XX
Reading edition
THE TRANSITION
I have now explained the nature and working of a national army, and shown the kind of strength it will give and the probable maximum cost which it will involve when adopted.
The chief difficulty attendant upon its adoption lies in the period of transition from the old order to the new. If Great Britain is to keep her place and do her duty in the world the change must be made; but the question arises, how is the gulf between one and the other to be bridged? War comes like a thief in the night, and it must not catch this country unready.
The complete readiness which the new system, when in full swing, will produce, cannot be obtained immediately. All that can be done in the transition period is to see that the number and quality of men available for mobilisation shall be at least as high as it is under the existing system. It may be worth while to explain how this result can be secured.
Let us assume that the Act authorising the new system is passed during a year, which may be called '00, and that it is to come into force on the 1st January of the year '01. The Act would probably exempt from its operations the men at the date of its passing already serving in any of the existing forces, including the territorial army, and the discussion on the Bill would, no doubt, have the effect of filling the territorial army up to the limit of its establishment, 315,000 men.
On the 31st December '00 the available troops would therefore be:—
Regulars in the United Kingdom (present figure) £138,000
Special reserve £67,000
Army reserve (probably diminished from present strength) £120,000
Territorial force £315,000
Total £640,000
From the 1st January '01 recruiting on present conditions for all these forces would cease.
The regular army of 138,000
would lose drafts to Indian and the colonies 23,000
and would have lost during '00 by waste of 5 per cent 6,000
29,000
This would leave:
regular army under old conditions 108,100
and leave room for recruits and new conditions 91,900
The total available for mobilisation during the year '01 would therefore be:—
Regulars 200,000
Paid reserves (the present first-class reserve. I assume an arbitrary figure below the actual one) 120,000
Special reserve (I assume a large waste and a loss form men whose time has expired) 50,000
Territorial force 315,000
Less 5 per cent 15,700
299,250
669,250
On the 1st January '02 the regular army would be:—
Old engagement 108,000
Less waste 5,400
Indian and Colonial reliefs 23,000
79,600
Recruits under new system 120,400
Mounted troops serving second year 20,000
Total of regulars 220,000
New reserve 91,900
Less 5 per cent 4,580
87,320
87,000
Paid reserve 120,000
Special reserve, reduced by lapse of engagements 40,000
Total liable for national war 467,000
Add Territorial force, reduced by 5 per cent waste (14,962), and lapse of (78,750) engagements 205,538
Total liable for national war 672,538
In the year '03 there would be:—
Old regulars, 79,600; less 5 per cent. waste, 3,950; les drafts for abroad, 23,000, leaves 52,050, say 50,000
Regulars, recruits under new conditions 150,000
Mounted troops serving second year 20,000
New reserve 197,331
Paid reserve 120,000
Special reserve 30,000
Total liable for national war 567,334
Territorial force 116,512
683,846
In the year '04 there would be:—
Old Regulars 50,000
Less 5 per cent 2,500
47,500
Less drafts 23,000
24,500
New regulars 175,500
Mounted troops, second year 20,000
220,000
New reserve 329,000
Paid reserve 120,000
Special reserve may be dropped Total liable for national war 669,000
Territorial force 116,512
Less 5 per cent. 5,825
110,687
Less 78,750
31,937
Total 700,937
At the end of '04 the territorial force would come to an end and in '05 there would be:—
(Old regulars, 24,000, after waste just enough for drafts.)
New regulars 200,000
Mounted troops, second year 20,000
New reserve 478,000
Less to paid deserve 20,000
458,000
Paid reserve 120,000
Total, all liable for national war 798,000
In these tables I have taken the drafts for India and the Colonies from the old regulars. But they can just as well be taken from the new regulars. If need be the old regulars could, before the fourth year, be passed into the paid reserve, and the full contingent of 200,000 one year's men taken.
The men of the special reserve and territorial force would on the termination of their engagements pass into the second line reserve or Landwehr until the age of thirty-one or thirty-two.
It will be seen that during the years of transition additional expense must be incurred, as, until the change has been completed, some portion of the existing forces must be maintained side by side with the new national army. It is partly in order to facilitate the operations of the transition period that I have assumed a large addition to the number of officers. There will also be additional expense caused by the increase of barrack accommodation needed when the establishment is raised from 138,000 privates to 200,000, but this additional accommodation will not be so great as it might at first sight appear, because it is reasonable to suppose that those young men who wish it, and whose parents wish it, will be allowed to live at home instead of in barracks, provided they regularly attend all drills, parades, and classes.
It has been necessary, in discussing the British military system, to consider the arrangements for providing the garrisons of India, Egypt, and certain oversea stations during peace, and to make provision for small wars or imperial police; but I may point out that the system by which provision is made out of the resources of the United Kingdom alone for these two military requirements of the Empire, is, in the present conditions of the Empire, an anomaly. The new nations which have grown up in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are anxious, above all things, to give reality to the bond between them and the mother country. Their desire is to render imperial service, and the proper way of giving them the opportunity to do so is to call upon them to take their part in maintaining the garrisons in India and Egypt and in the work of imperial police. How they should do it, it is for them to decide and arrange, but for Englishmen at home to doubt for a moment either their will or their capacity to take their proper share of the burden is to show an unworthy doubt of the sincerity of the daughter nations and of their attachment to the mother country and the Empire.
If Great Britain should be compelled to enter upon a struggle for existence with one of the great European powers, the part which Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa could play in that struggle is limited and specific. For the conflict would, in the first instance, take the form of a naval war. To this the King's dominions beyond the seas can do little more than assist during peace by their contributions, either of ships, men, or money, in strengthening the British navy. But during the actual course of such a war, while it is doubtful whether either Canada, Australia, or New Zealand could render much material help in a European struggle, they could undoubtedly greatly contribute to the security of India and Egypt by the despatch of contingents of their own troops to reinforce the British garrisons maintained in those countries. This appears to me to be the direction to which their attention should turn, not only because it is the most effective way in which they can promote the stability of the Empire, but also because it is the way along which they will most speedily reach a full appreciation of the nature of the Empire and its purpose in the world.