Volume 67 / Part 9 — AGRICULTURE, COMMERCE, AND MANUFACTURES: OPENING OF THE SESSION. (continued 2)

“It should also be remarked, that this distress cannot fail naturally to increase the poor-rates, and the charges of maintaining good order, which must act as a distinct cause of reducing the rents and income of farmer and landlord. In some instances these charges have pressed so heavily at particular times, as to consume the whole rent, and to render land of little or no value, which would otherwise have let at a fair average rate.”

We also learn from Mr Wilson, that extreme cheapness is the reverse of a benefit to the manufacturing operative, inasmuch as it induces habits of luxury which are by no means suited to his welfare. It is not impossible that this view may have led to that salutary reduction of wages, which seems, at the present moment, to be taking place throughout the manufacturing districts of England, and that the diminished supply of money is intended to check that inordinate appetite for cheap loaves and bacon, which is naturally enough engendered by the foreign untaxed supplies pouring in to supersede the production of the home labourer, and to drive him gradually to the workhouse. The member for Westbury says:—

“With the manufacturing labouring classes similar effects occur at opposite periods, when the necessaries of life are pressed to the highest point: they are introduced, in the years of ruinous cheapness, to habits of comparative luxury and consumption which their labour cannot, on an average, command; and they, therefore, feel much more the want occasioned by extreme high prices, when they cannot command so much as their labour should produce to them. So the effect is, that in cheap years his labour commands too much agricultural labour, and he thus anticipates a part of what should be the consumption of a future day; and in dear years his labour commands too little agricultural labour, and he is obliged to receive proportionably as much too little as before he received too much.”

We are decidedly of opinion that there is much sound sense in the above extract. We never have known a year so characterised by ruinous cheapness of all kinds of provisions as that which has just gone by; the present year holds out no prospect of improvement, but rather indicates a farther decline; and therefore we are not without hope that this important point may be worked out at greater length in the columns of the Economist.

The question of wages has led us into a slight digression. Our immediate topic was the dependence of the manufacturers, or at least a large section of them, upon the purchase power of the community; and we have already shown, by the evidence of our opponents, that, in so far as the agriculturists are concerned, their aggregate produce, which constitutes their means, has been diminished by one-third. Now, it must be remembered that the cost of production falls to be deducted altogether from the remaining two-thirds; and that, in the lost third was contained the greater part of the surplusage or profit, which afforded the means of commanding luxuries and superfluities. Of course any diminished power of purchase must tell against the manufacturers, by keeping up their stocks in hand, and lessening the necessity for production. But many of them, failing the home trade, have the chance of a market, though it may be a less profitable one, elsewhere. They can export on consignation if not on order; and late accounts from San Francisco, where bales of British goods are stated to be lying unwarehoused, and exposed to the weather without finding purchasers, show that the export mania may be carried beyond the verge of average recklessness. But the shopkeepers and tradesmen have no such alternative resource. They depend solely upon the consumers of Britain, and any material lowering of the value of home produce reacts upon them in the shape of lessened demand for all articles of luxury in which they deal, and upon the artisan in the form of diminished employment. It may be useful to lay before our readers Mr Spackman’s estimate of the total productions of this country, calculated on the most authentic data before the commencement of the depression.

ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

Annual value of agricultural productions, £250,000,000

Annual value of manufacturing productions, £177,184,292

From which deduct value of raw material, 50,000,000

127,184,292

Annual value of product of mining interest, 36,121,000

Annual value of profits of shipping interest, 3,637,231

Annual income from Colonies, about 15,000,000

Annual income from foreign trade, 15,000,000

Annual income from fisheries, about 3,000,000

Total, £449,942,523

This constitutes the whole product of our national wealth. It is the substance of Britain, and from one or other of the above sources does every individual in the land derive his means of support. Out of these all taxation is paid: from these, all professional men, tradesmen, artisans, and dealers, derive their profit and their means. Hitherto, by all wise legislators, the interests of the two leading classes of producers have been considered indissolubly united. The agriculturist supplied the manufacturer with food, and to a considerable extent with raw material; and in return he took annually two-thirds of the manufactured productions. Our exports were exchanged for luxuries, or for articles which could not be produced at home, and the balance in our favour constituted the yearly increment of our wealth. What free trade proposes to do, and, indeed, has partially effected, is the dissolution of the dependence of the two great classes on each other. The manufacturer is invited to seek his food and raw material from the cheapest foreign source; the agriculturist to do the same with respect to foreign manufactures. But the two classes are not upon a par. The agriculturist cannot export any considerable portion of his produce, because he is greatly undersold by the cheap growers of the Continent and America. We observe that, last year, the whole of the exports which can be termed agricultural, were as follows:—

Butter, £210,604

Cheese, 24,912

Wool, sheep and lambs, 535,801

£771,317

This, it will be seen, is an infinitesimally small portion of our whole products. The manufacturer can export, though not to an extent corresponding to his powers of production. Manufactures have been cheapening year by year, in consequence of augmented foreign competition, and that struggle is likely to go on for years as fiercely as ever. To maintain the export trade in a competition which cannot end otherwise than disastrously, we have been called upon to sacrifice everything. This is the true secret of the lowered tariffs, of the unnatural policy which we have pursued towards our colonies, of the clamour for financial reform which has been so industriously raised. Without speculating as to future operations, which probably will include a direct attack upon the Monarchy and the National Debt, we shall simply draw the attention of our readers to this fact, that, for the sake of increasing the bulk of our exports by the annual value of three, four, or ten millions, (which we have not achieved, our exports last year being lower than those of 1845,) we have lowered the annual value of our home productions by ninety-one millions! And the men who have done this call themselves statesmen, and congratulate each other on the results of their singular sagacity!

But, let the manufacturers do what they can, two-thirds of their produce, in round numbers £120,000,000, must still be consumed at home. The shopkeepers are the brokers of this amount of produce. And how is it to be consumed, if the great agricultural interest is to be broken up? No Free-trader alive can answer that question. We perfectly understand the virulence of their organs, and their wrath and rage at the unanswerable case which we have laid before the public in former papers; but no rage or wrath will extricate the Free-traders from their dilemma. They must now explain to the tradesmen and artisans the profitable nature of their scheme. They may take credit, if they please, for increased exportations to the amount of ten millions—let them debit themselves per contra with ninety-one millions of decrease in the power of the home consumers to purchase, and then account to us for the defalcation. We have a high authority behind whom we shall retire for shelter, if again assailed. That redoubted political economist, Mr James Wilson, must in common consistency put forth his ægis before us, and defend, lion-like, his original proposition, “that individuals, communities, or countries, can only be prosperous in proportion to the prosperity of the whole.”

There are other considerations connected with the permanent depreciation of landed property in Great Britain, which are personal to almost every man belonging to the higher and middle classes of society. It has been far too hastily assumed that this is a mere proprietor’s question, or at least one in which the mercantile and professional classes have no direct interest. We propose, towards the conclusion of this article, to examine that matter minutely: in the mean time we shall direct our attention to the official tables of the exports and imports for the last year, which have been thought so favourable to free trade, as almost to justify the celebration of a national jubilee.

In 1848, our exports were short of forty-nine millions; this year they exceed fifty-eight. Such is their declared value; and though we must still hold with Sir Robert Peel, that these tables cannot be entirely relied on for accuracy, we shall consider them simply as they are given us.

