Chapter IV · (continued 2)

“According to the constitutional law hitherto in force, it is the King who governs in Prussia and not the Ministers. Legislative and not governmental power is alone shared with the Chambers, and before them the Ministers represent the King. Therefore now, as before the Constitution, the Ministers are legally the servants of the King, and his Majesty’s authorised advisers, but they are not the regents of the Prussian State. Even since the Constitution, the Prussian monarchy does not stand on the same level as the Belgian or English monarchy. On the contrary, in Prussia the King still governs personally, and commands according to his own discretion, in so far as the Constitution has not otherwise provided, and it has only so provided in matters of legislation.”

Page 8. “The publication of State secrets is an offence against the criminal law. What is to be treated as a State secret depends upon the King’s command respecting official secrecy. Why is so much importance attached to giving ‘outside’ publicity to these matters? If his Royal Highness, as in duty bound, gives expression to his opinions in Council, he has satisfied his conscience. The Crown Prince has no official position whatever in State affairs, and no call to express himself publicly upon them. No one who has even a superficial knowledge of the system under which our State affairs are conducted would conclude that the Crown Prince agreed with the decisions of the Government merely because he (without a vote, and therefore without the possibility of effectual opposition) had listened to the discussions in Council.

“‘Not appear better.’ The mistake lies in the exaggerated importance attached to ‘appearances.’ The important point is what a man is and what he can do, and that is only the fruit of serious and well-directed labour.

“The participation of his Royal Highness in the Council is not ‘active,’ and no ‘votes’ are cast by the Crown Prince. The communication to ‘responsible’ (?) persons without the authorisation of his Majesty would be an offence against the criminal law. Of course, there is no limitation of his Royal Highness’s right to express his views; on the contrary, it is desirable that he should do so, but only in the Council, where, as a matter of fact, they can alone have any influence on the decisions that are about to be taken. The contrary course, ‘to express them openly before the country,’ can only be adopted as a means of gratifying his Royal Highness’s amour propre, and must result in promoting discontent and disaffection, and thereby paving the way for revolution.”

Page 10. “Unquestionably H.R.H. will render their work more difficult for the Ministers, and their task would be lighter if he did not attend the sittings. But can his Majesty shirk the duty of doing everything that is humanly possible to enable the Crown Prince to learn the business of State, and to become acquainted with the laws of the country? Is it not a dangerous experiment to leave the future King a stranger to the affairs of State, while the welfare of millions is dependent upon his familiarity with them? H.R.H. shows himself in the present memorandum unacquainted with the fact that the participation of the Crown Prince never involves any responsibility, and is only for the purpose of information, and that H.R.H. can never be asked to give a vote. The whole argument is based upon a misconception of this fact. If the Crown Prince had been more familiar with State affairs H.R.H. could not have thought of publishing the proceedings of the Council in case the King did not accede to his wishes, i.e., of committing an offence against the law, and what is more, the criminal law, and that too a few weeks after H.R.H. had himself severely censured the publication of the correspondence with his Majesty.”

Page 11. “Certainly the reproach mentioned may naturally occur to every one in the country. No one charges H.R.H. with such an intention, but it is said that others, who do entertain such an intention, hope to see it realised through the unconscious co-operation of the Crown Prince; and that such wicked attempts now afford those who originated them a better prospect than formerly of a change of system.”

Page 12. “The demand to have timely information of the business to be transacted at the sittings is perfectly legitimate, has always been recognised, and shall continue to be so. Indeed a desire has been expressed that H.R.H. should do his part in keeping himself more au courant than was hitherto possible. For this purpose H.R.H.’s whereabouts must always be known and within reach, the Ministers must have access to the Crown Prince, and discretion must be secured. But it is necessary that the Vortragende Räthe (Councillors who have the privilege of direct audience), with whom alone H.R.H. can be authorised to transact current State affairs, should be not opponents but friends of the Government, or at least impartial critics having no intimate relations with the Opposition in the Diet and the press. The most difficult point of all is discretion, particularly towards foreign countries, so long as H.R.H. and the Crown Princess are not thoroughly conscious that in reigning houses the nearest relations are not always fellow countrymen, but, on the contrary, must necessarily, and as in duty bound, represent other than Prussian interests. It is hard that a frontier should create a division of interest between mother and daughter, brother and sister, but to forget this fact is always a danger for the State. The ‘last sitting of the Council’ (on the 3rd) was not a regular sitting but only a meeting of the Ministers who had been summoned by his Majesty without their own previous knowledge.”

Page 13. “Communication to the Ministers would give the memorandum an official character which the Prince’s effusions do not in themselves possess.”

On Monday, the 22nd of October, Count Herbert was present at lunch and dinner, returning to Berlin on the Tuesday. On Monday, after we had had our coffee, I told the Chief that the sorting of the papers was now well advanced. There was a great deal more to do, however, than had appeared at first, and it might take eight or ten days more before I could hand them over to him in good order like the previous set. He replied: “Take plenty of time. But the Emperor will be here in a few days and you must not let yourself be seen then; or, better still, go to Hamburg while he is here, as otherwise he will ask who you are and what you are doing. I should then be obliged to tell him, and as he is curious he would eventually seize the whole lot, which would not suit me at all.”

On Tuesday and Wednesday I was very busy sorting, numbering and taking extracts. In the evening I took a walk with the Privy Councillor until an hour before dinner. We were joined at dinner on Wednesday by the Hamburg merchant, Merck, and his wife—she very pretty, twenty-seven years of age, and he between forty and fifty. On Thursday I was again hard at work on the Chief’s treasury of letters. At lunch the Chief said that formerly the rich and influential Hamburgers were strongly Austrian in their sympathies, and he referred to the millions advanced to the politicians of Vienna in 1857, and also condemned the unamiable and stupid policy of Prussia in those days. The Princess observed that even now these circles do not care much for Prussia, but are impressed, and indeed very strongly, by Bismarck. She then explained to me that the Mercks were neighbours of theirs, and occupied a country house with forty acres of ground on the edge of the forest, the remainder of an estate which a Saxon officer had acquired by marriage, and of which the Prince afterwards bought six hundred acres. In reply to my question, the Chief informed me that the Emperor would arrive on Monday evening and leave after lunch on Tuesday. I must therefore make myself scarce for thirty hours. To-day, however, we shall return to our anthology, and continue it to-morrow. Here follow some further specimens of the selection.

Letter from Bismarck to the King on the 1st of December, 1863: “Your Majesty has been gracious enough to send me Herr von Gruner’s communication of the 28th ultimo, and to observe that it reproduces the views adopted by your Majesty. Herr von Gruner’s opinions are based on the same general principles as those of Herr von Vincke and Herr von Roggenbach, and the latter have found expression in the letter of H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Baden. These gentlemen, in addressing their proposals to your Majesty, doubtless proceed on the assumption that if your Majesty were to accept their advice another Ministry would be summoned to office. Other influences are also being set in motion for this purpose even outside public life, to which Herr von Schleinitz and other persons closely connected with the Court have either voluntarily or involuntarily devoted their services. When I entered into the Ministry I ventured to explain to your Majesty that I did not regard my position as that of a Constitutional Minister in the usual sense of the word, but considered myself rather as your Majesty’s servant, and that in the last resort I would obey your Majesty’s commands even if contrary to my own views. I still maintain that standpoint, but this should not deter me from explaining my views with the candour I owe to your Majesty and to the interests of the country. Speaking in this sense, I must first declare that I consider it would be of advantage for your Majesty’s service, in carrying out a policy consonant with the views of Herr von Gruner, to select another Ministry, or at least another Minister for Foreign Affairs, who would enjoy in a higher degree the confidence of those upon whose support such a policy must mainly rely. Count Goltz has as yet had no occasion to come into conflict with those elements, and owing to his other qualifications may be regarded as best suited to take over the conduct of affairs.”

From a letter of the Crown Prince to Bismarck, dated Headquarters, Flensburg, April 17th, 1864: “I thank you heartily for your two letters of the 11th and 12th of April. I found the communication of the 11th very interesting; but I could not gather from it such a view of the objects of our policy as would enable me, from my standpoint, to support any particular measure with conviction. I do not agree that it is too early to come forward openly with a positive programme, and I fear that we shall gain nothing by protracting the solution of the question, but, on the contrary, thereby increase European complications. However that may be, we should at least have a positive programme for ourselves, the realisation of which it is true would still remain dependent upon circumstances. Instead of this, however, I find in your communication only the programme ‘to act according to circumstances,’ unless I am to infer from some isolated suggestions certain secret views which are ascribed to you, and which certainly appear to tally with many of your former utterances, particularly at the last Council which I attended before my departure for the army. With regard to any such arrière-pensées of Prussian aggrandisement, I may state briefly my opinion, namely, that to pursue them would entirely falsify our whole German policy, and would probably lead to our defeat by Europe. It would not be the first time that Prussia sought to outwit the world, with the result that she ultimately fell between two stools.”

A letter from Bismarck to the King, dated April 3rd, 1866: “Your Majesty has deigned to command me, through Abeken, to express my opinion whether the letter from the Duke of Coburg, which I respectfully return herewith, should be answered.

