Volume 12 — UNJUST ARREST AND PROSECUTION OF TWO BOSTON MERCHANTS.

Protest and Opinion on the Case of the Messrs. Smith Brothers, March 17, 1865.

Benjamin G. Smith and Franklin W. Smith, merchants and co-partners in Boston, with the firm name of Smith Brothers & Co., were suddenly arrested in June, 1864, by order of the Navy Department, under the charge of fraud in the performance of contracts with the Department. They were at once consigned to Fort Warren, in the harbor of Boston, with strict injunctions to prevent any communication by them with the outer world. Bail to the amount of half a million dollars was required, which was subsequently reduced to forty thousand. Their counting-room was broken open, their safe forced, and their books seized. Their houses were searched, and private papers taken away. Their business was, for the time, destroyed. This work was crowned by ordering a court-martial for the trial of these civilians at Philadelphia.

These proceedings excited a general interest at Boston. The Massachusetts delegation in Congress united in the following appeal to the President, which was drawn by Mr. Sumner.

To the President of the United States:—

The undersigned, Senators and Representatives in Congress from Massachusetts, ask leave to call your serious attention to the proceedings initiated by the Navy Department against Benjamin G. Smith and Franklin W. Smith, of Boston, of the firm of Smith Brothers & Co., a much respected firm, which has hitherto enjoyed the confidence, personal and mercantile, of the community where they reside. Among their neighbors and friends these proceedings have already attracted much attention, and awakened corresponding feeling.

The proceedings have seemed to be harsh, vindictive, and unnecessary.

1. In the character of the arrest of Messrs. Smith, which was attended by circumstances of severity utterly unjustifiable.

2. In requiring bonds to so large an amount as half a million of dollars. The fact that the parties in question easily obtained bonds for a much larger amount does not render the exaction of “excessive bail” less obnoxious to the requirements of the Constitution and of justice, or less indicative of the spirit in which these proceedings have been conducted.

3. In the seizure of their books and papers, which are still detained, although regarded by their eminent counsel as important to their defence.

4. In turning into a military offence what is more proper for a civil tribunal, and dragging these defendants before a court-martial.

5. In transferring the proceedings from Boston, where the parties reside, and the transactions in question occurred, to Philadelphia: thus increasing greatly the difficulties and the cost of defence. This will be appreciated, when it is understood that the witnesses are very numerous, and chiefly engaged in mercantile business, so that they cannot leave Boston without neglect of their private interests.

The undersigned, on reviewing these circumstances, which are so inconsistent with the administration of justice in its most ordinary forms, have been at a loss to account for the spirit manifested in the prosecution. If they look at the trivial character of many of the specifications against the defendants, they are still more at a loss. It is difficult to account for such elaborate and persistent harshness, without yielding to the prevailing belief that other motives than the vindication of justice have entered into this case.

The undersigned are not strangers to the fact, that one of these defendants, in the discharge of what he believed to be his duty as a good citizen, has, by correspondence and testimony before committees of Congress, been brought into collision with officers of the Navy Department; and there is too much reason to believe that some of these officers have allowed themselves to be governed by personal feelings throughout these strange proceedings.

Under such circumstances, the undersigned most respectfully ask your assistance in securing justice to these defendants, according to the common course of proceedings at law. They are acquainted with the statute which provides court-martial for contractors in certain cases, and they are unwilling to make any suggestion which shall interfere with its efficiency; but they have no hesitation in saying that such a statute, intended for extreme cases, should not be applied to a case like the present, where, with a single exception, the questions are simply whether the defendants complied with their contract, and therefore, from their nature, can be better considered by the ordinary tribunals accustomed to such questions than by a naval tribunal composed of officers who have no familiarity with them.

If the pending proceedings against the Messrs. Smith should be continued, there are two courses with regard to them which may be recommended.

First, That they should be transferred at once to the United States Court in Massachusetts, and be placed under the direction of the learned Attorney of the United States for that District.

