The Sermon. (continued 2)
Reading edition
On arriving at the era of Henry the Sixth, the learned counsel said he should refer to the law of Scotland about the period of history at which he was passing. The Scottish documents contained enough to establish the fact, that no king of Scotland who was married at the time of his coronation was ever crowned without his consort; nor, where the marriage took place afterwards, was there an instance in which a Scottish queen was not crowned as soon as possible after she became queen. The learned counsel then referred to the act 1428 in the Scottish statutes, cap. 109, passed in the eighth parliament of James the First, and read the "aith to be made to the queen, be the clergie and the baronnes."
The case of Henry the Seventh's queen was next quoted. She had been crowned two years after the king's coronation. This coronation was announced by proclamation similar to that which had announced his own two years and a month before; and the order of it, as would be seen in the Close Roll, and in Rymer, was similar to that observed at all other coronations of queens-consort. The varying conduct of Henry the Eighth with regard to his queens was then accounted for. Charles the First was crowned without his queen, because of the antipathy of the people against the papists, of whom she was one; yet only nine days before he was himself crowned, a proclamation was issued for the crowning of his queen, but observing the popular feeling to be against such a measure, that ceremony was postponed. The queen was said to have objected to take any part in the coronation unless she could be assisted in it by a popish priest, which the constitution of the country rendered absolutely impossible. The same reasons operated against the crowning of Charles the Second's queen, who was also a papist. James the Second and his queen were crowned together, although they were both Roman Catholics. If he and his consort could reconcile it to themselves to go into a Protestant cathedral, and to partake in the ceremonies of a Protestant ritual, there was an end of the difficulty which he had described as originating from the words of one of the oaths having one sense to one of the parties who took them, and another to the other. Since the revolution every thing regarding this subject was well known, and every king and queen had been regularly crowned. With regard to the queen of George the First, he must beg leave to observe, that as she had never been in this country, he had nothing to do with her. Besides, she was said to have been divorced from her husband by the sentence of a foreign ecclesiastical court before he ascended the throne of this country; so that it was legally impossible that she could be crowned if she had been divorced from her husband, and physically impossible if she had never set foot in the country. Her case, therefore, formed no exception to her present Majesty's right. Whilst he was upon this subject he might be permitted to remark, as not extraneous to it, that he had not expected and did not expect to hear in that court, as a bar to her Majesty's claim, that some proceedings had been instituted against her. He made that assertion not on his own authority, but on the authority of a noble and learned judge, who, in giving sentence on the King and Wolfe, in the court of the highest resort in the country, had said, in consequence of some observations having been made as to the defendant having been guilty of some great offence, "If a man be guilty of ever so great an offence, and the proceedings against him fail in substantiating that offence, he is to be considered in law as innocent as if no such offence had ever been charged against him."