“I take the liberty to recall the fact that the Duke of Coburg has during the past four years shared in every intrigue against your Majesty’s internal and foreign policy. His Highness has largely contributed to the return of democratic representatives in Prussia through his money and influence; he has associated himself with societies for arming the people (Büchsen-Groschen Vereine), and has adopted such an attitude towards the monarchy that your Majesty made strong representations to him on the subject in a long letter, and declined a visit from him on account of the bad impression it would make on the army. The Duke, together with his officials, Samwer and Francke, is the leader of the anti-Prussian Augustenburg movement; and but for him the hereditary Prince would have listened to reason. The Duke brought about the recall of Lord Napier, a diplomatist who was regarded as too Prussophil. I respectfully take the liberty of indicating the influence of the Duke upon H.R.H. the Crown Prince. I certainly do not go too far when I describe his Highness as one of the most irreconcilable opponents of your Majesty’s policy, and state that no devotion to your Majesty’s honour and interest is to be expected from him. The present letter from the Duke, and that from Count Mensdorff, which was obviously ordered for the special purpose of being communicated to your Majesty, and which is utterly untrue, betray their connection with the communications from Queen Victoria which have reached your Majesty through H.R.H. the Crown Prince; and it is certain that similar insinuations will have been made to your Majesty in other quarters. There can be no doubt that all these steps are based upon a well-laid plan, according to which the open and secret opponents of your Majesty endeavour to persuade your Majesty to yield to Austria, and thus to pave the way for another policy, your Majesty’s present Ministry and myself in particular being for this purpose represented in the first place as the root of all evil. Your Majesty is certainly convinced without any assurance from me that even if my health had remained unaffected during the past few years, I would at any moment willingly, and with lifelong gratitude to your Majesty for the many favours which I have enjoyed, retire into private life even if my continuance in office involved no detriment to your Majesty. How much more willingly would I do so, therefore, if my retirement could be of any benefit to my King and country. I see, however, no possibility of another Minister of your Majesty being able honestly to recommend a policy different to that which has hitherto been followed, and which was sanctioned in the Council of the 28th of February; for this policy is independent of all partisan tendencies, is enjoined solely by the interests of Prussia, and is rendered inevitable by the situation. If the Duke of Coburg recommends another policy, such as would be in agreement with what Vienna prescribes, I beg respectfully to point out that the same gentleman has for the last four years recommended everything that was opposed to monarchical interests, and in particular to those of the Prussian Monarchy. Notwithstanding this your Majesty has done him the honour of answering his letter of the 22nd. If your Majesty were to answer the present letter, with its offensive and untruthful enclosure, that would be an encouragement to your opponents and a discouragement to your servants. My most humble advice is that your Majesty should leave the letter of the Duke unanswered, and not conceal from his aide-de-camp that you have been disagreeably affected by the enclosure. If the aide-de-camp is a person to whom such a communication might be properly made, it would perhaps be well to signify to him verbally that your Majesty has clearly seen through the intention underlying the whole manœuvre with the Mensdorff letter, and that the tone of the latter is not to your liking.”

Letter from the King to Bismarck, dated April 8th, 1866: “Numbers 78 and 79 of the Kreuzzeitung have just been laid before me by an unknown hand (as I have not taken in this paper since 1861—Coronation article in June) on account of the abusive article against the Duke of Coburg. It is most unpleasant to me, as only you, the Queen and the Crown Prince had a knowledge of the Duke’s letters to me, and therefore the source of the article is immediately betrayed. Although you have always told me that the Government has no influence upon the Kreuzzeitung, this appears to be an instance which contradicts that statement. The manner in which I replied to the Duke, and the fact that on the second occasion I sent no reply, showed him that I did not desire to continue the correspondence. But articles like that in question must render him still more hostile to us. From a political point of view this is not right, and on that account I request you to put a stop to these improper proceedings of the Kreuzzeitung towards the Duke.

“William.”

In reply to this Bismarck wrote as follows: “I humbly beg your Majesty’s pardon if I have called down upon myself your Majesty’s dissatisfaction through the article on the intervention of the Duke of Coburg, which was based, not on his letter, but upon a number of other newspaper reports on this intervention. I would never venture to deceive your Majesty, and I frankly confess that the main part of this article was written at my instance, as I—like every one of my colleagues—while having indeed no influence over the Kreuzzeitung to prevent the insertion of matters to which I object, have yet enough to secure the insertion of what is not directly opposed to its own tendencies. The same connection exists with the Spenersche, the National Zeitung and many others, and I believe I have never denied the existence of influence of this description.

“It appeared to me as if your Majesty were yourself indignant at the insincerity of the Duke and of Count Mensdorff; but your Majesty generously pardons the disrespect manifested in such conduct, as also the former hostility of the Duke, who has done more harm to your Majesty and the Prussian State through the favour which he has shown to the democracy, and the disturbance of the relations with England, than he can ever make good through a military convention, and who gave evidence of his real sentiments towards your Majesty at the time of the Congress of Princes. Your Majesty, while entertaining no doubt as to my devotion and obedience, will not expect me to be superior to every human weakness and to preserve my composure at all times when I see how my heavy, and I may fairly say exhausting, duties are intentionally rendered more difficult by the displeasure of such highly placed personages, in whose hearts the success of Prussian policy and the renown of your Majesty and of the Royal House should naturally be expected to hold a first place. And why am I subjected to this implacable displeasure and forced into this struggle with powerful influences which I have to meet at every step I take? Merely because I will not consent to serve two masters, nor carry out another policy than your Majesty’s, nor reckon with other influences than your Majesty’s commands. My offence is that I was ready to serve your Majesty according to your own will when others declined to do so, and that I did not hesitate to obey your Majesty at the risk of drawing down upon myself the displeasure of those who stand nearest to your Majesty. I could have peace if, like many of my predecessors, I were prepared to submit to your Majesty as my own convictions what was suggested to me in other quarters; and if, in particular, I were to advise you to give way in matters of internal policy and military organisation, as of course nothing is really being done in foreign affairs except what was formerly desired by those who now oppose me. I beg your Majesty to forgive me if in this struggle, owing to the feeling that I have been unjustly attacked for the sole reason that I have tried to do my duty towards your Majesty without looking to the right or to the left, I have lost that composure which I myself am desirous of preserving.”

A letter from Bismarck to the King on the 1st of May, 1866: “I submit the enclosure to your Majesty in support of my urgent and respectful plea that your Majesty’s kingdom be no longer left exposed to the danger which, in my most humble opinion, at present threatens it from the warlike preparations of Austria, whose forces are already superior to ours and are being daily increased notwithstanding all pacific assurances. The Minister of War will to-morrow submit to your Majesty a report of the Ministry of State and proposals for further precautionary measures. If your Majesty will give me credit for not being easily accessible to unfounded apprehensions I may venture to hope that your Majesty will graciously consider my request that the measures to be taken as a result of my legitimate anxiety may be speedily carried out.”

Letter from Bismarck to the King, dated 2nd May, 1866: “I respectfully submit to your Majesty the communication which has just been received from Vienna. It vouchsafes no prospect that Austria will disarm, but seems to indicate that she merely wants to put us off for a few days in order to complete her armaments before adopting another tone towards your Majesty, in the belief that she will then have secured a start of us which we could no longer make up. Information reaches me from the Bourse that it is intended to adopt financial measures of a ruinous character (forced loans?) and that the trading community here, including its representative bodies, regard the inactivity of the Royal House in presence of the superior armaments of Austria, as inconceivable, and in the highest degree alarming and detrimental to the country. This feeling, which has prevailed among your Majesty’s Ministers before to-day, has now become general in the city since the facts which were previously known to the Government have found their way into publicity. This feeling would certainly find violent expression should the event show, which God forbid, that there had been any actual negligence in providing for the protection of the country.”

On Friday at lunch the Chief asked me: “What is your opinion, Busch, of Goethe’s tragedies, and of his dramas altogether?” I replied that he was less of a dramatist than a lyric poet, but that “Faust,” setting aside the second part, was after all a most wonderful production. “Yes, certainly,” he said, “and ‘Götz’ too, but ‘Egmont,’ the man in ‘Stella,’ Tasso, and the leading characters in the others, are all Weislingens—weak soft, sentimental creatures—not men as in Shakespeare, always repetitions of himself, for he too had something feminine in him, and could only realise and portray the feelings of women.” I finally recommended Victor Hehn’s “Gedanken über Goethe,” and referred him in particular to the first and second chapters. Towards evening another long walk with Rottenburg, while the Prince went to Schwarzenbeck and the Princess to Hamburg, probably to make purchases in view of the Emperor’s visit. Both were back for dinner, at which the Ranger or Chief Ranger of Schleswig-Holstein, and the Head Forester Lange were also present. The conversation at table turned chiefly on forestry, the various species of trees, and other wooden subjects. A further selection from the Chief’s papers, the arrangement of which will be complete in four or five days. A letter of the 5th of January, 1876, from the Crown Prince introduces Professor Geffcken, who has been to see him, and with whom he has been speaking about his book, Staat und Kirche (State and Church), as a man “of ripe thought and great experience.” The Chief replied on the 8th: “Dr. Geffcken belongs to that party in the Evangelical Church which, like President von Gerlach and some other Protestants, is in alliance with the Centre party and the Jesuits, and which has been and still is hostile to every phase of the German Empire’s development.” The letter goes on to say that his book is a superficial compilation; that his criticism of the Falk laws gives evidence of audacious presumption rather than of impartial consideration; and that his Augustenburg and Hanseatic Particularism has not been overcome by the restoration of the Empire, whose interests he opposes in Alsace. “If I were to see him without the presence of witnesses (which the Crown Prince seemed from his letter to desire) I should have reason to apprehend that my intercourse with such a tool of sectarian intrigue would arouse the mistrust of my colleagues and of public opinion.”

