Volume 8 — HELP FOR MEXICO AGAINST FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

Report from the Committee of Foreign Relations upon the Draught of a Convention with Mexico, February 19, 1862.

A convention was made at London, October 31, 1861, between Great Britain, France, and Spain, professedly to obtain redress and security from Mexico for citizens of the three contracting powers. Provision was made for the accession of the United States as a fourth party; but the note inviting us to join was dated a month after the Convention. The invitation was declined. But, anxious to help Mexico, Mr. Seward proposed pecuniary aid, in the hope of enabling our neighbor republic to satisfy the demands of the invading allies, so far at least as to make them withdraw. The draught of such a Convention with Mexico was transmitted to the Senate, who were asked to give their advice with regard to it.

A few passages of a letter from Mr. Corwin to Mr. Sumner, dated at Mexico, April 14, 1862, will show the condition of things there.

“The general and leading objects of my mission to Mexico were, first, to prevent the Southern Confederacy from obtaining any recognition here, and thus cut off the hope of augmenting the power of the South by acquisition, accompanied with Slavery, in Mexico, or any of the Southern Spanish-American republics; secondly, to use every proper means to prevent European power from gaining a permanent hold upon this part of the American Continent.

“In the first object I have fully succeeded. The Southern Commissioner, after employing persuasion and threats, finally took his leave of the city, sending back from Vera Cruz, as I am informed, a very offensive letter to the Government here. In obtaining the second end I have had more difficulty.…

“If the French attempt to conquer this country, it is certain to bring on a war of two or three years’ duration. The gorges of the mountains, so frequent here, afford to small detachments stronger holds than any position fortified by art; and the Mexicans have a strong hatred of foreign rule, which animates the whole body of the people. I trust our Government will remonstrate firmly against all idea of European conquest on this continent, and in such time as to have its due influence on the present position of France in Mexico.…

“But I am satisfied this danger may be avoided by the pecuniary aid proposed by the present treaty with us, and the united diplomacy of England, Spain, and the United States. If these means are not promptly and energetically applied, a European power may fasten itself upon Mexico, which it will become a necessity with us, at no distant day, to dislodge. To do this, in the supposed event, would cost us millions twenty times told more than we now propose to lend upon undoubted security.”

Spain and England soon withdrew from coöperation, leaving the French Emperor alone to pursue the unhappy enterprise, which ended in the sacrifice of Maximilian, whom he had placed on the Mexican throne.

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred a Message from the President, of December 17, 1861, transmitting a Draught for a Convention with the Republic of Mexico, with accompanying papers, and a Message from the President, of January 24, 1862, transmitting a Despatch from Mr. Corwin, Minister at Mexico, have had the same under consideration, and report.

On the 2d of September, 1861, Mr. Seward, in a despatch to Mr. Corwin, at Mexico, announced that the President greatly desired the political status of Mexico as an independent nation to be permanently maintained; that the events communicated by Mr. Corwin alarmed him, and he conceived that the people of the United States would scarcely justify him, were he to make no effort for preventing so great a calamity on this continent as would be the extinction of that neighbor republic; that he had therefore empowered Mr. Corwin to negotiate a treaty with Mexico for the assumption by the United States of the interest, at three per cent, upon the funded debt of that country, the principal of which was understood to be about sixty-two millions of dollars, for the term of five years from the date of the decree recently issued by Mexico suspending such payment, provided that Mexico could pledge to the United States its faith for the reimbursement of the money, with six per cent interest, to be secured by special lien upon all the public lands and mineral rights in the several Mexican States of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Cinaloa, the property so pledged to become absolute in the United States at the expiration of the term of six years from the time when the treaty went into effect, if such reimbursement were not made before that time. The President felt that this course was rendered necessary by circumstances as new as they are eventful, and seeming to admit of no delay.

Mr. Seward proceeds to say, that his instructions are conditional upon the consent of the British and French Governments to forbear action against Mexico, on account of failure or refusal to pay the interest in question, until after the treaty had been submitted to the Senate, and, if ratified, then so long thereafter as the interest is paid by the United States.

Mr. Seward adds, that his instructions are not to be considered as specific, but general, subject to modification as to sums, terms, securities, and other points.

Mr. Corwin, in an earlier despatch, dated at Mexico, 29th July, 1861, and addressed to Mr. Seward, had already suggested the policy he was now authorized to pursue, and proposed a lien on the public lands and mineral rights in the provinces mentioned by Mr. Seward. From such arrangement, in his opinion, two consequences would follow: first, all hope of extending the domain of a separate Southern republic in this quarter or in Central America would be extinguished; and, secondly, any further attempt to establish European power on this continent would cease to occupy either England or Continental Europe.

