Front matter (continued 3)

Our forces at this time in Knoxville numbered about twelve thousand effective men, exclusive of the new recruits of loyal Tennesseeans. The enemy was estimated at from twenty to twenty-three thousand, including cavalry.

In the line of our defence occurred the following strategic points: College, Loudon, Summit, Temperance, and Mabey's Hills, all of them of considerable height, and upon these hills were built forts of varying strength, those upon Loudon, Summit, and Temperance Hills being bastioned earthworks, protected by ditches of considerable depth and width, while those upon the other hills were merely earthworks without ditches. The parapets of all these forts were protected by cotton bales, covered with raw hides.

Upon Loudon Hill was constructed by far the most important work of the entire system. As has before been intimated, this fort was commenced by the enemy before Knoxville was occupied by the Army of the Ohio. From its strategic situation, coupled with the fact that the single assault made by the enemy upon our lines during the siege of Knoxville was upon this fort, when a force of less than three hundred men successfully repelled and disastrously defeated nearly four thousand picked men from Gen. Longstreet's army, it would seem to require a somewhat detailed account of its principal features.

There have been several different ideas expounded in relation to the build of Fort Sanders (called by the enemy Fort Loudon); the atlas accompanying the War Records has been taken as the most accurate one, but that differs very materially from what was built as Fort Sanders. Capt. Poe, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Ohio, laid out the works in quite an elaborate style, but on our arrival at Knoxville we went to work on the old fort that the Confederates had started, on Loudon Hill. The bastion on the extreme northwest corner was where the members of our battery put in hard labor with pick and shovel, and when it was completed we had a good defensible work. Perhaps it was not not quite up to the engineer's idea; every fort is expected to have a berme, ours did not; the western face of the bastion was as near a straight line as possible; the line from the bastion running to the Kingston road took a slight curve outward (or towards the west).

The following are the dimensions as we knew them at that time, and by actual measurements:

Starting at the northwest corner of the bastion it ran about south four hundred feet, then east one hundred and thirty-five feet, then south to the Kingston road, six hundred and seventy feet; from the northwest corner of the bastion running east one hundred and fifteen feet, then southeast eighty feet, then in an easterly direction until it reached the creek at the foot of the hill.

When we arrived at the fort it was simply a rifle-pit, but in two or three days it was in good shape. The irregularity of the site was such that the parapets of the bastion varied in height, the one on the north being thirteen feet, while the western front was twelve feet. The ditch on the west was twelve feet wide and eight feet deep; on the north it was eight feet deep at the corner of the bastion, and ran back to almost nothing at the northeast angle; on the south side of the bastion the ditch ran from eight feet deep to about a level where it joined the line running south. There was one embrasure on the west and one on the north side of the bastion. On the northwest angle the ground was built up so that a gun could be fired in barbette.

The line running south was quite heavy, where it joined the bastion, and had four embrasures, which were occupied by Benjamin's regular battery. As the line ran down the hill it was lighter, being about four feet with no ditch, or only a slight one where dirt had been thrown up from the outside, except in two places where the ground inside the breastworks had been dug lower to allow a piece of artillery to be placed and an embrasure cut in.

In front of the northwest angle of the bastion Capt. Poe had some telegraph wire stretched from stump to stump. Some time after the siege was over a fort was built south of the bastion, so as to command the ditch on the west, but during the siege there was no line of fire that could enfilade the ditch on the west side of the bastion.

During the siege the Seventy-ninth New York had a plank laid over the ditch from the embrasure on the west, which they used in going to and from the picket line, and when the enemy was looking for a good place to assault the works, they saw some men of the Seventy-ninth crossing on this plank, and came to the conclusion that there was no ditch in front of the bastion. Gens. Longstreet and McLaw both speak about this in their report of the siege and assault.

All of the large forts, such as Sanders, on Loudon Hill, Comstock, on Summit Hill, Huntington Smith, on Temperance Hill, were connected by a line of rifle-pits; on and near this line were built batteries for from one to six guns, which could command both a direct and enfilading fire for a considerable distance in their vicinity. Battery Noble, located to the left of the Kingston road, below College Hill; Battery Zoelner, to the right of Fort Sanders, commanded the railroad for a considerable distance on the left of Second Creek; Battery Galpin, on the right of Second Creek, overlooked the railroad for a considerable distance; Batteries Wiltsie and Billingsley were located between Gay street and First street, covering the ground near the depot and beyond; Battery Clifton Lee, east of Fort Huntington Smith, together with Battery Fearns, on Flint Hill, were in the second line of defence; Battery Stearman was located in the gorge between Temperance and Mabey's Hills; Fort Hill, the extreme north-eastern limit of our line, was situated upon Mabey's Hill.

It must be remembered that upon the morning of the army's arrival at Knoxville, Nov. 17th, almost none of the immense work contemplated in the line of defence which we have been considering, was begun. As fast as troops arrived and were assigned to their positions, they were ordered to select either a shovel or pick and dig for all there was in them.

Early in the morning Gen. Burnside, in order to relieve his exhausted troops, and also hurry along the work as rapidly as possible, had started patrols through different parts of the town with orders to arrest every able-bodied citizen, white or black, Union or Confederate, and put them at work on the fortifications. Relief gangs were organized, and the work continued night and day.

By the 20th our line was in such a condition as to inspire the entire command with confidence that we could hold the town against any rebel force that might be brought against us. First and Second Creeks had been dammed, the back water creating quite large ponds, the overflow from which made most formidable wet ditches in front of a considerable portion of the line.

The pieces of Battery D remained in Fort Sanders from their arrival until the 20th, when the right piece, right section, under Lieut. W.B. Rhodes, was moved into what afterwards became Battery Noble. The lieutenant felt that he would like to take both pieces of his section, and asked permission of Gen. Ferrero to do so, but the general refused, giving as his reason that "he thought one piece quite enough to be sacrificed." This remark, overheard as it was by the men, created in their minds the impression that in the general's opinion he was placing them in an extra-hazardous position, and they were constantly on the alert expecting an assault down the Kingston road.

On Wednesday, the 18th, the men of our battery, together with those from Benjamin's, and a large detail of citizens, commenced active labor upon the ditch and bastion of the fort. During the afternoon we were joined by the Seventy-ninth New York Highlanders. Lieut. Benjamin, who was appointed to the command of Fort Sanders, had requested that this regiment be assigned to duty as defenders of the fort, and it had been so ordered. While all of the regiments of the Ninth Corps had the thorough confidence of their comrades of the artillery service, the old Seventy-ninth was held in especial esteem because of its long service, and it was very gratifying to have them with us in the fort.

The work upon the fort was pushed forward with the greatest rapidity. The men were arranged in details and required to work a certain number of hours, then allowed a certain number for rest. In this way there was no cessation in the work.

The morning of Tuesday, the 19th, opened dull and cloudy. A heavy fog obscured the valley below the fort, and occasional picket shots made us very anxious that the mist should clear, that we might locate our enemy. The previous afternoon he had made his appearance upon the heights in the vicinity of the Armstrong house, where he had been held at bay for several hours by a force of mounted infantry and cavalry, under command of Gen. Sanders, of the Twenty-third Corps.

Gen. Longstreet had ordered Gen. McLaw to force his way into the town, and sent reinforcements to enable him to do so. Our troops were finally forced down into the ravine below the Armstrong house, and the enemy getting within easy range of our guns at the fort, both batteries improved the opportunity to shell them.

Gen. Burnside was in the fort at the time, and watched the battle over the parapet. He went from point to point along the west front, speaking encouragingly to the men, advising them to "keep cool, fire low, and be sure and hit something every time."

Towards evening the enemy ceased his efforts to push us further, seemingly contenting himself with occupying the heights in front of the Armstrongs. When the fog cleared we found that during the night the enemy had occupied a range of hills running from a point on the river south of the Armstrong house, thence along our west and north front to a point on Second Creek, while their pickets extended nearly to the Farwell road. A little later they established a battery upon this road and from it threw the first shells into the city. This line of the enemy was from three-fourths to one mile distant from our works, and as it became light enough we could plainly see their men at work throwing up breastworks for almost the entire length of their line.

All day long the pickets kept up a constant exchange of shots, which near the Armstrong house assumed the proportions of a fair-sized battle on several occasions during the day.

In the afternoon we raised a flagstaff in the fort and in a short time a flag was unfurled and heartily greeted by the men with cheers. The enemy desiring to honor the occasion, opened a furious cannonading upon the fort, fortunately doing us no damage. During this, the second day of the siege, bullets began to sing right merrily over the parapets and through the embrasures of the fort, a music which we were obliged to listen to day and night from this on for the seventeen days of the continuance of the siege.

The morning of Friday, the 20th, was cool and misty. The enemy had been very quiet during the night and allowed us to get a full night's rest; but at nine o'clock, when the new pickets made their appearance, they increased the vigor of their fire, causing the relieved men to hustle for all they were worth to get inside the fort.