In order to estimate the real advantage which the country has derived from the adoption of free trade, it is necessary to revert to the condition in which we stood before the Corn and Navigation Laws were repealed. No one, who reflects upon the state of the Continent in 1848, can be surprised that our exports have been augmented materially by the restoration of tranquillity. That augmentation has nothing whatever to do with free trade. The question which we must now consider is this—have we been materially benefited, or benefited at all, or the reverse, by the substitution of free trade instead of our former system? In order to ascertain that, we must institute a comparison between our situation anterior to free trade, and that which is now made the ground of Ministerial triumph. We shall, therefore, compare the exports and imports of the year 1845, the last protection year, with those of 1849. The fairness of this comparison will not, we presume, be disputed. And first, as to the exports:

From Mr Porter’s Tables, (page 358 of the new edition,) we learn that the real or declared value of British and Irish produce and manufactures, exported in 1845, was £60,111,081. The Government tables, just published, give us the total declared value of the exports for 1849 at £58,848,042. There is, therefore, a deficit of £1,263,039 in 1849, as compared with 1845. Mr M’Gregor, it will be remembered, told us that we were to have an increase of two millions a-week: the Government tables show us that we have a decrease of a million and a quarter a-year, comparing the one year with the other! We understand that the whole of the exports are included in the statement just issued. We can form no other conclusion from the large increase of the items inserted, and the small amount of some of them—for example, stockings—which are estimated at £1494 in 1849, in comparison with £39 in 1848; indeed, the words “total declared value,” admit of no other construction. So, then, our exports in the aggregate have not increased, but, on the contrary, have fallen off. We find the declared value of our principal textile exports to be as follows:—

1845. 1849.

Cotton manufactures, £19,172,564 £18,834,601

—— yarn, 6,962,626 6,701,920

Linen manufactures, 3,062,006 3,073,903

—— yarn, 1,051,303 737,650

Woollen manufactures, 7,674,672 7,330,475

—— yarn, 1,067,056 1,089,867

£38,990,227 £37,768,416

The imports, however, are more valuable for our consideration. No idea of their comparative value can be formed from the tables; but the amount is set forth in bulk and number, and we believe our readers will feel astonished at the results. We shall first enumerate those articles which have been brought in to displace British produce.

Animals living, viz.— 1845. 1849.

Oxen and bulls, 9,782 21,751

Cows, 6,502 17,921

Calves, 586 13,645

Sheep, 15,846 126,247

Lambs, 112 3,018

Swine and hogs, 1,598 2,653

Total animals, 34,426 185,235

Bacon, cwt., 64 384,325

Beef, salted, not corned, 3,540 144,638

— fresh, or slightly salted, 651 5,279

Pork, salted, 1,461 347,352

— fresh, 133 924

Hams, 2,603 9,460

Total of meats, cwt., 8,452 891,978

Butter, cwt., 240,118 279,462

Cheese, 258,246 390,978

Eggs, number, 75,669,843 97,884,557

Corn—

Wheat, qrs. 135,670 4,509,626

Barley, 299,314 1,554,860

Oats, 585,793 1,368,673

Rye, 23 256,308

Peas, 82,556 285,487

Beans, 197,919 483,430

Indian corn or maize, 42,295 2,249,571

Buckwheat, 1,105 308

Beer or bigg, 1,749

Total grain, qrs., 1,344,675 10,710,012

Wheat meal or flour, cwt., 630,255 3,937,219

Barley meal, 224

Oatmeal, 2,224 40,055

Rye meal, 24,031

Pea meal, 300

Bean meal, 2

Indian corn meal, 102,181

Buckwheat meal, 1,095

Total flour and meal, cwts., 632,479 4,105,107

These are the free-trade importations which are ruining the British agriculturist. This is the kind of competition which he is called upon to face, with a heavier load of taxation pressing upon him than is known in any other country in the world.

We shall probably be told, however, that this enormous supply of cheap food has enabled the people to extend their consumption of articles of luxury to a large extent. Let us see how that matter stands. We select the common luxuries, which are next to necessaries, for illustration,—and we also add another column, showing the quantities entered for consumption in 1848. By this our readers will be enabled to ascertain the increasing rate of demand for these articles.

1845. 1848. 1849.