The Crown Prince thinks otherwise. He replied on the 12th of January: “During the many years of my acquaintance with Dr. Geffcken I have never seen any leaning on his part to Catholicism, nor any opposition to Prussia as a matter of principle. On the contrary I could see from his whole attitude, as well as from the statements frequently made by him, that there is as little reason to doubt his ardent Protestantism as there is to question his patriotism.”

In a letter of the 12th of May, 1876, H.R.H. cannot too strongly urge the Chancellor to give Friedberg the Imperial Secretaryship of State for Justice, which it was proposed to establish. He at the same time tried to meet the objections which Bismarck supposed the Emperor to entertain. According to a letter of the 30th of June from the Crown Prince to Bismarck Friedberg had acquired a claim upon his gratitude by his long service, which frequently involved difficulties and sacrifices, but was always marked with the same devotion.

On the 13th of June, 1878, the Crown Prince writing to the Chief on the death of King George of Hanover, says inter alia: “I am of opinion that now, the unfortunate Prince being dead, we must above all things adopt a generous attitude towards his relatives.”

The Crown Prince now writes to the Chancellor more frequently than before. From the 6th of July, 1879, onwards, the project of marrying Prince William to the daughter of the Augustenburger was repeatedly mentioned, Bismarck being asked to promote it. Bismarck submitted his opinion of the scheme. (Professor Schulz prepared a similar statement, in which he proved the Augustenburger’s equality of birth, which had been strongly questioned.) In this opinion the Chief recommends as indispensable a previous renunciation by Duke Frederick.

Correspondence in connection with the Negotiations respecting the German Alliance with Austria.

Andrassy writes to Bismarck (neat handwriting in Latin characters): “Schönbrunn, 1st September, 1879. Honoured Prince! Before leaving Gastein I communicated in nuce by telegraph to my most gracious master, who went direct from Prague to Bruck, the tendency and the result so far of our conferences. I laid special stress on the fact that in view of the warlike preparations and the threatening language which was heard alternately, both in Vienna and in Germany, the question we had to deal with was that of a defensive understanding, a sort of guarantee of insurance, between our two sovereigns, in the sense that any attack upon either of the two empires should be repelled by their united forces, and that the casus fœderis should also arise in the event of an attack upon either by a third Power with the co-operation of Russia. I afterwards emphasised the circumstance that I was strongly in favour of this combination, but nevertheless had not in any way pledged his Majesty. Hereupon I received on my arrival a telegram from Prague, in which the Emperor declares that he approves of the tendency and present results of our meeting from the fullest conviction, and invites me to go to see him in camp at Bruck. I was at Bruck yesterday, and had an opportunity of submitting a detailed report on the subject. I found the Emperor so fully convinced of the usefulness and, indeed, necessity of such an arrangement, that further argument in its favour proved to be superfluous. His Majesty sees therein not only no departure from the determination to maintain peace between the three empires, but the only possible way at the present moment of removing the sword of Damocles which constantly hangs over our relations, and of securing peace for the benefit of both States, and, indeed, for the welfare of the third. As a matter of course, my Emperor is always glad to see you here, and will be particularly glad to do so on the present occasion. In the meantime, I am authorised as soon as you are in a position to inform me that you have obtained the approval in principle of the Emperor William to receive your draft text and to prepare one myself. I am to remain in office until this matter is completed, my successor only taking over the conduct of affairs after the understanding has been concluded. Besides, I have initiated him into the question, and he is in perfect agreement.

“Thus far as to what concerns his Majesty. The following is personal and quite confidential. I have not ceased to think over the matter for myself from all points of view, and my conviction has thereby been strengthened. If immediately after a war for which no one in Russia will to-day accept the responsibility and which has weakened the Empire both from a financial and military standpoint, and at a time when the Nihilist movement is momentarily suppressed and there is nothing to force the Government to seek a diversion abroad, Germany is to be threatened with France, and ourselves with an increase of the army, and that in connection with such questions as Merkovitch and the post offices of Eastern Rumelia, what is to be expected when the wounds of war are healed, when internal difficulties again make themselves felt, and when a foreign diversion may seem the only means of escape?

“I must confess that I can have no ease of mind so long as I do not see the torch extinguished which the Emperor Alexander half unconsciously swings about over the European powder barrel, and while I know the peace of Europe to rest in the hands of a Milutin, a Jomini, and doubtless presently of an Ignatieff. I believe that to-day every State (although our own less than others) has enough to do to protect its authority against the subversive elements in its midst. How is that to be done, however, and who will be able to do it if the State is constantly obliged to devote half its power and attention to dangers which are not of an internal but of a foreign character, and which come not from below but from above? I entertain no doubt as to the personal intentions of the Emperor Alexander. I am convinced that he does not wish for war at present. But as the Minister of a neighbouring State I cannot forget that he had also no desire for the war just concluded, and that from the beginning to the end of it he was trying to master the movement which had originated in his immediate entourage. I consider it a European necessity to provide in some way against this danger, and however difficult I find it now to postpone my retirement which is already widely known to be impending, it would be an immense gratification to me, as a servant of my Emperor and country, to be able to join with you, honoured Prince, in signing this guarantee for the future of our two realms. Austria once committed the mistake of declining the overtures of Germany which would have secured our mutual interests. It is a satisfaction to me to be able to state that the same mistake will not be committed by us this time.

“In sincere friendship and genuine respect,

“Your most devoted,

“Andrassy.”

To this Bismarck replied on the 3rd of September: “Honoured Count,—Yesterday evening I received your letter of the 1st instant, which is a source of much pleasure and satisfaction to me. I hasten to send you a provisional answer. And, first, I beg you to convey to his Majesty the Emperor my respectful thanks for the gracious manner in which he has referred to my intention to come to Vienna. I am pleased to see from your letter that his Majesty (unser Herr) has one foot in the stirrup, and do not doubt that our united efforts will succeed in placing him firmly in the saddle. Unfortunately, from the nature of things, geographical and political, my task cannot be so speedily completed as yours. A verbal report has not only the advantage of saving time, but also that of confining the replies to such questions as are actually raised in the most exalted quarter. In a written report I must, as a measure of precaution, discuss all the misunderstandings of which I may apprehend the possibility. It has, therefore, come to pass that I have been obliged to dictate to my son (who, with your kind permission, also writes this letter) sixty pages, the contents of which I was further obliged to expand in detail by telegraphic and other additions. Nevertheless, I have not succeeded, in spite of all my pains, in entirely removing the apprehension that our peaceful scheme may conceal some secret views of an aggressive character. This idea is unwelcome to a gentleman of over eighty-two years of age, but I hope I may be able to dispel it altogether, even if it costs me a somewhat lengthy postscript to those sixty pages. My master’s disinclination to a speedy acceptance of new situations, which is a feature of his character, offers less scope for my activity. For his Majesty, the attitude recently adopted by the Emperor Alexander has for the first time illuminated, as with a lightning flash, a situation which I have been repeatedly obliged to recognise during the past few years. It will be a matter of extreme difficulty for his Majesty to find himself forced into making a choice between the two neighbouring empires, and he will therefore close his mind as long as possible to the conviction that the moment has come for such a course. In our Royal House habit exercises an enormous power, and the instinct of persistence grows stronger with age, and resists the recognition of undoubted changes in the outer world. Besides, the Emperor Alexander (I do not know whether it be due to the influence of others, or to his own determination) now endeavours to force the Jupiter Tonans into the background by a rapid transition to sunshine. In this sense the last threatening utterances were followed within a week by a friendly invitation to send a Prussian officer to Warsaw. This was accepted by my Emperor, who announced the despatch of Field-Marshal Manteuffel and suite, without my previous knowledge of this step, as a military measure. Baron Manteuffel met at Warsaw with very considerable readiness to make advances, in the sincerity and permanence of which however, after all that has passed, I cannot place any confidence. I am not as yet aware whether the meeting which is to take place to-day at Alexandrowo, was suggested by him or by the Russians. The objections on this side against a meeting on Russian soil have been disposed of by a reference to the difficulty of taking with equal promptitude outside of Russia the necessary precautions for the safety of the Emperor Alexander. So far as I know this meeting takes place to-day, our Emperor being accompanied by an aide-de-camp. According to a report of Minister von Bülow it is mainly inspired by a desire to obtain from the Emperor Alexander an explanation of his threatening attitude. Before this has taken place I cannot expect an answer to my report, which was first communicated to the Emperor on the 2nd, and to which I have up to the present only received a telegraphic reply through Bülow. From Bülow’s telegram, however, it appears that even now the Emperor approves of my re-opening at Vienna the conferences with you, upon which I have already reported to him (—At first he was opposed even to Bismarck’s returning home by way of Vienna—), but that nothing must be settled without his approval. Of course that goes without saying and you will not be impatient if my master requires before coming to a decision the time which his years, his habits, and the novelty of the outlook demand. There is also a further circumstance which indeed is favourable to our plans, namely that H.R.H. the Crown Prince was consulted, and therefore that an exchange of ideas must have taken place between the exalted gentlemen. From my experience of my Sovereign for years past I had hardly hoped that, within twenty-four hours after taking cognisance for the first time of such a comprehensive and novel statement of the situation, he would without more ado agree to the continuation of our conferences. As I shall not remain inactive in the meantime I hope before I leave Gastein to obtain fuller powers. Like you, every day’s further consideration confirms my conviction of the usefulness and necessity of the work which we have undertaken, and I trust God will grant us to secure for our two great States the guarantee of external and internal peace towards which our efforts are directed. I have considered it my duty to inform you of the stage at which I have arrived in my work, and I shall continue to do so as soon as I receive the more detailed expression of my master’s views which has been promised. Should his Majesty commit this to paper at Königsberg on the 4th it would come to my hands on the 7th or at latest the 8th instant. I was greatly tempted after your departure to go personally to Berlin in order to plead our cause verbally, but the state of my health and strength was too indifferent to permit of such a strain. Moreover, experience has taught me that in explaining important and difficult matters to my master I attain my object, not more rapidly, it is true, but more certainly, by writing than in verbal intercourse, as, in the latter, difficulties occasionally arise which have no real connection with the matter under consideration. I hope to complete my cure here by the 15th or 16th, and to be then once more equal to the demands of the coming winter. Trusting that we shall soon meet again, I remain, with friendly and cordial respect,

