Volume 5 — ORIGINATION OF APPROPRIATION BILLS.

Speech in the Senate, on the Usurpation of the Senate in the Origination of Appropriation Bills, February 7, 1856.

On the 11th of December, 1855, Mr. Brodhead, of Pennsylvania, introduced a resolution directing the Committee on Finance to consider the expediency of reporting the appropriation bills for the support of the Government. The resolution was allowed to lie on the table till January 7, 1856, when it was called up for consideration, and adopted. On the 4th of February, Mr. Hunter, of Virginia, Chairman of the Committee on Finance, reported to the Senate the following resolution:—

“Resolved, That the Committee on Finance be instructed to prepare and report such of the general appropriation bills as they may deem expedient.”

The resolution was adopted by the Senate, February 7, but this was all. Nothing was done under it.

This attempt was prompted by the protracted contest in the organization of the House of Representatives, when, after one hundred and thirty-three ballotings, Mr. Banks was chosen Speaker, February 2, and the Slave Power received its first check.

In the course of the debate, February 7, Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

MR. PRESIDENT,—Whatever the Senator from New York [Mr. Seward] touches he handles with a completeness to render anything superfluous from one who follows on the same side; but the opposition which his views have encountered from the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Hunter], and also from the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Toombs], as well as the intrinsic importance of the question, may justify the attempt to state the argument anew.

We are carried first to the words of the Constitution, which are as follows:—

“All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills.”

Under this provision, the annual appropriation bills for the Army, Navy, Post-Office, and civil and diplomatic service, from the beginning of the Government, have originated in the House of Representatives; and this has always been so, I believe, without question. It is now proposed to reverse the standing policy, and to originate such bills in the Senate; and this proposition has the sanction of the Committee on Finance.

The proposition is a clear departure from usage, and on this account must be regarded with suspicion. A slight examination will demonstrate that it tends to subvert well-established landmarks.

By looking at the debates in the Convention which framed the National Constitution, it will be found that this clause was not hastily or carelessly adopted,—that it was the subject of much discussion, and was viewed as essentially important in establishing the system of checks and balances peculiar to our Republic. It was, indeed, part of the compromise between the small States and the large States.

After much consideration, the equality of the States was recognized in the Constitution of the Senate, and small States, like Delaware and Rhode Island, were allowed, in this body, equal power with large States, like Virginia and Massachusetts. But this great concession to the small States was coupled at the time with a condition that “money bills” should originate in the House of Representatives, where the people were represented according to numbers. The language finally employed was, “All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.” This was adopted, as compensation to the large and populous States for their comparative weakness in the Senate.

That I do not go too far, when I call it part of the compromise between the great States and small States, I proceed to show, from the debates in the National Convention, as reported by Mr. Madison, how it was regarded there.

The provision owes its authoritative introduction to Dr. Franklin, who moved it in the committee which subsequently reported it.[30] Afterwards, in Convention, when the clause relating to equality of votes was under consideration, we have this report of what he said.

“Dr. Franklin observed, that this question could not be properly put by itself, the Committee having reported several propositions as mutual conditions of each other. He could not vote for it, if separately taken, but should vote for the whole together.”[31]

Colonel Mason, of Virginia, was of the same opinion, and desired “that the whole might be brought into one view.”[32]

Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, followed up the idea of the mutual dependence of the two propositions, remarking,—

“He would not say that the concession was a sufficient one on the part of the small States; but he could not but regard it in the light of a concession. It would make it a constitutional principle, that the second branch were not possessed of the confidence of the people in money matters,”—

Please, Sir, to mark the breadth of this expression.

—“which would lessen their weight and influence.”[33]

Mr. Pinckney, of South Carolina, followed, saying,—

“He thought it evident that the concession was wholly on one side, that of the large States; the privilege of originating money bills being of no account.”[34]

At a later stage of the debates the subject was resumed, and the two propositions still appear together.