During the afternoon bales of cotton had been hauled into the fort from the town, and gangs of negroes were employed to roll them onto the parapets for the better protection of the men. The interior crest being only about four feet above the banquette tread, the upper part of the bodies of the infantry were exposed to the enemy's fire. The bales of cotton were covered with raw hides to prevent their being ignited from musket fire. It began raining during the afternoon, and continued well into the night, and, as we were without tents, it made our situation rather uncomfortable.

A brick house on the Kingston road in the ravine below the Armstrong house had become a source of annoyance to our men; the rebel sharpshooters occupying it had from the windows kept up a most disastrous fire upon our pickets and the fort, the distance being about five hundred yards.

Gen. Ferrero determined to destroy this building, that it should furnish no further protection to the enemy, and ordered Col. Humphrey, commanding the brigade in its front to detail a regiment to proceed under cover of darkness of the evening, dislodge the enemy from the house and burn it. The Seventeenth Michigan, under command of Lieut. Col. Comstock, was chosen for this dangerous and difficult work.

The sortie was made at eight o'clock in the evening, so quietly and with such alacrity as to completely surprise the enemy. Many of them were captured, while others had very narrow escapes, such as taking advantage of the opening of a door by one of our men to slip under his arm and escape. This was not an easy thing to do, as many found, quite a number losing their lives in the attempt.

As our men were returning from this successful assault the enemy seemed to suddenly realize what had happened, and opened furiously upon our lines with three or four batteries; but by that time our troops were back within the works, the light from the burning building enabling both infantry and artillery to pour a most destructive fire into the enemy's line, who, by half-past nine, confessed their willingness to call it enough for this day, by discontinuing their firing.

Work upon the rifle-pits and north front of Fort Sanders was continued during Saturday, Nov. 21st, strengthening them in every possible way. We were not molested by the rebels, and nothing worthy of mention occurred during the day.

A rumor reached the battery about noon that the enemy had commenced the construction of a raft at Boyd's Ferry, some distance above Knoxville, on the Holston River, which they proposed setting adrift, hoping that it would carry away our pontoon bridge, and thus break our connection with the south side. At five o'clock in the afternoon Chief Engineer Poe commenced the construction of a boom, made by stretching an iron cable across the river above the bridge. This cable was finished and placed in position by nine o'clock on the next morning.

Sunday, Nov. 22d, was passed quietly. Up to this time the pickets had been relieved about nine o'clock in the morning, but as many of the men had been badly wounded while performing this duty, the commanding officer decided to change the time for doing this work, to early morning before light, and this Sunday morning was chosen to make this change. The wire entanglement which had just been completed on the northwest in front of Fort Sanders, proved its efficacy upon this occasion, for notwithstanding the men of the relief party were perfectly familiar with its existence, nearly one-half their number were sent to the ground before they were reminded of the entanglement.

On Monday, Nov. 23d, two pieces of Battery D were moved from their positions on the northern portion of Fort Sanders, and placed in Battery Galpin, a small earthwork upon the eastern side of Second Creek. From this point they covered a considerable extent of territory, reaching from the pond made by the damming of Second Creek, along the railroad to the west and north for several hundred yards.

The section had but just reached this position when the enemy made an assault on Col. Christ's brigade, driving in his skirmish line, who, as they were driven back, set fire to a considerable quantity of combustible material which had been placed in the large round-house for just such an emergency. This fire soon communicated with adjacent buildings, and created an illumination which enabled our troops to see the entire field. This was not satisfactory to the rebels, and they soon retired.

Tuesday, Nov. 24th, it began raining at daylight. During the night the rebels had dug and occupied a rifle-pit which gave them a flank fire along our west front. This proved very troublesome, and it was decided that it must be stopped if possible. As soon as it was light enough to see, the Second Michigan made a charge on the enemy's new line at this point. The brave men of this regiment formed near the ditch of our fort, pushed rapidly forward, reached the objectionable ditch and had nearly destroyed it, when the enemy hurled a very heavy reserve force against them and drove them back. Further to the right a second determined assault was made by the Forty-first Massachusetts and the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania, our men driving the enemy from the rifle-pits and taking many prisoners.

On Wednesday, Now 25, the enemy made a determined effort to push forward their lines on the south side of the Holston River. It was evidently his desire to force us from our position opposite Knoxville. This would have given him the key to our position, and made it untenable for us.

Thursday, Nov. 26th, the work of strengthening our works continued, and all of the intrenching tools were kept busy.

On Friday, Nov. 27th, the enemy still appeared to threaten our troops on the south side of the river, moving their forces from one part of their line to another, but did not attack us.

Saturday, Nov. 28th, opened cold and rainy. The water in and around the fort formed into quite heavy ice during the night, while men woke with a coating of ice on their clothing which occasioned them much inconvenience in moving about. All the afternoon the enemy were moving large bodies of troops towards our right, constantly pushing our pickets nearer our works. In front of the northwest angle of Fort Sanders our picket line was only a few yards from the fort.

That the assault was near at hand, and must come in a few hours, we were all certain. That every one was on the alert was proven when at about ten o'clock in the evening a general alarm was sounded; our artillery immediately opened from Battery D's section at Battery Galpin, under Lieut. Parker, around Fort Sanders to Battery Noble, occupied by the right piece of Battery D, under Lieut. Rhodes.

Our fire at this time was only continued for a short time, ceasing as soon as we ascertained that the enemy were not coming. One of the greatest difficulties labored under by us was the absolute necessity of using the closest economy with regard to ammunition.

This ten o'clock attack had been for the purpose of driving in our pickets close under the fort, where they now lay. This enabled the enemy to advance within one hundred yards of our guns, and at that moment they were lying in a depression a short distance from the northwest angle of the bastion of the fort, waiting for the first dawn of day that they might rush on to what?—victory, they thought, but we had quite a different idea, and our idea was nearer right than theirs.

By five o'clock on Sunday morning, Nov. 29th, every man in our line had been aroused, and was occupying his position, either at the parapets or embrasures. The third piece of our battery was located on the north side of the fort some two hundred feet from the bastion; the fifth piece was located on the line running south about one hundred and fifty feet from the Kingston road; while the fourth had been mounted in the northwestern bastion, in barbette. This gun, under command of Sergt. Chas. C. Gray, was by far the most serviceable in the fort on that morning, as will be seen as our story progresses.

All of the guns were loaded with double canister, and at half-past five the cannoneers were at their posts in the position of "Ready," every number four holding his lanyard taut, ready to pull at a second's warning, and send the gun's charge of death into the ranks of the enemy.

It was a minute or two of half-past six when a signal gun was fired from the rebel battery near the Armstrong house, the shell passing over Fort Sanders and exploding in its rear. Instantly all the artillery in the enemy's line opened, and for twenty minutes poured a furious fire of shot and shell into and beyond the fort.

Suddenly the firing ceased, and the cannoneers who were straining their eyes trying to pierce the gloom and mist of the early winter's morning, saw our pickets hurry across the plank which gave them passage over the deep ditch through the embrasure into the fort, and rapidly fall into their places. Then we were certain that there was work before us. At this instant the first gun in the fort to fire—Sergt. Gray's—was discharged.

During the twenty minutes cannonading by the enemy not a gun had been fired from our side, every man having been cautioned to reserve his fire until he could see or hear the enemy. Soon the cannoneers caught the sound as of the rushing of many feet, followed quickly by a confused sound as the rebels encountered the wire entanglement, over which many of them stumbled and fell. Then we saw them coming through the mist, and greeted them with the contents of our double-shotted guns.

Sergt. Gray soon discovered that the position of his gun (in barbette) was a failure, because of the ease with which the rebel infantry could prevent his men from loading the piece—they being obliged to expose a considerable portion of their bodies in the performance of that duty. Ordering the piece taken down from its elevated position, the sergeant had it run into the embrasure upon his right, from which he rapidly poured round after round of canister among the mass of rebels that were charging the bastion on the north side.

Either the rapid and terribly destructive work of this gun, or the desire of the enemy to find some easier way of entering the fort, caused them to swing away from this point around to the western front, and soon our sergeant noticed that there was apparently no enemy in his front. Not being of the kind to throw away ammunition, and having in mind the necessity for observing economy in its use, after taking the precaution to load the piece with double canister, and have the number four affix his friction primer, with the lanyard held taut in his hand, he awaited events.

It was only a moment before the head and shoulders of a rebel officer appeared above the brow of the ditch, who, after a hurried glance around, sprang into the embrasure, rushed up to the muzzle of the gun and placing his sword upon it, ordered its surrender. William Mills, the number four, turned to his sergeant and asked, "Charlie, shall I let him have it?" "No," replied Gray, "don't waste a double round of canister on one d——d fool." Not long, however, did the sergeant have to wait for more victims. Before his words were hardly spoken three more brave rebels had followed their leader. Gray gave the order to "Fire!" and when the smoke cleared away not a vestige of the four heroes who had stood before that gun a moment before remained.

