” Clay playfully retorted that he “thought there was not timber there fit for a Cabinet office, unless it were Mr. Buchanan himself.”^[73] This familiar, private conversation, held in the unrestrained intercourse of a casual meeting, could have been of no use to Mr. Clay, even if divulged, in “carrying the war into Africa,” unless he should treat it as an occurrence having some connection with the conversation between Mr. Buchanan and General Jackson, which is referred to in a previous chapter. The result would be that Mr. Buchanan would stand charged by Mr. Clay on the one hand, as an emissary of General Jackson to open a negotiation for Mr. Clay’s vote in the House, as he had some years before been charged with being an emissary of Mr. Clay to approach General Jackson with a proposal to sell his vote for the office of Secretary of State. The truth manifestly is, that Buchanan would have been very glad to have had Mr. Clay appointed Secretary of State under General Jackson, not only because he had great admiration for Mr. Clay’s splendid abilities, but for public and patriotic reasons; and there were no such strict party relations at that time as would have rendered a union between Jackson and Clay in any degree objectionable. But neither in the conversation between General Jackson and Mr. Buchanan, in December, 1824, nor in the conversation between Mr. Clay and Mr. Buchanan, at the lodgings of Mr. Letcher, in January, 1825, could either Jackson on the one hand, or Clay on the other, have had the slightest reason for claiming that on the former occasion Buchanan was acting as an agent of Clay, or that on the latter occasion he was acting as an agent of Jackson. In that scene of excitement, there were persons in Washington who stood in much closer relations with Jackson than Buchanan did at that time, in whose efforts to secure the votes of different delegations there were conversations which, construed in one way, approached pretty nearly to a tender of office to Mr. Clay. But they were the unauthorized, irresponsible and voluntary expressions by partisans of what 509they believed might take place, in case Jackson should become President; and if they were ever understood in any other sense by those to whom they were addressed, it is apparent that they were misunderstood.

Governor Letcher, as soon as he learned that Mr. Clay threatened to make use of the conversation at his lodgings, resolutely refused to be a party to the disclosure. Mr. Buchanan’s answer to his letter of the 20th of June, and the further correspondence between them, are all that it is needful to add:

[MR. BUCHANAN TO GOV. LETCHER.]

(Private.) Lancaster, June 27, 1844.

Mr Dear Sir:—

I have this moment received your very kind letter, and hasten to give it an answer. I cannot perceive what good purpose it would subserve Mr. Clay to publish the private and unreserved conversation to which you refer. I was then his ardent friend and admirer; and much of this ancient feeling still survives, notwithstanding our political differences since. I did him ample justice, but no more than justice, both in my speech on Chilton’s resolutions and in my letter in answer to General Jackson.

I have not myself any very distinct recollection of what transpired in your room nearly twenty years ago, but doubtless I expressed a strong wish to himself, as I had done a hundred times to others, that he might vote for General Jackson, and if he desired, become his Secretary of State. Had he voted for the General, in case of his election I should most certainly have exercised any influence which I might have possessed to accomplish this result; and this I should have done from the most disinterested, friendly and patriotic motives. This conversation of mine, whatever it may have been, can never be brought home to General Jackson. I never had but one conversation with him on the subject of the then pending election, and that upon the street, and the whole of it, verbatim et literatim, when comparatively fresh upon my memory, was given to the public in my letter of August, 1827.

The publication then of this private conversation could serve no other purpose than to embarrass me, and bring me prominently into the pending contest,—which I desire to avoid.

You are certainly correct in your recollection. You told me explicitly that you did not feel at liberty to give the conversation alluded to, and would not do so, under any circumstances, without my express permission. In this you acted, as you have ever done, like a man of honor and principle.

With every sentiment of regard, I remain sincerely,

Your friend,

James Buchanan.

510[GOV. LETCHER TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

(Private.) Frankfort, July 7, 1844.

My Dear Sir:—

I have received your answer to my letters. I am glad your recollection of what took place between us corresponds so exactly with mine.

I will not in any event violate my promise, and shall, indeed did, say as much to my distinguished friend. My resolution upon this point is firm and decided; and I do not think it can be changed.

Polk! Great God, what a nomination! I do really think the Democratic Convention ought to be damned to all eternity for this villanous business. Has Polk any chance to carry Pennsylvania?

I write you very hastily to get my letter in to-day’s mail. More hereafter.

Your sincere friend,

R. P. Letcher.

[GOV. LETCHER TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

(Private.) Frankfort, July 19th, 1844.

My Dear Sir:—

I have not seen Mr. Clay since I wrote you, nor have I heard a single word more about that threatened publication. I hope he has thought better of it. I told him when I did see him, not to expect from me any statement of what took place in my room between you and him, and that I had made up my mind upon that subject years ago, and did not now see any good reason for changing it.