“Mr. Rutledge [of South Carolina] proposed to reconsider the two propositions touching the originating of money bills in the first, and the equality of votes in the second branch.”

“Mr. Sherman [of Connecticut] was for the question on the whole at once. It was, he said, a conciliatory plan. It had been considered in all its parts.”

“Mr. Luther Martin [of Maryland] urged the question on the whole. He did not like many parts of it.… He was willing, however, to make trial of the plan, rather than do nothing.”

“Mr. Gerry [of Massachusetts] did not approve of a reconsideration of the clause relating to money bills. It was of great consequence. It was the corner-stone of the accommodation.”[35]

At a still later stage Mr. Pinckney moved to strike out the section on money bills, “as giving no peculiar advantage to the House of Representatives, and as clogging the Government.” Mr. Gorham “was against allowing the Senate to originate, but was for allowing it only to amend.” Mr. Gouverneur Morris urged, that it was “particularly proper that the Senate should have the right of originating money bills. They will sit constantly, will consist of a smaller number, and will be able to prepare such bills with due correctness, and so as to prevent delay of business in the other House.” To all this Colonel Mason replied, in the strong language which seems to have been natural to him, that he “was unwilling to travel over this ground again. To strike out the section was to unhinge the compromise of which it made a part.”[36]

I might adduce other authorities; but here surely is enough to show that the provision was in reality one of the important compromises of the Constitution.

This brings me, Sir, to the precise meaning of the provision. The seeming indefiniteness of the term, “bills for raising revenue,” may alone furnish apology for the present debate. It may be argued, that, while the Senate is placed under certain restrictions, it may nevertheless originate “appropriation bills.” This, of course, is a question of interpretation. Does this interdict upon the Senate extend to bills by which money is appropriated to the support of Government, as well as to bills by which it is directly obtained? Are appropriation bills included under the term, “bills for raising revenue”? Now I cannot accord with opinions so confidently expressed by the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Hunter], and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Toombs], that it was clearly the intention of the Constitution to concede to the Senate the power of originating all appropriation bills; nor, on the other hand, do I assert that such exercise of power is in the strict sense unconstitutional. I approach the question as an inquirer anxious to find the real purpose.

Several considerations seem to shed light on the path to our conclusion.

First. The compromise between the small States and large States can be made completely effective, according to obvious intent of the authors of the Constitution, only by interdicting the Senate from originating the great appropriation bills. If this interdict is restricted simply to tariff bills, which occur only at rare intervals, it becomes a very inadequate compensation for the surrender by the large States to the small States in the constitution of the Senate. According to the reason of the rule, the great appropriation bills must be equally within its intendment. The reason is as strong in one case as in the other.

In the debates of the Convention, Dr. Franklin said:—

“As it had been asked what would be the use of restraining the second branch from meddling with money bills, he could not but remark, that it was always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of their money, and how it had been disposed of.”

Please, Sir, to mark these words.

“It was a maxim, that those who feel can best judge. This end would, he thought, be best attained, if money affairs were to be confined to the immediate representatives of the people.”[37]

Mr. Gerry, in urging the restraint upon the Senate, said:—

“The other branch was more immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the purse-strings.”[38]

How, Sir, can the people hold the purse-strings, unless they hold the bills by which the purse is appropriated?

And Colonel Mason broke forth in language clearly revealing his sense of danger against which to guard.

“If the Senate can originate, they will, in the recess of the legislative sessions, hatch their mischievous projects for their own purposes, and have their money bills cut and dried (to use a common phrase) for the meeting of the House of Representatives.”[39]

I repeat, then, according to the reason of the rule, the great appropriation bills must be embraced by the prohibition.