Secondly, If the foregoing order is not deemed expedient, on the existing evidence, then a commission or commissioner might be appointed by the President to inquire into the circumstances attending the arrest of the defendants, and also into the nature of the charges against them, in order to ascertain and report if there is any sufficient reason for the singular harshness to which they have been already subjected, and also for the exceptional proceedings instituted against them.

For the sake of justice, and to relieve the Government from all suspicion of undue harshness, the undersigned protest against the spirit in which these proceedings have been conducted, and appeal to you for such remedy as shall seem best, to the end that the public interests may be adequately protected without any sacrifice of the rights of the citizen, and without needless interference with the order of business.

Charles Sumner,

Henry Wilson,

Thomas D. Eliot,

Henry L. Dawes,

S. Hooper,

John B. Alley, by C. Sumner, as by letter,[183]

D. W. Gooch,

William B. Washburn,

John D. Baldwin,

George S. Boutwell.

[Boston, August 15, 1864.]

The trial proceeded at Charlestown, lasting several months, with able counsel for the defendants, and it ended in judgment against the defendants, who were sentenced to imprisonment for two years and a fine of twenty thousand dollars. This judgment and sentence were approved by the Secretary of the Navy, and it only remained for the President to give them his sanction. Before this was done, Mr. Sumner saw him. The President listened to his appeal, and at once put into his hands the elaborate report from the Secretary of the Navy, setting forth the facts in the case and approving the conclusion of the court-martial,—asking him to read it carefully and give his opinion upon it, which he did without delay.

OPINION.

This case has been pending since 17th June, 1864, when the Messrs. Smith Brothers, who, as merchants, enjoyed an enviable reputation, were suddenly arrested by military authority, and, without any opportunity of conferring with counsel or friends, were hurried off to Fort Warren. During all this period, running over nine months, I have kept myself aloof from the case, so far as possible, knowing that I was not so circumstanced as to consider it on its merits, and under the conviction, that, at last, justice would be done.

On certain matters independent of the merits I have with others been called to speak. One of these was the manner of the arrest and the bail required. At the time of the arrest, all the books and papers of the parties were seized and sequestered. The hardship of the arrest was aggravated by the bail required, which was fixed at half a million of dollars. “Excessive bail” is forbidden by the Constitution; but it would be difficult to say what bail could be “excessive,” if this was not.

The other matter on which I was called to speak was the order for the trial of the Messrs. Smith Brothers by court-martial at Philadelphia, when it was notorious that the proceedings must be protracted, and that numerous witnesses must be summoned from Boston, at great expense: the whole constituting a plain oppression, not unlike the demand of “excessive bail.”

The hardship in these preliminary proceedings seemed to justify an appeal to the President, in which I joined, for his intervention at least to change the place of trial. Perhaps they illustrate also the temper which entered into this prosecution.

It is only since the President has put into my hands the report on the findings of the Court, adopted by the Secretary of the Navy, that I have looked into the case on its merits. I have read that report carefully, and also the arguments of the counsel on both sides; but I have not had any opportunity to examine the whole record. From the fulness of the report, and of the arguments, this was hardly necessary. The record is extensively cited in the report and the arguments, and also in a pamphlet by one of the respondents, which I have read.

The more I have examined the case, the more I have been surprised by the preliminary proceedings, the continued prosecution, and the findings of the Court. I can well understand how they were used in the House of Representatives as an argument for the total repeal of the Act of Congress authorizing the trial of civilians by courts-martial. Such a case must make us fear, that, under this Act, justice may be sacrificed. It might make honest merchants hesitate to enter into business relations with the Government.

On careful examination, it seems that the whole prosecution, so far as proof is seriously pretended, is reduced to one single specification,—to wit, the sale and delivery of five thousand pounds of a tin called Revely, instead of a tin called Banca, by which, at most, the Government lost one hundred dollars. There are other specifications; but the report adopted by the Secretary of the Navy forbears to dwell on them; and I do not think they can be made the foundation of any judgment against the respondents. They did not seem to have impressed the President, in the conversation which I had with him on the subject. I put them aside as unproved or irrelevant. There only remains the single specification with regard to tin.

