Chapter XX

OUR CONQUERING AIRMEN

The airmen who were the eyes of the Army in Sinai and Palestine can look back on their record as a great achievement. Enormous difficulties were faced with stout hearts, and the Royal Flying Corps spirit surmounted them. It was one long test of courage, endurance, and efficiency, and so triumphantly did the airmen come through the ordeal that General Allenby's Army may truthfully be said to have secured as complete a mastery of the air as it did of the plains and hills of Southern Palestine. Those of us who watched the airmen 'carrying on,' from the time when their aeroplanes were inferior to those of the Germans in speed, climbing capacity, and other qualities which go to make up first-class fighting machines, till the position during the great advance when few enemy aviators dared cross our lines, can well testify to the wonderful work our airmen performed.

With comparatively few opportunities for combat because the enemy knew his inferiority and declined to fight unless forced, the pilots and observers from the moment our attack was about to start were always aggressive, and though the number of their victims may seem small compared with aerial victories on the Western Front they were substantial and important. In the month of January 1917 the flying men accounted for eleven aeroplanes, five of these falling victims to one pilot. The last of these victories I myself witnessed. In a single-seater the pilot engaged two two-seater aeroplanes of a late type, driving down one machine within our line, the pilot killed by eleven bullets and the observer wounded. He then chased the other plane, whose pilot soon lost his taste for fighting, dropped into a heavy cloud bank, and got away. No odds were too great for our airmen. I have seen one aeroplane swoop down out of the blue to attack a formation of six enemy machines, sending one crashing to earth and dispersing the remainder. In one brief fight another pilot drove down three German planes. The airman does not talk of his work, and we knew that what we saw and heard of were but fragments in the silent records of great things done. Much that was accomplished was far behind our visual range, high up over the bleak hills of Judea, above even the rain clouds driven across the heights by the fury of a winter gale, or skimming over the dull surface of the Dead Sea, flying some hundreds of feet below sea level to interrupt the passage of foodstuffs of which the Turk stood in need.

All through the Army's rapid march northwards from the crushed Gaza-Beersheba line the airmen's untiring work was of infinite value. When the Turkish retreat began the enemy was bombed and machine-gunned for a full week, the railway, aerodromes, troops on the march, artillery, and transport being hit time and again, and five smashed aeroplanes and a large quantity of aircraft stores of every description were found at Menshiye alone. The raid on that aerodrome was so successful that at night the Germans burnt the whole of the equipment not destroyed by bombs. Three machines were also destroyed by us at Et Tineh, five at Ramleh and one at Ludd, and the country was covered with the debris of a well-bombed and beaten army. After Jerusalem came under the safe protection of our arms airmen harassed the retiring enemy with bombs and machine guns. The wind was strong, but defying treacherous eddies, the pilots came through the valleys between steep-sloped hills and caught the Turks on the Nablus road, emptying their bomb racks at a height of a few hundred feet, and giving the scattered troops machine-gun fire on the return journey.

A glance at the list of honours bestowed on officers and other ranks of the R.F.C. serving with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in 1917 is sufficient to give an idea of the efficiency of the service of our airmen. It must be remembered that the Palestine Wing was small, if thoroughly representative of the Flying Corps; its numbers were few but the quality was there. Indeed I heard the Australian squadron of flying men which formed part of the Wing described by the highest possible authority as probably the finest squadron in the whole of the British service. This following list of honours is, perhaps, the most eloquent testimony to the airmen's work in Palestine:

Victoria Cross . . . . . 1 Distinguished Service Order . . . 4 Military Cross . . . . . 34 Croix de Guerre . . . . 2 Military Medal . . . . . 1 Meritorious Service Medal . . . 14 Order of the Nile . . . . 2

The sum total of the R.F.C. work was not to be calculated merely from death and damage caused to the enemy from the air. Strategical and tactical reconnaissances formed a large part of the daily round, and the reports brought in always added to our Army's store of information. In Palestine, possibly to a greater extent than in any other theatre of war, our map-makers had to rely on aerial photographs to supply them with the details required for military maps. The best maps we had of Palestine were those prepared by Lieutenant H.H. Kitchener, R.E., and Lieutenant Conder in 1881 for the Palestine Exploration Fund. They were still remarkably accurate so far as they went, but 'roads,' to give the tracks a description to which they were not entitled, had altered, and villages had disappeared, and newer and additional information had to be supplied. The Royal Flying Corps—it had not yet become the Royal Air Force—furnished it, and all important details of hundreds of square miles of country which survey parties could not reach were registered with wonderful accuracy by aerial photographers.

The work began for the battle of Rafa, and the enemy positions on the Magruntein hill were all set out before General Chetwode when the Desert Column attacked and scored an important victory. Then when 12,000 Turks were fortifying the Weli Sheikh Nuran country covering the wadi Ghuzze and the Shellal springs, not a redoubt or trench but was recorded with absolute fidelity on photographic prints, and long before the Turks abandoned the place and gave us a fine supply of water we had excellent maps of the position. In time the whole Gaza-Beersheba line was completely photographed and maps were continually revised, and if any portion of the Turkish system of defences was changed or added to the commander in the district concerned was notified at once. To such perfection did the R.F.C. photographic branch attain, that maps showing full details of new or altered trenches were in the hands of generals within four hours of the taking of the photographs. Later on the work of the branch increased enormously, and the results fully repaid the infinite care and labour bestowed upon it.