This seemed to quiet the enemy on the northern front of the bastion, but a fresh column now commenced a furious assault upon the western front, the noise and confusion of which attracted the attention of Sergt. Gray, who, glancing around to the embrasure in his rear, discovered that the gun from a New York battery, which occupied it, was evidently in trouble. Hurrying across, he ascertained that the horses had run away with the limber, thus depriving the gun of ammunition.

Sergt. Gray had the gun replaced with his own, and during the remainder of the battle, ably and heroically supported by the men of the fourth detachment, did such efficient service that although many desperate attempts were made to drive them from their position, none were successful.

Benjamin's twenty-pound Parrotts had opened fire at the same moment with our own, and were sweeping the opposite side of the glacis with double canister.

The infantry support in Fort Sanders consisted of the Seventy-ninth New York and two companies of the Twenty-ninth Massachusetts. These men were posted along the parapets and angles of the fort, every place that would afford opportunity for a shot at our assailants being fully occupied. Full cartridge-boxes, with hundreds of extras, were placed in front of each man, to facilitate the most rapid work. Men who could not find a place in the line were employed to load muskets and pass them to their comrades who were in position.

Soon we were in the midst of the very hottest work, the enemy charging in "Column by division, closed en masse," and although the entanglement prostrated many, the weight of the column carried them over it to the edge of the ditch, the formidableness of which caused them to momentarily hesitate. Then it was that the terrific fire from the double-shotted guns of our artillery and closely posted infantry, delivered almost in their faces—not ten yards distant—caused them to melt away as grass before the mower's scythe, and jump into the ditch for safety; but, alas! no sooner had they reached the ditch than Lieut. Benjamin had some of his twenty-pound Parrott ammunition with fifteen second fuses brought into the bastion of the fort, and lighting the fuses with a burning stick they threw them through the embrasures or rolled them down the parapets into the ditch.

Acts of heroism followed each other in rapid succession; the brave rebels were making every effort to scale the twenty feet from the bottom of the ditch to the parapet, under the greatest difficulties; digging with their fingers into the slippery surface they would raise themselves up the embankment for a short distance, only to lose their hold and slide back into the ditch; and if perchance one did reach the top without being shot on the way up, the moment his head showed above the parapet it would be pierced with a bullet, and back he would roll into the ditch. Two or three times the enemy succeeded in reaching the top of the parapet, upon which they placed their flags, but they were instantly killed.

An incident illustrative of the fierceness with which this battle was fought is described in the "History of the Seventy-ninth New York (Highlanders)": "Sergeant Dunn, of Company K, owing to the excitement, had forgotten to withdraw his ramrod when he last loaded his piece, and it was fired with the charge. On attempting to reload he was unable to ram home the cartridge. Two of the enemy were making their appearance above the crest, within six feet of him; clubbing his rifle he flung it at them, but failed to hit either. No other piece was within reach, his companions were busy with their own work; the enemy were nearly upon him; time was precious. Looking hastily about he espied an axe; it was but the work of a moment to seize it, swing it above his head, and hurl it at the approaching foe. It hit and knocked one down, while the other fell at the same instant, pierced by a bullet."

It was now apparent that the enemy had enough, for their main attacking force had been driven back under the protection of the depression just in front of the bastion of the fort, and those in the ditch could not stand the havoc which the shells that were thrown over the parapet were making, so one of them stuck a piece of cloth on his gun and poked it up in front of the embrasure, a signal that they surrendered.

Sergt. Gray stepped into the embrasure and commenced to pass what men there were left through. In taking their arms and equipments he soon found some men with artillery equipments on, who, when questioned, allowed they had been sent up to work our guns; but as we were not in need of recruits, they were sent to the rear with the rest of the prisoners.

About this time the enemy's artillery again opened on the fort, but ceased in a few minutes, when Gen. Burnside offered the enemy an armistice lasting until noon, to allow them to care for their wounded and to bury their dead, which was promptly accepted.

How thankful they were to be relieved from their terrible position may be imagined when it is remembered that for fully an hour most of them had been exposed to as terrific and deadly a fire as ever fell to the lot of a soldier to endure. Every stump within the northern and western glacis of the fort yielded from one to two rebels, while those in the ditch still alive and not too severely wounded, made haste to get within the fort.

"Yanks" and "Rebs" were soon fraternizing, discussing the events of the past few weeks. It was then we learned that our enemy had been told they had only new troops opposed to them, who would run at the first fire, and could be swept away from their front with very little effort. Their confidence in this story had been somewhat shaken after their encounter with us at Campbell's Station, when they discovered the old Ninth Corps was in their front. They were as familiar with the fighting qualities of this corps as we were with theirs, and began to realize that our encounters would very likely resemble the traditional one "when Greek meets Greek." They had been told that Fort Sanders was garrisoned only by Tennessee conscripts, and all they had to do was to yell like devils and they would run. Considerable bluffing was indulged in on both sides. They informed us that they were coming again soon, and when they did the boot would be on the other leg. We assured them that we would be glad to see them at any time, and guaranteed them a warm reception.

When noon arrived it was found that the work was not nearly completed, and the time was extended until five o'clock. On the arrival of that hour each side retired within its lines, our pickets occupying the rifle-pits from which they had been driven the night before.

The loss of the enemy in their attack upon Fort Sanders, as taken from their own reports, was 129 officers and men killed, 458 wounded, and 228 prisoners, an aggregate loss of 815. Besides this we captured three battle-flags, and between five and six hundred stand of small arms.

Monday, Nov. 30th, the thirteenth day of the siege, opened with much less firing from the pickets. It was said that during the armistice of Sunday the soldiers on both sides had entered into an agreement not to fire on each other's pickets.

Tuesday, Dec. 1st, some time before daylight an alarm sent every man to his post, where they remained until sunrise, when, as there was no demonstration on the part of the enemy, the men were dismissed. During the afternoon there were indications from within the enemy's lines of another attack. We made ready to receive them, but happily it did not materialize.

Wednesday, Dec. 2d, the enemy pushed forward their lines, their pickets very nearly reaching the advanced position occupied by them on the morning of the 19th. They could be seen erecting a new battery on a hill near the Clinton road. We sent a few shells at them, but the necessity of observing the closest economy in regard to our ammunition still continued, obliging us to use it very sparingly.

At daylight, Thursday, Dec. 3d, it became evident to us that the enemy were leaving our front, and rumors of the abandonment of the siege were current in the fort, much to our relief. Probably for the purpose of deceiving us, a rattling picket fire was maintained by the enemy well into the night, which kept us at our posts, much to our disgust.

Friday, Dec. 4th, the news that Gen. Sherman was advancing with an army of forty thousand men, and that his advance had crossed the Tennessee River the day before, made us all very happy, and when, at one o'clock Saturday morning, our pickets reported that the enemy were leaving our front, our joy knew no bounds. At daylight our skirmish line advanced and found that the enemy had departed.

The siege of Knoxville was over.

It is customary to date the commencement of this struggle between the Union and Confederate forces, on the 17th of November, that being the date on which the Union army entered Knoxville and began the erection of the defences.

A careful consideration of the movements occurring a few days just previous to that date, will convince anyone that the siege practically commenced on the 13th, the date upon which Gen. Longstreet reached Loudon, attacked our pickets, and moved down the Tennessee River to Hough's Ferry. From that moment until midnight Dec. 5th, there was no cessation, day or night, from deadly encounters, varying from the picket or skirmish fire, to that of the pitched battle, in which record will show as many men lost in killed, wounded and missing, as in any battle of the war where the numbers engaged were equal.

Commencing also on the 13th, the soldiers of this army were called upon to endure an amount of physical and mental strain such as men have seldom been called upon to pass through. Battery D's experience during this trying time was an average one. The record of its daily participation in the struggle of those three weeks is one of which its officers and men are justly proud. Not only were the members of the battery complimented by the commanding general for the excellence of their service, but individual members were specially complimented and praised in reports by other officers.

The faithful and intelligent serving of the fourth gun, in its two positions at the northwestern bastion of Fort Sanders, was acknowledged to have been of greater service in repelling the enemy from that section than any other piece of artillery; and when Gen. Burnside visited the fort with his staff soon after the flag of truce had been accepted, he personally shook hands with every member of the fourth piece, and thanked them for the gallant manner in which they had done their duty, and directed Capt. Buckley to apply at once to the Governor of Rhode Island for a commission for Sergt. Gray.

The first piece, under Lieut. Rhodes, had done excellent work from Battery Noble; the second and sixth, under Lieut. Parker, had done themselves proud in preventing the enemy from entering our works by the ravines at Second Creek, while the third and fifth, under Lieut. Chase, had as usual, done efficient service in their respective positions. The battery had certainly added much during the siege to its excellent record as a fighting battery.

Battery D entered East Tennessee well supplied with clothing, the men having replenished their wardrobes at Camp Nelson, but the long journey over the Cumberland Mountains had been so rough, and so filled with difficulties, in the way of climbing the rocky and precipitous roads, the lifting necessary in order to get the heavy carriages over the rough places, had, to say the least, entirely destroyed that appearance of newness which the cloth had possessed a month before. Then came the twice-repeated march, almost from one end of East Tennessee to the other, and it began to dawn upon some of us that the time was not far distant when we should be obliged to draw clothing to hide our nakedness. We were told that a train was then upon its way over the mountains, and promised that as soon as it arrived clothing would be issued. That was a train which was longingly looked for, but never came.