Look at this carefully, and the wonder increases that these proceedings were ever instituted.

1. The first remark to make is, that, even according to the finding of the Court, the Government has suffered only to the amount of one hundred dollars,—being the difference in price between the two kinds of tin at the date of delivery. The pettiness of this loss is still more apparent, when it is considered that the transactions of the respondents with the Government reached the sum of more than twelve hundred thousand dollars, having such infinite details that they covered twelve hundred and five pages of sales. Surely, on every principle of reason or evidence, the insignificance of this loss, in transactions on so large a scale, and extending over three years of time, constitutes an unanswerable presumption in favor of the respondents, excluding, as it does, any adequate motive for the perpetration of fraud. Even assuming that the supply of tin was questionable, it would be reasonable to call it ill-considered, hasty, or mistaken, rather than criminal, according to the finding of the Court. Certainly it could be no justification of the vindictive arrest and bail with which the proceedings began, and it is frightful that it should be made the pretence for a sentence of two year’ imprisonment and twenty thousand dollar’ fine. If a mountain in labor ever brought forth a mouse, it is this mountainous prosecution, whose only offspring yet crawling on earth is an allegation of loss to the United States of one hundred dollars! But, if we look further at this transaction, it will be seen that it is absolutely unimpeachable.

2. Much confusion has been caused by ignorance with regard to the two tins in question. The report adopted by the Secretary of the Navy says of them, that, “in the course of commerce, the two are never confounded by dealers”; then, again, that “Banca tin is one article, having a certain price, and that Revely tin is another and a different article, having a different price.” The repetition of this assumption again and again shows how important it was regarded in support of the accusation. But this assumption is founded on mistake.

I call attention to the letter of Hon. S. Hooper, addressed to myself, under date of 14th March instant, in which he testifies from his experience as an importer, for many years, of these two tins. He says: “If the only charge against Messrs. Smith Brothers & Co. is the delivery of Revely tin, on a contract to supply the Government with Banca tin, it is an absurdity, and it is evident to me that the Court did not know what Banca tin was.” He then proceeds to say, that the tin of the East passes under the general name of Banca tin, which is applicable to the Revely or Straits tin as well as to the Dutch; and he adduces the authority of the Commercial Dictionaries. Thus, McCulloch, under the word “Tin,” after speaking of the tin of Great Britain, says, “Tin, Oriental, in commercial language usually called Banca tin,” produced, according to this authority, in China, the Malay countries, and the islands lying toward Java. He also cites Simmonds’s “Dictionary of Trade,” published in London as late as 1858, which, under the term “Banca-Tin,” says, “A valuable kind of tin, equal to English refined, obtained in the Eastern Archipelago, originally from the island of Banca exclusively; but much is now procured in Malacca, and sent to Singapore for shipment.” The latter, it will be borne in mind, is what has been treated in this case as Revely.

Certainly, the testimony of Mr. Hooper, in concurrence with the Commercial Dictionaries, must tend to show that the report is mistaken, when it so confidently asserts, that, “in the course of commerce, the two tins are never confounded by dealers.” On the contrary, they have been treated by “dealers,” and by authoritative writers on commerce, as substantially the same. It is almost superfluous for me to add, that, according to the ruling of our courts, such testimony would be decisive. Thus, where certain words were used in the tariff, Mr. Justice Story decided, that, “the tariff being a statute regulating commerce, the terms of it must be construed according to commercial usage and understanding.”[184] Common sense is in harmony with this judgment.

As if to put this commercial usage beyond question, we have the testimony of Mr. Richards, a witness for the prosecution, as follows.

“Cross-Question 18. Do you ever have orders from customers for Banca tin, that you execute by the delivery of Revely or Straits?—Ans. We have.”

“Cross-Question 22. Suppose you had an order from a foundry—say Hooper & Co.—for five thousand pounds of Banca tin, which you knew was to be used for castings, how would you fill such an order?—Ans. We should not hesitate to give him Revely.”