“Your most devoted,

“Bismarck.”

Stolberg writes to Bismarck from Berlin on the 17th of September: “In continuation of my official communication of to-day, I have the honour dutifully to inform your Serene Highness of the following. As the Emperor was almost on the point of giving his approval he suddenly became embarrassed, and said there was still another obstacle, which he had mentioned to you in his last letter, and which obliged him to attach importance to the exclusion of every possibility of our being placed under an obligation to support Austria in a war of aggression against Russia. After some hesitation his Majesty made me pledge my word that, with the exception of your Serene Highness, I would speak to no one on the subject, and then referred to an understanding entered into by the two Emperors at St. Petersburg in 1873 (with your previous knowledge, but without your counter-signature), by which each was bound to render assistance to the other in certain circumstances. This has obviously been the chief stumbling-block, and has given rise to the notion of treachery towards the Emperor Alexander to which Herr von Bülow alluded from Stettin. Although this statement was too vague for me, in ignorance of the matter in question, to thoroughly appreciate the weight of the objection, I considered it my duty, in view of the approaching decision, to seize hold of the statement made by the Emperor, namely, that if the possibility above mentioned were excluded, his objection would cease, and therefore to propose the addition.

“Although this objection would be thus obviated, his Majesty nevertheless wishes to hear what your Serene Highness has to say upon that point, and desires me to inform you to that effect. After giving his sanction the Emperor was somewhat affected, and told me that this decision had cost him a great effort. He believed, however, that he ought to follow the advice of a tried counsellor like your Serene Highness.—I am, with the profoundest respect, &c.”

Stolberg’s suggested addition ran as follows:—

“The sanction of the Emperor William to the signature of the treaty with Austria would be obtained on condition that the Emperor might write to the Emperor Alexander: ‘His Majesty is satisfied with the assurances given in Berlin by Saburoff as to Russia’s love of peace, and desires, as an evidence of his loyalty and frankness, to communicate the fact that he was on the point (underlined in pencil by Bismarck) of concluding a treaty with Austria, in which the careful cultivation of good relations was promised, and mutual assistance was only provided for in cases of attack.’”

The letter from the Emperor to Bismarck, which Stolberg refers to in the above communication, is dated Stettin, September 15th, and runs as follows: “After I had completed my last letter to you, which you will have received to-day, Field-Marshal Manteuffel forwarded to me your telegram to him of the 7th instant, with which I am greatly pleased, as I can see from it that it will be possible to bring about an understanding between us. Fortunately this opinion is confirmed by your fourth report, which reached me yesterday. But an important point has occurred to me in connection with the pourparlers which you will hold in Vienna. That is the Convention dated St. Petersburg, 1873, which was only signed by the two Field-Marshals, Moltke and Barjatinsky, and was ratified by the Emperor Alexander and myself, while you declined to sign. A circumstance which goes to confirm the —— (illegible) which you then and so often raised against binding Conventions, in circumstances where there was as yet no positive object in view, for which reason I found much difficulty in making up my mind to sign the St. Petersburg Convention. How can you now desire to enter into a convention without giving notice of withdrawal from that concluded at St. Petersburg? Both are intended to be defensive conventions. Now, that of St. Petersburg binds Prussia and Russia to render each other assistance in case either should be attacked. The projected Convention is to contain the same stipulation, but against Russia. How are these two to be reconciled? It therefore appears to me that Bülow’s idea (?) of leaving out the ‘against Russia’ would afford us an opportunity of drawing Russia into the new Convention, and thereby fulfilling that of St. Petersburg. As I do not believe Bülow junior to be initiated into the secret of the St. Petersburg Convention, I have not been able to speak of it to him, all the more so as from his silence on the subject when stating his views he seemed to have no knowledge of it.

“William.”

To this was added a postscript of no particular importance: review of troops, inspection of fleet, patriotic reception, &c.

Bismarck to Andrassy from Gastein, on the 20th of September: “Honoured Count,—In continuation of my humble communication of the 3rd instant, I have the honour now to complete the answer therein begun to your Excellency’s kind letter of the 1st instant. I have, in accordance with our conferences here, sent repeated and detailed reports on the situation to the Emperor, my most gracious master. The conformity between my views, which are known to your Excellency, and those of my colleagues who represent me, have made it possible for me to overcome the difficulties which were created by distance and opposing influences from other quarters in so far that I am now in a position to state that the Emperor agrees in principle with the views by which I was guided at our recent conferences. According to an official communication from my substitute, Count Stolberg-Wernigerode, the Emperor is prepared to sanction an agreement under which both Powers mutually undertake to continue to promote the maintenance of peace, and in particular to cultivate peaceful relations between both States and Russia, but, in the event of either of them being attacked by one or more Powers, to jointly repel such attack with their entire united strength. According to this I am empowered by my most gracious master to propose an unconditional defensive alliance between Austria-Hungary and the German Empire, either with or without a limit of time. I humbly beg your Excellency to enter upon a verbal discussion of this proposal. I shall have to submit the result of our negotiations to my most gracious master for approval. I entertain no doubt as to my being able to obtain this sanction, if your Excellency be in a position to agree in the name of the Emperor Francis Joseph to the proposal made on our side, in the same simple and general terms in which it is submitted. In any case I shall consider myself fortunate if our conferences lead to this or other results calculated to promote the mutual interests of both Empires and the peace of Europe.

“With friendly and cordial respect,

“I remain your most devoted,

“v. Bismarck.”

Letter from the King to Bismarck, dated Baden-Baden, October 2nd, 1879: “I regret to see from your letter of the 24th ultimo, as also from the memorandum enclosed therewith, from the protocols of your negotiations in Vienna, and from the draft treaty which has been based upon them, that my views with regard to the latter have not found acceptance on any side. As I expressed these views in my letters from Danzig and Stettin of the 10th and 12th ultimo as clearly as it was possible for me to do, you can see for yourself how far they differ from the results arrived at, so that there is no necessity for me to repeat them. Notwithstanding this circumstance, however, I return herewith your letter of the 24th in order that you may form an idea from my marginal notes (which, I regret to say, are only in pencil) of the impression which it has made upon me.

