CONTENTS (continued 4)

Many of the representatives seem to have had an equally low opinion of the average intelligence of female electors, as they sought to capture the votes of domestic servants by a Bill which was rejected by the Council, in which a weekly half-holiday was decreed to them except in cases of sickness or death in the family, or where an annual holiday of not less than fourteen days had been substituted by mutual agreement between employers and their servants. How the period of rest was to be enforced was, perhaps wisely, not laid down, as domestics would, in few cases, be prepared to give information against their employers. Those among the latter, however, who took the matter seriously would, presumably, guard themselves against judiciary proceedings by compelling their servants to be out of the house on the holiday between three o'clock and half-past nine, whatever might be the state of the weather. Again, the undoubted evil, that young girls, by the culpable weakness of their parents, are allowed to parade the streets at night, was to be cured, according to the Government, by the so-called Juvenile Depravity Suppression Bill, which failed to meet with acceptance by the usually docile House of Representatives. Its danger and absurdity can be gathered, without further comment, from the quotation of one of the clauses: "Whenever any constable finds any girl" (who is apparently not over the age of sixteen years) "loitering in the streets or in out-of-the-way places after the hour of ten of the clock at night, and he has reason to believe that she is there for improper purposes, the following provisions shall apply:—

"1. He shall forthwith take her to the nearest beat of another constable, or, failing him, to the nearest justice or clergyman, or, failing him, to the nearest house of some married person of good repute, in whose presence the girl shall be questioned as to her name, her abode, her parents or guardians, and her reason for being from home and loitering as aforesaid.

"2. The constable shall then take, or shall cause her to be taken, to her home, where she shall be handed over to the person in charge of the house, and the constable shall forthwith on his return from duty make report of the facts to the officer in charge of the station."

Should the offence be repeated and the girl's reply be deemed by the officer in charge of a police station to be unsatisfactory, she may be brought before a magistrate and be committed to a reformatory or an industrial school. Some justification, I must add, for the seemingly depreciatory opinion of the members was afforded by the proceedings at the convention of the National Council of Women held at Christchurch early in 1896. This Association, which claims to be non-political and to focus the views of the women of New Zealand, passed resolutions in favour of the nationalisation of the land, a compulsory eight hours' day, and the enactment of a minimum rate of wages; but the climax was reached when it was resolved that "in all cases where a woman elects to superintend her own household and to be the mother of children, there shall be a law attaching a certain just share of her husband's earnings or income for her separate use, payable if she so desires it into her separate account." The first portion of this sentence is mysterious, and seems to be based on the assumption that the husband has nothing to say in the matter.

The extraordinary legislative activity which I have summarised need arouse no astonishment, as it is in consonance with the usual practice of the Parliament of New Zealand. Between the years 1876 and 1894, it has been computed, 2,972 measures were passed, and of these no less than 1,602 have already been repealed.

So much for the past: we must now consider briefly the present position of affairs and the further effects which may be anticipated from female suffrage.

It is the general impression that while a large majority of the women voted in 1893 as their husbands and brothers advised them, yet they were induced, in many instances, by their leagues, which had been started on independent lines, to support candidates on moral rather than political considerations. In the following year these leagues, with the exception of those which placed liquor questions before all others, were captured by one of the political parties, most of them by the Ministerialists. An amusing incident occurred in this connection at Dunedin. Shortly before the last elections it was decided, at a thinly-attended meeting of the Women's Franchise League, to support the three Ministerial candidates, although one of them was an anti-prohibitionist. Thereupon many of the members protested against the party character given to the association, and called a meeting, the proceedings at which were thus described by the local newspaper:—

"The meeting which was held yesterday afternoon in connection with the Women's Franchise League was, in some respects, the most unique gathering ever held in the city. There were nearly 200 women present, and they were divided into two parties—the followers of Mrs. Hatton and the supporters of Mrs. Don and Mrs. Hislop. At the close of the opening remarks of the Chairman (the Rev. Mr. Saunders), Mr. Hatton mounted the platform, and declining to take his seat, the Chairman threatened to send for a policeman. Then occurred a scene and uproar, of which it is impossible to give any conception. The noise was deafening; and attracted to the spot passers-by in the street. Half a dozen persons occupied the stage, and while some persons were addressing the meeting, others were engaged in heated argument. Women stamped on the floor with their feet and parasols, others were speaking at the highest pitch of their voices; there were hissing and hooting, and other unwomanly demonstrations. Eventually a portion of Mrs. Hislop's supporters withdrew to a side room, and the Chairman, having dissolved the meeting, vacated the chair."[1]

We find, therefore, that, with the exception of ardent Prohihitionists, women are subordinating their special interests to their increasing attachment to one or other of the parties; but it does not follow that they will cease to exercise a direct influence upon legislation. It is not easy to learn to what extent their views have been modified during the last few years. The proceedings of the National Council of Women cannot be taken seriously, and the practical aspirations of the sex must be sought rather in the points emphasised by the local leagues. The files of the newspapers, unfortunately, afford little information, as it was the practise of candidates to speak upon general topics at their public meetings, and to take part in informal and unreported discussions with the members of the various women's leagues. On these occasions, I understand, and I must again except the Prohibitionists, the women made their views known, but did not seek to exact pledges as a condition of support. It is believed that they took less interest in the second elections, but statistics are not yet available for a comparison of the numbers that went to the poll on the two occasions. Of 9,332 women who were registered for the City of Auckland, 6,304 recorded their votes, but I am unable to say whether the proportion of about seven in ten holds good for the Province.

But, while it is necessary to consider the view of local leagues in order to form general conclusions as to the trend of female thought, it is found that, in the absence of one predominating centre, different issues obtain prominence in different places, and that the vote lacks the force which would be given to it by concentration. A general similarity of aims, however, enables an estimate to be formed of the questions which the women will press upon the attention of Parliament in the immediate future. The repeal of the C.D. and Totalisator Acts, amendments of the marriage laws, and greater protection of women and children against the cruelty of husbands and fathers, are subjects which are certain again to provoke discussion. Parliament will also be asked again to admit women within its precincts, as they are no longer satisfied with the possession of the franchise; but the agitation will, I think, at present be unsuccessful, partly because, in the only instance in which a woman has held a public position, the experiment is regarded as having been a failure. Some three years ago Mrs. Yates was elected to be Mayor of Onehunga, and was unable to fill the position satisfactorily. She was a woman of considerable ability, but of a hasty temper, and came into constant conflict with the Councillors. Very possibly they did not give her a fair chance; but the fact remains that the proceedings excited much ridicule, in the press and elsewhere, and retarded the movement in favour of rendering women eligible for seats in Parliament.