Coffee, lb., 34,318,095 37,107,279 34,431,074

Tea, 44,183,135 48,735,696 50,024,688

Tobacco and snuff, 26,323,944 27,305,134 27,685,687

Wine, gallons, 6,986,846 6,369,785 6,487,689

It will be observed, that of these articles there is no great additional consumption. We have excepted sugar from the above list, on account of the alteration of the duties since 1845. There was, however, less entered for home consumption in 1849 than in 1848, by 240,067 cwt.

There appears to be nothing else in these tables which calls for special remark. They establish the fact that, under the operation of free trade, we have not yet been able to export as large an amount of manufactures as left this country in the last year of protection; a fact very suggestive, when we regard the enormous increase of the imports. The foreigner is supplanting our agricultural industry, without taking in return an augmented quantity of the produce of our manufacturers.

We cannot, therefore, see that these returns afford us any ground for congratulation. We can draw no good augury for the future from the figures which appear on the import side of the account: on the contrary, they appear to us ominous of calamity and disaster.

The large amount of bullion contained in the vaults of the Bank of England has been triumphantly referred to by the Free-traders as a proof, almost conclusive in itself, that the country is flourishing under the system of unrestricted importations; and the Protectionists have been taunted with the failure of their prediction, that a large import of foreign grain would drain the gold from Britain. These assumptions rest upon a most superficial view of the causes which have combined to restore bullion to the Bank during the last two years; and they argue a total forgetfulness of the calamitous monetary panic of 1847, occasioned by the demand for gold to meet the large importations of foreign grain consequent upon the famine. The ruinous effects of the adverse state of the foreign exchanges upon our commercial and manufacturing classes, in 1847 and 1848, are matters of history; and the unprecedented advice given by the Government to the Bank, to charge eight per cent on its advances, as well as the virtual abrogation of the Bank Act of 1844, are incidents in our mercantile annals too startling to be soon forgotten. It is not difficult, if we keep these things steadily in view, and also take into account the disturbed state of Europe for the last two years, to understand the reason why the returns of bullion have been so great.

The principal sources of the steady accumulation of gold during the last two years, in the face of continued large imports of grain and provisions, may be enumerated as follows:—

1st, The sale of foreign investments by parties in this country, and the stringent enforcement of all moneys due to them abroad.

2d, Forced sales and consignments of British goods at prices ruinously low to the producers.

3d, A considerable reduction in the stock of raw material.

4th, A diminution in the quantity of gold coin required to carry on the internal trade and domestic expenditure of the country. This diminution has been caused by the fall of prices, whereby the same quantity of commodities is represented by less money—by the sudden limitation of the employment of labour—and by the reduced means of the people for ordinary expenditure.

5th, Remittances from foreign countries, caused by the revolutionary movements in most of the Continental states.

3726th, The return of the absentees from abroad, whose expenditure has been estimated as high as £20,000,000. Allowing this to be a great exaggeration, and estimating it even at a third of the amount, the result becomes most important.

7th, By other minor causes, amongst which we may particularise the return of sovereigns to this country from Belgium, in consequence of the alteration in the law which regulates the currency there.

When we look to the operation of these causes, some of them being, from their nature, mere temporary expedients, and others arising from political movements over which we had no control, the existence of a large balance of bullion in the coffers of the Bank of England ceases to be an index of the legitimate operations of trade. It is, in fact, nothing more than a balance. Without accurate data as to the quantities of the gold which have been sent into and again exported from this country during the last two years—data which our opponents have no wish whatever to see produced—it would be fallacious to assume that our increased imports of commodities have been met by our extended exports. Indeed, the Government accounts distinctly demonstrate that such is not the case. They prove that our imports are augmenting at a ratio to which the exports bear no manner of proportion; and no man, who will take the pains of considering dispassionately the foregoing tables, can doubt this. How, then, is the balance paid? Not certainly in goods; and if not in goods, in what other shape than money?