I hardly think he will make a publication without submitting it to me; indeed, I believe he said so expressly. As I can perceive no earthly good growing out of such a movement, of course I shall continue to oppose it in every possible manner. He has a great many facts now in his possession, and some much stronger than I had supposed to exist, and, no doubt, could put forth a powerful document, but he shall not do it with my consent.

I had a short chat with Colonel Benton a few days ago. If you remember, he was always a good friend of mine, and having the fullest confidence in my discretion, he talked very freely. It was “Multum in parvo” literally. Well, the truth is, your party, speaking classically, have come to a poor pass. Polk for your leader! and then to think of such villanous intrigues to get him on the track, and such old warriors as Van Buren, Buchanan, both the very fellows who were so rascally cheated, being compelled to support the “cretur.” Why, I had rather die.

The fact is, both Benton and yourself are hunted down daily by your own dogs. No two men are more constantly the subjects of vituperation by your own party, and I would see them at the devil before I would act a part in such a miserable play as they are now getting up. Besides, you owe it to your own true principles, to your State, to your country, to your own character, 511not to engage in the dirty job of trying to elect such an —— as Polk to the greatest office in the world.

Our Whig candidate for Governor is a death slow nag, as they tell me; still he is a very worthy gentleman, and, I presume, will be elected very easily, though he is twelve or fifteen thousand votes weaker than Clay. I go to no public gatherings, but shall soon be let loose, thank God.

R. P. Letcher.

[BUCHANAN TO LETCHER.]

Lancaster, July 27th, 1844.

My Dear Sir:—

I have received your kind favors of the 7th and 19th instant, and am rejoiced to learn that your distinguished friend has probably thought better of the publication. You have ever been a sagacious man, and doubtless think that James K. Polk is not quite as strong an antagonist as Andrew Jackson, and therefore that it would not be very wise to drop the former and make up an issue with the latter. If this had been done, it would not be difficult to predict the result, at least in Pennsylvania.

The whole affair has worried me much from first to last; and yet I have been as innocent as a sucking dove of any improper intention. First to have been called on by Jackson as his witness against Clay, and then to be vouched as Clay’s witness against Jackson, when, before Heaven, I can say nothing against either, is a little too much to bear patiently. I have got myself into this scrape, from the desire which I often expressed and never concealed, that Jackson, first of all things, might be elected President by the House, and that Clay might next be his Secretary of State.

It was a most unfortunate day for the country, Mr. Clay, and all of us, when he accepted the office of Secretary of State (under J. Q. Adams). To be sure, there was nothing criminal in it, but it was worse, as Talleyrand would have said, it was a great blunder. Had it not been for this, he would, in all probability, now have been in retirement, after having been President for eight years; and friends like you and myself, who ought to have stood together through life, would not have been separated. But, as the hymn says, I trust “there’s better days a coming.”

You ask:—Has Polk any chance to carry Pennsylvania? and I answer, I think he has. Pennsylvania is a Democratic State by a majority of at least 20,000; and there is no population more steady on the face of the earth. Under all the excitement of 1840, and Mr. Van Buren’s want of popularity, we were beaten but 343; and ever since we have carried our State elections by large majorities. Besides, Muhlenburg, our candidate for Governor, is a fast horse, and will certainly be elected; and the Governor’s election will exercise much influence on the Presidential. But your people, notwithstanding, are in high hopes; and, after my mistake in 1840, I shall not prophesy positively.

I was ignorant of the fact that any portion of the Democratic party were 512playing the part of Acteon’s dogs towards me. I stood in no man’s way. After my withdrawal, I never thought of the Presidency, and the few scattering votes which I received at Baltimore were given to me against my express instructions, at least so far as the Pennsylvania delegation were concerned. The very last thing I desired was to be the candidate. If they desire to hunt me down for anything, it must be because I have refused to join in the hue and cry against Colonel Benton, who has been for many years the sword and shield of Democracy. Although I differed from him on the Texas question, I believe him to be a much better man than most of his assailants. I sincerely hope that they may not be able to defeat his re-election to the Senate. I have delayed the publication of my Texas speech to prevent its use against him in the approaching Missouri elections.

It is neither according to my taste, nor sense of propriety as a Senator of the United States, to take the stump, and I have yet resisted all importunities for that purpose. Whether I shall be able to hold out to the end, I do not know. It is sincerely my desire, and I owe Muhlenburg much kindness, and if he should request it, I could not well refuse. Should I enter the lists, I shall never say, as I never have said, anything which could give the most fastidious friend of Mr. Clay just cause of offence. I shall go to the Bedford Springs on Monday, where I expect to remain for a fortnight.

As I grow older, I look back with a mournful pleasure to the days of “auld lang syne.” There was far more heart and soul and fun in our social intercourse than exists “in these degenerate days.” But, perhaps, to think so is an evidence of approaching old age. Poor Governor Kent! I was forcibly reminded of him a few days ago, when, at the funeral of a friend, I examined his son’s gravestone, who was a student of mine. To keep it in repair has been for me a matter of pious duty. I loved his father to the last......