During the three weeks siege the men had no time to give any attention to their persons, and as may be imagined, they were, at the close of the siege, in a deplorable condition. Daily the expected clothing train was looked for, but it did not materialize. Fortunate was it for us that we could not see into the future, and have known that it would be more than two months before we would see that clothing, and realize fully what suffering we would have to endure from the extreme poverty of our condition in regard to clothing and food.

Up to the appearance of Gen. Longstreet, before we had been deprived of the privilege of foraging, our army had been able to live upon the country. His coming altered that condition of things immediately. As soon as Gen. Burnside became assured of the approach of the enemy, he ordered Col. Goodrich, Chief Commissary, to collect all the beef cattle, hogs, etc., and drive them into Knoxville. The hogs were killed and salted; the cattle were collected in two droves, one located near Temperance Hill, the other near Second Creek, in close proximity to Battery D's caissons.

Orders were at once issued to reduce rations. The Commissary, hoping, I suppose, to impress the men's minds with the fact that they were after all getting a fair amount of food, stretched his conscience as much as he could, and called the amount given us one-fourth rations; but the old soldiers that he was trying to deceive were too well posted upon the size of a ration to be thus taken in. They were perfectly certain that a piece of fat pork about the size of their hand, together with a quart of flour or corn meal—ground cob and all—issued to last three days, but frequently made to last four, which could be eaten at one meal without the least sensation of fullness or the slightest indication of indigestion, was not only not a fourth ration, but was not even an eighth. Small rations, such as coffee, beans, etc., were discontinued entirely, the supply being so small that it was found necessary to reserve them all for the hospitals.

Our flour ration was not a popular one, from the beginning, in consequence of the difficulties attending the getting it into edible condition. Before we were shut in we succeeded in getting along fairly well, because we were able to secure from our lady friends a supply of those rather essential articles for making good bread—leaven and salt. After we were shut in we found it impossible to procure those articles, and our efforts at bread-making yielded only a cake of burnt dough, which required a good appetite to enable us to eat.

The enemy found it impossible to extend their line on the northwest much beyond the Taswell road, and on the south the excellent work of a division, aided by the cavalry of the Twenty-third Corps, prevented the rebels from extending their lines much beyond their works, which left open to us the free use of our bridges and enabled us to forage along the French Broad River and out on to the Louisville road, both of which were kept open to our foraging parties during the principal part of the siege. The loyal citizens sent down the French Broad River a large amount of grain and meat in flats, and Capt. Doughty maintained a small force up the river during the whole siege directing the efforts of the people in our behalf.

On our arrival at Knoxville on the 17th, we had a mixed motive power consisting of mules and horses, but as soon as we had been assigned positions in the works, we gave up our mule teams. They had helped us out of a bad hole on the road from Loudon, but we had not taken kindly to them, and were glad to see them go.

Our caissons were parked in the ravine near Second Creek, and all our horses but the wheel teams on the pieces, were picketed in a small grove of pine trees near the caissons. Forage was short, and it was soon found that it was an impossibility to keep them hitched, as they would chew up every piece of leather that they could get at, and in a few days there were no halters to be had, and the picket ropes went with the halters. They ate up all the pine boughs, and finally we had to shoot quite a number of them, as they were so near starved it was a mercy to put them out of their misery.

The departure of the enemy was very satisfactory to us. A person who has never passed through the experience of being confined within very narrow limits for a considerable time, under an almost constant fire from artillery and infantry, can hardly realize what a strain it produces on one's nervous system.

To be continually upon the alert, prepared to dodge a shell, never forgetting to keep your head down and your body out of sight, lest some sharpshooter should get a bead upon you which would certainly end your earthly career; the constant screaming of the shells and the whirring of the minie balls, all have such a wearing effect upon the nerves of a man that he wishes something would happen that would make the other fellow quit and give him a rest. With us something had happened—the other fellow had gone, and for the first time in weeks we could straighten our backs and walk erect.

Among the very few pleasant recollections of that disagreeable time is the writer's remembrance of the affection entertained by the men of the Army of the Ohio for their commanding general. His appearance at any time, day or night, along the rifle-pits, or in the forts, always aroused their enthusiasm to the highest pitch. His interest in, love and sympathy for them in their sufferings, conveyed to them in orders, conversations and kindnesses, quite won their hearts.

Many are the stories in circulation illustrative of the kindness of his heart towards his army; true or not, they found ready believers among the men. Personally, the stories were accepted as truthful by my young mind, and to-day I would not willingly listen to any argument or story which had for its object the lessening of my faith in the great humanity of my beloved general, Ambrose E. Burnside.

On Dec. 6th the battery was paid, and for the first time in our experience we took no interest in receiving money. We had received pay more frequently since entering Tennessee than at any previous time during our service. There was very little to buy, and our stock of greenbacks had accumulated. It was said that the government's liberality toward us was occasioned by the fact that our paymasters had found themselves at the beginning of the siege with a large supply of money, and desiring to be relieved of part of the responsibility, allowed the men to share it with them.

After a careful searching for information, I am fully assured that the following brief account of the Confederates' movements from ten o'clock on the evening of the 28th to half-past eight on the morning of the 29th, is substantially true:

At dark on the 28th, Gen. Longstreet sent a dispatch to Gen. McLaw ordering him to double his pickets, and as soon as the moon had risen sufficiently to throw a little light upon the movement, to press our pickets back as far as possible. After having successfully accomplished this, he was to move the three brigades of his division chosen for the assault, to a depression occurring in the topography of the glacis in front of the northwestern bastion of Fort Sanders, where they were to lie down until the signal gun should be discharged.

At daylight Anderson's brigade, of Hood's division, was ordered to take position about one hundred yards to the left—our right—of the fort, and in case of the success of McLaw's column, to break over our breastworks, wheel to the left and force their way through the ravine of Second Creek to the rear of Fort Sanders. If, however, McLaw was unsuccessful, Anderson was to wheel to the right after passing our breastworks, and take the fort by an attack in reverse.

At the appointed time, as we have seen, the signal gun was fired. Wofford's brigade sprang to their feet, closely followed by Bryan's and Humphrey's brigades; the Seventeenth Mississippi, of Humphrey's, and Phillips' Georgia, of Wofford's brigade, leading the assaulting column, dashed forward to the fort.

Wofford, who was to attack the northwest bastion, with his left well extended along the northern face of the fort, was so disturbed by the physical difficulties, including the wire entanglement through which he was obliged to pass, that he took so much distance to the right that the attack extended only about twelve feet upon the northern face, or to the first embrasure, occupied on that side by the fourth gun of Battery D.

Humphrey's brigade, with Bryan on his right, moved to the assault on the right of Wofford's, meeting with all the physical difficulties of the last-named, in their endeavor to get to the ditch.

Anderson's brigade, of Hood's division, which had been ordered to attack the rifle-pits upon the left of Fort Sanders, became so excited and exasperated over the terrible treatment their comrades were receiving, that they rushed with impetuosity toward the fort, and were into the ditch and suffering the same treatment, before orders which had been sent them to retire from in front of the fort, could reach them, leaving many of their number in the ditch dead or wounded.

As to the number of Confederates engaged in the assault on Fort Sanders, it can only be approximated. Four brigades participated. Wofford's contained six, Humphrey's four, Bryan's four, and Anderson's five regiments.

Gen. Jenkins, who commanded Hood's division upon this occasion, gives us the only clue, when he states that Anderson's brigade, which had been greatly reduced by details for picket duty, contained only about one thousand rifles. This would seem to make the statement truthful, that four thousand men of the Confederate army marched to the assault of Fort Sanders on Sunday morning, Nov. 29th, 1863, and out of that number, less than two hundred and eighty Union soldiers obliged nearly twelve hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners, to remain.

Of this bloody work Battery D did its full share. The fourth piece did the largest part, because of its situation, but the third and fifth did a work which caused the rebel Gen. McLaw to complain of the damage done to Wofford's brigade by guns on his left—our right—in the fort. The second and sixth pieces won this compliment from a rebel source: "That two guns, mounted in a redoubt on the left [our right] of Second Creek, fired so rapidly and accurately as to prevent his column from penetrating the ravine at that point." The first piece, in its position at Battery Noble, was too far removed from the scene of active operations to take a prominent part.

Dec. 7th we were ordered to prepare as many of our guns as possible and be ready to start in pursuit of the enemy. In consequence of losing so many of our horses, we found it impossible to equip more than four guns. These, with about three-fourths of our army, started at noon for Strawberry Plains. Capt. Buckley, Lieuts. Rhodes and Chase accompanied us. The other two pieces, with the battery wagon and forge, were left at Knoxville, under command of Lieut. Parker.

