Note 147 — K (continued 5)

In the Northern Circars, and part of the Ceded Districts, the Vēdōktha form of marriage now prevails, and its usage is spreading into the southern districts of Mysore. Further, the Kōmatis perform most of their ceremonies in the same form. This, it is contended, is a latter day development by some of the more conservative members of the caste, but it is stated by those who follow it that it is allowed to them by the Hindu sāstras (law books), as they are Vaisyas. During recent years, the latter view has obtained a great impetus through the writings and influence of several of the more prominent members of the caste, between whom and their opponents a war of pamphlets has taken place. It is not possible here to go into details of the dispute, but the main point seems to be as follows. On the one hand, it is denied that there are any true Vaisyas in the Kaliyuga (iron age). And so, though the Kōmatis are accorded the status of Vaisyas in recognition of their being traders, yet they cannot follow the Vēdic form of ceremonial, which is the exclusive right of Brāhmans; and, even if they ever followed it, they forfeited it after the break-up of the caste on the death of Kanyakamma. On the other hand, it is stated that the Kōmatis are Dwijas (twice born), and that they are consequently entitled to follow the Vēdic ritual, and that those who forfeited the Vēdic rights are those who did not follow Kanyakamma to the fire-pits, and do not therefore belong to the 102 gōtras. The dispute is an old standing one, and nearly a century ago was taken for adjudication as far as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The question whether the Kōmatis are entitled to perform their subah and asubah (auspicious, like marriage, and inauspicious, like death) ceremonies according to the Vēdic form, was raised by the Brāhmans of Masulipatam in 1817, and adjudicated upon.147 Disputes had occurred between the Brāhmans and Kōmatis for a long time, and disturbances constantly took place. The Magistrate of Masulipatam prohibited the Kōmatis from performing one of the ceremonies, until they had established their right to do so in a Civil Court. The appellants thereon sued the defendants in damages for impediments made against their attending to the rites prescribed by the Vēdas, and prayed for permission to perform them in conformity with the Vēdas. The defendants denied the right of the Kōmatis to perform, and the fact of their ever having performed the ceremonies appointed by the Vēdas. They admitted the intervention of the Magistrate, and stated that “upwards of two thousand years ago, the Kōmatis adopted the customs of the Soodra caste, and some of them became Byri Kōmatis, and Bookha caste people, etc. The rest of them, amounting to a hundred and two gōtras, fabricated false gōtrams for themselves, and called themselves Nagaram Kōmatis. They fabricated a book called Canniaca Purānam, named the Bashcara Puntulu Varu their priest, conformed to that book, performed the sign of the upanayana ceremony in a loose manner, and in the language of the Purānas; at the time of marriage, made marriage ceremony in seven days contrary to the custom of all castes whatever, erected prōlu posts, made lumps of dough with flour, and got the same divided among them according to their spurious gōtrams, at midnight fetched the pot of water called arivany, and observed the ceremonies for ten days on the occurrence of a birth, and fifteen days on the occurrence of a death. In this manner, the forefathers of the plaintiffs, the other merchants, and the plaintiffs themselves, had got all ceremonies conducted for upwards of two thousand years past.” They cited instances, in which the plaintiffs, or some of them, had failed in previous attempts to sustain the right now claimed, and objected to the form of the plaint as not sufficiently setting forth the particulars and nature of the obstruction for which the plaintiffs claimed compensation. The plaintiffs, in their reply, did not negative or rebut the specific statements of the defendants, but insisted generally on their right to the performance of the ceremonies in question. The point at issue being not clear from the pleadings, the parties were questioned in open Court as to the precise object of the action, and the ground on which it was maintained. The plaintiffs stated that their object was the establishment of their right to have the whole of the subha and asubha ceremonies performed in their houses by Brāhmans in the language of the Vēdas, and that they claimed this right on the ground of the Sāstras. On this, the Zilla Judge framed a hypothetical statement of facts and law based on the defendant’s answer for the opinion of the Pandit of the Court, and, upon his opinion, declared the plaintiffs entitled to have the ceremonies performed for them by Brāhmans. Upon appeal, the Provincial Court for the northern division remitted the suit to the Zilla Court to take evidence, and, upon such opinions of the Pandits which the Provincial Court took upon the same statement as the Zilla, they affirmed the decree, but without costs. The Pandits consulted by them were those of the Provincial Courts of the northern, centre, southern and western divisions. They all agreed that “the Brāhmans ought not to perform the ceremonies in the language of the Vādas for the Vaisyas.” Three of them further added that, in their opinion, the Judges ought to pass a decision, awarding that the Kōmatis are to continue to perform religious rites according to the rules laid down in the book called Purānam (i.e., in the Purānōktha form), as are at present observed by the corrupt or degenerate Vaisyas or Kōmatis and others. On appeal, the Sudder Dewāni Adawlut reversed the decisions of the lower Courts, “having maturely weighed the evidence produced, and considered the unbiassed and concurring opinions of the four law officers of the Provincial Courts.” On further appeal to the Privy Council, Lord Brougham, in delivering judgment, observed that “the plaintiffs, not having, in their opinion, alleged any case of injury done to them by the defendants upon which they were entitled to go into evidence, and not having therefore established any case for damages in their suit against the defendants, no question remained but of a mere declaration of a right to perform certain religious ceremonies; that, if the Courts had jurisdiction to proceed to the determination of that question in this suit (upon which their Lordships guard themselves in their judgment), the plaintiffs have not produced sufficient evidence to establish such a right; that, under these circumstances, all the decrees therefore ought to be reversed, and the plaint dismissed (the reversal of the Sudder Court amounts in fact to a dismissal of the plaint); but it is not, as it ought to be, a dismissal without costs; and that this decision should be without prejudice to the existence or non-existence of the right claimed by the appellants, in any other suit, in which such a question may be properly raised.”