The Prohibitionists do not count upon much legislative assistance during the next three years, as the number of members of the House of Representatives who are in favour of prohibition upon the vote of a bare majority was reduced by the last election. They believe that if the "National Option" Bill be re-introduced, the Council may seize upon that fact as a ground for again rejecting it. In the meanwhile, they will concentrate their efforts upon the education of the electorate, and have, as I have shown, no reason to be discouraged by the results of the second local option poll.

"Equal wages for equal work" is a new cry of the female voters. They believe that if the Government were to introduce the principle of equal wages for similar work as between the men and women in the Civil Service, private employers would gradually follow the example. This proposal has the support both of those who desire to raise the wages of women and of those who think that they would no longer be able to compete with men in the search for employment. It might have been expected that the habit which women have now acquired of meeting together for the discussion of a common policy would have inclined them to the formation of Trades Unions; but it is too early to look for indirect results from female suffrage, which has hitherto had no appreciable effect upon the rate of wages of women. Nor has it modified the domestic instincts of the vast majority of the sex.

Lastly, the women of the working classes, almost without exception, are in favour of pensions to the aged and needy, and regard objections based on the deterrence of thrift or the difficulty of raising the necessary funds as factitious and disingenuous. Herein, as in some of the other matters to which I have referred, we see the principal danger of female suffrage in New Zealand, the tendency of the women to subordinate reason to sentiment. They note the prevalence of an evil, and believe that if the State decrees its cessation it will promptly cease to exist. But we must cherish the hope, though the justification for it is not yet manifest, that as the women become accustomed to the exercise of their power, they will no longer take a purely emotional view of the problems which engage their attention. At the same time, as we have seen, they have promoted several unobtrusive but eminently useful reforms which would have had less chance of acceptance in a House elected by men. It is in this direction, and not in attempts to make people virtuous or sober by Act of Parliament, that we may anticipate the best results from the enfranchisement of the women of New Zealand.

IX

THE EVOLUTION OF A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The five self-governing Provinces of the mainland of Australia have been evolved from the Crown Colonies of New South Wales, South Australia, and Western Australia by the successive detachment of Victoria and Queensland from the former and the gradual growth of the system of responsible government, and are separated by lines of demarcation which, except where the Murray or one of its tributaries forms the boundary, are purely arbitrary and have not been drawn in accordance with any distinctive geographical features. In the exercise of fiscal autonomy as regards their reciprocal relations, they have adopted protective tariffs which have not only impeded the interchange of commodities, but in some cases diverted trade from its natural course. New South Wales, indeed, after a period of protection, has reverted to the policy of free trade, while the tariffs of Queensland and Western Australia are directed mainly to the acquisition of revenue; but they are actually protective, as are, avowedly and to a high degree, those of Victoria and South Australia. Under these circumstances, and as the result of insufficient intercourse, antagonistic interests have been created and jealousies aroused which are a source of anxiety to those who consider the future of Australia.

The dangers which would be likely to arise from the independent development of the Provinces were recognised at an early date. At the time of the suggested separation of the district of Port Phillip from New South Wales and of the discussion of the new constitutions which were about to be granted, it was proposed by the Imperial Authorities that the government should be in the hands of a General Assembly and local Provincial Councils, but it was objected by the colonists that, in the absence of regular means of communication, any scheme which included the creation of a central legislature and executive would be found to be impracticable. In deference to their views the idea was allowed to drop, and no attempt was made to secure unity of action between the Provinces, except that, in 1850, the Governor of New South Wales received a commission as Governor-General of Australia and Governor of Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania, the administrators of which obtained the rank of Lieutenant-Governor. They were to be superseded in their authority by the former when he was in their territories, but were instructed to correspond directly with the Colonial Office. It is not clear to what extent the Governor-General was expected to direct the administration of the other Provinces. Some writers maintain that his pre-eminence was purely titular and intended as a compliment to the Mother Colony. In any case, when, a few years later, responsible government was established and the Governors gradually became little more than figure-heads of the Executive, the matter ceased to be of any importance.