“Re-Cross-Question 1. Would you not deliver to a party five thousand pounds of Revely tin, upon a contract for Banca tin, if you had never known them to buy such a quantity of any kind but Revely or Straits, if you had repeatedly sold them Revely or Straits acceptably, and you considered the tin was to be used for castings?—Ans. I should.”

3. The usage at the Navy Yard was in harmony with commercial usage, as the testimony abundantly shows. For at least seven years previous to the contract of the respondents, the tin known as Revely had been received at the yard as Banca. Edward Cody, witness for the prosecution, and the master founder, on cross-examination, puts this beyond question.

“Cross-Question 4. During these seven years [past], has not the Revely tin been the standard article in use in your bureau or foundry?—Ans. It has.”

“Cross-Question 11. If you had been inquired of by them [Smith Brothers & Co.] what kind of tin you required, what would have been your reply?—Ans. I should have had the same as I have had.

“Cross-Question 12. What is that?—Ans. Revely.”

Another witness, the Hon. Eugene L. Norton, the Navy Agent at Boston, testifies, that, having occasion to buy tin on a requisition from the Ordnance Office, he sent to inquire of Captain Green, the Ordnance Officer, what brand was required. The answer was, “that, in all cases where it was foundry work, Revely or Straits would be the kind that would be received; that, in those cases where it was wanted in small quantities, for solder, Banca would be preferred, as Revely or Straits was somewhat cheaper than Banca.” And he added, that the quantity named in the requisition, as a ton, or a pig, would indicate the kind he should buy. Add to the testimony of these two witnesses the undisputed fact, that, when, in May, 1863, C. W. Schofield, being under contract to deliver five thousand pounds of Banca, failed to perform his contract, the Government, although entitled to purchase the desired article in open market at his expense, bought Revely. Here was a practical interpretation of the contract, which establishes the usage of the Navy Yard.

4. The openness of the transaction and of the delivery testify also to the usage. The tin, when delivered, was stamped upon its face “Revely & Co.” This stamp, which was open to the observation of all officers, workmen, and passers-by, is an incontrovertible witness, which no argument of counsel or ingenious commentary can neutralize. Calmly, but unanswerably, it shows two things: first, the usage at the Navy Yard; and, secondly, the good faith of the transaction. But I refer to it now simply to illustrate the usage.

5. Then comes the acceptance of the tin marked as Revely, and the approval of the bills by the officers of the Government, in performance of the contract. It is not denied that the tin was accepted by Mr. Merriam, the master machinist at the Navy Yard, and that the bills were approved by Mr. Kimball, the inspecting officer of Government,—an inspector who is said to have been unfriendly to the respondents. This double fact is beyond question. An attempt is made to throw doubt on the integrity of one of these witnesses, by charging complicity; but it does not appear that there is a scrap of evidence in the record to sustain the imputation, and I need not say it is outrageous to imagine it, in order to increase the pressure upon the respondents. Mr. Merriam, in his testimony, says: “I was influenced, undoubtedly, from my knowledge of the practice which had existed heretofore, and also from my belief that the article answered every purpose in the department which Banca tin was required for. The previous practice of the department, of which I had been informed, in addition to my own judgment as to the substantial equality of the articles, were reasons for my approving the bill.” Nothing could be more explicit or reasonable.

The report adopted by the Secretary of the Navy seeks to parry the force of this approval by the allegation, that “there is not a particle of proof on the record that any one of the officers or other persons employed at the Navy Yard, or in the transaction of its business, had ever received from the Government any sort of authority to make such inspection, approval, and payment as appears in the case.” The report forgets the usage of seven years at the Navy Yard, and the commercial usage besides, which were ample to justify them.

6. As it is evident that the Government did not expect to receive other than Revely, so it is proved that the respondents never expected to supply other than Revely, unless in cases of small quantities, where, as we have seen, the Banca was supposed to be desired. Such is the testimony of Benjamin G. Smith, one of the respondents, and also of Mr. Dunnells, their clerk. The latter states, that his instructions from the respondents were to deliver Banca when small lots were required, but Revely when large lots of one thousand pounds and upwards were required, and that, as far as his knowledge went, this had always been done. Therefore the contract was performed according to the mutual understanding of the two parties.