“Germany and Austria are desirous of attaining the same end—security against unprovoked attacks by foreign foes. But owing to the special mention of Russia as the foe in question, I cannot agree to the present proposals nor to the immediate conclusion of a treaty. After again extending the hand in friendship to the Emperor Alexander after the removal of misunderstandings (at Alexandrowo), am I now to conclude an alliance against him, even of a defensive character, in which he alone is referred to as the presumable aggressor, and keep this intention a secret from him? I cannot be guilty of such an act of disloyalty. In mitigation of this objection it has been urged that, le cas échéant, Russia would be informed of the existence of an alliance, if indications of a war against us became evident. This very uncertain expression is so elastic that the notice would either come too late or would only cause still greater irritation. It was further argued that in the state of ferment now prevailing in the internal affairs of Russia the knowledge of the alliance in question would give her the leverage and self-command necessary to master that ferment. But surely for that purpose official knowledge of that honourable intention is necessary. And yet it is of course impossible to give official knowledge of the fact that Russia is regarded as the sole enemy. Therefore in order that it may be possible to communicate the treaty to Russia, the reference to her must be omitted from it, and the enemy be only described in general terms, while it must be incidentally mentioned that in entering upon it the parties have this honourable intention in view. That is what I desire. I am opposed to an immediate ratification of the treaty, because there is at the present moment absolutely nothing which could lead to a war against Germany and Austria, and it is notorious that binding treaties entered into without urgent necessity are double-edged weapons. Austria urges the immediate ratification on the ground that the favourable situation which for the moment exists in France may be endangered, and that the intimacy between Austria and England may cool down. I cannot conceive how such far-reaching political combinations can possibly be made to depend upon the hazard of a Minister of the French Republic who is on the point of being overthrown. The Anglo-Austrian intimacy must after all be very shaky if it depends upon the date of the ratification of a treaty. In view of the consideration shown by Austria for the susceptibilities of France and her apprehensions as to a coolness with England, Milutin’s opinion as to the possibility of a Triple Alliance may after all not be entirely unfounded.

“Now, another circumstance has arisen which may open a way out of the dilemma in which I find myself between my conscience and honour so far as Russia is concerned, and the objections raised to my views on the Austrian side. In reply to my telegraphic inquiry, you have informed me by wire of what Saburoff told you under instructions from the Emperor. You infer from these communications that Russia has already got wind of our Austrian negotiations (as is quite natural), and you wish to conclude from the defensive attitude, which, according to Saburoff’s assurance, Russia intends in future to maintain that this assurance must have been a consequence of the knowledge obtained respecting our negotiations. In these circumstances it might be possible to immediately carry out the suggestion made by me on page 3 as to the manner of communicating our proposed arrangement with Austria, and to give the treaty a general character, not only by omitting the name of Russia, but by inviting her to join in the treaty. You yourself have said to Saburoff that you are thoroughly in favour of the maintenance of the Three Emperors’ Alliance; and the same idea occurs in the memorandum, the protocol, and the treaty. What, then, could be simpler than to confirm in a real written treaty the Drei Kaiser Bündniss which has hitherto been merely verbal, or, at most, only had a written basis in the St. Petersburg-Vienna arrangement? You yourself have further told Saburoff that you would not be able to co-operate in any policy by which Austria would be endangered. It is as right as it is important that Russia should thus receive the first official intimation of that of which it has already got wind. Inasmuch as our Ambassador at St. Petersburg will have informed Minister Giers of your interview with Saburoff, I would ask whether his assurance that Russia would henceforth only pursue a defensive policy based on the Treaty of Berlin is authentic, and whether it signifies a defensive policy as against Germany and Austria. If a satisfactory answer were received, and this were immediately communicated to Austria, there would be no further obstacle in the way of ourselves and Austria acquainting the Emperor Alexander in the manner above mentioned (page 3) with the projected treaty, and inviting his adhesion.

“This would render necessary a modification of section 1; section 2 would drop out entirely; section 4 would be redrafted in accordance with my marginal notes, should it be considered desirable that the draft itself should constitute the first invitation to Russia to join in the treaty, as the whole treaty would be submitted as an instrument affecting so far only Germany and Austria. I consider the omission of section 2 to be necessary, because it is directed exclusively against Russia; and furthermore because it is specially stated in your letter of the 24th ultimo that in case of an attack by France upon Germany, Austria would be dispensed from supporting the latter, and only bound to observe a benevolent neutrality. That is as much as to say that we should support Austria against Russia with our whole power (section 1), while Austria is dispensed from rendering a like service if France should attack us. But the latter eventuality is unquestionably more possible and indeed more probable than a Russian attack, at least up to the present, since there the desire for the revanche is only slumbering, has never been abandoned, and will show itself again directly a suitable opportunity arises. With regard to our—Germany’s—position in a war with France I differ from Field-Marshal Moltke, inasmuch as I cannot endorse his view that our forces are sufficient to enable us to carry on such a war without allies. In that event we should find ourselves in presence of an army entirely different to that of 1870, as the progress which it has made is undeniable. Besides, there is a further consideration, namely, the almost hermetically sealed French frontier, extending from the Swiss to the Belgian frontiers, a continuous line of fortresses and forts, which—even if broken through—would render it impossible to send reinforcements to the front, and would, moreover, enormously hamper the strategic advance of our forces. It is on this restricted field that, according to Field-Marshal Moltke, we are to deliver battle. If we are victorious we cannot pursue the defeated enemy as we did in 1870, being stopped by this girdle of fortresses, to which, instead of engaging in a pursuit, we should immediately have to lay siege. Months might pass before we could capture any of them, and this would give the defeated army time to refit at its leisure behind this line and to meet us well prepared in the event of our breaking through it at the risk of our communications with our base. But if the German army is defeated in the first battle then the left bank of the Rhine is immediately lost and we must withdraw across the river.

“For this reason Austria ought not to remain neutral in such a war, but, on the contrary, must be bound by treaty to support us with her whole power, in the same way as the treaty binds us to do with regard to Russia.”

Continuation of this Imperial communication to the Chancellor, dated Baden, October 4th: “I had not finished the enclosed letter to you yesterday when your long telegram arrived, so that I had still to add the last three-quarters of a page. The standpoint taken by me in this letter has not been affected by my resolve to approve conditionally of the Vienna proposal. But I again ask you what are we to reply if, in reference to the Memorandum to be communicated to him, the Emperor Alexander should ask: ‘What, then, have you decided to do in connection with this Memorandum? most probably concluded an agreement? Until I am acquainted with it, I can come to no decision, therefore show me this agreement.’ But as the agreement in its present form cannot be shown to Russia, we must decline to produce it; and what impression must this refusal make upon the Emperor Alexander? Certainly the very worst. The wording of section 2 is, to my mind, so very strange that I merely wanted to sum up the enclosure by proposing that the neutrality of Austria in case of our being attacked by France be struck out, and Austria be called upon to assume the same obligation to stand by us with her entire strength that we undertake towards Austria in section 1, in case of a Russian attack. Otherwise the conditions are not equal. Strongly impress this upon Andrassy once more.

“William.”

Letter from Andrassy to Bismarck, dated 3rd October, 1879: “I have received your much esteemed letter of the 29th of September, for which I return my warmest thanks. I have since then received through Prince Reuss some communications referring to the position of the negotiations. I enclose them herewith in the form in which they were written down by Prince Reuss himself. I am in a position to declare myself in agreement with the intention manifested in this proposal, but I have nevertheless some scruples as to two points. The first is that a treaty is spoken of, and the second that the conclusion of the treaty is described as impending in the future. My objection to the first is that, if the intention to conclude a treaty is expressly emphasised in the letter of his Majesty the Emperor William, it follows necessarily that they will ask for the text at St. Petersburg, and this will afford the Russian Cabinet, before things are settled between us, an opportunity to commence negotiations à trois from which I do not anticipate a satisfactory result for any of the parties. For this reason I venture to submit a counter, or, more correctly, a parallel proposal, the adoption of which would, it seems to me, be of advantage to both sides. This is:—

“After having sanctioned the signature of the Treaty (underlined by Bismarck in pencil) his Majesty the Emperor William can communicate the entire contents (underlined in pencil by Bismarck) of the Memorandum agreed upon and signed by us, which, of course, implies an agreement, adding on his own part the explanation that this agreement at the same time involves a tacit understanding by both Governments that an attack upon either Empire will be regarded as directed against both, and will also be construed by his Majesty in that sense. His Majesty, satisfied with the statement made by Saburoff, respecting Russia’s love of peace, makes this communication as a proof of his loyalty and frankness. His Majesty may, perhaps, add that this understanding is of an entirely defensive character, and that there is nothing to prevent Russia from removing any antagonistic tendency by herself adhering to the principles laid down in the Memorandum. (Pencil-marked in the margin by Bismarck.) By this means the object of the Emperor William would be fully attained, namely, to communicate the significance of our understanding, while, on the other hand, no mention would be made of the existence of a more precise agreement, and, therefore, the necessity of communicating it would be avoided.

“Such a communication of the text would have among other things the disadvantage, first, that the adhesion of Russia to this text is inconceivable; secondly, that the passage in it referring to France and Italy would become known there almost immediately, and would, at the present time, give rise to quite unnecessary combinations; and, thirdly, that the affair might transpire in Parliament, and lead to undesirable discussions. These considerations commend my proposal. Should you not be able to secure its acceptance in the competent quarter, I could agree to any other method, including the suggestion made by Stolberg, my most gracious master having before his departure declared that he would not make a conditio sine quâ non of preserving secrecy as to the Treaty after signature.