Afterwards, in a despatch, dated at Mexico, November 29, 1861, Mr. Corwin enclosed to Mr. Seward the project of a treaty between the United States and Mexico, by which the United States were to lend Mexico five millions of dollars, payable in monthly instalments of one half million a month,—also the further sum of four millions of dollars, payable in sums of one half million every six months; the whole to be secured by mortgage on the public lands, mineral rights, and Church property of Mexico, for the realization of which a board of five commissioners was to be organized, three to be appointed by Mexico and two by the United States, holding sessions in the city of Mexico until the debt and interest were fully discharged. No reference was made in the proposed treaty to the consent of the British and French Governments, mentioned by Mr. Seward as a condition, nor to the application of the money, when received by Mexico; nor does anything on this subject appear in the accompanying despatch.

The President, by his Message of December 17, 1861, submitted the draught of this treaty to the Senate for their advice. Afterwards, by another Message, of January 24, 1862, he called their attention to it again, in the following language.

“I have heretofore submitted to the Senate a request for its advice upon the question pending by treaty for making a loan to Mexico, which Mr. Corwin thinks will in any case be expedient. It seems to me to be my duty now to solicit an early action of the Senate upon the subject, to the end that I may cause such instructions to be given to Mr. Corwin as will enable him to act in the manner which, while it will most carefully guard the interests of our country, will at the same time be most beneficial to Mexico.”

Meanwhile, Great Britain, France, and Spain, by a Convention, dated at London, October 31, 1861, have entered into an alliance, the declared object of which is “to demand from the authorities of the Republic of Mexico more efficacious protection for the persons and properties of their subjects, as well as a fulfilment of the obligations contracted by the Republic of Mexico.” The high contracting parties engaged not to seek for themselves, in the employment of coercive measures, any acquisition of territory, nor any special advantage, and not to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of a nature to prejudice the right of the Mexican nation to choose and to constitute freely the form of its government. Desiring that the measures they intend to adopt should not bear an exclusive character, and being aware that the Government of the United States, on its part, has, like them, claims upon the Mexican Republic, they further agree that our Government shall be invited to join in the Convention.

Mr. Seward, in a despatch, dated at Washington, December 4, 1861, declined to join in the Convention, saying, “that the United States prefer, as much as lies in their power, to maintain the traditional policy recommended by the Father of their country, confirmed by successful experience, and which forbids them to make an alliance with foreign powers.”

In pursuance of this Convention, the naval and military forces of the three great powers have assembled at San Juan de Ulua, and the flags of the three powers now float over the castle. The Government of Mexico has rallied the people to resistance, and there is at this moment the prospect of a prolonged and exhausting contest. The occasion seems to have arrived, when the aid proposed by Mr. Seward, in his despatch of September 2, 1861, may be of decisive value to Mexico. To the United States it may also be of great importance, if it could be the means of removing from Mexico the pressure of hostile armaments, and placing a neighbor republic in a more tranquil and independent condition. If the Allied Powers desire security for their claims, and nothing else, then a reasonable provision of this nature ought to be satisfactory, so far as any question arises from the claim.

The debt of Mexico to the Allied Powers may be stated, in round numbers, as follows.

To England,immediate$ 1,000,000

convention, 4 per cent interest5,000,000

bondholders, 3 per cent interest65,000,000

general claims4,000,000

—————$75,000,000

To France,immediate500,000

convention, balance, immediate200,000

Pennand agreement800,000

claims, general3,500,000

—————5,000,000

To Spain,immediate500,000

convention, 3 per cent interest8,000,000

claims1,500,000

—————10,000,000

—————

Total$90,000,000

Of course, payment or guaranty of this large mass on our part is out of the question; nor was it contemplated by the United States in the original instructions to Mr. Corwin. It was proposed to make such payment as would afford present relief to Mexico, and secure the forbearance of the Allied Powers. To this end, Mr. Seward offered to assume the interest of the Mexican debt for the term of five years. But the unfunded claims in the foregoing list, entitled “immediate,” it is understood, are pressed with equal energy by the Allied Powers. If these were satisfied, and provision made for the interest, the United States would have the following liabilities.

Payments, immediate, or at 3, 6, and 12 months, as follows.

To England, 3, 6, and 12 months’ drafts of Mexico on United States$1,000,000

To France, 3, 6, and 12 months’ drafts of Mexico on United States700,000

To Spain, 3, 6, and 12 months’ drafts of Mexico on United States500,000

—————

Total cash, or 3, 6, and 12 months$2,200,000

Interest, in semi-annual drafts of Mexico on the United States.