The maintenance of the stock of bullion in the Bank depends solely upon the continuance or the recurrence of such unusual accidents as we have enumerated above. We have been large sellers of foreign funds and investments; and we have received from other countries, for the sake of security, important remittances of the precious metals. But until we can restore the balance of trade by raising our exports to the level of the imports, or by restricting the latter, which we are bound to do in every case where large branches of native industry can be affected, we cannot hope permanently to retain the treasure, except at a frightful sacrifice. Further sales and further deposits may combine to keep it here, even for a considerable period; but so soon as confidence is restored abroad, we must look for a steady drain. If our imports shall constantly exceed our exports, which is the tendency of our recent legislation, we shall be forced to correct the balance of trade by drawing upon the accumulations of our more prudent ancestors, who acted on different principles; and so long as the foreign investments of their wealth last us, we may be enabled to continue our spendthrift course, consuming more than we produce. But this must evidently have an end; and, long before that period, the annual diminution of our national means would be felt by all classes of society, and the war between the great bulk of the community and the money power would commence in terrible earnest.

There are, we know, many people who, in spite of all the testimony which has been adduced, and the solemn declaration of the farmers that they cannot carry on cultivation at present prices, refuse to believe that the agricultural interest is virtually doomed to extinction. They say that the farmers are habitual grumblers, and they insinuate that this may be a false alarm. Now, as to grumbling, we suspect it would be impossible to find any body of men, who are exposed to constant fluctuations in the value of their produce, exempt from such a propensity; and we have heard, ere now, something worse than grumbling proceed from the throats of the manufacturers. But we ask those gentlemen whether, supposing America were to carry her avowed purpose into execution, and to stimulate her own population by converting the raw material of cotton into fabrics, instead of sending it four thousand miles across the Atlantic to be spun in Manchester,—and supposing that, in consequence, American calicoes could be offered in the British market at a price lower than the cost of the production of a similar article would be to Mr Cobden or Mr Bright—they imagine that the machinery of Manchester, Rochdale, and Staley Bridge, would still continue in motion? Does not common sense—does not all experience tell us, that a losing trade must be abandoned? And in order to show that agriculture is a losing trade, we need have recourse neither to farmers’ statistics nor to pamphlets, however valuable. We prove it out of the mouths of our adversaries. Here they are:—

Sir Robert Peel, in February 1842, estimated the proper remunerative price of wheat in this country, “allowing for natural oscillations,” as between 54s. and 58s.—on the average, 56s.; and stated, that he, “for one, would never wish to see it vary beyond these two specified values.”

Mr James Wilson, M.P. for Westbury, writing in 1839, stated it as his opinion, that the proper price of wheat was 52s. 2d.; and that, whatever average annual price the farmer received in any year less than that standard price, he made “so much distinct loss.”

Sir Charles Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer, stated in January 1850, that he did not think “the agriculturist would be ruined with wheat at 44s. a quarter.”

The average price of wheat at the Haddington market, on 8th February, was 34s. 1d.

We know, moreover, that sales of good wheat have been made in Scotland, since that time, at even lower prices.

But is this state of things to continue? We say it must. It is a simple labour and taxation question. You expect the British labourer, who, in every commodity he consumes, pays taxes to Government, to compete with foreign serfs, who pay no taxes at all. You expect the British farmers and landowners to work a worse soil, in a more variable climate, to as much advantage as the foreign grower; and, moreover, to discharge a great portion of the public burdens of the state, to pay their full share of the interest arising from the expenses of every war in which Britain has been engaged since the Revolution of 1688; to support the national church, and to pay an undue proportion for the maintenance of the poor. The cost of cultivating 100 acres of British soil, in Hertfordshire, is estimated at £545—£1 per acre being allowed for rent. The cost of cultivating the same area, in Denmark or the northern states of Germany, is £324, 3s. 4d.—being £220, 16s. 8d., or 40 per cent, cheaper than in England. In this way, if we assume 50s. as the productive cost of British wheat, on an expenditure of £545, for the average here assumed, it will be seen that the expenditure of £324, 3s. 4d. gives 29s. 8d. as the productive cost of German wheat; that the difference in the price of barley between the countries will be as 30s. to 18s.; and of oats, as 20s. to 12s.^[11]