The R.F.C. made long flights in this theatre of war, and some of them were exceptionally difficult and dangerous. A French battleship when bombarding a Turkish port of military importance had two of our machines to spot the effect of her gunfire. To be with the ship when the action opened the airmen had to fly in darkness for an hour and a half from a distant aerodrome, and they both reached the rendezvous within five minutes of the appointed time. The Turks on their lines of communication with the Hedjaz have an unpleasant recollection of being bombed at Maan. That was a noteworthy expedition. Three machines set out from an aerodrome over 150 miles away in a straight line, the pilots having to steer a course above country with no prominent landmarks. They went over a waterless desert so rough that it would have been impossible to come down without seriously damaging a plane, and if a pilot had been forced to land his chance of getting back to our country would have been almost nil. Water bottles and rations were carried in the machines, but they were not needed, for the three pilots came home together after hitting the station buildings at Maan and destroying considerable material and supplies.

The aeroplane has been put to many uses in war and, it may be, there are instances on other fronts of it being used, in emergencies, as an ambulance. When a little mobile force rounded up the Turkish post at Hassana, on the eastern side of the Sinai Peninsula, one of our men received so severe a wound that an immediate operation was necessary. An airman at once volunteered to carry the wounded man to the nearest hospital, forty-four miles away across the desert, and by his action a life was saved.

APPENDICES

I

The following telegram was sent by Enver Pasha to Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, at Supreme Army Command Headquarters, from Constantinople on August 23, 1917:

The news of the despatch of strong enemy forces to Egypt, together with the nomination of General Allenby as Commander-in-Chief on our Syrian Front, indicates that the British contemplate an offensive on the Syrian Front, and very probably before the middle of November.

The preservation of the Sinai Front is a primary condition to the success of the Yilderim undertaking.

After a further conversation with the Commander of the IVth Army (Jemal Pasha) I consider it necessary to strengthen this front by one of the infantry divisions intended for Yilderim, and to despatch this division immediately from Aleppo.

With this reinforcement the defence of the Sinai Front by the IVth Army is assured.

General von Falkenhayn takes up the position that he does not consider the defence assured, and that the further reduction of Yilderim forces is to be deprecated under any circumstances.

He consequently recommends that we on our side should attack the British, and as far as possible surprise them, before they are strengthened. He wishes to carry out this attack with four infantry divisions, and the 'Asia' Corps. Two of the four infantry divisions have still to be despatched to the front.

I cannot yet decide to support the proposal, nor need I do so, as the transport of an infantry division from Aleppo to Bayak requires twenty days. During this period the situation as regards the enemy will become clear, and one will become better able to estimate the chance of success of an attack.

I must, however, in any case be able to dispose of more forces than at present, either for the completion of Yilderim, or for the replacement of the very heavy losses which will certainly occur in the Syrian attack.

I must consequently reiterate, to my deep regret, my request for the return of the VIth Army Corps (which was operating at that time in the Dobrudja) and for the despatch of this Corps, together with the 20th Infantry Division, commencing with the 15th Infantry Division.

In my opinion the Army Corps could be replaced by Bulgarians, whose task is unquestionably being lightened through the despatch of troops (British) to Egypt.

Should this not be the case, I would be ready to exchange two divisions from the Vth Army for the two infantry divisions of the VIth Army Corps, as the former are only suited for a war of position, and would have to be made mobile by the allotment of transport and equipment.

If these two infantry divisions were given up, the Vth Army would have only five infantry divisions of no great fighting value, a condition of things which is perhaps not very desirable.

For the moment my decision is: Defence of Syria by strengthening that front by one infantry division, and prosecution of the Yilderim scheme.

Should good prospects offer of beating the British decisively in Syria before they have been reinforced I will take up General von Falkenhayn's proposal again, as far as it appears possible to carry it out, having in view the question of transport and rationing, which still has to be settled in some respects.—Turkish Main Headquarters, ENVER.

II

Von Falkenhayn despatched the following telegram from Constantinople on August 25, 1917, to German General Headquarters:

The possibility of a British attack in Syria has had to be taken into consideration from the beginning. Its repercussion on the Irak undertaking was obvious. On that account I had already settled in my conversations in Constantinople during May that, if the centre of gravity of operations were transferred to the Sinai Front, command should be given me there too. The news now to hand—reinforcement of the British troops in Egypt, taking over of command by Allenby, the demands of the British Press daily becoming louder—makes the preparation of a British attack in Syria probable.

Jemal Pasha wishes to meet it with a defensive. To that end he demands the divisions and war material which were being collected about Aleppo for Yilderim. The natural result of granting this request will be that true safety will never be attained on the Sinai Front by a pure defensive, and that the Irak undertaking will certainly fritter away owing to want of driving power or to delays.

I had consequently proposed to the Turkish Higher Command to send two divisions and the 'Asia' Corps as quickly as possible to Southern Syria, so as to carry out a surprise attack on the British by means of an encircling movement before the arrival of their reinforcements. Railways allow of the assembly of these forces (inclusive of heavy artillery, material and technical stores) in the neighbourhood of Beersheba by the end of October. The disposable parts of the IVth Army (two to three divisions) would be added to it.

In a discussion between Enver, Jemal, and myself, Enver decided first of all to strengthen the IVth Army by the inclusion of one division from the Army Group. This division would suffice to ward off attack. The Irak undertaking could be carried through at the same time. Judging from all former experiences I am firmly convinced as soon as it comes to a question of the expected attack on the Sinai Front, or even if the IVth Army only feels itself seriously threatened, further troops, munitions, and material will be withdrawn from the Army Group, and Turkey's forces will be shattered.