Secondly. There is a further consideration, founded on the familiar use of the term money bills throughout the debates in the Convention, as applicable to bills which the Senate cannot originate. I need not occupy time by reference to instances; but whoever takes the trouble to investigate the matter in Mr. Madison’s report of the debates, and also in the report of the Virginia Convention, will find that this term is universally employed,—unless, indeed, where Mr. Gouverneur Morris uses the broader term “money plans,”[40] and Mr. Gerry “money matters.”[41] Now all these phrases are clearly applicable to “appropriation bills,” by which the Government is carried on; and the inference seems irresistible, that the parties who used them must have had such bills in mind.

In the Virginia Convention objection was made by Mr. Grayson “to the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to money bills.” The objection is even to “amendments.” He pronounced this “a departure from that great principle which required that the immediate representatives of the people only should interfere with money bills.… The Lords in England had never been allowed to intermeddle with money bills. He knew not why the Senate should.”[42]

Thirdly. This brings me to another consideration, founded on the example of England, which was obviously present to the framers of the Constitution. The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Hunter] is clearly mistaken on this point. It was often adduced in debate in the National Convention, and, as we have just seen, in the Virginia Convention also. In England the rule is explicit, and of ancient date. As early as July 3, 1678, the Commons resolved:—

“That all aids and supplies, and aids to his Majesty in Parliament, are the sole gift of the Commons; and all bills for the granting of any such aids and supplies ought to begin with the Commons; and that it is the undoubted and sole right of the Commons to direct, limit, and appoint, in such bills, the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants, which ought not to be changed or altered by the House of Lords.”[43]

In pursuance of this rule, estimates for the annual expenditure are submitted by the Ministry to the House of Commons, sitting as a Committee of Supply. This process is explained as follows.

“The member of the Administration representing the department for which the supplies are required first explains to the Committee such matters as may satisfy them of the correctness and propriety of the estimates, and then proceeds to propose each grant in succession, which is put from the Chair in these words: ‘That a sum not exceeding —— be granted to her Majesty, for the object specified in the estimate.’ … The Committee of Supply votes every sum which is granted annually for the public service,—the army, the navy, the ordnance, and the several civil departments.”[44]

At the close of the session all the grants are embodied in a bill, which is known as “Appropriation Bill,” and, as it is kindred in character to that under our system, doubtless has given its name to ours. This bill is thus described:—

“It enumerates every grant made during the whole session, and authorizes the several sums, as voted by the Committee of Supply, to be issued and applied to each service.”[45]

Thus, on three grounds,—first, by the reason of the thing,—secondly, by the familiar use in all the debates of the descriptive term, “money bills,”—and, thirdly, by the example of England,—the conclusion is inevitable, that “appropriation bills,” by which the Government is carried on, are within the spirit of the interdict upon the Senate, and that this body cannot originate such bills without violation of a well-established principle inherited from English jurisprudence, and also without unhinging, according to the language of Colonel Mason, that compromise by virtue of which the small States are admitted to equality of representation on this floor.

I am not unmindful of the fact, on which the Senator from Virginia has dwelt so emphatically, that the Senate is in the habit of originating pension bills, also bills for payment of private claims, and kindred measures. I was glad, to-day, to vote for the bill originating in this body for the relief of our late distinguished Minister at Constantinople.[46] But against this usage, which is exceptional in character, and has probably attracted little attention, from its considerable convenience and little importance, may be opposed the uniform practice by which the great bills providing for the necessities of the Government have always originated in the House of Representatives. And you will bear in mind, Sir, that the question is now on these bills.

Mr. President, it is a received maxim, that it is the part of a good judge to amplify his jurisdiction; but it will hardly be accepted, that it is the part of the American Senate to amplify its powers, particularly in derogation of the popular branch. And it surely cannot escape observation, that the present effort is launched at a moment when the popular branch promises to differ from the Senate on important questions of national policy. I am not insensible to the public convenience, which has been pressed in this debate; but permit me to say, Sir, that, should this convenience require the proposed departure from our standing policy, we shall be wise, if we hearken to the counsels of the Senator from New York, and refrain from any innovation, unless assured of the consent and coöperation of the other House.