7. The price, according to the contract, shows that the tin called Revely was intended. This can be demonstrated.

At the date of the contract, 30th March, 1863, the price of Banca in the market was fifty-seven to fifty-eight cents a pound. Revely was less. The price stipulated in the contract was fifty-seven cents. But it is plain that the respondents could not undertake to supply an article at less than its market price. This would be absurd. Of course, as merchants, they expected a profit. Therefore, in their bid, they would naturally take into consideration the various elements which would enter into the final price. These would be, first, the original price; secondly, the commission; thirdly, the condition of the currency, which at that time had begun to depreciate; fourthly, the variation of the market for a month; fifthly, store expenses and interest; sixthly, postponement of payment; and, seventhly, risks of a contractor in placing himself within the unhesitating grasp of military power. So far as these can be estimated, they are as follows:—

Original price.52

Store expenses and interest at 5 per cent.0260

.5460

Commission at 5 per cent.0273

.5733

But the price was fifty-seven cents.

Now can any person, not to say any merchant, assert that fifty-seven cents a pound was a high price for the tin called Revely? Would anybody but a fool offer to supply the tin which in this prosecution is called Banca at fifty-seven cents a pound, when its original price was more than this, and the contractor must lose store expenses and interest, with the risks of currency, market, postponement of payment, and military tribunals, without the possibility of a mill for commissions? Clearly not. It is evident, therefore, that, in offering to supply Banca tin at fifty-seven cents a pound, they must have intended that species of Banca tin known as Revely, which, according to the usage of the Navy Yard and of merchants, had been recognized as Banca tin.

On this point we have the testimony of Mr. Richards, a witness for the Government, whose cross-examination thus confirms the foregoing conclusion.

“Cross-Question 37. What would it be worth to give a party the refusal for, say, five thousand pounds of tin for twenty or thirty days?—Ans. At least fifteen per cent.”

“Cross-Question 44. During the year 1863, how much, in addition to the cash market price, would you have considered should be added for a refusal of thirty days?—Ans. From, ten to fifteen per cent.

“Cross-Question 45. Tin being sold to us at fifty and three-fourths cents net cash in the market, would fifty-seven cents be an improper sum for us to charge the Government on a time refusal?—Ans. I should think not.

“Cross-Question 46. If you were to be subject to a delay of vouchers for merchandise delivered for thirty days, if there should be a reservation of twenty per cent until the contract was closed, and if then you were liable to be compelled to receive certificates of indebtedness that would not sell in the market at par, what, in addition to the cash market price, would you consider should be added?—Ans. From five to ten per cent, I should think.”

“Cross-Question 50. Upon a Government contract, to run three months or one year, with a reservation of twenty per cent, a bid being made which amounts to a refusal for twenty or thirty days, and subject to terms of Government payment, what would you consider a fair addition to the cash market price on a sale to the Government?—Ans. At least ten per cent.”

“Cross-Question 52. Among Boston merchants what is the character of the house of Smith Brothers & Co. for integrity and fair dealing?—Ans. A No. 1.”

Such is the testimony of a Government witness. In the face of this testimony, concurring with the reason of the case, it is hard to tolerate the allegation against these respondents founded on price. Indeed, it is hard to tolerate the allegation on any ground.

Under these seven heads, this whole case, so far as concerns the contract for tin, may be considered. It appears that the loss to the United States, from the delivery of Revely instead of what is called Banca, was not more than one hundred dollars in a mass of transactions amounting to more than one million two hundred thousand dollars; that, according to extensive and long-continued usage, Revely is included under Banca; that, according to usage at the Navy Yard, it was treated as Banca; that the whole transaction and the delivery were open and without any concealment; that Revely was actually accepted by the officers of the Government in performance of the contract; that the respondents never expected to supply other than Revely; and, lastly, that the price paid shows that Revely was intended. This is enough. I forbear to go into the evidence of founders and plumbers, derived from experience, of assayers and chemists, derived from analysis of the two tins, and also of business men, as to their comparative value,—for all this is superfluous. To charge fraud against the respondents under such circumstances is cruel, irrational, preposterous. Their conduct cannot be tortured or twisted into fraud. As well undertake to spin sunbeams into cables, or extract oil from Massachusetts granite.