Then nothing decisive can be undertaken in either theatre of war. The sacrifice of men, money, and material which Germany is offering at the present moment will be in vain.

The treatment of the question is rendered all the more difficult because I cannot rid myself of the impression that the decision of the Turkish Higher Command is based far less on military exigencies than on personal motives. It is dictated with one eye on the mighty Jemal, who deprecates a definite decision, but yet on the other hand opposes the slightest diminution of the area of his command.

Consequently as the position now stands, I consider the Irak undertaking practicable only if it is given the necessary freedom for retirement through the removal of the danger on the Syrian Front. The removal of this danger I regard as only possible through attack. V. FALKENHAYN.

III

Here is another German estimate of the position created by our War Cabinet's decision to take the offensive in Palestine, and in considering the view of the German Staff and the prospect of success any Turkish attack would have, it must be borne in mind that under the most favourable circumstances the enemy could not have been in position for taking an offensive before the end of October. Von Falkenhayn wished to attack the British 'before the arrival of their reinforcements.' Not only had our reinforcements arrived before the end of October, but they were all in position and the battle had commenced. Beersheba was taken on October 31. This appreciation was written by Major von Papen of Yilderim headquarters on August 28, 1917:

Enver's objections, the improbability of attaining a decisive result on the Sinai Front with two divisions plus the 'Asia Corps' and the difficulty of the Aleppo-Rayak transport question, hold good.

The execution of the offensive with stronger forces is desirable, but is not practicable, as, in consequence of the beginning of the rainy weather in the middle of November, the British offensive may be expected at the latest during the latter half of October; ours therefore should take place during the first part of that month.

The transport question precludes the assembly of stronger forces by that date.

Should the idea of an offensive be abandoned altogether on that account?

On the assumption that General Allenby—after the two unsuccessful British attacks—will attack only with a marked superiority of men and munitions, a passive defence on a thirty-five kilometre front with an exposed flank does not appear to offer any great chance of success.

The conditions on the Western Front (defensive zone, attack divisions) are only partially applicable here, since the mobility of the artillery and the correct tactical handling of the attack division are not assured. The intended passive defensive will not be improved by the theatrical attack with one division suggested by General von Kress.

On the contrary this attack would be without result, as it would be carried out too obliquely to the front, and would only mean a sacrifice of men and material.

The attack proposed by His Excellency for the envelopment of the enemy's flank—if carried out during the first half of October with four divisions plus the 'Asia Corps'—will perhaps have no definite result, but will at all events result in this: that the Gaza Front flanked by the sea will tie down considerable forces and defer the continuation of British operations in the wet season, during which, in the opinion of General von Kress, they cannot be carried on with any prospect of success.

The situation on the Sinai Front will then be clear. Naturally it is possible that the position here may demand the inclusion of further effectives and the Yilderim operation consequently become impracticable. This, however, will only prove that the determining factor of the decisive operation for Turkey during the winter of 1917-1918 lies in Palestine and not in Mesopotamia. An offensive on the Sinai Front is therefore—even with reduced forces and a limited objective—the correct solution.

PAPEN.

IV

Letter from General Kress von Kressenstein to Yilderim headquarters, dated September 29, 1917, on moral of Turkish troops.

A question which urgently needs regulating is that of deserters. According to my experience their number will increase still more with the setting in of the bad weather and the deterioration of rations.

Civil administration and the gendarmerie fail entirely; they often have a secret understanding with the population and are open to bribery.

The cordon drawn by me is too weak to prevent desertion. I am also too short of troops to have the necessary raids undertaken in the hinterland. It is necessary that the hunt for deserters in the area between the front and the line Jerusalem-Ramleh-Jaffa be formally organised under energetic management, that one or two squadrons exclusively for this service be detailed, and that a definite reward be paid for bringing in each deserter. But above all it is necessary that punishment should follow in consequence, and that the unfortunately very frequent amnesties of His Majesty the Sultan be discontinued, at least for some time.

The question of rationing has not been settled. We are living continually from hand to mouth. Despite the binding promises of the Headquarters IVth Army, the Vali of Damascus, the Lines of Communication, Major Bathmann and others, that from now on 150 tons of rations should arrive regularly each day, from the 24th to the 27th of this month, for example a total of 229 tons or only 75 tons per diem have arrived.

I cannot fix the blame for these irregularities. The Headquarters IVth Army has received the highly gratifying order that, at least up to the imminent decisive battle, the bread ration is raised to 100 grammes. This urgently necessary improvement of the men's rations remains illusory, if a correspondingly larger quantity of flour (about one wagon per day) is not supplied to us. So far the improvement exists only on paper. The condition of the animals particularly gives cause for anxiety. Not only are we about 6000 animals short of establishment, but as a result of exhaustion a considerable number of animals are ruined daily. The majority of divisions are incapable of operating on account of this shortage of animals. The ammunition supply too is gradually coming into question on account of the deficiency in animals. The menacing danger can only be met by a regular supply of sufficient fodder. The stock of straw in the area of operations is exhausted. With gold some barley can still be bought in the country.

Every year during the rainy season the railway is interrupted again and again for periods of from eight to fourteen days. There are also days and weeks in which the motor-lorry traffic has to be suspended. Finally we must calculate on the possibility of an interruption of our rear communications by the enemy. I therefore consider it absolutely necessary that at least a fourteen days' reserve of rations be deposited in the depôts at the front as early as possible.

The increase of troops on the Sinai Front necessitates a very considerable increase on the supply of meat from the Line of Communication area, Damascus district.