Friday, July 6.—Mr. Brougham rose at a few minutes after ten to resume his speech. He had yesterday gone through a long and unbroken series of precedents, showing that no king of England had ever been crowned, he being married at the time of his coronation, without his consort participating in that ceremony. Having gone so far, he contended that he had a right to assume his larger proposition, that queens-consort had, at all times throughout the ages of English history, themselves enjoyed the ceremony of the coronation. If in one or two instances this was not done at the time when the king's own coronation took place, and supposing that there was an instance or two where the queen-consort became such after the coronation of the king, still he would affirm, that according to all the rules of argument, of law, and of common sense, those few instances, (admitting there were some, though in point of strict fact he believed there were none,) did not in any manner or degree affect his general argument, which he held upon the authorities he had cited to be altogether incontrovertible. He was not before their lordships to show where the right which he asserted in behalf of the queen-consort had been claimed and refused. In every instance, in which it was actually possible for a coronation of a queen to take place, he had shown that it had been solemnized. There was not a single case which, quoad that case, cast a doubt upon the uniform force of his proposition, except that of Henrietta Maria, wife of Charles the First; and he reminded their lordships, it was merely a doubt so far as that particular case went. He had a right then to assume the larger proposition, that all queens-consort of England had, in point of fact, been crowned. Nothing was clearer in the rules of equity and law, than that non-uses did not forfeit, unless where they clearly, from the length of the lapse, involved a waiver of the claim. Where a right had been disputed, and the opposition assented to by the party tacitly, or confirmed by a competent authority, then, of course, there was an end to the legal exercise of such a right. But here the very reverse was the fact. Suppose he were called upon to prove a right of way or a right of common, (the two instances in which the courts of law were most commonly called upon to consider the length of usage,) the principle of law would go with the uniformity, and the absence of exercising the right in one or two particular instances would prove nothing. There were three modes of calling into question the fact of usage; first, as to its uniform enjoyment; next, where the right claimed by the party had been contested, but nevertheless enjoyed by the person exercising it; and the third case was, where the right asserted had been confiscated, and an adjudication passed upon it: that was of course held to be conclusive against the party, where the right claimed was refused, opposed, and not acquiesced in; then he admitted that no long admission of the right could be pleaded without the fatal interruption of the bar. He entreated their lordships to try the usage of the coronation of the queen-consort by these three principles of investigating such rights founded upon immemorial custom. Of the first, namely, uniform enjoyment, they had abundant proof. As to the second, namely, the occurrence of interruption in the exercise of the right, non-acquiescence in that interruption, a successful and most complete resistance to the attempt to withhold the exercise of the right, they had that, fully sustaining his proposition, in the case of the wife of Prince Henry; where Henry thought proper in his lifetime to crown his eldest son without also crowning that eldest son's consort. He had therefore with him the uniform enjoyment of the right her Majesty claimed; then the successful resistance of an attempt, as in Henry's case, to delay the exercise of the right; and lastly, the total absence of any adjudication or confiscation, or any thing like either in any single instance against him. There was, in fact, no other possible way of showing the existence of the right, but in the manner in which he was assuming, proving, and, as he thought, establishing it. How else, before the Court of Claims, were rights of service at the ceremony of the coronation established? How else did the barons of the Cinque Ports show their right to carry the canopy over the king, and to have a part of that canopy for their service? Suppose any instance in which the barons should, for want of specific proof, in the lapse of ages, fail to show that they had exercised that privilege—would that countervail the validity of their claim, founded on repeated usage? Certainly not. He would venture to say that there were at least half a dozen instances in which the barons could not show they had exercised their asserted right: and would any of these instances, where that proof failed, shake the firm hold of their long and undeniable usage? Upon a reference to the services which were to be performed at the ceremony of the coronation, it was clear, from the separate rights held upon the performance of particular kinds of attendance upon the queen, that her part of the ceremony was substantive, independent, and principal; that her right was clearly within herself, and not dependent upon the mere will of the King. So essential, indeed, was it that she should be crowned with all the forms of pomp which belonged to such a solemnity, that the same writs of summons were issued, and nearly the same demands of service made upon officers of state as when the king himself was crowned. The usage clearly governed the right, and more especially in this solemnity of coronation, which was altogether the creature of precedent, and existed only by its authority. The queen's coronation was in itself manifestly a substantive, important, and independent ceremony, illustrative of the right of the one party, and not dependent or contingent upon the mere will of the monarch. The origin of the king's ceremonial was lost in remote antiquity; but the numerous tenures and dependencies determinable by the non-performance of services at the solemnity, showed how important it was intended to be in the eyes of the people. The only grounds of right for the king's coronation, the queen equally had for hers; and there were, as he had already stated, separate forms prescribed for those who were officially to attend her ceremony.