“There is, on the other hand, one point which I would regard as entirely out of the question, namely, any communication of the existence and contents of the Treaty before the sanction of his Majesty, the Emperor William, is actually given or is assured. (Bismarck added in pencil: ‘Quite right.’) Without desiring to forestall the decision upon this point of my most gracious master, I should prefer to renounce altogether the conclusion of an agreement, and in any case I should be obliged to forego for my own part any further share in the negotiations upon such basis. Pray excuse, dear Prince, the somewhat abrupt tone of this statement, but as the matter appeared to me to be pressing, I desired to let Prince Reuss have the letter to-day. Begging you to present my respects to the Princess, I remain, with unalterable and cordial respect,

“Your sincerely devoted,

“Andrassy.”

The Crown Prince writes to Bismarck (quite confidentially) from Baden-Baden, on the 4th of October, 1879: “Count Stolberg will have already informed you prior to the receipt of these lines of the course of affairs up to the signing of the draft Treaty by the Emperor. I therefore say nothing more about this very exciting crisis, the result of which I confidently anticipate will be of far-reaching importance for the position of Germany. I must point out, however, that his Majesty is quite miserable, and keeps on repeating that he has dishonoured himself by his decision, and has been disloyal to his friend the Tsar; so that one clearly sees how fearfully difficult the decision was for him, with his extreme conscientiousness.”

Draft (dated Varzin, October 30th, 1879) of a verbal answer to be made to the Emperor Alexander in reply to any question which he might ultimately put: “An institution which arose under the influence of Alexander I. and which preserved the peace of central Europe for half a century, had to be sacrificed in 1866 to irresistible necessity. The German Confederation was an excessive burden to us Prussians, while it did not satisfy the aspirations of the other Germans. The discontent thus created was utilised by the revolutionary party, for the purpose of threatening every German Prince. It was necessary to deprive them of this weapon, and to satisfy the national sentiment. This was done at the expense of the security which the Confederation afforded, almost without cost, to its weaker members.

“That the breach caused by the secession of Austria, which extended from the Carpathians to the Lake of Constance, would have to be filled up was recognised even in the Paulskirche. Later on, after the war of 1866, attempts were unceasingly made to bind Austria to the States, with which it had been formerly united in the German Confederation, so as to prevent her from allying herself with France against them. This object has now been attained without any obligation on our part to defend Trient, Trieste, or, indeed, Bosnia, against Italians, or Turks, or Southern Slavs. Our agreement with Austria no more involves anything in the nature of a threat to our neighbours than would do the erection of a fortress on the frontier, which, of course, has never been regarded in that light, and it is even less of a menace for instance, than the construction of strategic railways. It has, indeed, the character of a mutual assurance society, which every one having similar interests is at liberty to join.”

Report of the Emperor William to Bismarck of his interview at Alexandrowo, from a copy made for the Crown Prince:—

1. September 5th.—“The Emperor Alexander began the conversation by an explanation of his letter to me. Nobody knew anything of it.” (Marginal note by Bismarck: “Gortschakoff revised it.”) (1) He had shown it to no one before it was despatched, and after it had been sent he only communicated it verbally without naming the persons. If, therefore, I had found anything offensive in the letter, as he saw from my answer, he alone was to blame, and he recognised that it was possible for me to have misunderstood him. (2) He was very sorry for that, and since it had had such a serious result as to cause me personal offence, he wished it to be regarded as if it had never been written. Nothing was farther from his intention than the idea of a threat. He had only wished to call my attention to the fact, which was perfectly true, that if the press of both countries continued to rail at each other it must lead in the course of time to a feeling of hostility between the two States, and his sole object was to avoid that. (3) He considered that the preservation of the peace of Europe was only possible in the future, as it had been in the past, so long as good relations between Prussia and Russia were maintained under all circumstances. (3A) The votes given, mostly against Russia, by my Commissioners in the proceedings of the European Commissions in the East had betrayed a hostile attitude on the part of Germany towards Russia, which had caused great irritation in the latter country, and gave rise to the excited comments of the press. (4) In these Commissions Russia was pursuing the object which she had had exclusively in view during the war, namely, to improve and render more assured the fate of the Christian populations, but not to make conquests. If opposition were now offered thereto in the delimitation of the frontier, and more or more Christians were restored against his wish to Turkish sovereignty, the Commissioners must have received instructions to that effect. (5) The German votes had already produced a bad effect in Turkey also, inasmuch as the disagreement which was there seen to exist between Germany and Russia rendered the Turks more obstinate, and caused work to drag on interminably. (6) Prince Bismarck, whom he had hitherto known only as the friend of the Russo-Prussian relations, seemed unable to forget Prince Gortschakoff’s—stupid—circular of 1875. He had strongly advised Prince Gortschakoff against sending this circular, and pointed out to him the evil consequences (of his vanity, en parenthese) because if there actually were anything to smooth over, that was not the way to set about it. Prince Gortschakoff had his way, however. Bismarck’s grudge, and his inability to forget, which began with this irritation against Gortschakoff, appeared to him to have been transferred to Russia, and it was to this that he referred in his letter to me when he said that he could not reconcile such conduct with the character of so eminent a statesman. This expression of his in the letter to me did not refer to the instructions given to the Commissioners with respect to Eastern affairs. Moreover (7), Prince Gortschakoff is a man who has outlived his usefulness, and whom he hardly ever consults now. “In reply to No. 1, I said I could not deny that I had been painfully affected by his letter, particularly because I had considered that his remarks referred only to the votes in question, and they seemed to me a matter of such slight consequence that I could not understand his irritation on that score. It was only through his declaration to the effect that his expression referred to the subject dealt with in No. 7 (doubtless No. 6 is meant) that I now for the first time understood it. I could assure him that Prince Bismarck still regards the relations between Prussia, Germany, and Russia as he always did, but that he saw a feeling gaining ground in Russia, chiefly owing to the press, which he could not understand, in view of the existing laws there, especially as semi-official organs contributed to this detrimental state of feeling. I added that I was prepared to admit that our press was also guilty of similar excesses, but, after all, these were mainly in self-defence against the Russian attacks. We are so tied by our press laws that we can only intervene in the way of personal appeal to the editors of the newspapers, but not legally unless a state of siege were proclaimed in certain districts. Nos. 2 and 3. If the words in question were to be understood as containing no threat I should feel reassured, as the interpretation which the Emperor gave to this passage of his letter was in perfect accord with my own convictions. As his Government had quite recently issued a serious reprimand with regard to improper articles in the newspapers, it was to be expected and hoped, from the power with which the Governor-General was invested, that energetic action would be taken. I, on my part, had caused certain advice to be given to the editors, the law did not permit any more. 3A. Our instructions to the Commissioners in question had remained the same from the very beginning: if Russia and Austria were in agreement always to vote with them; when points arose where that was not the case to vote with the majority, where the Russian proposal was not flagrantly untenable. That had been the case in the matter of Silistria, where I was entirely in favour of the Russian proposal to appoint a Commission to inquire into the question of the bridge on the spot, and also with regard to the military road through Eastern Rumelia. 4. This view was quite new to me, as nothing of the kind had previously been brought to my notice. At the same time, these little frontier details were after all so trifling that they could hardly affect the question of the Christians to any important extent. Unfortunately, the Greek frontier question had only been mentioned at the Congress as the expression of a desire, and not as a demand, and I foresaw, from the first, how it would be, mais pendant le congrès je n’avais pas voix au chapitre. I regarded in the same way the Jewish question in Rumania, the broader solution desired being, to my mind, impracticable, and therefore I wished to see the Greek modification adopted.”

Continuation of this report, dated September 12th, 1879:—

“Nos. 6 and 7. I had never noticed that Prince Bismarck was inspired by particularly hostile feelings towards Prince Gortschakoff on account of the latter’s circular of 1875. My opinion and his upon that note was exactly the same as that of the Emperor Alexander himself; but at the Berlin Congress the same view with regard to Prince Gortschakoff was manifested as was expressed above by the Emperor, and I therefore understood the peculiar position which was now assigned to him. I believe that in my answer to the Emperor I adequately emphasised how little change there has been in Prince Bismarck’s political views so far as Russia is concerned. He had always agreed with me that, remembering the attitude adopted by Russia towards us in 1870, we for two whole years, 1876 and 1877, tried to manifest our gratitude to the Emperor by our neutralité bienveillante, and actually succeeded in preventing a coalition of the Western Powers, including Austria. This seemed to me to disprove the suspicion of the Emperor that Prince Bismarck had out of spite against Prince Gortschakoff changed his political views, and on that account had adopted towards Russia an attitude to which expression had been given in such trifling questions. Up to the present Prince Bismarck’s sentiments towards Russia remained unaltered.