V

The troops of General Allenby's Army before the attack on Beersheba were distributed as follows:

XXTH CORPS.

10th Division.

29th Brigade. 30th Brigade. 31st Brigade.

6th R. Irish Rifles. 1st R. Irish Regt. 5th R. Inniskillings. 5th Con. Rangers. 6th R. Munst. Fus. 6th R. Inniskillings. 6th Leinsters. 6th R. Dublin Fus. 2nd R. Irish Fus. 1st Leinsters 7th R. Dublin Fus. 5th R. Irish Rifles.

53rd Division.

158th Brigade. 159th Brigade. 160th Brigade.

1/5th R. Welsh Fus. 1/4th Cheshires. 1/4th R. Sussex. 1/6th " 1/7th " 2/4th R. West Surrey. 1/7th " 1/4th Welsh 2/4th R. West Kent. 1/1st Hereford. 1/5th " 2/10th Middlesex.

60th Division.

179th Brigade. 180th Brigade. 181st Brigade.

2/13th London. 2/17th London. 2/21st London. 2/14th " 2/18th " 2/22nd " 2/15th " 2/19th " 2/23rd " 2/16th " 2/20th " 2/24th "

74th Division.

229th Brigade. 230th Brigade. 231st Brigade.

16th Devons (1st 10th E. Kent (R.E. 10th Shrop. (Shrop. Devon & R.N. Kent & W. Kent & Cheshire Yeo.). Devon Yeo.). Yeo.). 12th Somerset L.I. 16th R. Sussex 24th R. Welsh Fus. (Yeo.). (Yeo.). (Denbigh Yeo.). 14th R. Highrs.(Fife 15th Suffolk (Yeo.) 25th R. Welsh Fus. & Forfar Yeo.). (Montgomery Yeo. & Welsh Horse). 12th R. Scots Fus. 12th Norfolk (Yeo.) 24th Welsh Regt. (Ayr & Lanark (Pembroke & Glanmorgan Yeo.). Yeo.).

XXIst CORPS.

52nd (Lowland) Division.

155th Brigade. 156th Brigade. 157th Brigade.

l/4th R. Scots Fus. 1/4th Royal Scots. 1/5th H.L.I. l/5th R. Scots Fus. 1/7th Royal Scots. 1/6th H.L.I. l/4th K.O.S.B. 1/7th Scot. Rifles. 1/7th H.L.I. l/5th K.O.S.B. 1/8th Scot. Rifles. 1/5th A. & S. Highrs.

54th (East Anglian) Division.

161th Brigade. 162th Brigade. 163th Brigade.

l/4th Essex. 1/5th Bedfords. 1/4th Norfolk. l/5th Essex. 1/4th Northants. 1/5th Norfolk. l/6th Essex. 1/10th London. 1/5th Suffolk. l/7th Essex. 1/11th London. 1/8th Hampshire.

75th Division.

232th Brigade. 233th Brigade. 234th Brigade.

1/5th Devon. 1/5th Somersets. 1/4th D.C.L.I. 2/5th Hampshire. 1/4th Wilts. 2/4th Dorsets. 2/4th Somersets. 2/4th Hampshire. 123rd Rifles. 2/3rd Gurkhas. 3/3rd Gurkhas. 58th Rifles.

DESERT MOUNTED CORPS.

Anzac Mounted Division.

1st A.L.H. Bde. 2nd A.L.H. Bde. N.Z. Mtd. Rifles Bde.

1st A.L.H. Regt. 5th A.L.H. Regt. Auckland M. Rifles. 2nd A.L.H. Regt. 6th A.L.H. Regt. Canterbury M. Rifles. 3rd A.L.H. Regt. 7th A.L.H. Regt. Wellington M. Rifles.

Australian Mounted Division.

3rd L.H. Brigade. 4th L.H. Brigade. 5th Mtd. Brigade.. 8th A.L.H. Regt. 4th A.L.H. Regt. 1/1st Warwick Yeo. 9th " 11th " 1/1st Gloucester Yeo. 10th " 12th " 1/1st Worcester Yeo.

Yoemanry Mounted Division

6th Mtd. Brigade. 8th Mtd. Brigade. 22nd Mtd. Brigade. 1/1st Bucks Hussars. 1/1st City of London 1/1st Lincolnshire Yeo. Yeo. 1/1st Berkshire Yeo. 1/1st Co. of London 1/1st Staffordshire Yeo. Yeo. 1/1st Dorset Yeo. l/3rd Co. of London 1/1st E. Riding Yeo. Yeo.

7th Mounted Brigade (attached Desert Corps).

1/1st Sherwood Rangers. 1/1st South Notts Hussars.

Imperial Camel Brigade.

VI

There can be no better illustration of how one battle worked out 'according to plan' than the quotation of the following Force Order:

FORCE ORDER

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 22nd October 1917.

It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to take the offensive against the enemy at Gaza and at Beersheba, and when Beersheba is in our hands to make an enveloping attack on the enemy's left flank in the direction of Sheria and Hareira.

On Zero day XXth Corps with the 10th Division and Imperial Camel Brigade attached and the Desert Mounted Corps less one Mounted Division and the Imperial Camel Brigade will attack the enemy at Beersheba with the object of gaining possession of that place by nightfall.