It is difficult to imagine the origin of these unfortunate proceedings, which, beginning in unheard-of harshness, threaten to end in unexampled injustice, unless arrested by the President. But there are certain facts which may shed light upon some of the hidden springs. Nobody supposes that the able and candid Head of the Navy Department became acquainted with this prosecution until after it had been already conceived, shaped, and set in motion. Others in the Department used its great powers, if not for purposes of oppression, at least recklessly and unaccountably.

It appears that Franklin W. Smith, one of the respondents, published a pamphlet, in which he exposed abuses in the contract system of the Navy Department; and it is understood that sundry officials felt aggrieved by these disclosures. The spirit of these officials appears sufficiently in the following extract from a letter of a Government witness, holding an important position in the Navy Department, addressed to another witness, himself also an official.

“I have been summoned before the Select Committee of the Senate for investigating frauds in Naval Supplies; and if the wool don’t fly, it won’t be my fault. Norton, the Navy Agent, has complained that I have interfered with his business: he and his friend Smith are dead cocks in the pit. We have got a sure thing on them in the tin business. They that dance must pay the fiddler.”

The writer of this letter, after appearing before the Senate Committee at a later day, came on from Washington to appear before the court-martial at Charlestown as a witness against the respondents, where he underwent a cross-examination on which I forbear to comment. If the prosecution did not originate in the spirit which fills his letter, it is evident that this spirit entered into it. “If the wool don’t fly, it won’t be my fault”; “Dead cocks in the pit”; “A sure thing on them in the tin business”: such are the countersigns adopted by the agent of this dark proceeding, showing clearly two things: first, the foregone conclusion, that these respondents were to be sacrificed; and, secondly, that the case turned on “the tin business.”

It is hard that citizens enjoying a good name, who had the misfortune to come into business relations with the Government, should be exposed to such a spirit; that they should be dragged from their homes, and hurried to a military prison; that, though civilians, they should be treated as military offenders; that they should be compelled to undergo a protracted trial by court-martial, damaging their good name, destroying their peace, breaking up their business, and subjecting them to untold expense,—when, at the slightest touch, the whole case vanishes into thin air, leaving behind nothing but the incomprehensible spirit in which it had its origin.

Of course, the findings and sentence of the Court ought, without delay, to be set aside. But this is only the beginning of justice. Some positive reparation should be made to citizens who have been so deeply injured.

Charles Sumner.

Washington, March 17, 1865.

To the President of the United States.

The President promptly overruled the judgment and sentence. The result was received with manifestations of joy. The defendants, whose cruel prosecution had been protracted for six months, had an ovation in the congratulations of their friends and fellow-citizens. Strangers at a distance, feeling that public liberty had suffered through them, sent their sympathy. The press gave expression to the prevailing sentiment. Nor was Mr. Sumner forgotten. The defendants made haste by telegraph to say: “Accept the lasting gratitude of Smith Brothers, their families, and their many friends.” Others wrote in the same spirit,—as, for instance, J. C. Hoadley, of New Bedford, who, though not knowing the sufferers, said: “I thank you, in the name of all fair dealing, for your opinion upon the case of Franklin W. Smith”; and John Clark, who, having been connected with the press in Boston, had passed into the public service, wrote from Norfolk:—

“Will you permit me to thank you for your able exposition of the case of the Smith Brothers? I do not know those parties; but I am interested in public liberty, and I have seen no abler defender of it, since the beginning of the war, than you have shown yourself to be on this occasion. I thank you, Sir.”

From these expressions it appears that the effort of Mr. Sumner was regarded as not only a defence of the individual citizen, but a contribution to good government. The testimony of Mr. Clark was of the more value, as he had not been accustomed to sympathize with Mr. Sumner in his public course.