Following the enemy as fast as our impoverished condition would allow, we reached Rutledge about two o'clock on Dec. 9th, where we remained until late in the evening of Dec. 15th, and then began a retrograde movement towards Knoxville. Our enemy had been encamped during this time about nine miles beyond Rutledge. He had now turned upon us, and rumor had it that an attempt was being made to flank us at Strawberry Plains, and Thursday, Dec. 17th, quite a brisk engagement occurred at that place, which quieted down toward evening, and some prisoners captured upon that evening gave us the information that the rebels were retiring from our front.

We encamped for the night, and next day started for Knoxville, arriving on the 20th, and went into camp on the south side of the city. After a rest of a day or two the order came to have fifty men detailed each day to work on fortifications. This was a duty which the men did not relish, and being still short of rations, and having very little clothing, it was a physical impossibility for the men to do even a half day's work.

The weather was very cold, and many of the men left the prints of their toes on the snow as they walked. This was by far the hardest winter that we had seen in the service, and when, about the first of March, we had a chance to draw clothing and shoes, it was appreciated, and when a few rations of coffee and some "hard-tack" was issued, the members of the battery thought they had struck a bonanza.

Notwithstanding the privations we had passed through, nearly two-thirds of the battery re-enlisted, and on March 10th we turned in our guns and horses, and on the 12th started for Rhode Island, on a thirty days furlough. The men that did not re-enlist were left at Knoxville.

We marched to the depot at two o'clock in the morning on the 12th, and took cars for Loudon; crossed the Ferry at eight o'clock that forenoon, and boarded cars for Chattanooga; from there we went to Stevenson, Ala., Nashville, Louisville, Jefferson, Cincinnati, Pittsburg, Harrisburg, New York, and finally reached Providence on March 20th. We had been eight days on the road, having had several delays, but as we were going toward home, we found no fault.

It was quite a change to us when we were told that we could now go to our respective homes for thirty days. It is needless to add that we made the most of our leave of absence. I think most of us rather appreciated our change of diet, and it seemed as if those thirty days passed off very quickly; but notwithstanding the good times we were having, on April 20th, every man but one reported in Providence to Capt. Buckley, ready to again go to the front.

CHAPTER VIII.

Battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania—the Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley.

Leaving Providence at quarter past seven o'clock, on April 20th, 1864, we took the steamboat train en route for Washington, where we arrived at dark on the 23d, and went to the "Soldiers' Rest" barracks.

On the 24th we took in the Capitol and other sights about Washington, and the next day went into camp about a mile east of the Capitol.

The 26th we drew two government wagons, ambulance, and horse equipments for the officers. The men who did not re-enlist, and were left in Knoxville, joined the battery at this camp.

On the 27th we drew horses, a battery of six Napoleon guns, ammunition, etc., and were now ready for the field; and on the morning of the 30th we were ordered to Alexandria, and arrived there in the afternoon, and went into camp near the city.

May 2d, loaded the battery on cars and started for Warrenton Junction, arriving there at three o'clock in the afternoon, and were assigned to the artillery brigade of the Ninth Army Corps.

The whole Army of the Potomac was in our immediate vicinity, under command of Gen. Meade; the Ninth Corps, under Gen. Burnside, reporting direct to Gen. Grant, who was in command of the entire Army of the United States, and was personally directing the movements of the campaign against Richmond, and at this time, May 2d, had about completed his plans to cross the Rapidan and attack Lee's army.

On May 4th, the Fifth and Sixth Corps crossed at Germania Ford, and the Second Corps and Sheridan's cavalry crossed at Ely's Ford; Burnside's Corps was at the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, to hold that position until our troops had crossed the Rapidan.

On May 3d we got everything in shape for a forward movement, and on the 4th moved toward Brandy Station, and encamped near the railroad bridge for the night.

May 5th, broke camp early in the morning, and moved with the corps across the Rapidan, at Germania Ford, and continued our march until late in the evening. Since early in the forenoon we had heard the incessant roar of artillery and musketry in our front, and during the last part of the march had passed large numbers of wounded men going to the rear.

On the morning of the 6th we hitched up at three o'clock, and awaited orders. At five o'clock we started with Benjamin's battery, and marched about four miles and went into position near some woods. There had been a constant roar of musketry since five o'clock. Our position was such that we could see but a very small part of the field, and we wondered why we were put in such a position, as the underbrush in the woods just in our front was so thick that we could not see an enemy until they were right on our guns.

We remained in this position until nine o'clock in the evening without firing a shot. All day long the roar of battle had continued; large numbers of wounded had been passing our position all day; occasionally a stray shot would come our way, but nothing of any account.

At nine o'clock in the evening we had orders to limber up, and moved about five miles out on the Chancellorsville road, and went into camp at three o'clock in the morning.

On the 7th we hitched up at eight o'clock in the morning, but did not move until dark; then we marched by the Chancellorsville House, and at daylight went into camp. From this until the 15th, we remained near this camp, going into position once or twice, but not firing a shot; in the meantime the infantry and cavalry with some artillery, had been having some very hard fighting, but the large amount of woods and the contour of the ground was such that a small amount of artillery was used in the battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania, so that on the 15th a large number of batteries were sent back to the rear.

We hitched up at four o'clock on the morning of the 15th, and started for Fredericksburg, where we arrived in the evening, and encamped; remained in camp the 17th, crossed the Rappahannock on the 18th, and next day marched to Belle's Landing, and remained there until the 24th, when we started for Port Royal, where we arrived on the 26th.

On the morning of the 27th we received orders to send forty horses and twenty men to the front.

On the 28th we turned over the balance of our horses, and loaded guns and caissons on steamer and started for Washington, landing at the Navy Yard on the night of the 31st, and turned in our battery, then marched to Fort Lincoln, about four miles north of the city, and went into barracks. We remained there doing garrison duty and having drills on both light and heavy artillery until July 5th.

On the morning of the 5th we started for Fort Sumner, on the northwest of the city near the Potomac, arriving there in the afternoon, and went into barracks. In the fort was a battery of six thirty-two pound rifled guns, and we were given charge of these. The infantry in the fort were all one hundred day men.

On the 7th Gen. Augur visited the fort and ordered Capt. Buckley to draw muskets for the men. We did not like this move, but had to "take our medicine." We had to smile when we saw some of the hundred-day men out on drill; but when we went out on our first drill with muskets I guess it must have been rather amusing to the spectators.

We appeared on dress parade with the infantry the same night we received our muskets, and it wasn't a success as far as we were concerned. Quite a large number of our men had been in the service long enough to get quite a good idea of infantry tactics, but on this occasion they failed to remember "just a little bit" of them.

The next morning we sent a detail of thirteen men and a sergeant up the Potomac on picket. That night at about one o'clock we heard firing on our picket-line, and in a short time some of the infantry pickets reached the fort and reported that the rebel cavalry were driving in our whole line.

Everybody was turned out, and there was considerable excitement. We waited for some of our men to show up, but they did not come, and we came to the conclusion that it was a scare.

In the morning our relief went out, and when our men came in we found that two farmers had come down the road with a wagon and some led horses. Our men halted them, but some of the led horses got away and started on. The infantry pickets opened on them, and our men tried to stop their firing, but the more they halloed the faster came the bullets. For self-protection, our men opened on the pickets, firing high, and in a few minutes everything was quiet on the picket-line.

Perhaps a slight history of the situation of affairs at this time will be of interest. The Army of the Potomac was before Richmond; Gen. Hunter, commanding forces in the Shenandoah Valley, had moved up the valley and had met with good success, destroying the Central Virginia Railroad at Goshen Springs and at Staunton, also destroying at Staunton the enemy's depot, woolen factory, government stables, and large quantities of army material, and captured fifteen hundred prisoners and three pieces of artillery.

Here Hunter was joined on June 8th by the troops of Crook and Averell, who had marched from West Virginia by way of Warm Springs and Goshen, making his available force about eighteen thousand men. On the 10th Hunter started with his whole army for Lynchburg. Two days marching brought him to Lexington, Va., where he remained until the 14th, waiting for his expected wagon train, and then continued his march. Averell reached Lynchburg on the afternoon of the 17th, and Hunter's main force the same evening.

On the 18th Hunter attacked with all his available force, but was repulsed. From some prisoners taken Hunter found that Breckenridge had been re-enforced during the night by the corps of Gen. Early (Stonewall Jackson's old corps).

Hunter was now in a tight place, and could not retreat up the Shenandoah Valley, as the enemy had repaired the railroad and could now send troops by rail and hold Rockfish Gap, so Hunter resolved to retreat by way of Bulford's Gap to Charlestown, in the Kanawha Valley. Early hurried him along for a time, but soon turned back. By this move the Shenandoah Valley was left open, and Gen. Lee immediately started Early and Breckenridge down the valley and into Maryland, and on the 11th of July Early was in front of Washington.

Things remained quiet in our front until the afternoon of the 11th, when our pickets reported that our cavalry was falling back under quite a brisk fire from the enemy's cavalry. We had our muskets piled up and at once took our positions on the thirty-two pound rifle battery, thinking we could do more execution with them than we would be apt to with the muskets. At about five o'clock in the afternoon our men out on picket were relieved by some cavalry.