The next phase in the movement originated in Victoria upon the initiative of Mr. (now Sir Charles) Gavan Duffy, who, in 1857, induced the Legislative Assembly to appoint a committee to consider the advisability of federal union. Upon their recommendation that an inter-provincial conference should be held, communications were addressed to New South Wales, South Australia, and Tasmania, which, though separated from the mainland of Australia, has always identified itself closely with Australian affairs. The proposal was in each case favourably received, as also, a little later, by Queensland, which had been erected into a separate Province in 1859; and Tasmania actually appointed its delegates. But there the matter was allowed to rest; and, although occasional conferences were held at which a uniform tariff, the immigration of the Chinese, and other subjects were discussed, no practical steps were taken until 1883, when external questions impressed Australian statesmen with the necessity for the creation of some body which would voice the opinions of Australia. Germany was reputed to have designs upon New Guinea, France upon the New Hebrides; while the latter country also gave offence by the penal settlement in New Caledonia. In the spring of that year Sir T. M'Ilwraith, the Premier of Queensland, which from its position has the greatest interest in New Guinea, had hoisted the British flag on the Island and taken formal possession of that part of it which was not under the control of the Dutch; but his action had been disavowed by the Imperial Government. A convention, attended by representatives from the five Australian Provinces, Tasmania, New Zealand, and Fiji, was accordingly held at Sydney, at which a decision was arrived at as to the main principles which were embodied in the Federal Council Act of 1885, the first legislative recognition of the Unity of Australia. Under this Act it was provided that a Federal Council, containing two representatives from a self-governing Province and one from a Crown Colony, should come into existence as soon as four of the Australasian Provinces had expressed their willingness to join it, and should thenceforward hold biennial sessions. The motive which had called the Council into existence was shown clearly in the principal power delegated to it, that of legislating, subject to Imperial approval, in regard to the relations of Australasia with the Islands of the Pacific. It was also authorised to deal, among other subjects, with the fisheries in Australasian waters beyond territorial limits and certain aspects of civil and criminal jurisdiction, upon which it could pass enactments which would bind the Provinces represented upon it; and with questions such as general defences, quarantine, copyright, uniformity of weights and measures, and others which might be referred to it by the Legislatures of two or more Provinces, and any other matters of general Australasian interest on which the Legislatures can legislate within their own limits, but as to which it is deemed desirable that there should be a law of general application. Such legislation, however, was to take effect only in the Provinces that requested the Council to act, and in any others that might subsequently adopt it. It will thus be seen that the measure is of a purely permissive character, as each Province decides for itself whether it will be represented on the Council. New South Wales, mainly under the influence of the late Sir Henry Parkes, and New Zealand have never taken part in the deliberations, and South Australia has only been represented on a single occasion. The abstention of New Zealand is of smaller importance, from her geographical position and her intention not to identify herself at present with any scheme of Australian federation; but the hostility of New South Wales and the apathy of South Australia have placed great obstacles in the way of Queensland, Victoria, Western Australia, and Tasmania, which, and especially Victoria, have attempted to turn the Council to the best account. Other causes have combined to minimise its utility; it has neither an Executive to carry out, nor a judiciary to enforce its decisions; it has no control over public funds; and, as has recently been pointed out, "it transacts its business without a Ministry or a department, without a leader or an Opposition, without a party or a programme; there is no necessary continuity of representation, or similarity in the mode of appointment of representatives, or fixed area within which its legislation has force; it is vagrant in domicile and without a roof to shelter it, without a foot of territory to rest upon, without a ship or a soldier to protect it, without a single man in its service, or a shilling of its own to pay one."[1] But, in spite of these drawbacks, the Council has done practical work: it has paved the way for a system of national defence by the establishment of federal garrisons at King George's Sound and Thursday Island; it has regulated the pearl-shell and bêche-de-mer fisheries on the coasts of Queensland and Western Australia, and it has interested itself actively in the promotion of the proposed Pacific cable. More would have been done, particularly in the consideration of the matters referred to it by Provincial Legislatures, had it not been hoped that by the postponement of action the Council would be enabled, through the adhesion of South Australia and New South Wales, to legislate for the whole of Australia. Several of the Provinces, notably Western Australia and Queensland, which have shown little eagerness for the immediate realisation of a closer union, believed that the Council would, by a gradual process of development, be transformed into a Federal Parliament, and were prepared to allow events to take their natural course; but in other quarters a strong feeling arose, which was strengthened by the report of Imperial officers on the condition of the Provincial Defences, that the time had arrived when an attempt should be made to draft a Federal Constitution Bill which should be submitted to the various Provinces, and, if approved by them, to the Imperial Authorities. As the result of correspondence between the Premiers, delegates from the whole of Australasia, with the exception of Fiji, met at Melbourne in 1890, and passed resolutions which led to the convocation at Sydney in the following year of a constituent convention, which was attended by Parliamentary representatives from the seven Provinces. The convention sat for several weeks, under the presidency of Sir Henry Parkes, and drew up a Bill "to constitute the commonwealth of Australia," which formed the basis of the discussions at the recent Federal Convention.

The legislative powers of the Commonwealth are, under the provisions of the Bill, vested in a Governor-General, appointed by the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives. The laws passed by the Parliament are to be presented to the Governor-General, who may assent to them in the Queen's name, reserve them for the signification of her pleasure, withhold his assent, or return them to the Parliament with any amendments that he may recommend. Laws assented to by the Governor-General may be disallowed within two years by the Queen in Council, and laws that have been reserved shall not come into force unless within the same period they have received the assent of the Queen in Council. The Members of the Convention did not deem it necessary that any class of Bills should be reserved, but understood that, as they proposed that the Commonwealth should be able to legislate on several matters affecting the relations of Australia with foreign nations, the Constitution would not be acceptable to the Imperial Authorities unless a considerable power of intervention were reserved to them.

The Senate is to be composed of eight members for each Province, which is henceforth to be called a State, of whom one-half retire triennially, directly chosen by the Houses of Parliament of the several States for a period of six years. Senators are subject to no property qualification, but must be of the age of thirty years, have resided for five years within the limits of the Commonwealth, be entitled to vote for a member of the House of Representatives, and if not British subjects by birth, have been naturalised for at least five years before the time of their election. Bankrupts, criminals, and Government contractors are specially disqualified. Similar provisions and disqualifications apply to members of the House of Representatives, except that the minimum age is reduced to twenty-one years, and that the periods of residence and naturalisation are reduced from five years to three. They are to be chosen, in constituencies of thirty thousand inhabitants, by electors whose qualification shall be that prescribed by each State as the qualification for electors of its more numerous House of Parliament. The members of both Houses are to be paid at the rate of £500 a year, and are precluded from sitting in a State Parliament. The Parliament of the Commonwealth is to have authority to deal with "external affairs and treaties," to take over the powers of the Federal Council, which will cease to exist from the date of its establishment, and to have the exclusive right to legislate in regard to the affairs of the people of any race, not being Australian aboriginals or Maoris of New Zealand, with respect to whom it is deemed desirable to make laws not applicable to the general community; the seat of the Federal Government and any places required for Federal purposes; and the provisional administration of any territory surrendered by any State, and accepted by the Commonwealth, or any territory in the Pacific placed by the Queen under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth. The framers of the Constitution doubtless had in view the Northern Territory, which, as it forms a heavy burden upon its resources, South Australia might be glad to hand over to the Federation. The Federal Parliament is also to deal exclusively with the postal and telegraphic services, military and naval defences and munitions of war, ocean beacons and lighthouses, quarantine, and, as soon as a uniform tariff has been imposed, with foreign and internal trade, bounties and duties of customs and excise. In the meanwhile, the duties are to be collected by Federal officials, but will be those that are, or may be, imposed by the Parliaments of the several States. Upon the enactment of a uniform Federal tariff, all such State laws will thereby be repealed and "trade and intercourse throughout the Commonwealth, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free." The expenditure of the Commonwealth is to be charged to the several States in proportion to the numbers of their people, and any surplus of revenue over expenditure is to be returned to them in proportion to the amount of revenue raised therein respectively, subject to certain reservations and to the right of the Federal Parliament, after the imposition of a uniform tariff, to prescribe the method of its disposal. The Federal revenue is to consist of customs and excise duties and of moneys raised by any other mode or system of taxation, but so that all such taxation shall be uniform through the Commonwealth. The Federal Parliament may also, "with the consent of the Parliaments of all the States, make laws for taking over and consolidating the whole or any part of the public debt of any State or States; but so that a State shall be liable to indemnify the Commonwealth in respect of the amount of a debt taken over, and that the amount of interest payable in respect of a debt shall be deducted and retained from time to time from the share of the surplus revenue of the Commonwealth which would be otherwise payable to the State."[2] Certain other legislative powers are vested in the Federal Parliament, which may concurrently be exercised by the several States, and in such cases Federal shall supersede State legislation. All subjects not exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth, or withdrawn from the Parliaments of the several States, are reserved to, and shall remain vested in, the State Parliaments.