“On the forenoon of the 4th the Emperor came to see me again in order to take leave of me after lunch. He had received a telegram from Jugenheim, from the Empress Marie, who desired to be remembered to me, and was very pleased at our meeting at Alexandrowo. He added: ‘C’est à elle que j’ai communiqué la première ma lettre à Vous dont le brouillon était par differentes correctures presque illisible. I afterwards showed my letter and your answer to Adlerberg, Milutin and Giers; they know exactly what my political opinions are concerning Prussia and Germany, and being in perfect agreement with me on this subject, they are pleased that erroneous impressions will be dispelled by our meeting.’ The Emperor then read me a letter from the Russian envoy reporting a conversation which he had had at Kissingen with Prince Bismarck on the political situation; and a great deal had in particular been said about Prussia and Russia acting together. The envoy found that Prince Bismarck’s former view of the Three Emperors’ Alliance had remained entirely unchanged. The Emperor repeated, en aperçu, the views which we had exchanged, and was heartily glad the misunderstandings had been cleared up and that the old friendship would be maintained between the two States in association with Austria. As to the latter, he now added for the first time: ‘Certainly I had reason to be dissatisfied with her, as her attitude towards me during the war was louche as usual. Without firing a shot she occupied two Turkish provinces, of course never to surrender them again, as the English will never give up Cyprus, respecting which they entered into a separate treaty during the Congress without making any communication to the Great Powers.’ I interrupted him here, saying I believed there had been negotiations at Reichstadt respecting the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. ‘Yes,’ said the Emperor, ‘but under quite different conditions, that Austria should take part in the war in some way or other. All the same, the main point is that we should hold together à trois.’ Of course I could only confirm that view as my own conviction.

“On the same morning I spoke to General Count Adlerberg, Minister Giers, and Minister of War Milutin, one after the other. The first two spoke with equal warmth in favour of the old relations. They were aware of the Emperor’s letter and of my answer, which I mentioned as entrée de conversation, and they were at one with the Emperor in his satisfaction at the removal of the misunderstandings which they would have thought to be impossible, knowing, as they did, exactly the views to which the Emperor desired to give expression in his letter. I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of these sentiments. I nevertheless told them quite plainly that it was the press that led to an estrangement between our countries. As a strongly worded rescript had now been issued in Russia decidedly disapproving of the hostile attitude adopted by the press towards Germany, an improvement was to be anticipated, that is, if the Governors by whom a state of siege had been proclaimed throughout almost all Russia—a measure to which I could only wish every success—made use of their power to immediately seize all newspapers, pamphlets, &c., which published inflammatory matter. If that were not done the dangerous consequences which the Emperor had foreseen would certainly follow, namely, discord between the two States. In dealing with our own free press, my hands were tied by the law and our representative Constitution, and hence the defensive attitude against the Russian press taken up in our newspaper articles. I had, however, given orders that the editors should be advised to exercise greater restraint themselves, should an improvement take place in the Russian press. The gentlemen in question agreed with me in all this, and hoped for an improvement.

“The conversation with General Milutin began with the subject described above. I then expressed my appreciation of the new organisation introduced during the war, and said I could not understand where the money was found for it. But all Europe had been alarmed at seeing the efforts and the monetary sacrifices made for carrying on the war suddenly retained on a peace footing. He replied: ‘It was precisely the war which proved that the Russian army was not strong enough even to overcome the power of Turkey, its enormous forces being dispersed over the whole empire from Siberia to the Vistula. Therefore a nucleus must be maintained which shall be equal to European requirements. This cost can be met out of Russian resources that are unknown to other countries. We have war frontiers against China, against the countries on the Indian border, against Persia and against Turkey. We have received news that a coalition is being formed between Austria, England, and perhaps France. That points to a new conflict in the East. England is organising and arming Asia Minor, which is being inundated with State officials, generals, and officers in the guise of consuls, a sure indication of hostile intentions upon our position in the Caucasus. The Eastern conflict is near at hand.’ I demurred to the latter statement, and asserted that if once the decisions of the Berlin Congress were carried out in their entirety, no fresh war was to be anticipated there, as Turkey required peace above everything else.

“(Signed) William, 9/9/79.”

“While the Emperor was with me on the 4th a telegram from London was brought to him, according to which England declared that, although not in favour of the appointment of a technical commission ad hoc for the settlement of the bridge question at Silistria, she would be pleased to see the Servian Frontier Commission entrusted with that task. The Emperor said he could agree to that, and that only technical members should be appointed to the Commission.”

These papers also include the letter from the Emperor William to Bismarck, dated 10/9/79, which accompanied the foregoing report: “Herewith I send you the conclusion of the notes of my conversation with the Emperor Alexander. My letter from Berlin, which crossed your memorandum No. 1, showed you that your views, which you now repeat with more detail in No. 2, are in contradiction—first in principle, and then that an answer could not be given until I had spoken with the Emperor Alexander. Your premises in the memoranda could be transformed into truth for me only after I had spoken to the Emperor, and—as I wrote you through Minister von Bülow—after light had been thrown upon the correspondence. Up to that time I regarded your memoranda comme non avenus. For me my notes have brought this light. The Emperor regrets having written the letter, as it has given rise to misunderstandings; as the words ‘ce qui doit avoir des suites fâcheuses et dangereuses’ should absolutely not be regarded as threatening a rupture, but only as directing my attention to the fact that if some restraint were not placed upon the press, ill feeling might arise between our two countries, which neither of us desired, and therefore that measures should be taken accordingly. That being as true as anything in this world can be, I could only express my complete approval, all the more so as the Russian Government had already taken such steps, and I had ordered similar measures prior to my departure. As you will see from the notes, I corrected the view taken by the Emperor Alexander of the votes given by my Commissioners in the East, and he fully understood this, although he stated that he had already received news of the unfavourable consequences of these votes, which was quite new to me, but which explained the Emperor’s dissatisfaction on that score. You will also read how I defended you against the passage in the Emperor’s letter. He fully agreed that our policy during the war in the East was of the greatest benefit to Russia, which involves the highest recognition for yourself. I could assure him that till now you had maintained your old sentiments towards Russia, as was sufficiently proved in 1877 and 1878. On this occasion the Emperor expressed his conviction that peace could only be preserved for Europe by our holding together à trois, as we had done since the meeting in Berlin in 1872. Having hitherto held the same conviction myself, I could only agree with him. As the three persons, Adlerberg, Giers, and Milutin, spoke in exactly the same sense, the light which I looked for at this meeting at Alexandrowo respecting the sentiments of the Emperor and those persons who stand highest in his confidence has been forthcoming so far as I am concerned. None of them has the slightest wish to wage war upon us. The great additions to the Russian army which were raised as a reserve during the Turkish war, are retained as a permanent increase because they believe themselves to be threatened by a European coalition, and therefore must be in a state of preparation which would enable them to meet this alone.

“Since therefore, for me, the premises in your memoranda fall to the ground, namely, that owing to the danger threatened from Russia we should give up the policy we have hitherto pursued in our relations with that country and not only seek but actually conclude a European coalition of a defensive nature against Russia, I cannot lend myself to this project in its present extension. In view of the explanation given by the Emperor Alexander of his letter to me, which I originally did not regard as a threat but only as a desire to see the existing good relations between our States maintained by means of restrictions upon the press, it could only be a source of satisfaction to me to see the milder tone which prevailed in your answer sent by me to the Emperor, the moderate pressure and the truths which it contained being sufficiently intelligible and also understood. The words ‘une entente séculaire, les legs de nos pères de glorieuse mémoire’ were written according to my own heart, and went to the heart of the Emperor, so that he repeated them to me twice. I could not therefore understand your hostility to Russia, which increases with each memorandum, nor could I see how the expressions quoted above could be interpreted as a mere empty phrase! I was just as deeply affected by the words that we should outwardly maintain a friendly attitude towards Russia while at the same time concluding a coalition against her with Austria, with England, and perhaps with France. And you have its conclusion already so fixedly in view that you have not only communicated your whole project to Count Andrassy, but have also permitted him to speak of it to his Emperor (seinem Kaiser), who also immediately accepts it. Then you invite me to send you instructions, on your way back through Vienna, to conclude a defensive alliance there with Austria against Russia, which would be followed by the larger coalition. Put yourself in my place for a moment. I am in presence of a personal friend, a near relative and an ally, in order to come to an understanding as to some hasty and indeed misunderstood passages in a letter, and our interview leads to a satisfactory result. Shall I now at the same time join a hostile coalition against this sovereign, that is to say, act behind his back in a manner contrary to that in which I spoke to him?

“I will not absolutely deny that the dangers set forth in your memoranda may arise one day, particularly on a change of rulers in St. Petersburg. I am, however, utterly unable to see that there is any imminent danger. How often have you warned me against treaties with other Powers, which tied one’s hands, when there is no positive object in view, and there is only room for conjecture as to an uncertain future. My brother and Minister Manteuffel in particular burnt their fingers over the Three Years’ Treaty with Austria which was concluded after Olmütz, and impatiently awaited the expiry of that term. The present case is quite similar. It is against my political convictions and my conscience to bind my hands for the sake of a possible eventuality.

“At the same time, I must not disavow you and the steps which you have already taken in dealing with Andrassy and his master. Therefore in Vienna, whither all the newspapers already say you are going, you may speak of the eventuality of disagreement with Russia developing into a possible breach, and enter into pourparlers respecting the joint measures to be then taken with Austria. But, following my conscience, I do not authorise you to conclude a convention, to say nothing of a treaty.