The learned counsel then quoted some passages from the Liber Regalis, being merely directions for particular parts of the ceremonial to be observed on the queen's coronation. Every solemnity of which the origin was lost in distant antiquity, which was in itself of a most high and public nature, and which occupied a great and important space in the history of the country, he would fearlessly assert, must be deemed and taken as the right of the realm, and not as a mere appanage of the king. He held the coronation of the king himself to be a right of this nature; and that, not merely in the present times on account of the coronation oath, (which had been devised by the legislature on the coronation of William and Mary,) but also in times long before them: indeed, it had always been considered as a high and august ceremony with which the monarch himself could not dispense; it being the right of the sovereign, not in his individual but in his political capacity, for the benefit of the whole nation, in which capacity alone the nation knew him at his coronation. So much with regard to the coronation of the king. The coronation of the queen ought to be considered in a similar light, from its having been celebrated almost without interruption with the same publicity, and from being in its nature such as he had repeatedly described it. The king and the queen being both of them the mere creations of the law, the solemnities of their coronations were mere creations of the law also, and were known to it in no other light than as the rights of the whole realm of England. He, therefore, who was ready to take one step, and to get rid of the queen's coronation, as a mere optional ceremony, ought to be ready to take also another step, and to get rid of the king's coronation, on the ground of its being a vain, idle, empty, and expensive pageant. Her claim to a coronation rested upon immemorial usage, and the numerous rights of individuals which were interwoven and connected with it. Indeed, it rested on the same foundation as the king's: it was supported by the same arguments, and the interruptions which it had experienced admitted of the same explanations that he had given to those which had occurred in the case of the king. He had mentioned, in the course of his argument, the rights which belonged to other individuals in consequence of the queen's right to a coronation. If a coronation was not granted to her Majesty, their rights were unavailing to them; and that, in his opinion, formed a very sufficient reason why it should be celebrated. That the coronation was the acknowledgment of the king by the people, he conceived to be a point which it was unnecessary to prove to their lordships: but he might be permitted to remark to them, that the coronation of the queen was even considered as an acknowledgment of her right to enjoy that dignity in an entry in a charter roll of the fifth year of King John, now preserved in the Tower. The entry to which he alluded was the grant of certain lands in dower to his Queen Isabella, and it referred by way of recital to her coronation as queen. This excerpt was of no small importance in the consideration of this question; for it proved to their lordships, that in times when the coronation of the king was positively either his election, or the recognition of his election as monarch, the coronation of the queen was conducted, for the very same reasons, with the same solemnities. This was evident from the description of what was done, and from the manner and the avowed object of doing it. John was crowned to show that he was king—"coronatus in regem." Isabella was crowned to show that she was queen—"in reginam coronata communi consensu archiepiscoporum," &c. &c. The very same persons who elected, or recognised, or only crowned him as their monarch, are, in this passage, recorded to have elected, or recognised, or only crowned her as their queen. Was it intended to be maintained that no right existed, whenever something moving from the crown was necessary to the exercise of it? He would frankly confess that he knew of no right which a subject could enjoy without the interposition of the crown in some manner or other. All writs issued from the crown, and no right could be maintained without them; yet, would any one dispute the right of the subject to obtain them? Supposing a peer were to die, and the crown were to refuse a writ of summons to his eldest son: it was said to be by petition of right alone that he could sue to the crown to be admitted to his father's honours; and yet that petition of right would be considered as a strict undeniable legal right. He could refer also to cases in which the subject could demand, not merely the king's writ, but also the king's proclamation, to which he was entitled, not by a common law right, but by a right given him by an express statute; for instance, in all cases relative to prize-money. Again, supposing that the House of Commons were to die a natural death after sitting for seven years, and the king were to refuse to issue his proclamation to convoke another within three years of that period, as ordered by the first of William and Mary, sec. 2, cap. 2, would it be asserted that the subject would have no right to call for the proclamation of the king to convoke another parliament, because such proclamation could not issue without an act of the crown? He thought that none of their lordships would advocate such an absurdity. But the subject and the country were in full possession of all these rights; and if the Queen's right to a coronation were put upon the same footing, it would be equally clear that she possessed it, and that the necessity of granting it was as obvious as it was imperative. He had heard it said that her Majesty could not claim the honours of a coronation by prescription, because she was not a corporation. This, however, he denied. Her Majesty certainly could prescribe, for what business had they to call her Majesty less a corporation than the King? But still, supposing her not to be a corporation, she had a right to prescribe as a functionary, holding a high dignity and situation. This was evident from Baron Comyn's Digest, who, under the title of Prescription, lays it down that such a functionary can claim by prescription. In conclusion, Mr. Brougham said, their lordships would sit in dignified judgment on the opinion given by the great lawyers of the nineteenth century; and, as he firmly believed, finding they had no difficulties to explain, perceiving that they had no obscurities to clear up, they would not be under the necessity of referring to those remote periods of our history, to which he had been obliged to allude, but would look back to the first decision that ever had been given on this question, with that decided confidence which the names of those privy counsellors before whom the case was argued would in after-times command—a judgment, which he ventured confidently to pronounce, would not derogate from the high character they had so long maintained.