Independent of its character, this case has an incidental interest. It was one of the last, if not the last, having a personal relation, that ever occupied the mind of President Lincoln. His indorsement, overruling the judgment and sentence, bears date March 18th. This was Saturday. Meanwhile the Rebellion was about to fall, and the President left Washington, by boat, Thursday, March 23d, for City Point, the headquarters of the Army of Virginia, where he remained till after the surrender of Richmond, returning to Washington Sunday evening, April 9th, and being assassinated Friday evening, April 14th.

Some circumstances associated with this case help exhibit the character of the President. They will be stated briefly. As soon as Mr. Sumner had prepared his Opinion, he hurried to the President. It was late in the afternoon, and the latter was about entering his carriage for a drive, when Mr. Sumner arrived with the papers in his hand. He at once mentioned the result he had reached, and added that it was a case for instant action. The President proposed that he should return the next day, when he would consider it with him. Mr. Sumner rejoined, that, in his opinion, the President ought not to sleep on the case,—that he should interfere promptly for the relief of innocent fellow-citizens,—and urged, that, if Abraham Lincoln had suffered unjust imprisonment as a criminal, with degradation before his neighbors, an immense bill of expense, a trial by court-martial, and an unjust condemnation, he would cry out against any postponement of justice for a single day. The President, apparently impressed by Mr. Sumner’s earnestness and his personal appeal, appointed eleven o’clock that evening, when he would go over the case, and hear Mr. Sumner’s Opinion.

Accordingly, at eleven o’clock that evening, in the midst of a thunder-storm, filling the streets with water, and threatening chimneys, Mr. Sumner made his way to the Presidential mansion. At the very hour named he was received, and at the request of the President proceeded to read his Opinion. The latter listened attentively, with occasional comments, and at the close showed his sympathy with the respondents. It was now twenty minutes after midnight, when the President said that he would write his conclusion at once, and that Mr. Sumner must come and hear it the next morning,—“when I open shop,” said he. “And when do you open shop?” Mr. Sumner inquired. “At nine o’clock,” was the reply. At that hour Mr. Sumner was in the office he had left after midnight, when the President came running in, and read at once the indorsement in his own handwriting, as follows:—

“I am unwilling for the sentence to stand and be executed, to any extent, in this case. In the absence of a more adequate motive than the evidence discloses, I am wholly unable to believe in the existence of criminal or fraudulent intent on the part of one of such well-established good character as is the accused. If the evidence went as far toward establishing a guilty profit of one or two hundred thousand dollars, as it does of one or two hundred dollars, the case would, on the question of guilt, bear a far different aspect. That on this contract, involving from one million to twelve hundred thousand dollars, the contractors should attempt a fraud which at the most could profit them only one or two hundred, or even one thousand dollars, is to my mind beyond the power of rational belief. That they did not, in such a case, strike for greater gains proves that they did not, with guilty or fraudulent intent, strike at all. The judgment and sentence are disapproved and declared null, and the accused ordered to be discharged.

“A. Lincoln.

“March 18, 1865.”

Then followed an incident as original as anything in the life of Henry the Fourth, of France, or of a Lacedæmonian king. As Mr. Sumner was making an abstract of the indorsement for communication by telegraph to the anxious parties, the President broke into quotation from Petroleum V. Nasby, and, seeing that his visitor was less at home than himself in this patriotic literature, he said, “I must initiate you,” and then repeated with enthusiasm the message he had sent to the author: “For the genius to write these things I would gladly give up my office.” Then rising and turning to a standing-desk behind, he opened it and took out a pamphlet collection of the letters already published, which he proceeded to read aloud, evidently enjoying it much. For the time he seemed to forget the case he had just decided, and Presidential duties. This continued more than twenty minutes, when Mr. Sumner, thinking there must be many at the door waiting to see the President on graver matters, took advantage of a pause, and, thanking him for the lesson of the morning, left. Some thirty persons, including Senators and Representatives, were in the anteroom as he passed out.[185]

Though with the President much during the intervening days before his death, this was the last business Mr. Sumner transacted with him.