This comparison is favourable to our opponents, because, in estimating the cost of British cultivation, a remarkably low rent is assumed; whilst, on the other hand, the wages of labour and other charges are greatly higher in Denmark and North Germany than in Russia, Poland, Wallachia, or Moldavia, from which countries we draw large supplies of grain. What hope is there of a rise of prices? Corn has been brought to its present low ebb by the importation, last year, of enormous supplies from the deficient Continental harvest of 1848. This year we are about to receive the discharge of a cornucopia filled to the very brim, in consequence of an unusually luxuriant crop. We have had experience of a bad year, and we are about to have experience of a good year, heralded by the following significant fact:—“Bell’s Weekly Messenger states, on unquestionable authority, that, a few days ago, one of the principal City houses chartered several vessels at a freight of 6s. per qr., to load wheat at Odessa at 24s. per qr., free on board.” How long is this to go on? Is it proposed, by this precious Ministry of ours, that nothing is to be done until the whole capital of the tenant-farmers is squandered, and the soil has gone out of cultivation? Or are we to understand that nothing whatever will be done, should prices fall lower than now, or even remain at their present level? If the land goes out of cultivation, a large proportion of the whole annual production of Great Britain, giving at present employment to many thousands, must be directly sacrificed; the manufacturers would, in that event, be compelled to close their establishments for the want of a home market; and we should have no revenue left to pay the expenses of the cheapest kind of provisional government, far less the interest of the national debt. Are the Ministry really aware of what they are doing? According to their own admissions—according to the calculations of their supporters—according to the estimates of the leading Free-traders, the tenant-farmers are at this moment cultivating the soil at a prodigious annual loss. No possible reduction of rent can suffice to cure the evil, even if a reduction of rent, which would throw hundreds of thousands out of employment, were no evil in itself. And yet, in this state of matters, the Whigs have thought proper to issue a prosperity address, almost without qualification, in the name of their gracious Sovereign!

We shall now entreat the attention of our readers to a point in which almost every man of ordinary means in this country is vitally interested. For a great many years the benefits to be derived from Life Insurance, as the best means of providing portions for families, have been acknowledged and largely sought. All classes have participated in these Assurances; and we believe that, in Scotland, it would be difficult to find any considerable number of professional persons, or tradesmen, who do not contribute to the funds of some of the numerous societies. We are not exactly aware what may be the method practised in England, but in Scotland by far the greater portion of the accumulated funds of these societies, amounting to many millions sterling, is lent on the security of the land. The value of the land, as every one knows, must in the aggregate depend on its productive power; and, if present prices are to rule, (and why they should not do so, under present legislation, no mortal man can tell us,) great tracts of the land of this country must go out of cultivation, and consequently be depreciated in value. In that case, how will the creditor fare? There is already a disposition shown, in some quarters, to make the creditor participate in the reduced income of the landed debtor. So hints Lord Drumlanrig, and he is not quite singular in his opinion. This is just repudiation; for could the idea be carried into effect, it would be necessary to apply the same rule to the principal as to the interest, and to provide that the lender of £100 under protection, should not be entitled to claim from his debtor more than £67 under the benign, just, and wholesome operation of free trade. Were this view to be adopted, and the adjustment made on the supposition that rents were only lowered by a third, the family of the man who has insured his life for £100, and regularly paid the premium, would lose rather more than £33. But a reduction of the whole rental of Great Britain and Ireland, to the extent of one-third, would amount to little more than £19,500,000,—a sum utterly insufficient to meet the depreciation, if we adopt the figures of Mr Villiers, or even if we make the largest allowance for exaggeration. The merest tyro in political science knows that land incapable of cultivation is comparatively worthless in price: we have a practical instance of that at present before us in Ireland, where estates have been actually abandoned by their owners. Now, if land at present under tillage should go out of cultivation, on account of the sale of the produce being inadequate to its cost—a catastrophe to which our northern districts are fast approaching—it must become, to all intents and purposes, waste; and the creditor who has lent money on its security will find that, instead of grain-bearing acres, he can take possession of nothing save a wilderness of heather and furze.