Mr. Denman followed on the same side, and after a long speech, called on their lordships, as a court sitting for legal inquiry, to say whether there ever was a case presented to an inquest, which depended on custom and usage, where a more complete and perfect body of custom and usage had been adduced, than was brought forward on the present occasion? If her Majesty's claim were refused, no dignity was safe, no property was secure, not a single institution could be said to rest on a firm foundation. If the coronation of the Queen could not be supported by custom, the rest of that ceremonial could not be supported. Why was this country governed by a king? Why did we submit to a kingly government? Because the earliest ages, because all times, had recognised that form of government, and because we could trace that custom beyond all time of memory. Nothing could be more dangerous than to separate royalty from the circumstances which belonged to it and added to its dignity. The lives and properties of men depended for their security upon the same principle. Why was there a house of peers, in which noble lords formed a part of the legislature? Why were there commoners, who sat as representatives of the people? Precisely because custom had ordered it so. Custom was the author of the law and the law-makers. Custom authorized the king, lords, and commons, to enact laws for the government of this realm. All property, all dignity, all offices existed, because they were sanctioned by prescriptive custom, or because custom gave a prescriptive right to create them.
Saturday.—The Privy Council resumed this morning, soon after ten o'clock. Below the bar was again crowded to excess.
Counsel were then called in.
Mr. Brougham said, he now held in his hand, and was prepared to lay before the council, the documentary evidence to which he and his learned friend had adverted in the course of their addresses in support of her Majesty's memorial.
Lord Harrowby.—Mr. Attorney-General, have you any observations to offer on what counsel have stated to their lordships?
The Attorney-General then rose.—He said, he perhaps should best discharge his duty by stating, at the commencement, that, in his own opinion, the argument and claim were wholly unfounded. That the claim was not founded on any recognised law, appeared from the statements and course of proceeding adopted by her Majesty's counsel. He would add, that the claim now made, so far from ever being supposed to have any foundation, was not even mentioned by any writer on the laws and constitution. It had never been agitated or alluded to in any way, not even by those writers who had touched on the privileges peculiar to a queen-consort. The one single ground urged in support of the claim was usage—that usage was supposed to have prevailed through a long series of years at the coronation of kings who were married. It had been stated with confidence that such usage was evidence in support of the right; but when they were talking of rights founded on usage, it was not sufficient to state that particular facts had taken place. In all such cases, where the facts were relied on, it was essential to state the circumstances that had attended such facts, the peculiarities that had accompanied the alleged privilege, whether it was right of way or otherwise. As to the right of way, for instance; if permission were given to use certain paths or roads, the fact of such permission having preceded the use, at once destroyed the claim of right. If the license and permission were proved, there was an end of the right. By that proof, all the inferences drawn from the use were at an end—they were at once destroyed. The coronation was for the purpose of the monarch's recognition by the people, and on the part of the king to enter into the solemn compact to preserve the laws. The coronation of a queen was a mere ceremony; but that of the king was something more than ceremony. His coronation was accompanied by important political acts—the recognition by the people, and, on the other hand, the solemn compact entered into by the sovereign to preserve and maintain the laws of the realm. Still, however, as far as the king was concerned, it was a ceremony; it was not necessary to the sovereign's possession of the crown—it was what proceeded from his will, and might be dispensed with. But the queen-consort, who filled no political character in the state, had only enjoyed the privilege because she was the king's consort. With respect to a queen-consort, when she was crowned, there was no recognition of her by the people, no compact towards the people. There was no engagement between her and the subjects of the realm. This fact established that, with respect to a queen-consort, a coronation was an