The authority of the Senate in regard to Money Bills formed the subject of much discussion, and was decided by a compromise which, it was hoped, would satisfy both those who desired to secure the financial supremacy of the House of Representatives and the inhabitants of the smaller States, who would naturally struggle for the rights of the Senate in which they would be on a footing of equality with their more powerful neighbours. The views of the former were met by the provisions that "laws appropriating any part of the public revenue, or imposing any tax or impost, shall originate in the House of Representatives," and that "the Senate shall have equal power with the House of Representatives in respect to all proposed laws, except laws imposing taxation and laws appropriating the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual services of the Government, which the Senate may affirm or reject, but may not amend. But the Senate may not amend any proposed law in such a manner as to increase any proposed charge or burden on the people." The interests of the latter were safeguarded by the four succeeding sub-sections:

"Laws imposing taxation shall deal with the imposition of taxation only.

"Laws imposing taxation, except laws imposing duties of customs on imports, shall deal with one subject of taxation only.

"The expenditure for services other than the ordinary annual services of the Government shall not be authorised by the same law as that which appropriates the supplies for such ordinary annual services, but shall be authorised by a separate law or laws.

"In the case of a proposed law which the Senate may not amend, the Senate may at any stage return it to the House of Representatives with a message requesting the omission or amendment of any items or provisions therein. And the House of Representatives may, if it thinks fit, make such omissions or amendments, or any of them, with or without modifications."[3]

The executive authority of the Commonwealth is to be exercised by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, with the aid and advice of a Federal Executive Council. Considerable discussion took place at the Convention as to the relations which should exist between the Federal Executive and Legislature, some of the Representatives being in favour of the British system, others of the direct popular election of the head of the Government. It was finally agreed that the members of the Council should be chosen and summoned by the Governor-General, should hold office, during his pleasure, and should be capable of being chosen and of sitting in either House of Parliament. They are to execute the provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth; to assume at once control of the departments of customs and excise, posts and telegraphs, military and naval defence, ocean lights and quarantine; and, until other provision is made by Parliament, to appoint and remove all other officers of the Government.

The Parliament of the Commonwealth may establish a Supreme Court of Australia, consisting of a Chief Justice and not less than four other Justices, who shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council, and shall be irremovable except upon an address from both Houses of Parliament. The Supreme Court shall be a final Court of Appeal from any other Federal Court, which may be established by Parliament, and from the highest Court of final resort in any State; and may be invested by Parliament with final and conclusive jurisdiction in all cases upon which an appeal has hitherto been allowed to the Queen in Council, subject to the right of the Queen to grant an appeal to herself in Council against the judgment of the Supreme Court in any case which concerns the public interests of the Commonwealth, or of any State, or of any other part of the British Empire. The Parliament may also confer upon the Federal Courts, other than the Supreme Court, jurisdiction to deal, either exclusively or concurrently with the Courts of the States, with cases arising under the Constitution or under any law made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth or affecting the Representatives of Foreign Powers, and with certain other matters including cases in which the Commonwealth is a party, or in which a Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.

As the powers of the State are to be substantially those which they possess at present with the exception of such as are transferred to the Federal Legislature and Executive, it is only necessary to add that the Governors of the States are to be appointed in the manner which their Parliament may prescribe, but are to correspond with the Imperial Authorities through the Governor-General: that States are not to be subdivided nor deprived of any of their territories without the consent of their Parliaments; and that they are forbidden explicitly to raise or maintain any military or naval force, to coin money, or make anything but gold and silver legal tender in payment of debts, to make any law prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, or to make or enforce any law abridging any privilege or immunity of citizens of other States of the Commonwealth, or to deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Finally, it is provided that any of the existing Provinces that have not adopted the Constitution may, upon doing so, be admitted to the Commonwealth, and that any law for the alteration of the Constitution is not to be submitted to the Governor-General for the Royal Assent until it has been passed by an absolute majority of both Houses of Parliament, and has been approved by conventions of a majority of the States representing a majority of the people of the Commonwealth.