“In this way I hope our views will again agree. If it be God’s will that this should be the case, I can look forward with confidence to the future, which would otherwise for me be very dark, and anticipate a genuine continuance of the relations with Russia, which are growing more friendly. I cannot tell you how painful the episode has been to me, when it seemed, for the first time in seventeen years, as if we could not come to an understanding. I impatiently await your answer to the above authorisation, and am convinced that we shall be able to come to an agreement. God grant that it may be so!

“Your faithful and devoted,

“William.

“Finished at Stettin, 12/9/79.”

“As Herr von Bülow, after taking a copy of my additions to the Alexandrowo notes, had the original immediately despatched to you, there is a corresponding change in the opening words of this letter.”

Letter from Bismarck to Prince Reuss, dated Varzin, 28th January 1880 (on the left top corner, the note: “Copied a second time in the interest of history”—doubtless in Holstein’s handwriting):—

“In connection with your report, No. 11 of the 10th, I take the liberty to send your Serene Highness a few words confidentially, and only for your personal information, on the relations between Austria and Italy.

“I consider it natural that Baron Haymerle should have made no official complaint respecting Urezzana, and furthermore, that he was tactically right in taking that course. I should not regard it as good policy however to adopt a purely passive attitude towards similar permanent threats. Such a course would, I fear, only encourage Italian Chauvinism, and the semi-complicity of the Government therewith. According to my political convictions a purely defensive attitude, i.e., one of mere complaint, is not an effective weapon against such permanent threats or incitement. It is open to Austria to parry such attacks, by assuming the offensive, on similar lines to the Italian demonstrations. It is not the Italian Government which adopts a threatening attitude. It only suffers Italian subjects to do so. Now I am convinced that there are elements and movements in Austria that favour the restoration of the Papal States, and of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, just as the Irredentists work for the acquisition of the Trentino. If these elements in the press and public life of Austria were to come or to be drawn into greater prominence, that would involve a counteraction against the Irredenta, which would compel the Italians to fall back upon the defensive, without being able to make any complaint. Even the plea that Austria, in view of such threatening movements, requires a better line of defence than that which she now possesses would be quite as legitimate as a craving for the Trentino, Trieste, and Dalmatia. Italy by herself would scarcely venture to attack Austria, but her present attitude is a constant encouragement to the war party in Russia. For about twelve months I have had the impression that Italy is inclined to place herself at the disposal of a Russian policy of war if in return she were offered an accession of territory and a stretch of the Adriatic coast. The relations which it has been sought to establish between the two armies, the Italian and the Russian, and the shifting of the centre of gravity of the Italian army towards the north support this impression, not less than the indications furnished by various votes which the Great Powers have respectively given. This whole attitude shows that Italy must not be numbered to-day among the peace-loving and conservative Powers, who must reckon with this fact. I beg your Serene Highness also to think over this matter for yourself, and to kindly send me your views in an autograph private letter. Of course any initiative in opening up this subject must be carefully avoided, but Baron Haymerle, or Count Andrassy when he comes to Vienna, can hardly fail to bring it up in conversation with your Serene Highness, and thus give you an opportunity of introducing observations in the sense of the foregoing remarks, not as the expression of German policy, but as your own opinion in the character of a friendly expert. In certain circumstances the Nuncio also might afford an opportunity for an expression of opinion in this sense which would excite no suspicion. It would in any case be of interest to assure one’s self of the present feelings of the Italian Prelacy with regard to strategic moves of this description.

“I cannot deny that, to my mind, the Italy of to-day offers Germany small prospect of useful co-operation with us in the possible crises of the future. On the contrary, we have much more ground to fear that Italy will join our adversaries than to hope that she will unite with us, seeing that we have no more inducements to offer her. Every encouragement to Italian policy to join the bellicose and predatory Powers in Europe is contrary to German interests, and in the present instance still more contrary to those of Austria. For the protection of the latter it would, I think, be useful to call the attention of the English Cabinet to the encouragement to breaches of the peace which the attitude of Italy involves. Perhaps your Serene Highness can ascertain whether anything has been done or is intended in this direction.

“Bismarck.”

The Emperor William to the Imperial Chancellor, Berlin, November 13th, 1885: “Enclosed I return you brevi manu, your two extremely important and interesting letters, with my observations. I beg you to excuse me for selecting this method of answering them, but you know how badly I write long explanations, and from the marginal notes you will see my complete agreement with your views, so that I believe I may adopt this shorter form of answer. I may mention to you at the same time that I consider the moment has now come to lay before my son the views with which it was all along intended to acquaint him, as to the utter inexpediency, now no less than formerly, of the marriage in question, which, of course, he himself has also always held to be impossible. Now, however, that Prince Alexander has come forward as a rebel against the peace of Paris (doubtless Berlin was meant), and the signatories thereto, whether he remains in Bulgaria or not, a marriage of this kind has become more than ever impossible. Your political explanations are quite to the point.

“Your grateful

“William.”

I left for Hamburg at 12.20 on the 29th of October, shortly after the Emperor passed through that city. On the evening of the 30th I returned to Friedrichsruh, where I arrived about 5.30 P.M. At dinner, the Prince, who was in excellent spirits, said that the most gracious Master had in all taken up five hours of his time. Afterwards, over our coffee, he observed to me: “This afternoon he let me talk to him for three hours on end. I stood as if in the pulpit, and I am tired out.” Everybody said that the Emperor was extremely unaffected and amiable, and the Princess noticed in particular that he could laugh most heartily. I heard that Minister Mittnacht would arrive next day. By 12 o’clock on the day of my journey to Hamburg I had read through the last of the Bismarck papers, which went as far as the year 1887 and concluded with No. 735. Among the most recent of the papers are three letters of the year 1880 from King Lewis of Bavaria, full of recognition for Bismarck, the second expressing regret at his wish to retire, and the hope that he would remain. A letter from the Emperor William to the Chief dated May 31, 1886, on the “horrifying news from Munich,” says towards the close that there is little to be hoped from Prince Luitpold, while King Lewis is credited with having “shown more good will ... for the German cause.” Then two autograph letters from the Crown Princess (the present Dowager Empress). One is dated December 23, 1885, and accompanied a present of Moselle wine which he had liked at her table; while the other, dated from Villa Zivio, November 22, 1887, deals with the illness of her consort, and reports the unanimous opinion of the German doctors. Finally, a letter of November 23, 1887, from the Emperor William, which is very illegibly written and runs somewhat as follows: “Enclosed I send you the nomination of your son as Wirklicher Geheimrath with the title of Excellency, in order that you may hand it to him, a pleasure which I would not deny you. I imagine that this pleasure will be threefold, for yourself, for your son, and for me! I take this opportunity (to explain) to you the silence which I have observed up to the present respecting your proposal, in view of the sad condition of health of my son the Crown Prince, to initiate my grandson, Prince William, more fully into State affairs. In principle I entirely agree with you that this must be done, but it is a very difficult matter to carry into execution. You will of course know that the very natural decision, which I took on your advice, that, in case of my being prevented, my grandson William should sign the current Cabinet rescripts in civil and military affairs with the superscription ‘By Order of his Majesty’ greatly irritated the Crown Prince, as if, in Berlin, a substitute were already being thought of. On considering the matter quietly my son will doubtless have reassured himself. But such reflection would be more difficult if he ascertained that his son were allowed a still greater insight into State affairs, and were even given a Civil aide-de-camp as I used to call my Vortragende Räthe. Things were, however, quite (different) then. As there was nothing that could induce my Royal father to appoint a substitute for the then Crown Prince (although my succession to the throne could be anticipated long beforehand), my introduction to State affairs was put off till I was forty-four years old, when my brother suddenly nominated me a member of the Ministry of State with the title of Prince of Prussia. It was necessary in this position that an experienced man of business should be appointed to prepare me for each sitting of the Council of Ministers. At the same time I received the diplomatic despatches every day, after they had passed through four, five, or six hands—according to the seals! A mere conversation, such as you propose, the appointment of a statesman in attendance on my grandson, would not have the character of a preparation, as in my case, for a specific object, and would certainly still further irritate my son, a thing which must absolutely be avoided. I would therefore suggest that the course of occupation hitherto followed—learning the manner of dealing with State affairs—should be continued, that is to say that (my grandson) should be attached to single Ministries or perhaps to two at a time, as during this winter, when my grandson was attached in a voluntary capacity to the Foreign Office as well as to the Ministry of Finance. This voluntary course should cease with the New Year, and perhaps (be replaced) by the Ministry of the Interior, my grandson being permitted in special cases to obtain information at the Foreign Office. This continuation of the course hitherto followed may cause my son less irritation, although you will remember that he was strongly opposed even to this. I therefore beg you to let me have your opinion on the matter. Wishing you all a pleasant festival,

“Your grateful

“William.”[18]

On Thursday, November 1st, I told the Prince, at lunch, that I would either immediately or next morning return him the papers, sorted and arranged. He replied, however, that he had found some more which belonged to the collection. He took me with him to his study, and handed them to me for arrangement, adding that there were very many more at Varzin, a whole box full, including private letters of historic significance. I should also go through these later on, and put them into chronological order.