As soon as Beersheba is in our hands and the necessary arrangements have been made for the restoration of the Beersheba water supply, XXth Corps and Desert Mounted Corps complete will move rapidly forward to attack the left of the enemy's main position with the object of driving him out of Sheria and Hareira and enveloping the left flank of his army. XXth Corps will move against the enemy's defences south of Sheria, first of all against the Kauwukah line and then against Sheria and the Hareira defences. Desert Mounted Corps calling up the Mounted Division left in general reserve during the Beersheba operation will move north of the XXth Corps to gain possession of Nejile and of any water supplies between that place and the right of XXth Corps and will be prepared to operate vigorously against and round the enemy's left flank if he should throw it back to oppose the advance of the XXth Corps.

On a date to be subsequently determined and which will probably be after the occupation of Beersheba and 24 to 48 hours before the attack of XXth Corps on the Kauwukah line, the XXIst Corps will attack the south-west defences of Gaza with the object of capturing the enemy's front-line system from Umbrella Hill to Sheikh Hasan, both inclusive.

The Royal Navy will co-operate with the XXIst Corps in the attack on Gaza and in any subsequent operations that may be undertaken by XXIst Corps.

On Z—4 day the G.O.C. XXIst Corps will open a systematic bombardment of the Gaza defences, increasing in volume from Z—1 day to Zx2 day and to be continued until Zx4 day at the least.

The Royal Navy will co-operate as follows: On Z—1 and Zero days two 6-inch monitors will be available for bombardment from the sea, special objective Sheikh Hasan. On Zero day a third 6-inch monitor will be available so that two of these ships may be constantly in action while one replenishes ammunition. On Zxl day 6-inch monitors will discontinue their bombardment which they will reopen on Zx2 day. From Zxl day the French battleship Requin and H.M.S. Raglan will bombard Deir Sineid station and junction for Huj, the roads and railway bridges and camps on the wadi Hesi and the neighbourhood. The Requin and Raglan will be assisted by a seaplane carrier.

From Zero day one 92 monitor will be available from dawn, special objective Sheikh Redwan.

From Z—1 day inclusive demands for naval co-operation will be conveyed direct from G.O.C. XXIst Corps to the Senior Naval Officer, Marine View, who will arrange for the transmission of the demands so made.

XXth Corps will move into position during the night of Z-l=Zero day so as to attack the enemy at Beersheba on Zero day south of the wadi Saba with two divisions while covering his flank and the construction of the railway east of Shellal with one division on the high ground overlooking the wadis El Sufi and Hanafish. The objective of XXth Corps will be the enemy's works west and south-west of Beersheba as far as the Khalasa-Beersheba road inclusive.

Desert Mounted Corps will move on the night of Z-1=Zero day from the area of concentration about Khalasa and Asluj so as to co-operate with XXth Corps by attacking Beersheba with two divisions and one mounted brigade. The objective of Desert Mounted Corps will be the enemy's defences from south-east to the north-east of Beersheba and the town of Beersheba itself.

The G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will endeavour to turn the enemy's left with a view to breaking down his resistance at Beersheba as quickly as possible. With this in view the main weight of his force will be directed against Beersheba from the east and north-east. As soon as the enemy's resistance shows signs of weakening the G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will be prepared to act with the utmost vigour against his retreating troops so as to prevent their escape, or at least to drive them well beyond the high ground immediately overlooking the town from the north. He will also be prepared to push troops rapidly into Beersheba in order to protect from danger any wells and plant connected with the water supply not damaged by the enemy before Beersheba is entered.

The Yeomanry Mounted Division will pass from the command of the G.O.C. XXth Corps at five on Zero day and will come directly under General Headquarters as part of the general reserve in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief.

When Beersheba has been taken the G.O.C. XXth Corps will push forward covering troops to the high ground north of the town to protect it from any counter movement on the part of the enemy. He will also put in hand the restoration of the water supply in Beersheba. The G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will be responsible for the protection of the town from the north-east and east.

As soon as possible after the taking of Beersheba the G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will report to G.H.Q. on the water supplies in the wells and wadis east of Beersheba and especially along the wadi Saba and the Beersheba-Tel-el-Nulah road. If insufficient water is found to exist in this area G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps will send back such of his troops as may be necessary to watering places from which he started or which may be found in the country east of the Khalasa-Beersheba road during the operations.

A preliminary survey having been made, the G.O.C. XXth Corps will report by wire to G.H.Q. on the condition of the wells and water supply generally in Beersheba and on any water supplies found west and north-west of that place. He will telegraph an estimate as soon as it can be made of the time required to place the Beersheba water supply in working order.

When the situation as regards water at Beersheba has become clear so that the movement of XXth Corps and Desert Mounted Corps against the left flank of the enemy's main position can be arranged, the G.O.C. XXIst Corps will be ordered to attack the enemy's defences south-west of Gaza in time for this operation to be carried out prior to the attack of XXth Corps on the Kauwukah line of works. The objective of XXIst Corps will be the defences of Gaza from Umbrella Hill inclusive to the sea about Sheikh Hasan.

Instructions in regard to the following have been issued separate to all corps:

Amount of corps artillery allotted.

Amount of ammunition put on corps charge prior to operations.

Amount of ammunition per gun that will be delivered daily at respective railheads and the day of commencement.

Amount of transport allotted for forward supply from railheads.

The general average for one day's firing has been calculated on the following basis:

Field and mountain guns and mountain howitzers …150 rounds per gun. 4.5-inch howitzers….120 rounds per gun. 60-pounders and 6-inch howitzers. 90 rounds per gun. 8-inch howitzers and 6-inch Mark VII. 60 rounds per gun.

This average expenditure will only be possible in the XXIst Corps up to Zx16 day and for the Desert Mounted Corps and XXth Corps to Zx13. After these dates if the average has been expended the daily average will have to drop to the basis of 100 rounds per 18-pounder per day and other natures in proportion.