honorary ceremony, unaccompanied by any acts. That the coronation neither was, nor had been considered to be essential to the possession of the crown, was proved by the fact of considerable delays having often taken place between the accession of the monarch and his coronation. Henry the Sixth, for instance, was not crowned till eight years after the crown had descended to him. Again, in the "Pleas of the Crown," it was held, that the king was fully invested with the crown the moment it descended to him; that he was absolutely king although there should have been no coronation. If the coronation of a king, important as he held it to be, proceeded from the sovereign will, à fortiori it must be so with that of a queen-consort. The rights of the queen-consort did not proceed from any coronation; they flowed from her relationship to the sovereign. Her rights were complete and absolute without any coronation. Nor was it essential to the people, for the queen-consort occupied no political station. This view of the right was strengthened by the important preamble of William and Mary, which settled the coronation oath. The language of the act applied to queens regnant, not to queens-consort, for to the latter no oath was administered. As the oath was prescribed, it became necessary that every reigning monarch should be crowned, that there might be the oath and recognition; but the law made no mention of any thing that rendered such a ceremony requisite in the instance of a queen-consort. How then could the crowning of a queen-consort be considered a necessary adjunct of the coronation of the reigning monarch? No part of the ceremony rendered her presence requisite. Selden's work had been quoted in support of the memorial; amongst other things, Selden expressly said that the "anointing, &c. of the queen-consort, were dignities communicated by the king." Selden further stated, that the anointing of the queen, as well as her consecration—it was, in fact, a consecration rather than a coronation—proceeded from the "request" and "demand" of the king, after he had been crowned, made to the metropolitan, who had performed such ceremony. Bracton had entered largely into the particulars de coronatione regis, but not one word of the queen's coronation. There was not a single law-writer that had touched upon the existence of such a right, as appertaining to a queen. Blackstone had it not, nor Lord Coke, nor Selden. He next adverted at some length to the precedents quoted by his learned friends opposite, beginning with that of William the Conqueror. The very precedents quoted by his learned friends raised the inference, if there were no other arguments, that the act, so far as related to the queen, was entirely dependent on the will of the king. The Attorney-General then referred largely to Reymer, from whose book he quoted apposite passages, in support of his main argument, that the ceremony of a queen's coronation was entirely dependent upon the order of the king. In all, from the time of Henry the Seventh, six queens had been crowned, and seven had not; so that the majority was against the present claim, which it had been attempted to support on the plea of ancient, uninterrupted usage.
The Attorney-General concluded at a quarter before one o'clock; and the Solicitor-General, after a short pause, rose to follow his learned friend, and of course was compelled to go over the same ground, strengthening and confirming the preceding statements by such arguments as occurred to his observance, and contending that the usage pleaded by her Majesty's law-officers arose entirely from the sovereign's will and pleasure.
About two o'clock Mr. Brougham rose in reply, but we can touch but very briefly on his arguments. It had been intimated that the queen's right to be crowned rested on the proclamation of the king; but it might as well be pleaded that the right of the eldest sons of peers to seats in the House of Lords rested on the king's writ, because usually preceded by it. It had been argued from the word postulamus, that the queen's coronation depended on the king's will; but it might as well be argued, from another term employed (dignemini), that it was optional in the archbishop. If this right was unnecessary for the queen, how was it necessary to the king? He contended not for the necessity, but the right. The learned gentleman then went over the various cases and authorities of the learned counsel for the crown, and concluded by stating his opinion, that even if the right were not established, the expediency was such, that the council would be all but criminal, in advising that her Majesty should be excluded from her part in this important ceremony; for it would be setting an example of the most injurious nature.