We did not fire a shot from our battery, and only one shot was fired from the fort, and that was at a squad of our own cavalry. The shot did no harm, as it went wide of its mark. The major commanding our fort wanted us to open on this same party, but Capt. Buckley refused to do so until he was satisfied who we were going to fire on.

We felt rather blue over our situation, as all in our immediate vicinity were new troops or clerks from the city, and we did not have much confidence in them, but we soon heard that the Sixth Corps and a part of the Nineteenth had arrived, and we felt that Washington was safe.

The night of the 11th was quiet in our front, and on the 12th only a little picket firing. Before dark Early had been driven back by Wright's Sixth Corps, and things had quieted down.

About noon time we received orders to turn in our muskets and report at Camp Barry. Nobody objected to this order, and soon we were on the march. Capt. Buckley and Lieuts. Bonn and Gray started ahead, and when the men under command of Lieut. Chase arrived at Camp Barry, they had requisitions for a four-gun battery of three-inch rifles. We did not get our complement of horses, baggage wagons, ambulance, etc., until the next morning, but at five o'clock on the afternoon of the 13th we marched in pursuit of Early.

We reached Tenallytown and went into camp, but the next morning we found that many of our horses were lame, and we had to stay there two days, working night and day to get them shod.

On the 16th we started for Snicker's Gap. Marched twenty miles, and went into camp at Edwards' Ferry. Hitched up early in the morning, crossed the Potomac, and marched to Leesburg, and joined the Nineteenth Corps.

Early in the morning on the 18th, we were on the road; passed through Snicker's Gap and went into camp near the Shenandoah River, but later crossed the river and marched about four miles and went into position, where we remained until about nine o'clock in the evening, when we received orders to recross the river and report at Washington with the Nineteenth and Sixth Corps.

This movement was by order of Gen. Grant, he supposing that Early had started for Richmond, and wanting the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps forwarded via Washington to join the Army of the Potomac, then in front of Petersburg.

We marched nearly all night, stopping at Leesburg to feed, and then continued on to Goose Creek, where we went into camp, having marched about twenty-four miles. Our march was continued for three days, starting early in the morning and making camp at dark.

The 23d we started at daylight and arrived at Chain Bridge in the afternoon and went into camp, remaining there two days, which gave the men and horses a rest. The weather had been very warm, and the dust on the march was almost suffocating.

On the 26th we had orders to start back to Harper's Ferry, and we broke camp early in the morning and hurried along, arriving at our destination on the evening of the 29th and went into camp, the men and horses being pretty well tired out. We omitted the evening roll-call so as to allow the men to go to sleep early; but we were just a little vexed to get orders in the evening to be ready to move at three o'clock in the morning—where? Right back over the road we had just come!

"Boots and saddles" were blown at half-past two the next morning, and we moved out of camp promptly at three o'clock. It was reported that some one in the battery, on being woke up and told that we were to retrace our steps over the same ground that we had covered twice since the 16th, made a very profane remark, but on investigation the culprit could not be found.

We marched that day until late in the evening, when we encamped in a lot alongside of the pike. Starting early next morning we passed through Frederick City and went into camp on the Gettysburg pike, where we remained one day, and then started back, making twenty-four miles, and again went into camp. We remained there until Aug. 6th, when we stared at daylight and reached Knoxville, having marched twenty-three miles.

On the 7th we crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and encamped at Halltown.

There were various reasons for the marches and countermarches we had been making for the past fifteen days. Early had not started up the valley as was supposed, but was holding on to some of the fords, and his whole force was in the lower part of the Shenandoah Valley. There were a number of generals commanding certain sections of the country in the vicinity of Washington, and each thought that Early was sure to attack him, and if a small cavalry force showed up in his vicinity, he immediately wired to Washington that Early's whole force was after him, and then everything had to "hustle;" but at last Gen. Grant insisted that one man should take command of the whole, and Gen. Philip H. Sheridan was sent from his command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac to take command of all troops on the Upper Potomac. Gen. Grant, on the 6th of August, ran down to Monocacy Bridge, in Maryland, and met Gen. Sheridan at that point, and gave him his final instructions.

Gen. Hunter had just arrived from his long trip down the Kanawha Valley, and his troops were at or near Harper's Ferry, having been delayed by low water in the Ohio River, and also by various breaks on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, from reporting as soon as expected.

Gen. Halleck had sent one or two sharp telegraph orders to Hunter, hurrying him up, so Hunter, as soon as he had his troops at the Ferry, sent his resignation to Washington, and it was accepted, and the army lost a good general.

Sheridan's army consisted of the Sixth Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Wright, its three divisions by Gens. Russell, Getty and Rickets; one division of the Nineteenth Corps, Maj. Gen. Emory commanding corps, Gen. Dwight commanding division (the second division of the Nineteenth Corps, Gen. Grover, arrived on the 18th of August); Army of West Virginia (Eighth Corps), Gen. Crook commanding, Gens. Thoburn and Duval as division commanders. The cavalry consisted of Gen. Torbert's division and Averell's; Torbert was appointed as Chief of Cavalry, with Merritt and Averell commanding divisions.

The rebel force in the valley consisted of "Stonewall" Jackson's old corps, now commanded by Early, with Gens. Rodes, Ransom and Gordon commanding divisions. Breckenridge's division, three battalions of artillery and one corps of cavalry commanded by Gen. Lomax, with Vaughn, Johnson, McCausland and Imboden as brigade commanders.

I quote from Sheridan's Memoirs the following description of the Shenandoah Valley, that the reader may have a better idea of the different movements of the army:

"The valley has its northern limit along the Potomac between McCoy's ferry at the eastern base of the North Mountain, and Harper's Ferry at the western base of the Blue Ridge. The southern limit is south of Staunton, on the divide which separates the waters flowing into the Potomac from those that run to the James. The western boundary is the eastern slope of the Alleghany Mountains, the eastern, the Blue Ridge; these two distinct mountain ranges trending about southwest inclose a stretch of quite open, undulating country varying in width from the northern to the southern extremity, and dotted at frequent intervals with patches of heavy woods.

"At Martinsburg the valley is about sixty miles broad, and on an east and west line drawn through Winchester about forty-five, while at Strasburg it narrows down to about twenty-five. Just southeast of Strasburg, which is nearly midway between the eastern and western walls of the valley, rises an abrupt range of mountains called Massanutten, consisting of several ridges which extend southward between the North and South Forks of the Shenandoah River until, losing their identity, they merge into lower but broken ground between New Market and Harrisonburg. The Massanutten ranges, with their spurs and hills, divide the Shenandoah Valley into two valleys, the one next the Blue Ridge being called the Luray, while that next the North Mountain retains the name of Shenandoah.

"A broad macadamized road, leading south from Williamsport, Maryland, to Lexington, Virginia, was built at an early day to connect the interior of the latter State with the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, and along this road are situated the principal towns and villages of the Shenandoah Valley, with lateral lines of communication extending to the mountain ranges on the east and west. The roads running toward the Blue Ridge are nearly all macadamized, and the principal ones lead to the railroad system of eastern Virginia through Snicker's, Ashby's, Manassas, Chester, Thornton's, Swift Run, Brown's and Rockfish Gaps, tending to an ultimate centre at Richmond. These gaps are low and easy, offering little obstruction to the march of an army coming from eastern Virginia, and thus the Union troops operating west of the Blue Ridge were always subjected to the perils of a flank attack; for the Confederates could readily be brought by rail to Gordonsville and Charlottesville, from which point they could move with such celerity through the Blue Ridge that, on more than one occasion, the Shenandoah Valley has been the theatre of Confederate success, due greatly to the advantage of possessing these interior lines."

As before stated, our battery arrived at Halltown on the 7th of August. We put our guns in position and remained there three days.

On the 9th, Lieut. Gray was detailed as Ordnance Officer, Artillery Brigade, Nineteenth Army Corps.

The 10th we moved with our corps to Berryville, and on the morning of the 11th we made a forward movement, Sheridan intending to force Early into a fight. Early was not willing to accept a battle, and moved his army up the valley.

We followed as far as Cedar Creek, and on the afternoon of the 13th had quite a lively brush with Early's rear guard, we only firing a few shots. We remained there until the evening of the 15th, when we moved out of camp at ten o'clock, and reached Winchester at daylight, and went into position, where we remained until the morning of the 17th, when we moved back to Berryville.

Next morning we retired about four miles and formed line-of-battle, Crook on the left, Emory in the centre, and Wright on the right. This retrograde movement was caused by Sheridan receiving notice that Kershaw's division of infantry and two brigades of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry were on the way to re-enforce Early, and at that time, the 16th, had reached Front Royal, where Merritt, with his cavalry, was disputing their advance.

Early, as soon as he found that Sheridan had fallen back, put his force in motion, and lost no time in following us down the valley, and from this until the 19th, our army was on the defensive. We were at or near Halltown, where several skirmishes occurred, we firing only a few shots, however.