AIRCRAFT, ARMY WING.—Strategical reconnaissance including the reconnaissance of areas beyond the tactical zone and in which the enemy's main reserves are located, also distant photography and aerial offensive, will be carried out by an Army squadron under instructions issued direct from G.H.Q. Protection from hostile aircraft will be the main duty of the Army fighting squadron. A bombing squadron will be held in readiness for any aerial offensive which the situation may render desirable.

CORPS SQUADRONS.—Two Corps squadrons will undertake artillery co-operation, contact patrols, and tactical reconnaissance for the Corps to which they are attached. In the case of the Desert Mounted Corps one flight from the Corps squadron attached to XXth Corps will be responsible for the above work. Photography of trench areas will normally be carried out daily by the Army Wing.

VII

ORDERS FOR THE OFFICIAL ENTRY INTO JERUSALEM

1. The Commander-in-Chief will enter Jerusalem by the Bab-el-Khalil (Jaffa Gate) at 12 noon, 11th December 1917. The order of procession is shown below:

Two Aides-de-camp. (Twenty paces.) O.C. Italian Palestine Commander-in-Chief. O.C. French Palestine Contingent(Col. Contingent Dagostino). (Col. Piepape). Staff Officer. Two Staff Officers. Staff Officer. (Ten paces.) M. Picot (Head of French Mission). French Mil. Brig.-Gen. Italian Mil. Att. American Att. (Capt. Clayton. (Major Caccia). Mil. Att. St. Quentin). (Col. Davis). (Five paces.) Chief of General Staff (Maj.-Gen. Sir L.J. Bols). Brig.-General General Staff (Brig.-Gen. G. Dawnay). (Five paces.) G.O.C. XXth Corps, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Philip W. Chetwode, Bart., D.S.O. Staff Officer. Brig.-Gen. Bartholomew. (Ten paces.) British Guard. Australian and New Zealand Guard. French Guard. Italian Guard.

2. GUARDS.—The following guards will be found by XXth Corps:

Outside the Gate—

British Guard: Fifty of all ranks, including English, Scottish, Irish, and Welsh troops.

Australian and New Zealand Guard: Fifty of all ranks, including twenty New Zealand troops.

These guards will be drawn up facing each other, the right flank of the British guard and the left flank Australian guard resting on the City Wall. The O.C. British guard will be in command of both guards and will give the words of command.

Inside the Gate—

French Guard: Twenty of all ranks. Italian Guard: Twenty of all ranks.

These guards will be drawn up facing each other, the left flank of the French guard and the right flank of the Italian guard resting on the City Wall.

3. SALUTE.—On the approach of the Commander-in-Chief, guards will come to the Salute and present arms.

4. The Military Governor of the City will meet the Commander-in-Chief at the Gate at 12 noon.

5. ROUTE.—The procession will proceed via Sueikat Allah and El Maukaf Streets to the steps of El Kala (Citadel), where the notables of the City under the guidance of a Staff Officer of the Governor will meet the Commander-in-Chief and the Proclamation will be read to the citizens. The British, Australian and New Zealand, French and Italian guards will, when the procession has passed them, take their place in column of fours in the rear of the procession in that order.

On arrival at El Kala the guards will form up facing steps on the opposite (i.e. east) side of El Maukaf Street, the British guard being thus on the left, Italian guard on the right of the line, and remain at the slope. The British and Italian guards will bring up their left and right flanks respectively across the street south and north of El Kala.

On leaving the Citadel the procession will proceed in the same order as before to the Barrack Square, where the Commander-in-Chief will confer with the notables of the City. On entering the Barrack Square the guards will wheel to the left and, keeping the left-hand man of each section of fours next the side of the Barrack Square, march round until the rear of the Italian guard has entered the Square, when the guards will halt, right turn (so as to face the centre of the Square), and remain at the slope.

The procession will leave the City by the same route as it entered and in the same order.

As the Commander-in-Chief and procession move off to leave the Barrack Square the guards will present arms, and then move off and resume their places in the procession, the British guard leading.

On arrival at the Jaffa Gate the guards will take up their original positions, and on the Commander-in-Chief's departure will be marched away under the orders of the G.O.C. XXth Corps.

6. POLICE, etc.—The Military Governor of the City will arrange for policing the route of the procession and for the searching of houses on either side of the route. He will also arrange for civil officials to read the Proclamation at El Kala.

VIII

The Proclamation read from the steps of David's Tower on the occasion of the Commander-in-Chief's Official Entry into Jerusalem was in these terms:

To the inhabitants of Jerusalem the Blessed and the people dwelling in its vicinity:

The defeat inflicted upon the Turks by the troops under my command has resulted in the occupation of your City by my forces. I therefore here and now proclaim it to be under martial law, under which form of administration it will remain as long as military considerations make it necessary.

However, lest any of you should be alarmed by reason of your experiences at the hands of the enemy who has retired, I hereby inform you that it is my desire that every person should pursue his lawful business without fear of interruption. Furthermore, since your City is regarded with affection by the adherents of three of the great religions of mankind, and its soil has been consecrated by the prayers and pilgrimages of multitudes of devout people of those three religions for many centuries, therefore do I make it known to you that every sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer, of whatsoever form of the three religions, will be maintained and protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to whose faiths they are sacred.