When the Constitution Bill had been drafted, the next step should have been its reference to the Parliaments of the Constituent Provinces; but it was not even introduced in New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia, or New Zealand. In Victoria it was passed by the Assembly and forwarded to the Council, which passed it subject to certain amendments which were never considered by the Assembly; in South Australia it was introduced in the Assembly, and was dropped; in Tasmania it passed the Assembly and was dropped at an early stage in the Council. This procession of failures caused the advocates of Federation to realise that there must be something faulty in the method of procedure, and to ask themselves whether it was reasonable to expect that fourteen independent Chambers, or twelve, if New Zealand be excluded, should be able to arrive at a uniform decision on so complicated and contentious a subject. It was felt, also, that the Parliaments had no popular mandate to deal with the question, and that, in the general apathy and absence of interest, the electors themselves should be stirred up by direct participation in the movement. Accordingly, Mr. Reid, the Premier of New South Wales, invited the Premiers of the other Australian Provinces to meet him at Hobart in January, 1895, taking advantage of the fact that four of them would be there in connection with the biennial meeting of the Federal Council. The invitation was accepted, and a new scheme was devised of which the main principles were the popular election of delegates empowered to meet and frame a Federal Constitution; the reference of the Constitution so framed to a plebiscite of the several electorates and its subsequent transmission for Imperial legislation. The Premiers of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania accepted the proposal in its entirety; the Premier of Queensland agreed to it, except as regards the reference of the Constitution to a plebiscite; but the Premier of Western Australia was unable to concur with the decision of his colleagues. Sir John Forrest did not believe that popular election would lead to the choice of the most highly trained jurists and financiers, who could alone frame a consistent and workable Constitution, and he regarded as absurd the assumption that the average elector could give an intelligent opinion upon a measure of so complicated a character. There is much force in these objections; but it must be remembered that the former effort failed from its dissociation from popular impulse, and that the delegates would have the benefit of the work of their predecessors, which they would be bound to accept as the basis of their deliberations. As regards the plebiscite, it cannot have been expected that the vote of the bulk of the electorate would be more than an affirmative or negative reply upon the broadest issue; but, assuming it to be necessary that the Constitution Bill should in some manner or other be submitted for the judgment of each of the Provinces, the direct reference has the merit of being expeditious and conclusive and of avoiding the quagmire of Parliamentary discussions.

Before proceeding to note the results of the resolutions passed at the Premiers' Conference, it may be of interest to consider to what extent recent events have affected the status of the Federal Council. As has already been remarked, it has pursued a policy of self-effacement, and in spite of the increase in its numbers, it has never appealed to the imagination of Australians. It was undoubtedly dwarfed by comparison with the Federal Convention, which, indeed, decreed its contingent extinction, and it has, to some extent, been supplanted by the informal meetings of Australian Premiers which tend to become an annual institution. At a Conference held at Sydney in January, 1896, the urgent necessity for Federation was again emphasised, and it was resolved that, pending its attainment, the military laws of the Provinces should be assimilated, and a cordite factory be established under State supervision. Resolutions were also passed in favour of a Federal system of quarantine, the distribution of the cost of lighthouses on the basis of population, the extension to all coloured races of the provisions of the Chinese Restriction Acts, and non-participation in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. In this manner the Premiers, instead of referring questions to the Federal Council through their respective legislatures, decided, after personal consultation, upon measures which each would endeavour, in the common interest, to pass through the Parliament of his own Province. Other interprovincial conferences also are becoming more common. The precautions to be adopted against the tick fever were discussed at Sydney in 1896, and a few months ago, earlier, several Ministers of Agriculture met the South Australian Minister at Adelaide and decided upon the advisability of uniform legislation which would promote similarity of out-put in the products of the different Provinces, such as frozen meat, butter, wine, and fruit, for which it was hoped to create a large market in England. It has been argued that the growing realisation of the interdependence of the Provinces and of the material advantages accruing from combined action, will tend to hasten the advent of Federation.

The new proposals in that direction were favourably received, and the Legislatures of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania passed the so-called Australasian Federation Enabling Act, in substantially similar form, upon the lines laid down by the Premiers. The details of their scheme may be gathered from the principal provisions of the Victorian Act:—

"The Convention shall consist of ten Representatives of each Colony represented.

"The Convention shall be charged with the duty of framing for Australasia a Federal Constitution under the Crown in the form of a Bill for enactment by the Imperial Parliament.

"Every Member and every person eligible for Membership of either House of Parliament shall be eligible for Membership of the Convention as a Representative of Victoria. And any one hundred or more electors duly qualified to vote for the election of a Member of the Legislative Assembly shall be entitled in the prescribed manner to nominate any eligible person.

"Every person duly qualified to vote for the election of a member of the Legislative Assembly shall be qualified and entitled to vote for the election of Representatives of Victoria.

"The voting shall be taken throughout Victoria as one electoral district, and every voter shall vote for the full number of Representatives required, otherwise the vote shall be rejected as informal.

"No person shall vote or attempt to vote more than once at the same election of Representatives of Victoria."

(A similar provision applies to the subsequent referendum.)

"When the Constitution has been framed by the Convention, copies thereof shall be supplied to the Members of the Convention, and the President shall declare the sitting of the Convention adjourned to a time and place to be fixed by the Convention, not being less than sixty nor more than one hundred and twenty days thereafter. And as soon as convenient the draft constitution shall be submitted for consideration to each House of Parliament sitting in Committee of the whole, and such amendments as may be desired by the Legislature, together with the draft Constitution, shall be remitted to the Convention through the Senior Representative.

"On the reassembling of the Convention the Constitution as framed prior to the adjournment shall be reconsidered, together with such suggested amendments as shall have been forwarded by the various Legislatures, and the Constitution so framed shall be finally adopted with any amendments that may be agreed to."

"So soon as practicable after the close of the proceedings of the Convention the question of the acceptance or rejection of the Constitution shall be referred and submitted to the vote of all persons in Victoria qualified and entitled to vote for the election of Members of the Legislative Assembly."

"The majority of votes shall decide the question, and if the Constitution be thereby rejected, no further action shall be taken pursuant to this Act: Provided that any number of votes in the affirmative less than fifty thousand shall be equivalent to the rejection of the Bill.

"If two Colonies in addition to Victoria accept the Constitution the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly of Victoria may adopt a Joint Address to the Queen praying that the Constitution may be passed into law by the Imperial Parliament upon receipt from the Parliaments of such two Colonies, either of similar joint or separate Addresses from each House of such Parliaments."

It will be noticed that the Convention will have entire freedom in regard to any amendments suggested by the Provincial Parliaments, and that if the Constitution be accepted, the Victorian Parliament will not be bound to join in submitting it for Imperial enactment. It is assumed that it will bow to the popular pronouncement unless the Government should have some grave reason for recommending a contrary course. A difficulty, not provided against in the Act, might arise if the Constitution were to be amended during its passage through the Imperial Parliament.

