Note 232 — Chapter III

Footnote 232:

(return)

The present dominion of evil demons or of one evil demon, was just as generally presupposed as man's need of redemption, which was regarded as a result of that dominion. The conviction that the world's course (the πολιτεια εν τω κοσμω, the Latins afterwards used the word Sæculum) is determined by the devil, and that the dark one (Barnabas) has dominion, comes out most prominently where eschatological hopes obtain expression. But where salvation is thought of as knowledge and immortality, it is ignorance and frailty from which men are to be delivered. We may here also assume with certainty that these, in the last instance, were traced back by the writers to the action of demons. But it makes a very great difference whether the judgment was ruled by fancy which saw a real devil everywhere active, or whether, in consequence of theoretic reflection, it based the impression of universal ignorance and mortality on the assumption of demons who have produced them. Here again we must note the two series of ideas which intertwine and struggle with each other in the creeds of the earliest period, the traditional religious series resting on a fanciful view of history—it is essentially identical with the Jewish Apocalyptic, see, for example Barn 4—and the empiric moralistic, (see 2 Clem. 1. 2-7, as a specially valuable discussion, or Praed. Petri in Clem, Strom. VI. 5, 39, 40), which abides by the fact that men have fallen into ignorance, weakness and death (2 Clem. 1. 6 'ο βιος 'ημων 'ολος αλλο ουδεν ην ει μη θανατος). But perhaps, in no other point, with the exception of the αναστασις σαρκος has the religious conception remained so tenacious as in this and it decidedly prevailed, especially in the epoch with which we are now dealing. Its tenacity may be explained, among other things, by the living impression of the polytheism that surrounded the communities on every side. Even where the national gods were looked upon as dead idols—and that was perhaps the rule, see Praed. Petri. I. c, 2 Clem. 3. 1, Didache, 6—one could not help assuming that there were mighty demons operative behind them, as otherwise the frightful power of idolatry could not be explained. But on the other hand, even a calm reflection and a temper unfriendly to all religious excess must have welcomed the assumption of demons who sought to rule the world and man. For by means of this assumption which was wide-spread even among the Greeks, humanity seemed to be unburdened, and the presupposed capacity for redemption could therefore be justified in its widest range. From the assumption that the need of redemption was altogether due to ignorance and mortality there was but one step, or little more than one step, to the assumption that the need of redemption was grounded in a condition of man for which he was not responsible, that is, in the flesh. But this step which would have led either to dualism (heretical Gnosis) or to the abolition of the distinction between natural and moral, was not taken within the main body of the Church. The eschatological series of ideas with its thesis that death evil and sin entered into humanity at a definite historical moment when the demons took possession of the world drew a limit which was indeed overstepped at particular points but was in the end respected. We have therefore the remarkable fact that, on the one hand, early Christian (Jewish) eschatology called forth and maintained a disposition in which the Kingdom of God, and that of the world, (Kingdom of the devil) were felt to be absolutely opposed (practical dualism), while, on the other hand, it rejected theoretic dualism. Redemption through Christ, however, was conceived in the eschatological Apocalyptic series of ideas as essentially something entirely in the future, for the power of the devil was not broken, but rather increased (or it was virtually broken in believers and increased in unbelievers), by the first advent of Christ, and therefore the period between the first and second advent of Christ belongs to 'ουτος 'ο αιων (see Barn. 2. 4; Herm. Sim 1; 2 Clem. 6. 3: εστιν δε 'ουτος 'ο αιων και 'ο μελλων δυο εχθροι; 'ουτος λεγει μοιχειαν και φθοραν και φιλαργουριαν και απατην, εκεινος δε τουτοις αποστασσεται, Ignat. Magn. 5. 2). For that very reason, the second coming of Christ must, as a matter of course, be at hand, for only through it could the first advent get its full value. The painful impression that nothing had been outwardly changed by Christ's first advent (the heathen, moreover, pointed this out in mockery to the suffering Christians), must be destroyed by the hope of his speedy coming again. But the first advent had its independent significance in the series of ideas which regarded Christ as redeeming man from ignorance and mortality; for the knowledge was already given, and the gift of immortality could only of course be dispensed after this life was ended, but then immediately. The hope of Christ's return was therefore a superfluity, but was not felt or set aside as such, because there was still a lively expectation of Christ's earthly Kingdom.