IX

No story of the capture of Jerusalem would be complete without the tribute paid by General Allenby to his gallant troops of all arms. The Commander-in-Chief's thanks, which were conveyed to the troops in a Special Order of the Day, were highly appreciated by all ranks. The document ran as follows:

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY

G.H.Q., E.E.P.,

15th December 1917.

With the capture of Jerusalem another phase of the operations of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force has been victoriously concluded.

The Commander-in-Chief desires to thank all ranks of all the units and services in the Force for the magnificent work which has been accomplished.

In forty days many strong Turkish positions have been captured and the Force has advanced some sixty miles on a front of thirty miles.

The skill, gallantry, and determination of all ranks have led to this result.

1. The approach marches of the Desert Mounted Corps and the XXth Corps (10th, 53rd, 60th, and 74th Divisions), followed by the dashing attacks of the 60th and 74th Divisions and the rapid turning movement of the Desert Mounted Corps, ending in the fine charge of the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade, resulted in the capture of Beersheba with many prisoners and guns.

2. The stubborn resistance of the 53rd Division, units of the Desert Mounted Corps and Imperial Camel Brigade in the difficult country north-east of Beersheba enabled the preparations of the XXth Corps to be completed without interference, and enabled the Commander-in-Chief to carry out his plan without diverting more than the intended number of troops to protect the right flank, despite the many and strong attacks of the enemy.

3. The attack of the XXth Corps (10th, 60th, and 74th Divisions), prepared with great skill by the Corps and Divisional Commanders and carried out with such dash and courage by the troops, resulted in the turning of the Turkish left flank and in an advance to the depth of nine miles through an entrenched position defended by strong forces.

In this operation the Desert Mounted Corps, covering the right flank and threatening the Turkish rear, forced the Turks to begin a general retreat of their left flank.

4. The artillery attack of the XXIst Corps and of the ships of the Royal Navy, skilfully arranged and carried out with great accuracy, caused heavy loss to the enemy in the Gaza sector of his defences. The success of this bombardment was due to the loyal co-operation of the Rear-Admiral S.N.O. Egypt and Red Sea, and the officers of the Royal Navy, the careful preparation of plans by the Rear-Admiral and the G.O.C. XXIst Corps, and the good shooting of the Royal Navy, and of the heavy, siege, and field artillery of the XXIst Corps.

5. The two attacks on the strong defences of Gaza, carried out by the 52nd and 54th Divisions, were each completely successful, thanks to the skill with which they were thought out and prepared by the G.O.C. XXIst Corps, the Divisional Commanders and the Brigade Commanders, and the great gallantry displayed by the troops who carried out these attacks.

6. The second attack resulted in the evacuation of Gaza by the enemy and the turning of his right flank. The 52nd and 75th Divisions at once began a pursuit which carried them in three weeks from Gaza to within a few miles of Jerusalem.

7. This pursuit, carried out by the Desert Mounted Corps and these two Divisions of the XXIst Corps, first over the sandhills of the coast, then over the Plains of Palestine and the foothills, and finally in the rocky mountains of Judea, required from all commanders rapid decisions and powers to adapt their tactics to varying conditions of ground. The troops were called upon to carry out very long marches in great heat without water, to make attacks on stubborn rearguards without time for reconnaissance, and finally to suffer cold and privation in the mountains.

In these great operations Commanders carried out their plans with boldness and determination, and the troops of all arms and services responded with a devotion and gallantry beyond praise.

8. The final operations of the XXth Corps which resulted in the surrender of Jerusalem were a fitting climax to the efforts of all ranks.

The attack skilfully prepared by the G.O.C. XXth Corps and carried out with precision, endurance, and gallantry by the troops of the 53rd, 60th, and 74th Divisions, over country of extreme difficulty in wet weather, showed skill in leading and gallantry and determination of a very high order.

9. Throughout the operations the Royal Flying Corps have rendered valuable assistance to all arms and have obtained complete mastery of the air. The information obtained from contact and reconnaissance patrols has at all times enabled Commanders to keep in close touch with the situation. In the pursuit they have inflicted severe loss on the enemy, and their artillery co-operation has contributed in no small measure to our victory.

10. The organisation in rear of the fighting forces enabled these forces to be supplied throughout. All supply and ammunition services and engineer services were called upon for great exertions. The response everywhere showed great devotion and high military spirit.

11. The thorough organisation of the lines of communication, and the energy and skill with which all the services adapted themselves to the varying conditions of the operations, ensured the constant mobility of the fighting troops.

12. The Commander-in-Chief appreciates the admirable conduct of all the transport services, and particularly the endurance and loyal service of the Camel Transport Corps.

13. The skill and energy by which the Signal Service was maintained under all conditions reflects the greatest credit on all concerned.

14. The Medical Service was able to adapt itself to all the difficulties of the situation, with the result the evacuation of wounded and sick was carried out with the least possible hardship or discomfort.

15. The Veterinary Service worked well throughout; the wastage in animals was consequently small considering the distances traversed.

16. The Ordnance Service never failed to meet all demands.

17. The work of the Egyptian Labour Corps has been of the greatest value in contributing to the rapid advance of the troops and in overcoming the difficulties of the communications.

18. The Commander-in-Chief desires that his thanks and appreciation of their services be conveyed to all officers and men of the force which he has the honour to command.

G. DAWNAY, B.G.G.S.,

for Major-General, Chief of the General Staff, E.E.F.

X

The men of units forming the XXth Corps were deeply gratified to receive this commendation from their gallant Corps Commander:

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY

BY

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR PHILIP W. CHETWODE, BT., K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., commanding XXth Corps

HEADQUARTERS, XXTH CORPS, 13th December 1917.