Mr. Brougham concluded his reply at half-past three o'clock. Strangers were then ordered to withdraw; the counsel and agents on both sides, however, remaining. The Tower record-keepers were called in, to verify certain documents produced by Mr. Brougham. After which, at a quarter to four o'clock, the Privy Council adjourned.
The decision was ultimately against the Queen's claim.
On the 11th of July, in the House of Commons, Mr. Hume made an ineffectual attempt to induce the House to address his Majesty on this much-agitated subject.
He had just commenced the reading of a resolution "That an humble address be presented to his Majesty, praying that he will be graciously pleased to issue his royal proclamation for the coronation of her Majesty," when the deputy-usher of the black rod was heard knocking at the door; and as he was concluding it, he was called to order by the Speaker, who reminded him of the presence of that officer; and proceeded forthwith to the House of Peers, where parliament was prorogued.
The following spirited protest of her Majesty appeared on the 17th.
HER MAJESTY'S PROTEST AGAINST THE DECISION OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL.
Caroline R.
To the King's Most Excellent Majesty.
The Protest and Remonstrance of Caroline, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland.
Your Majesty having been pleased to refer to your privy council the Queen's memorial, claiming as of right to celebrate the ceremony of her coronation on the 19th day of July, being the day appointed for the celebration of your Majesty's royal coronation; and Lord Viscount Sidmouth, one of your Majesty's principal secretaries of state, having communicated to the Queen the judgment pronounced against her Majesty's claim; in order to preserve her just rights, and those of her successors, and to prevent the said minute being in after-times referred to as deriving validity from her Majesty's supposed acquiescence in the determination therein expressed, the Queen feels it to be her bounden duty to enter her most deliberate and solemn protest against the said determination; and to affirm and maintain, that by the laws, usages, and customs of this realm, from time immemorial, the queen-consort ought of right to be crowned at the same time with the king's majesty.
In support of this claim of right, her Majesty's law officers have proved before the said council, from the most ancient and authentic records, that queens-consort of this realm have, from time immemorial, participated in the ceremony of the coronation with their royal husbands. The few exceptions that occur demonstrate, from the peculiar circumstances in which they originated, that the right itself was never questioned, though the exercise of it was from necessity suspended, or from motives of policy declined.
Her Majesty has been taught to believe that the most valuable laws of this country depend upon, and derive their authority from, custom; that your Majesty's royal prerogatives stand upon the same basis: the authority of ancient usage cannot therefore be rejected without shaking that foundation upon which the most important rights and institutions of the country depend. Your Majesty's council, however, without controverting any of the facts or reasons upon which the claim made on the part of her Majesty has been supported, have expressed a judgment in opposition to the existence of such right. But the Queen can place no confidence in that judgment, when she recollects that the principal individuals by whom it has been pronounced were formerly her successful defenders; that their opinions have waved with their interest, and that they have since become the most active and powerful of her persecutors: still less can she confide in it, when her Majesty calls to mind that the leading members of that council, when in the service of your Majesty's royal father, reported in the most solemn form, that documents reflecting upon her Majesty were satisfactorily disproved as to the most important parts, and that the remainder was undeserving of credit. Under this declared conviction, they strongly recommended to your Majesty's royal father to bestow his favour upon the Queen, then Princess of Wales, though in opposition to your Majesty's declared wishes. But when your Majesty had assumed the kingly power, these same advisers, in another minute of council, recanted their former judgment, and referred to, and adopted these very same documents as a justification of one of your Majesty's harshest measures towards the Queen—the separation of her Majesty from her affectionate and only child.
