Note 559 — Chapter V

Footnote 559:

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On the psychology of Irenæus see Bohringer, p. 466 f., Wendt p. 22. The fact that in some passages he reckoned the πνευμα in man as the latter's inalienable nature (e.g. II. 33-5), though as a rule (like Tatian) he conceives it as the divine Spirit, is an evident inconsistency on his part. The εικων is realised in the body, the 'ομοιωσις is not given by nature, but is brought about by the union with the Spirit of God realised through obedience (V. 6. 1). The 'ομοιωσις is therefore subject to growth, and was not perfect at the beginning (see above, IV. 38. 4, where he opposes Tatian's opinion). It is clear, especially from V. 12. 2, that it is only the πνοη, not the πνευμα, that is to be conceived as an original possession. On this point Irenæus appealed to 1 Cor. XV. 45. It is plain from the 37th chapter of the 4th Book, that Irenæus also views everything as ultimately dependent on man's inalienable freedom. Alongside of this God's goodness has scope for displaying itself in addition to its exercise at the creation, because it guides man's knowledge through counsel; see § 1. On Matth. XXIII. 37 Irenæus remarks: "veterem legem libertatis hominis manifestavit, quia liberum eum deus fecit ab initio, habentem suam potestatem sicut et suam animam ad utendum sententia dei voluntarie et non coactum a deo ... posuit in homine potestatem electionis quemadmodum in angelis (et enim angeli rationabiles), ut hi quidem qui obedissent iuste bonum sint possidentes, datum quidem a deo, servatum vero ab ipsis." An appeal to Rome II. 4-7 (!) follows. In § 2 Irenæus inveighs violently against the Gnostic doctrines of natural goodness and wickedness: παντες της αυτης εισι φυσεως. In § 4 he interprets the Pauline: "omnia licent, sed non omnia expediunt," as referring to man's inalienable freedom and to the way in which it is abused in order to work evil(!): "liberæ sententiæ ab initio est homo et liberæ sententiæ est deus, cuius ad similitudinem factus est." § 5: "Et non tantum in operibus, sed etiam in fide, liberum et suæ potestatis arbitrium hominis servavit (that is, respected) dominus, dicens: Secundum fidem tuam fiat tibi." § 4: "deus consilium dat continere bonum, quod perficitur ex obedientia." § 3: "το αυτεξουσιον του ανθρωπου και το συμβουλευτικον του Θεου μη βιαζομενου." IV. 4. 3: "homo rationabilis et secundum hoc similis deo liber in arbitrio factus et suæ potestatis, ipse sibi causa est, ut aliquando quidem frumentum aliquando autem palea fiat."