Now that the efforts of General Sir E.H.H. Allenby's Army have been crowned by the capture of Jerusalem, I wish to express to all ranks, services, and departments of the XXth Army Corps my personal thanks and my admiration for the soldierly qualities they have displayed.

I have served as a regimental officer in two campaigns, and no one knows better than I do what the shortness of food, the fatigue of operating among high mountains, and the cold and wet has meant to the fighting troops. But in spite of it all, and at the moment when the weather was at its worst, they responded to my call and drove the enemy in one rush through his last defences and beyond Jerusalem.

A fine performance, and I am intensely proud of having had the honour of commanding such a body of men.

I wish to give special praise to the Divisional Ammunition Columns, Divisional Trains A.S.C., Supply Services, Mechanical Transport personnel, Camel Transport personnel, and to the Royal Army Medical Corps and all services whose continuous labour, day and night, almost without rest, alone enabled the fighting troops to do what they did.

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY

HEADQUARTERS, XXTH CORPS, 31_st December_ 1917.

I have again to thank the XXth Corps and to express to them my admiration of their bravery and endurance during the three days' fighting on December 27, 28, and 29.

The enemy made a determined attempt with two corps to retake Jerusalem, and while their finest assault troops melted away before the staunch defence of the 53rd and 60th Divisions, the 10th and 74th were pressing forward over the most precipitous country, brushing aside all opposition in order to relieve the pressure on our right.

Their efforts were quickly successful, and by the evening of the 27th we had definitely regained the initiative, and I was able to order a general advance.

The final result of the three days' fighting was a gain to us of many miles and extremely heavy losses to the enemy.

A fine three days' work.

INDEX

ABU SHUSHE. Adaseh. Ain Ari. —Karim. Air Force honours. Akir. Allenby, General. —administration. American Red Cross Society. Arsuf. Askalon. Auja, River.

BAKER, Colonel Sir Randolf. Bald Hill. Barrow, Major-General G. de S. Bartholomew, Brigadier-General. Bayley, Colonel. Beersheba, Anzac march on. —battle of —German preparations Beit Hannina. —Iksa. —Izza. —Jala. —ur el Foka. —ur et Tahta. Beitunia. Bethany. Beth-horons. Bethlehem. Biblical battlefields. Biddu. Bireh. Bols, Major-General. Borton, Major-General. Bulfin, Lieutenant-General. Bulteel, Captain. Burkah. Butler, Brigadier-General.

CHAUVEL, Lieutenant-General. Chaytor, Major-General. Cheape, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Chetwode, Lieutenant-General Sir. —thanks to XXth Corps troops. Clayton, Brigadier-General Colston, Brigadier-General. Cox, Brigadier-General Cripps, Colonel Hon. F.

DAMMERS, Captain. Dawnay, Brigadier-General. Deir Sineid. —Yesin. de Rothschild, Major. Desert railways. —pipeline. Dukku.

EKTEIF. El Jib. El Kala. Enver.

FARAH, wadi. Force Order, General Allenby's thanks to troops. Ful, Tel el.

GAZA, plan of attack on. —Ali Muntar. —defences. —El Arish redoubt. —Great Mosque. —naval gunnery. —Outpost Hill. —Sea Post. Gaza, Sheikh Hasan. —Umbrella Hill. German Hospice. Gilgal. Girdwood, Major-General. Godwin, Brigadier-General. Good Samaritan Inn. Grant, Brigadier-General.

Hadrah. Hanafish, action on wadi. Hebron. Hill 1070. Hill, Major-General J. Hodgson, Major-General. Hong Kong and Singapore battery. Huj.

Ibn Obeid. Imperial Service cavalry.

Jackson, Admiral T. Jaffa. —Gate. Jebel Kuruntul. Jelil. Jericho. Jerisheh. Jerusalem, battle of. —civil administration —Memorial to Army —Official Entry —order of procession —Proclamation to people —water supply Jordan. Jezar. Junction Station.

Katrah. Kantara. Kanwukah. Khurbet Subr. Khuweilfeh. Kressenstein, von. Kulonieh. Kuryet el Enab. Kustul.

Latron. Lawson, Captain. Lifta. Longley, Major-General. Ludd.

M'Call, Brigadier-General Pollak. Maclean, Brigadier-General. Mejdel. Meldrum, Brigadier-General. Mott, Major-General. Mount of Olives. Mughar. Mukhmas. Mulebbis.

Nablus Road. Nebi Musa. Nebi Samwil. Nejile.

O'Brien, Colonel.

Palestine Army, composition of. Palin, Major-General. Patron, Captain. Pemberton, Colonel. Perkins, Lieutenant. Primrose, Captain Hon. Neil.

Ramallah. Ramleh. Raratongas. Ras et Tawil. Rushdi trenches. Ryrie, Brigadier-General.

Saba, Tel el. Sakaty, Tel el. Saris. Sarona. Shea, Major-General H. Sheikh Muannis. Sheria. Sherifeh. Shilta. Smith, Rifleman. Soba. Solomon's Pools. Strategy in Palestine. —the German view. Suffa. Supplying the front. Surar, wadi. Sukereir, wadi.

TALAT ED DUMM. Temperley. Thornhill, Corporal. Train, Corporal, V.C. Turkish line of communications. —moral.

WATSON, Brigadier-General. Whines, Corporal. Whitehill. Wingfield-Digby, Captain. Wire roads.

YEBNAH. Yilderim undertaking. —von Falkenhayn's doubts.

ZAMBY. Zeitun ridge.

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