I wish I could have you with me for a few days. I have better wine than any man between this and Frankfort, and no man in the world would hail you with a heartier welcome. When shall we meet again?

Ever your sincere friend,

James Buchanan.

[LETCHER TO BUCHANAN.]

Frankfort, August 3d, 1844.

My Dear Sir:—

Your very interesting favor of the 27th ultimo has reached me and I have just read it with a great deal of pleasure.

I have not seen Mr. Clay since I wrote you, nor have I heard one single word further in regard to the threatened publication. When I saw him, as I believe I told you, he had the full benefit of my opinion upon the subject, expressed in terms by no means equivocal.

You know my warm, and strong, and long attachment to the man. A 513better and a greater man, take him altogether, in my view, has never lived in any age or country. He is a little excitable, and under that state of feeling seems to raise the imperial colors, but it’s mere manner, growing out of his peculiar organization. He is not a malice bearing man, and never was. He never disliked you in his life, though I think you had always perhaps an impression to the contrary. But with all my regard for the man personally, and unbounded confidence in his political worth, I cannot be prevailed upon to advise him to make a publication, however strongly his feelings may be interested in the matter, of the character of the one alluded to, nor am I at all willing to be referred to as a witness to anything that occurred under the sanctity of my hospitality. Unless my mind undergoes a most radical change, I never will consent. And although I flatter myself I am an exceedingly amiable man, yet I am as firm, and as decided, and as unyielding in matters of judgment as any man living.

Our election comes off Monday next. The Whig candidate for governor is not considered by any means a popular man. He will not carry the entire Whig vote, according to the estimate of the knowing ones, by 10,000 votes. On the other side they are running a very popular man, and a “war horse at that.” The party lines will be better drawn between the candidates for lieutenant-governor, as I am told. My position places it very much out of my power to see exactly the progress of the campaign.

One word as to yourself. Were I in your place, I would not take the stump, mark that. “I know a thing or two,” and if I know anything, it is judging accurately “men and things.” My opinion upon this point is correct. Polk has no more chance to be elected than if he were now dead, and buried, and damned, as he will be in due time. The idea of his being a tariff man is very provoking.

I would pay Muhlenberg at a more convenient season. He is at best, a tricky old fellow; I know him “like a book.” We shall probably meet during the next spring, if we live. I may possibly make a visit to Washington after Clay gets under way. As this is rather an interesting topic (and as you pay no postage), I will explain myself to you more fully.

Mr. Clay’s attachment to me, I have no doubt about. I am fully aware that he has the most entire confidence in my integrity and (to the full extent of my merits) every reasonable confidence in my judgment. When he comes into power, he will be surrounded by a set of flatterers, artful, designing, and cunning. Of course a man in that condition, will at once, or in due time, form a new set of feelings and a new set of friends. It is the true course of human nature, and all history proves it. He may offer me something, but that may not be at all agreeable to my feelings. On this subject I have never had the first word with him or anybody else, and I don’t intend to have. My impression has been all along, he would take Crittenden into the cabinet, should he be inclined to take a place. Oh no, when my friends are in trouble, I am a first rate doctor, but when restored, I doubt whether there will be use for me. The impression prevails in this country, that I can get 514any place that I select. Not so. I tell you this confidentially, that in case we live, we may see how accurately we understand the business. But in fact there is no place I have set my heart upon in the slightest degree, and I do assure you now that I am not expecting, and hope that I shall never apply for any directly or indirectly. Upon a moment’s reflection I doubt whether I shall go East in the spring, lest it might be supposed I was seeking place. My time is almost out as governor, and how to dispose of myself, I confess I know not, but I would rather fly to a saltpetre cave, and work for a living, than to solicit office from friends to whom I have adhered for upwards of a quarter of a century. True, my services were rendered without the hopes of personal reward. They were given purely for what I deemed the good of the country. This is a strange world, I can tell you. I often hear of its being said, if Letcher was out of the way, Mr. Adams, Mr. Buchanan, and Mr. Clay could be provided for, but Letcher will have a controlling influence, etc., etc. What miserable stuff. The truth is I shall not try to have a controlling influence, and do not wish it, and will not have it if I could get it. But I could not have it if I wanted it. Now give me just as long a love-letter as this. Don’t drink up all that good wine, but wait till I come.

Ever yours,

R. P. Letcher.

The whole substance of what Mr. Clay meant about “carrying the war into Africa” was probably this: that the familiar conversation at Mr. Letcher’s room in January, 1825, was as good evidence of Jackson’s effort to corrupt him as the conversation between Jackson and Buchanan in the previous December was, of a purpose on his (Clay’s) part, to induce Jackson to buy his vote in the House of Representatives by promising to make him (Clay) Secretary of State.^[74]

515