Every man, therefore, whose life is insured, has a direct interest in the maintenance of the agricultural prosperity of the country. If that is not maintained, the provision which he has prudently made for his family is placed in extreme jeopardy, and free-trade legislation may utterly neutralise his thrift. Nor let him quarrel with the security, for there is none better. If the land goes down, the tenure of the existence of the Funds is worse than precarious. If the imports of foreign corn and provisions shall augment materially during the next two years, and if “the great experiment,” as it has been called, shall be persevered in so long, the fortunes and apparent destiny of this great country must be materially and radically altered. In any case, there must be a change, and a change of an important description. The unprincipled Currency Act of 1819 has yet to undergo a revision. In spite of dilettante arrangements, and financial hocus-pocus, sedulously invented to blind the eyes of the community to the rottenness and peculation of our present monetary system, that matter must be thoroughly probed and examined by the aid of a clearer light than the lamp of the Jew Ricardo. But, for the present, it would be unwise to complicate the immediate question. Our stand is taken upon the broad basis of justice to native industry. We care not in what form or shape that industry is developed—whether it be applied to agriculture, trade, or manufactures—so long as it is industry seeking but its own, and disclaiming the selfish and sordid end of making an individual profit at the expense, and from the ruin, of other classes of the community. Sometimes, in calmly considering the course of our legislation for the last few years, this reflection irresistibly obtrudes itself—whether men have altogether lost the old feeling of patriotism and devotion, which, more than anything else, placed Britain in her proud position in the scale of the European nations? Certainly, when we read the speeches and harangues of the Free-traders, there is no trace of any such sentiment. They are cosmopolitans, not Britons: and, discarding the landmarks of the Almighty, they seem to hope that the laws of nature will be abrogated, and the doom of Babel reversed, by their own miserable efforts. Their sympathy is of a curious kind. They estimate foreign nations upon a scale founded on the consumption of calico; their notions of liberty undergo a material change, whenever raw cotton or cheap sugar become elements of the calculation of profit. They must have slavery abolished in the West Indian colonies: and yet, having ruined the planters, they are ready to take sugar on the cheapest terms which they dare offer from foreign slave-growing states, and to furnish them with clothing and machinery. Their capital, Manchester, and their principal seats of manufacture, depend for their existence on the continuance of Negro slavery in America, and not a man of these cosmopolitans dare raise his voice to denounce it. Why should he? He can gain popularity cheaper, by retailing gross falsehoods against unreciprocating European states, in every instance where Red Republicanism has reared its head, and been, most fortunately, suppressed. The British labourer has none of his sympathy—he cares not for him in his capacity of a fellow-subject. If the labourer is an agriculturist, our generous philanthropist would rather see him and his family condemned to the union-workhouse, than throw any obstacle in the way of increased serfage in Russia or in Poland. If the labourer is a manufacturer, the cosmopolitan spurns the laws enacted by the gentlemen of England for the protection of the women and children; and, availing himself of a verbal error, claims his right to work human beings, by relays, like cattle in his mill! And these are the men who now regulate the movements, and almost dictate the words, of our British statesmen! In the pages of British history, we meet with instances of degradation which we fain would see cancelled. We know that Charles II. was an acquiescent pensioner of the crown of France, and was content to remain so, at the hazard of the national honour. But we shall search history in vain for so mean a pandering as that which we have seen by Ministers to the interests of an upstart oligarchy—founded on the most perishable basis—scarcely disguising their hostility to the religion and the constitution of the land—trampling on the rights of the poor—denying the claims of Native Industry—and doing their utmost to make these great and glorious kingdoms the habitation of only two classes—one of them being the master-manufacturers, and the other, the operatives, whom they may tread at pleasure under their heel.

Printed by William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained.

Used numbers for footnotes, placing them all at the end of the last chapter.

Erratum item was corrected.