To England, convention, 4 per cent$200,000

bondholders, 3 per cent1,950,000

—————$2,150,000

To Spain, convention, 3 per cent240,000

—————

Total interest, per annum$2,390,000

Other outstanding claims of the Allied Powers are not included in either of these lists. It is proposed that these should be provided for by a sinking fund, at the rate of 10 per cent a year for ten years, as follows.

To England$400,000

To France80,000

To France350,000

To Spain150,000

————

Total, per annum$980,000

The assumption of all these liabilities for a long period would throw upon the United States a burden too great for the present moment, although, perhaps, not out of proportion to the anticipated advantages. If anything be done on our part, it must be more moderate. The offer of Mr. Seward for five years, if accepted, would devolve upon the United States a responsibility sufficiently large; and this responsibility ought to be kept within a limitation, of which $15,000,000 should be a maximum.

But there are two conditions to be required by the United States, before the assumption of any such responsibility. The first is the assent of the Allied Powers, and the acceptance on their part of the friendly offers proposed. Unless the Allied Powers are parties to the transaction, it would be productive only of embarrassment and loss, without accomplishing any permanent good to the United States or to Mexico.

The other essential condition is, that security should be given by Mexico for the liabilities assumed. It is not too much to expect such security; nor is Mexico, as is well known, disinclined to give it. Her creditors are now foreclosing their demands, at the cost, perhaps, of her national existence, and she turns to the United States for help. Not merely friendship, but a continental policy, affecting our own cherished interests, prompts us to afford such help, so far as in our power. In asking for security, we simply follow the rules of prudence, whether between individuals or nations.

The security proposed by Mr. Corwin on the public lands, minerals, and Church property of Mexico, would require the appointment of a board or mixed commission for the management and disposition of this property. This necessity adds to the complications of such security.

The security proposed by Mr. Seward, on the public lands and mineral rights in the several provinces of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Cinaloa, is simple, and it is understood that in some of this territory there is vast mineral wealth. The province of Lower California is unquestionably the territory of Mexico most interesting to the United States in a military and naval point of view.

Another security, perhaps less manageable, but more interesting still, would be the right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, with a mortgage on the adjoining public lands of the Isthmus. Estimated by its pecuniary value, this security would not be large; but there can be no doubt of its political and commercial value.

Still another security would be a pledge by Mexico of 25 per cent, or perhaps a larger percentage, of the customs or other revenues.

It is not easy to say positively, at this distance from the scene of operations, and with the information before the Committee, what is the most practicable form of security. Perhaps it is advisable to leave the matter to the careful discretion of our minister at Mexico, under instructions from the President, with the explicit understanding that the United States decline any territorial acquisition, and seek the consolidation of Mexico, without dismemberment of any kind.

Such are the main features of the question on which the President has asked the advice of the Senate. With more precise information on the matters involved, it might be proper for the Senate to enter upon details in its answer. But such information, especially with regard to actual relations, now daily changing, between Mexico and the Allied Powers, can be obtained only on the spot. It is evident, therefore, that the Senate can do little more than indicate an opinion on what has already been done, and declare the proper principles on which a negotiation with Mexico should be conducted, without presuming to fix in advance all its terms. Much must be left to the discretion of our minister there, and to the instructions he will receive from the President.

The Committee recommend the passage of the following resolution.

Resolved, That, in the changing condition of the relations between Mexico and the Allied Powers, and in the absence of precise information, it is impossible for the Senate to advise the President with regard to all the terms of a treaty with Mexico, so as to supersede the exercise of considerable discretion on the part of our Minister there, under instructions from the President, but that, in answer to the two several Messages of the President, the Senate expresses the following conclusions.

First. The Senate approves the terms of the instructions to our Minister at Mexico contained in the despatch bearing date September 2, 1861.

Secondly. The Senate does not advise a treaty in conformity with the project communicated by our Minister to Mexico in his despatch of November 29, 1861, as the same fails to secure in any way the application of the money to the demands of the Allied Powers, or either of them, and therefore can be in no respect satisfactory to them.

Thirdly. The Senate advises a treaty with Mexico providing for the assumption of the interest on the debt from Mexico to the Allied Powers during a limited period of time, and also for the payment of certain immediate claims by these Powers, the whole liability to be kept within the smallest possible sum; it being understood that the same shall be accepted by the Allied Powers in present satisfaction of their claims, so that they shall withdraw from Mexico.[206] And it shall be secured by such mortgage or pledge as is most practicable, without any territorial acquisition or dismemberment of Mexico.

The Resolution reported by the Committee was amended in the Senate by striking out all after the word “Resolved,” and inserting in lieu thereof as follows: “That, in reply to the two several Messages of the President with regard to a treaty with Mexico, the Senate express the opinion that it is not advisable to negotiate a treaty that will require the United States to assume any portion of the principal or interest of the debt of Mexico, or that will require the concurrence of European powers.”