The Act passed by Western Australia provided for the election of the delegates by the two Houses of Parliament sitting as one Chamber, the area of selection being limited to candidates nominated by not less than twenty persons who are qualified to vote at elections for Members of the Assembly. "The draft Constitution, as finally adopted by the Convention, if approved by Parliament, shall be submitted for the decision of the electors of Western Australia by their vote; and if a majority of the electors voting on such question signify their approval of such Constitution, the same may be adopted by the Colony, provided that any number of votes in the affirmative less than six thousand shall be equivalent to the rejection of the Constitution." "The adoption of the Constitution by Western Australia may be signified by the passing of an Act or by a joint resolution of both Houses of Parliament, and both Houses may thereupon adopt Addresses to the Queen, praying that the Constitution may be passed into law by the Imperial Parliament, subject to the adoption of similar Addresses by at least two other Colonies, of which New South Wales shall be one." Parliament thus retains the initiative in each successive phase of the movement, but will have no power to alter the Bill when it finally leaves the Convention. If the provisions are regarded as unacceptable, it will be able to decline to submit the Bill to the electorate. The Western Australian measure was based in its general language upon that previously introduced in Queensland, but differed from it in several important particulars. In the latter case it was proposed that the election of the delegates should be vested in the members of the Assembly alone, that, of the ten delegates, five should be chosen by the Southern, three by the Northern, and two by the Central Parliamentary Representatives, a provision inserted in view of the somewhat divergent interests of different portions of the Province, and that the draft Constitution should be submitted for the consideration of the electors in such manner as Parliament might prescribe. The Bill was passed by the Assembly, in spite of a widespread feeling that Queensland should have followed the course of the other Provinces, and was amended by the Council, which regarded itself as unjustifiably ignored, and provided that it should have an equal share with the Assembly in the appointment of the delegates to the Convention. It is unnecessary to consider the arguments by which the Premier supported his proposal of indirect election, or those put forward by the two Houses during the deadlock which followed upon their disagreement. Finally, when each House had insisted several times upon its attitude, the Bill was laid aside by the Council. As a result of this action the new movement was blocked at its first step, which was regarded with little anxiety even by those who appreciated the difficulties which were likely to attend the later stages. Great disappointment was felt in Australia, and efforts were made, though in vain, to induce Sir Hugh Nelson to reintroduce the Bill in some form that would be acceptable to both Houses. At the same time public opinion demanded that the Convention should be held, even though one of the Provinces would be unrepresented.

The benefits which would follow Federation are so obvious as scarcely to require enumeration. The Federal Government would be able to deal adequately with the problem of National Defence and to speak authoritatively, to the manifest satisfaction of the Imperial Authorities, upon such matters as the contribution of Australia towards the expenses of the Imperial squadron maintained upon its coast; the consolidation of the debts would, it has been estimated, enable a million pounds to be saved upon the annual bill of interest; Interprovincial Free Trade would promote intercourse between neighbours who have hitherto been estranged by arbitrary lines of demarcation; and in the words of the Chief Justice of Queensland,[4] "The first effect in point of importance, though some time may elapse before the effect is fully felt, will be the creation of an Australian Nation, forming a distinct constituent part of the British Empire, having one mind, speaking with one voice instead of the six, often discordant and sometimes inarticulate, voices now heard, consulted on all matters of Imperial concern, and exercising a powerful influence in the political affairs of the whole world." Such would appear to be the destiny of Australia, which has, however, doubtless been benefited by the independent development of its component parts. In the absence of distinctions of race and language, in the general diffusion of the Roman Catholics among the Protestants, and the steady determination to exclude coloured races, the early establishment of Federal relations would have produced among Australians a monotonous uniformity of characteristics, which has to some extent been prevented by the divergent political tendencies of the several Provinces.

But, to put the practical question, what are the prospects of Federation? The general impression is not one of hopefulness: it is pointed out that the Provinces have so long maintained an independent existence that they are unlikely to submit to a curtailment of their powers except under the imperative impulse of the fear of foreign invasion; that all but the leading politicians realise that they would be affected prejudicially by a change which would dwarf the Legislatures with which they are connected; that many, especially during the period of depression, dread the creation of a new taxing and governing body; and that the Labour members, in the natural belief that their influence would be smaller in a Federal Parliament, are either apathetic or actively hostile. The economic aspects of Intercolonial Free Trade, in reference to its probable effect upon the prosperity of manufacturers and producers in the different Provinces, also form an important factor in the situation. Time alone can show whether popular participation in the successive stages of the movement, though it will not be universal, will generate an enthusiasm sufficient to outweigh the opposing forces and weld Australia into a strong and united Nation.

APPENDIX TO IX.

THE NEW FEDERAL SCHEME.[5]

Now that the Adelaide Convention has completed its labours, it is possible to give a connected view of the provisions of the draft Constitution Bill, as it will be submitted to the local Parliament, and then after it has been again dealt with by a second meeting of the Convention at Sydney, to the vote of the people.

The Bill provides for the constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia and for the appointment of a governor-general by the Queen, at a salary of £10,000. The Federal Parliament is to consist of two Houses—the Senate and the House of Representatives. The former chamber will be composed of six members for each state. They are to be elected by the electors of the Legislative Assembly in each colony for a term of six years, and one-half will retire every three years. For the election of these senators each colony will be regarded as one electorate, and no one will be allowed to vote at more than one polling-booth on the day of election. In other words, the election will be conducted on the same lines as the recent election of representatives to the Federation Convention. At the first meeting of the Senate, the members elected for each state will be divided by lot into two classes, and the seats of those in the first class are to be vacated at the end of the third year, but the others will continue to be members of that House for the full term of six years. In this way one-half the members of the Senate will be elected by the people every third year.

The House of Representatives is to be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the several states, and the number which each colony will return will depend on its population. This Chamber is, as nearly as practicable, to contain double the number of members of the Senate. The House of Representatives would therefore consist, at the outset, of about seventy-two members, which would give as nearly as possible, one member for every 50,000 of the population. Victoria would, roughly speaking, have about twenty-two members. In order, however, to protect the interests of the smaller states in this House, it is provided that Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia, shall be entitled to at least five members each, although on the population basis, the island colony might not be able to claim more than four members. Until the Federal Parliament otherwise provides, each local or state Parliament can determine into how many electoral divisions the colony should be divided for the purpose of returning members to the House of Representatives, but should it not divide the state into electoral districts, then each colony is to be regarded as one electorate, in the same way as in the case of the election of senators.