The Queen, like your Majesty, descended from a long race of kings, was the daughter of a sovereign house connected by the ties of blood with the most illustrious families in Europe; and her not unequal alliance with your Majesty was formed in full confidence that the faith of the king and the people was equally pledged to secure to her all those honours and rights which had been enjoyed by her royal predecessors.
In that alliance her Majesty believed that she exchanged the protection of her family for that of a royal husband, and that of a free and noble-minded nation. From your Majesty, the Queen has experienced only the bitter disappointment of every hope she had indulged. In the attachment of the people she has found that powerful and decided protection which has ever been her steady support and her unfailing consolation. Submission, from a subject, to injuries of a private nature, may be matter of expedience—from a wife it may be matter of necessity—but it never can be the duty of a queen to acquiesce in the infringement of those rights which belong to her constitutional character.
The Queen does therefore repeat her must solemn and deliberate protest against the decision of the said council, considering it only as the sequel of that course of persecution under which her Majesty has so long and so severely suffered; and which decision, if it is to furnish a precedent for future times, can have no other effect than to fortify oppression with the forms of law, and to give to injustice the sanction of authority. The protection of the subject from the highest to the lowest, is not only the true but the only legitimate object of all power; and no act of power can be legitimate which is not founded on those principles of eternal justice, without which law is but the mask of tyranny, and power the instrument of despotism.
Queen's House, July 17.
On the day of the coronation a considerable crowd assembled about her Majesty's house in South Audley Street soon after four o'clock. As soon as it was ascertained that her Majesty's coach was making ready in the yard, the crowd, both in South Audley Street and in Hill Street, became very great. The wall opposite to her Majesty's house in Hill Street was soon covered with spectators, who announced to the crowd below each successive step of preparation. "The horses are to;" "every thing is quite ready;" "the Queen has entered the coach,"—were the gradual communications, and they were received with the loudest cheers. Lady Anne Hamilton arrived a few minutes before five, and was most cordially and respectfully greeted. Soon after five the gate was thrown open, and a shout was raised—"The Queen! The Queen!" The Queen immediately appeared in her coach of state, drawn by six bays. Lady Hood and Lady Anne Hamilton sat opposite to her Majesty. Lord Hood followed in his own carriage. Her Majesty looked extraordinarily well; and acknowledged, with great dignity and composure, the gratulations of the people on each side of her coach. The course taken was, through Great Stanhope Street, Park Lane, Hyde-Park Corner, the Green Park, St. James's Park, Birdcage Walk, and by Storey's Gate, along Prince's Street, to Dean's Yard—a way, it must be observed, the least likely to attract notice or to gather crowds. The crowd accumulated immensely along this line; the soldiers every where presented arms with the utmost promptitude and respect; and a thousand voices kept up a constant cry of "The Queen!" "The Queen for ever!" The coup d'œil from the road along the Green Park, was the most striking which can be imagined; the whole space presented one mass of well dressed males and females hurrying with every possible rapidity to accompany the Queen, and shouting their attachment and admiration. The two torrents that poured along the south side of the park and the eastern end occasioned the greatest conflux at Storey's Gate. As soon as the Queen's arrival was known in the scene of the King's coronation, shouts of "The Queen!" at once arose from all the booths, and hats and handkerchiefs were every where waved in token of respect. As soon as her Majesty came in sight of the coronation platform and Westminster Abbey, she stopped for a few moments, apparently uncertain what course to take, as she had hitherto met with no obstruction, and yet had received nothing like an invitation to approach. At this moment the feelings of the spectators were wound up to a pitch of the most intense curiosity and most painful anxiety. The persons who immediately surrounded her carriage knew no bounds in expressing their enthusiastic attachment, while many of those in the galleries, apprehensive of the consequences of the experiment which she was making, could not restrain their fears and alarms. In the meantime great confusion seemed to prevail among the officers and soldiers on and near the platform; the former giving orders and retracting them, and the latter running to their arms, uncertain whether they should salute her by presenting them or not. Astonishment, hurry, and doubt, seemed to agitate the whole multitude assembled either to witness or compose the ensuing pageant. She alighted from her carriage and proceeded on foot, leaning on the arm of Lord Hood, and accompanied by the faithful companions of her affliction, Lady Hood and Lady Anne Hamilton, to demand admission. The approach of the Queen towards the hall-door produced a considerable sensation within: there was an immediate rush to the door, which was closed amidst much confusion. The officer on guard (we believe Colonel M'Kinnon) was immediately summoned to the spot, and asked her Majesty for her ticket. She replied that she had none, and as Queen of England needed none. He professed his sorrow, but said he must obey orders, and that his orders were to see that no person whatever should be admitted without a ticket. Her Majesty then retired. The party went to the door of the duchy of Lancaster behind the champion's stable, and had the door shut in their faces. They then turned round, and leaving the royal carriage behind, proceeded to demand admission at another entrance. The same intense sensation of interest and the same applause, mixed with partial disapprobation, continued to follow her.
