Note 533 — Chapter V

Footnote 533:

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See my detailed exposition of the orthodox side of Tertullian's doctrine of the Trinity ("orthodox" in the later sense of the word), in Vol. IV. There it is also shown that these formulæ were due to Tertullian's juristic bias. The formulæ, "una substantia, tres personæ", never alternates in his case with the others, "una natura, tres personæ"; and so it remained for a long time in the West; they did not speak of "natures" but of "substances" ("nature" in this connection is very rare down to the 5th century). What makes this remarkable is the fact that Tertullian always uses "substance" in the concrete sense "individual substance" and has even expressed himself precisely on the point. He says in de anima 32: "aliud est substantia, aliud natura substantiæ; siquidem substantia propria est rei cuiusque, natura vero potest esse communis. Suscipe exemplum: substantia est lapis, ferrum; duritia lapidis et ferri natura substantiæ est. Duritia (natura) communicat, substantia discordat. Mollitia lanæ, mollitia plumæ pariant naturalia eorum, substantiva non pariant ... Et tune naturæ similitudo notatur, cum substantiæ dissimilitudo conspicitur. Men and animals are similar natura, but not substantia." We see that Tertullian in so far as he designated Father, Son, and Spirit as one substance expressed their unity as strongly as possible. The only idea intelligible to the majority was a juristic and political notion, viz., that the Father, who is the tota substantia, sends forth officials whom he entrusts with the administration of the monarchy. The legal fiction attached to the concept "person" aided in the matter here.