The duration of every House of Representatives will be three years, unless it is sooner dissolved by the Governor-General. There is no power, however, conferred on the Governor-General to dissolve the Senate. The qualification of electors of members of the House of Representatives is in each state to be that for electors of the more numerous House—or Legislative Assembly—of the state. The members of both Houses are to receive an allowance of £400 each per annum for their services.

The following are the subjects the Commonwealth Parliament is to be empowered to legislate upon and deal with:—

1. The regulation of trade and commerce with other countries and among the several states.

2. Customs and excise and bounties.

3. Raising money by any other mode or system of taxation.

4. Borrowing money on the public credit of the commonwealth.

5. Postal and telegraphic services.

6. The military and naval defence of the commonwealth and the several states, and the calling out of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the commonwealth.

7. Munitions of war.

8. Navigation and shipping.

9. Ocean beacons and buoys and ocean lighthouses and lightships.

10. Astronomical and meteorological observations.

11. Quarantine.

12. Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits.

13. Census and statistics.

14. Currency, coinage, and legal tender.

15. Banking, the incorporation of banks, and the issue of paper money.

16. Insurance, excluding state insurance not extending beyond the limits of the state concerned.

17. Weights and measures.

18. Bills of exchange and promissory notes.

19. Bankruptcy and insolvency.

20. Copyrights and patents of inventions, designs, and trade marks.

21. Naturalisation and aliens.

22. Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations, formed in any state or part of the commonwealth.

23. Marriage and divorce.

24. Parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants.

25. The service and execution throughout the commonwealth of the civil and criminal process and judgments of the courts of the states.

26. The recognition throughout the commonwealth of the laws, the public acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of the states.

27. Immigration and emigration.

28. The influx of criminals.

29. External affairs and treaties.

30. The relations of the commonwealth to the islands of the Pacific.

31. The control and regulation of the navigation of the River Murray, and the use of the waters thereof from where it first forms the boundary between Victoria and New South Wales to the sea.

32. The control of railways with respect to transport for the military purposes of the commonwealth.

33. The taking over by the commonwealth, with the consent of the state, of the whole or any part of the railways of any state or states, upon such terms as may be arranged between the commonwealth and the state.

34. Railway construction and extension with the consent of any state or states concerned.

35. Matters referred to the Parliament of the commonwealth by the Parliament or Parliaments of any state or states, but so that the law shall extend only to the state or states by whose Parliament or Parliaments the matter was referred, and to such other states as may afterwards adopt the law.

36. The exercise within the commonwealth, at the request or with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the states concerned, of any legislative powers which can at the establishment of this constitution be exercised only by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or by the Federal Council of Australasia.

37. Any matters necessary for, or incidental to, the carrying into execution of the foregoing powers or of any other powers vested by this constitution in the Parliament or the Executive Government of the commonwealth, or in any department or officer thereof.

All matters not mentioned above, such as land settlement, railway construction, &c., are to remain vested in the Parliaments of the several states. Each state shall retain its local Parliament and have a Governor, who is to be appointed by the Crown, and communicate direct with the Crown as at present.

On the establishment of the commonwealth the control of the following departments will be taken over by the Federal Government, and the commonwealth will assume the obligations of any state or states with respect to such matters:—

Customs and excise.

Posts and telegraphs.

Military and naval defence.

Ocean beacons, buoys, lighthouses.

Quarantine.

There are to be seven Ministers of State, and their salaries will, in the aggregate, be £12,000 per annum. A Minister, within three months after being appointed to that office, must become a member of one of the Houses of the Federal Parliament.

All Bills having for their main object the appropriation of any part of the public revenue, or moneys, or the imposition of any tax, must originate in the House of Representatives. Bills imposing taxation must deal with the imposition of taxation only, and those imposing duties of Customs or excise must deal with duties of Customs or excise only. The expenditure for services other than the ordinary annual services of the Government must not be authorised by the same law as that which appropriates the supplies for the ordinary annual services, but must be authorised by a separate measure. The Senate can amend any Bills except those imposing taxation, or appropriating the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual services of the Government. With respect to these money measures, the Senate can, at any stage, return a taxation or appropriation Bill to the House of Representatives, suggesting that any provision or item therein should be omitted or amended, and the House of Representatives may, if it thinks fit, make such omissions or amendments with or without modifications. The Bill, in its amended or original form—should the House of Representatives decline to adopt the suggestion of the Senate—will then be sent back to the latter Chamber, which may either pass or reject the measure.

The seat of the Government of the commonwealth is to be determined by the Federal Parliament. Until such determination the Parliament shall be summoned to meet at such place as the majority of the Governors of the states, or, in the event of an equal division of opinion amongst them, as the Governor-General may direct.

Before the Constitution can be amended an absolute majority of both the House of Representatives and Senate must approve of the alteration, and it must then be confirmed by a vote of the people, a majority of the states being required as well as a majority of the people.

There is to be a federal judiciary, consisting of a high court of Australia, and such inferior courts as Parliament may determine. The high court is to consist of a chief justice, and at least four other judges, and is to hear appeals from the state courts and inferior federal courts. This appeal is to be final, except that in matters affecting the public interests of the commonwealth or of any state, application may be made to the Queen for special leave to appeal to the Privy Council. Uniform Customs duties are to be imposed within two years of the establishment of the commonwealth, and trade and intercourse throughout the commonwealth is then to be absolutely free. In the meantime the local tariffs are to continue, but they will be collected by the Federal Government, and after deducting from the revenue received in each state the contribution of that state towards federal expenses, the balance is to be returned to the state month by month. During the first three years after federation the total annual expenditure of the Federal Government is to be limited to £300,000 for new federal expenses, and £1,250,000 for services transferred from the states. During the first five years after the imposition of a uniform tariff, the surplus revenue, after deducting the contribution of each state to the federal expenses, is to be returned to the states in the following way: Accounts of Customs and excise duties collected in each state are to be kept during the twelve months following the coming into operation of the uniform tariff, in order to ascertain, first the average net amount per head in each state, and next the average per head for the whole commonweath. A sliding scale, extending over four years, is then to be adopted, in order to determine the amount to be returned. Where the average for a particular state for the first year is less than the general average, the per capita sum is to be increased by equal gradations, until, at the end of four years, it equals the general average. Similarly, where the average for a state is greater than the general average, it is to be gradually reduced to the general average. Then, at the end of the five-year period, all the states will be placed on the same footing, and will receive an equal sum per head from the federal revenue. This scheme of distribution is subject, however, to the important proviso that during the five years the aggregate amount returned to all the states in any year must not be less than the aggregate amount returned in the year immediately preceding the imposition of uniform duties.