On the 3d of September all the three-years men who had not re-enlisted were mustered out at Charlestown, and went home under the charge of Capt. Buckley.

Sheridan learned on the 16th that Kershaw's division of infantry and Cutshaw's artillery had been returned to Richmond, and he immediately made preparations for a forward movement; and on the morning of the 19th his cavalry forced the Berryville crossing of the Opequon, followed by the Sixth, Eighth and Nineteenth Corps. The enemy was posted in line-of-battle, and in a short time the engagement became general. It was nearly dark before Early was fairly beaten and sent "whirling through Winchester."

Our part in this important victory may be seen in part from the report of Capt. E.D. Taft, Chief of Artillery, Nineteenth Army Corps:

"Battery D, First Rhode Island Artillery, by my direction, took position in a skirt of woods on the right of the Nineteenth Army Corps, and immediately opened fire on one of the enemy's batteries, then enfilading our lines on the right, when the enemy opened fire from two guns in the wood with canister, about two hundred yards distant and in rear of our line of infantry. The battery soon silenced these two guns, and then renewed the fire on the battery enfilading our line, silencing it for a short period, but the infantry falling back for want of ammunition rendered the position unsafe for artillery. The battery had whilst in this position, although under a severe fire front and left oblique, been gallantly fought. The support having retired, and the battery having lost four men and six horses and one wheel broken, I ordered it to withdraw, which was done in good order. This closed the operations of these batteries for the day."

Capt. Taft's report is wrong in one particular. When our infantry fell back, Capt. Taft did ride up to our battery and tell the commanding officer to hold his position as long as possible, but look out and not lose his pieces, and then rode away. We soon had orders to limber up.

At this time some infantry in our front was showing up rather near our position. As we were afraid they would get at us before we could get through the woods, we thought that a few rounds of canister, rightly distributed, would give them a check and allow us to retire.

Lieut. Bonn was in command of the right section, and Lieut. Gray of the left. Lieut. Gray was still on detached duty, but came up while we were halted in the woods and took his section into the fight. We promptly commenced to distribute canister among the infantry in our front, and they soon took shelter under the bank of Red Bud Run. Just at this time Lieut. Gray's left piece was disabled by a shot, and he sent it to the rear, but retained the cannoneers to help on the other pieces. It was now decided that we could pull out.

The right section pulled out, and the right piece of the left section was about to limber up, when a shot from a twenty-pound Parrott that was across the Red Bud Run passed entirely through the swing horses. We had to stay, then, and Sergt. Tucker and his men needed no orders to commence firing again.

We soon expended all our canister, and had to use solid shot as our shell had given out some time before. The infantry that was under the bank to our right and front now commenced to give us some trouble, and we began to think that we had staid too long; but we would shy a shot along the bank and they would lay low; meantime we were hurrying to get our dead horses on the limber clear, but it was a slow job.

About this time an officer rode out of the woods in our rear and gave us the welcome news that a brigade of the Eighth Corps was close at hand; and in a minute or two we saw them coming on the double-quick. When they arrived we ceased firing and limbered up, and taking the harnesses from our dead horses, we soon joined the rest of the battery. When our lines advanced, we were ordered to move with them, and we had quite a good view of the final rout of Early's army. We went into camp for the night just outside of Winchester.

On the morning of the 20th we started early in pursuit of the enemy, and on arrival at Strasburg went into camp. Gen. Early was found in position just in our front at Fisher's Hill, strongly fortified. His position was almost impregnable from an attack in front, so Sheridan sent the Eighth Corps around his left to take the position by flanking it. It took until the afternoon of the 23d to get the Eighth Corps into position, as they had to make most of the movements through thick woods, and keep out of sight of the rebels' signal stations. On the afternoon of the 23d the Eighth Corps charged down on to Early's left flank and routed it. The movements in our front were to help carry out this project.

On the morning of the 23d our corps was advanced, and at three o'clock in the afternoon Grover's division drove in the skirmish line in our front and formed in line-of-battle. Some two hundred yards in our front was a ridge, and the rebel sharpshooters took up their position on this ridge, and made it very uncomfortable for us. The third brigade, second division, Nineteenth Corps, soon made a charge and captured this position, which was within three hundred yards of the enemy's fortifications.

Gens. Sheridan and Grover were at the right of our battery when the infantry carried the hill. Sheridan wanted a piece of artillery sent out there, and Gen. Grover came and asked Lieut. Chase if he could put a piece on that ridge. Lieut. Gray was sent to see if it was possible to do so. Dismounting just before the top of the ridge was reached, he left his horse in charge of an orderly and took to all fours to do the rest of the distance.

There was quite a depression on the top of the ridge, and just on the other edge was a slight rifle-pit that had been hastily thrown up by the enemy. Our skirmishers were occupying this, and it was quite necessary to keep well down, as the enemy's infantry and artillery were within short range, and were giving this particular spot very close attention.

Becoming convinced that if a piece could be put into this depression it would do good execution, Lieut. Gray gave the signal, and Sergt. Tucker with his piece started on the gallop and was soon there, the piece being halted before the top of the ridge was reached. The pickets kept up a sharp fire so as to have the smoke hide our movements, and we ran the piece by hand into the depression and filled both haversacks with ammunition and loaded. We had a sure mark, and when we sent that shell into the earthwork in our front, it made things jingle. The enemy was not slow in returning the compliment, and as they had eight or ten guns in our immediate front, we laid low, but just as soon as we thought they had fired everything, we repeated the experiment before they had loaded.

We had been in this position about fifteen or twenty minutes when Gens. Sheridan and Grover ran over the ridge and took shelter in the depression just to our right. Sheridan was anxious to see the whole situation, and crawled up to the skirmish line, some ten feet in advance of us. Gen. Grover soon joined him, and just about this time a shot from a twenty-pound Parrott ploughed through the slight ridge within a foot of Sheridan's head, covering him with dirt. He rolled over on his side, and we thought he was wounded, but he was only getting the dirt out of his ear and neck; he came back, though, and took his position by the side of our piece.

In a few minutes we heard cheers on our right and soon saw the enemy breaking all along the line. We sent shot after shot in quick succession, but were told to stop firing. Soon our corps came sweeping over the ridge and down the other side.

Sheridan now wanted his horse, but could not see it, so Lieut. Gray let him take his, but regretted it in a moment, as Sheridan went dashing down the hill over stumps and fallen trees, and we expected to see horse and rider take a tumble, but they were soon out of sight.

We limbered up and went back to where the remainder of the battery was, and then started over to the pike and joined our division. We marched nearly all night and then went into camp at Woodstock, to get a little sleep and some rations.

At two o'clock in the afternoon we started again and reached Edenburg, where toward night we fired a few shots and then encamped. In the morning we were away early, and marched all day, going into position two or three times and firing a few shots, but apparently doing the enemy no great harm. The next day we marched to Mount Jackson, having quite a skirmish in the afternoon.

On the morning of the 29th we started at nine o'clock, and on reaching Harrisonburg, went into camp, remaining there until the 6th of October, occupying the time in foraging for our horses.

On the morning of the 30th Lieut. Gray took nine mounted men from the battery, armed with revolvers, and started out into the country to secure some horses that he had seen the day before, but on arriving where he had seen the horses he found the natives had run them off to the mountains. Following the trail for about seven miles we ran across a few straggling rebel cavalrymen, several of whom were captured, and also a number of horses.

We continued on until we were about fifteen or sixteen miles from camp, when we stopped at a farmhouse and had dinner and fed our horses. We then started toward camp again, but by a different road than that on which we came. We had two or three quite sharp skirmishes with squads of rebel cavalry, and about dusk Billy Mills, who was in the advance, rode back bringing the information that there was a company of rebel cavalry drawn up on the side of the road with the intention of obstructing our passage. We had at this time nine rebel cavalrymen as prisoners and twenty-three horses.

The line was immediately halted, and Lieut. Gray rode ahead to reconnoiter. When he arrived at the edge of the woods he found a company of rebels drawn up in line in a large field adjoining the road. On looking over the situation he found that the fence in the rear and on the left had been taken down, to allow egress from the lot, which gave him the impression that the force there had some doubt as to the number of our men.

Riding back, the column was started forward, following the road until close to the edge of the woods where we could be seen from the lots. We filed by twos from the road into the woods and made a short countermarch on to the road and into the woods again, which manœuvre made it look as if we had two companies. On moving into the woods the second time, all the rebel cavalrymen were dismounted, their arms strapped to each other and ordered to sit down, and one man left as guard.

The darkies that had been confiscated to take care of the spare horses, twelve in number, were mounted on them, and a line was formed at the edge of the woods, consisting of twenty men, nine of us and eleven darkies sandwiched in, the other darkey being left to look after the horses. These arrangements were not quite satisfactory to some of the darkies; but they were told that when we started out of the woods they must keep well up in the line or get shot.