When she arrived nearly at the other extremity of the platform—that which was opposite to the central pavilion—her further progress was arrested by a file of about a dozen soldiers, who were suddenly ordered to form across the platform. Her Majesty then quitted it, and went straight on to the House of Lords on foot, there to repeat the same request, and with the same success.
In about twenty minutes she returned, and having ordered the top of her carriage to be taken down, rode off, amid the astonishment and acclamations of the people.
We subjoin the following account from the Courier of her Majesty's reception at the door of Westminster Abbey:—
"Lord Hood having desired admission for her Majesty, the door-keepers drew across the entrance, and requested to see the tickets.
"Lord Hood.—I present you your Queen; surely it is not necessary for her to have a ticket.
"Door-keeper.—Our orders are to admit no person without a peer's ticket.
"Lord Hood.—This is your Queen: she is entitled to admission without such a form.
"The Queen, smiling, but still in some agitation—Yes, I am your Queen, will you admit me?
"Door-keeper.—My orders are specific, and I feel myself bound to obey them.
"The Queen laughed.
"Lord Hood.—I have a ticket.
"Door-keeper.—Then, my Lord, we will let you pass upon producing it.
"Lord Hood now drew from his pocket a peer's ticket for one person; the original name in whose favour it was drawn was erased, and the name of 'Wellington' substituted.
"Door-keeper.—This will let one person pass, but no more.
"Lord Hood.—Will your Majesty go in alone?
"Her Majesty at first assented, but did not persevere,
"Lord Hood.—Am I to understand that you refuse her Majesty admission?
"Door-keeper.—We only act in conformity with our orders.
"Her Majesty again laughed.
"Lord Hood.—Then you refuse the Queen admission?
"A door-keeper of a superior order then came forward, and was asked by Lord Hood whether any preparations had been made for her Majesty? He was answered respectfully in the negative.
"Lord Hood.—Will your Majesty enter the Abbey without your ladies?
"Her Majesty declined.
"Lord Hood then said, that her Majesty had better retire to her carriage. It was clear no provision had been made for her accommodation.
"Her Majesty assented.
"Some persons within the porch of the Abbey laughed, and uttered some expressions of disrespect.
"Lord Hood.—We expected to have met at least with the conduct of gentlemen. Such conduct is neither manly nor mannerly.
"Her Majesty then retired, leaning on Lord Hood's arm, and followed by Lady Hood and Lady Hamilton.
"She was preceded by constables back to the platform, over which she returned, entered her carriage, and was driven off amidst reiterated shouts of mingled applause and disapprobation."
Her Majesty returned through Pall Mall, St. James's Street, and Piccadilly, followed all along by a great concourse of people. In St. James's Street the water had previously created abundance of mud, and this material the crowd bestowed upon some public offices which were prepared for an illumination. During the whole course of her Majesty's progress no accident occurred.