An order was given to charge, every man was told to halloo as loud as he could yell, and ride straight for the line of the rebel cavalry. The scheme worked like a charm. The rebel line soon broke and fled to the woods, we in hot pursuit, capturing three, two seriously wounded, while our loss was one darkey shot, and slight wounds on two horses. We soon collected our men together and sent them back to the woods under command of Sergt. Tucker.

Lieut. Gray and Mills rode down to the town to see if there were any rebels there, we having seen a squad of men leaving there a few minutes before we had our brush with the company of cavalry. Both Lieut. Gray and Mills had on rebel uniforms, and they soon had information that the body of men which had left the town a few minutes before were Yankees, which information was pleasing to them.

Mills was immediately sent back to have the line moved forward, and we soon entered the town. Lieut. Gray sat on his horse with a dozen people around him, who were giving what information they could, and urging him to hurry so as to capture some of the Yankees that had left a few minutes before. The squad of men we saw leaving the town was Lieut. Corthell and some men from Battery G. of our regiment. When our line came up there was a look of astonishment on the faces of some of the people when they found we were Yankees.

We arrived in camp about eight o'clock with twenty-eight horses and thirteen rebel cavalrymen, which we considered a good day's work for ten light artillerymen.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan started his army down the valley, having done all the damage with his cavalry that he could in this neighborhood. We bivouacked at Mount Jackson, and started the next morning and reached Woodstock late in the evening.

On the morning of the 8th we hitched up early, but did not move. We soon learned that Sheridan had made up his mind to give the rebel cavalry another lesson.

Gen. Rosser had just arrived in the valley with his brigade, and he was put in command of all the cavalry. Since leaving Harrisonburg they had been annoying our rear guard, so Sheridan sent word to Torbert on the evening of the 7th to "give Rosser a drubbing in the morning, or get whipped yourself, and the infantry will be halted until the affair is over."

Torbert had the divisions of Merritt and Custer, and in the morning he attacked Rosser. After a hard fight of about two hours Rosser had received his "drubbing," losing eleven pieces of artillery, several wagons, and three hundred prisoners.

We started on our march at ten o'clock, and encamped near Strasburg, remaining there one day, and then moved to the north bank of Cedar Creek, and went into position just off the pike on the extreme left of the Nineteenth Corps. Crook (Eighth Corps) went into position on the left of the pike joining the left of the Nineteenth Corps, his right advanced some hundred and fifty yards beyond our position. The Sixth Corps had started for Port Royal, to rejoin the Army of the Potomac, while Merritt's cavalry was on the extreme right of our line.

Our cavalry destroyed all the mills and crops in the valley as we fell back, and gathered in all the live stock, so that Early could not subsist his army in the valley. Early was at Fisher's Hill on the morning of the 13th, just the same, but probably brought his rations with him. We occupied this position until the morning of the 19th. In the meantime the Sixth Corps had come back and taken position in rear of the Nineteenth Corps. Sheridan had been called to Washington, which left Wright in command.

At break of day on the 19th, three of Early's divisions surprised Crook's camp and stampeded his whole command. Our battery, being on the extreme left of the Nineteenth Corps, were the first troops to receive their attention after the Eighth Corps had been swept away.

We had orders to have our battery hitched up at daylight, and we had just completed the task when we heard a volley of musketry on our left. We fired four rounds, just to make a noise and wake up the camp, not yet realizing just what had happened on our left.

Lieut. Gray hurriedly gave orders to have the tents struck and everything in readiness to move. In a few minutes we saw a line coming over the hill on our left, and making sure they were not our troops, we opened on them, but after firing for a few minutes, Gen. Emory dashed up and ordered us to stop firing, as they were some of our men, and Lieut. Gray was told to always look out before he commenced firing. At this moment Lieuts. Chase and Bonn came up, and Chase took command.

In the two or three minutes that had elapsed since we had stopped firing, the line of infantry that we had driven behind the brow of the hill, now opened on us, and in a few seconds we had orders to "give it to them." We had just opened on them as Gen. Wright rode up. He asked Emory "What is the matter?" and Emory replied, "Early has surprised us—Crook's corps has gone." Wright quickly took in the situation, and started off.

We had warm work before us, the enemy's line of infantry on our left having a notion of charging us, but as they came over the ridge we had very nearly a complete flank fire on them, and our left section commenced using canister. The right of their line was driven back over the ridge, but the left was swinging up parallel with the pike, which gave them a flank fire on our battery. We were lucky in having three or four loads of hay piled up just in rear of the limbers and on a line with the caissons on the extreme left of the battery, this pile of hay stopping many of the bullets from our left.

At this time the fourth brigade, second division, Nineteenth Corps, swung into position on our left. The smoke and fog was quite thick, and they did not open fire for some minutes thinking that the line in their front was some of the Eighth Corps falling back. Their mistake was discovered, and none too soon, for the enemy made a dash for our guns, but the line on our left had their guns loaded, and poured a volley at them which checked their onward rush.

We were firing very rapidly and doing good execution, as we kept the line on our left (or in front of our left section, which had swung to the left) back to the brow of the ridge; but it now became apparent that we must fall back, as the right of our support had given way and the troops on the left of the battery were only hanging on so as to give us a chance to get out; and to add to our troubles, the line of infantry on our left, which we had until now been able to keep back to the ridge, was joined by Wharton's rebel division which had moved up the pike, and they were pouring in a nasty fire.

When we received the order, "Limber to the rear," we were not long in executing it, as the rebels were now very close to us. All the pieces were taken off but the left piece of Lieut. Gray's section—three of the limber horses being down, and in a minute every horse on the limber was shot. It was impossible to take the piece by hand to the rear, and the caisson had started some minutes before. The pike had been in the hands of the rebels for the last fifteen minutes, so Lieut. Gray told the three or four cannoneers who had been trying to get the limber clear, to join the battery.

Maj. Hart, of Gen. Emory's staff, wanted to save this piece, and told Lieut. Gray to fix the prolong and he would have the infantry haul it off. It was simply sacrificing men to make the attempt under the circumstances. Maj. Hart lost his life, also Capt. Watson and Lieut. Quay, both of the Eighth Indiana, and Lieut. Col. Kenny, commanding the Eighth Indiana, was severely wounded, and four others. Lieut. Gray was the only one who escaped from the attempt to get the piece away.

The following is from Vol. XLIII. of the Official Records of the War:

Hdqrs. Fourth Brig., Second Div., 19th Army Corps, Cedar Creek, Va., October 24, 1864.

Captain: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of my command in the engagement on the 19th of October, instant:

* * * * the right regiment (Eighth Indiana) supporting Battery D, First Rhode Island Artillery. In consequence of the dense fog, which existed at the time, the enemy advanced on the battery and were within a short distance of it before we could distinguish whether they were friends or foes, the more so, as we supposed them to be a portion of the Eighth Corps, and notwithstanding we received a very heavy fire from that direction, we did not reply to it until they charged directly on the battery. Five pieces were withdrawn successfully, and while attempting to save the last one Major Hart (of General Grover's staff), Capt. William D. Watson, and Lieut. George W. Quay (both of Eighth Indiana) were killed, and Lieut. Col. A.J. Kenny (commanding Eighth Indiana) severely wounded. * * * * *

I cannot close this report without referring to the bravery of the lamented Major Hart (of General Grover's staff), who was killed while cheering on the men in their attempt to save the last gun of Battery D, First Rhode Island Artillery. In him we have lost a noble, brave, efficient officer.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID SHUNK, Colonel Eighth Indiana, Commanding.

Capt. E.A. Fiske, Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Second Div., Nineteenth Army Corps.

Hdqrs. Third Brig., Second Div., 19th Army Corps, Near Cedar Creek, Va., October 24, 1864.

Sir: In obedience to orders, I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of this brigade in the action of the 19th instant:

* * * * the left of the One Hundred and Seventy-sixth New York reached nearly to and supported Battery D, First Rhode Island Artillery.

These dispositions had scarcely been made, and orders given to the men to reserve their fire until the enemy was near enough to make the fire effective, when we began to receive a heavy fire of musketry from the advancing, but still hidden, enemy. The fire came from our front, our right, and our left, with a heavy, but random fire of artillery from the heights formerly occupied by General Crook's command. The enemy's lines were not developed until they were within one hundred and fifty yards of our lines, and then were but dimly visible through the fog. At this time they opened a furious and destructive fire upon us, still advancing, which was vigorously and effectively returned, checking to some extent their advance. The enemy's lines, as now developed, were nearly at right angles with the main brigade line, and facing the One Hundred and Seventy-sixth New York and the three companies of the One Hundred and Fifty-sixth New York, which had changed front. The left of their lines extended very nearly to Cedar Creek, while their right extended as far as the eye could reach through the fog and smoke. In a very few moments they were on us in force, their left swinging to the right, while their right poured heavy volleys in our rear. A desperate hand-to-hand fight ensued on the left of the brigade line. The enemy had planted their colors on our works and were fighting desperately across them, meeting with a stubborn resistance, while they swarmed like bees round the battery on our left and rear. * * * *