Equality of trade is to be preserved throughout the commonwealth, and any law or regulation derogating from that principle is to be null and void. Parliament may appoint an interstate commission to execute and maintain upon railways within the commonwealth, and upon rivers flowing through, in, or between two or more states the provisions of the constitution relating to trade and commerce. The commission is to have such powers of adjudication and administration as may be necessary for its purposes, and as the Parliament may from time to time determine, but shall have no powers in reference to the rates or regulations of any railway in any state, except in cases of rates or regulations preferential in effect, and made and used for the purpose of drawing traffic to that railway from the railway of a neighbouring state.

X

SALIENT FEATURES OF THE AUSTRALASIAN DEMOCRACY

Indirect effects of the discovery of gold—Causes of the financial crisis—The origin and extent of State Socialism—The thriftiness of the working-classes—Labour Representation in Parliament—Parliamentary Government—Direct Taxation—Conciliation and Arbitration in Industrial disputes—Protection and its corollaries—The feeling towards Great Britain—General conclusions.

The enormous immigration of the fifties, due to the great discoveries of gold in Victoria and New South Wales, has caused Australia to become one of the most democratic countries in the world. Before that time the soil was held in large areas by pastoralists who, in the absence of opposing forces, would have formed themselves gradually into a strong landed aristocracy. But the miners, a class of men who had shown their energy and determination by their readiness to travel thousands of miles in the search for wealth, introduced an entirely new element: they had thrown off their traditionary reverence for vested institutions, they were able to earn high wages or directly to enrich themselves, and they resented an assumption of superiority on the part of any section in the community. When, in the course of years, the mining industry began to wane, they swarmed into the towns and constituted an important link in the chain of causes which has swelled some of the capitals to their present unwieldy dimensions. Deprived of their means of livelihood, and indisposed for rural life, they clamoured for other employment, and were able, in several Provinces, to induce the Ministry to impose a protective tariff which artificially fostered the growth of manufactures. The protective tariff naturally increased the urban population, as did the undiscriminative system of State-aided immigration, the centralisation of all departments of the Government, and, in its ultimate effects, the construction of public works.

In a population of pastoralists and miners, engaged in pursuits which inculcate reliance upon individual efforts, it is somewhat strange to note the early development of a tendency towards State socialism; but I am inclined to think that, in this respect also, the discoveries of gold exercised a permanent influence, not only in the Provinces immediately affected, but throughout Australasia, from a tendency towards imitation. In the first years of Responsible Government British capitalists had a natural distrust of Australian securities, and declined to advance money except at a high rate of interest. But when they saw the phenomenal increase in the yield of gold, and the large revenue obtained from the sale of lands, they overcame their scruples and displayed, during the twenty years which preceded the financial crisis, a readiness to grant loans to the several Governments which is believed by many to have been a great misfortune to their debtors.

The political and unremunerative railways of Victoria, which have been discussed in the chapter dealing with that Province, could not have been constructed but for the easy access to large funds. Another aspect of the question has been emphasised in an article published by the Sydney Bulletin[1] which, however much an Englishman may demur to its Republican principles, must be admitted to be an authority on Australasian topics. A strong plea is put forward for the necessity of defining by Act of Parliament what kind of works should be charged to loan-moneys, and what should be charged to revenue. The advantages, it is contended, will be threefold; the attention of the country will be drawn to the matter; the Loan Estimates go through so rapidly that very few people are aware how the thing is worked. The lender will know the destination of his money, and all treasurers will be placed on a level, whereas, at present, "the dishonest treasurer who makes a surplus by using borrowed money for road repairs and all manner of other ordinary expenditure is a heaven-born financier, while the honest one who doesn't is driven out of office, either for having a deficit, or for increasing taxation, and is a failure either way." Official figures are quoted for New South Wales in order to prove that during the years 1885-1890, which covered the flotation of several loans, surpluses and deficits alternated as the treasurer was or was not able to dispose of borrowed funds. Indirectly, of course, many of the public works which do not produce a direct revenue may be of financial benefit to the State, through an increase of population and the encouragement of settlement; but it is a hazardous principle to borrow money for their construction.

Equally dangerous for Australia was the more recent excessive eagerness of the British capitalist to invest his money in Australian commercial undertakings, as, according to the Victorian Year Book,[2] a publication of the highest merit, "there is no doubt that the feverish financial activity that preceded, and ultimately led to, the Australian financial crisis primarily arose from the enormous influx of British capital—far in excess of the legitimate requirements of the Colonies—for remunerative enterprises. This influx was probably the result of the large amount of attention that for some years prior to 1888 had been directed to these Colonies, which were brought into prominence by such events as the passing of the first Federal Council Act by the Imperial Parliament in 1885, the Colonial and Indian Exhibition held in London in 1886, and the Imperial Conference in 1887; it was also much stimulated by the lowering in 1888 of the interest on the British Public Debt, and pro rata on other first-class British securities. The first indications of this were noticeable in the marked rise in the prices of all Colonial Government securities which occurred just after Mr. Goschen's notification of his scheme for reducing the interest on the National Debt of the United Kingdom, in March, 1888. Such securities, however, being of limited extent, the superabundant capital was forced into private channels, which led to the growth of co-operative enterprise on an unprecedented scale—through the medium of joint stock companies—which commenced prior to, but probably in anticipation of, the conversion of the British Public Debt, and culminated in the United Kingdom, as well as in Australia, in the same year. Owing to this increasing competition for Colonial Government securities, and the consequent fall in the rate of interest thereon, the Colonial Governments were tempted to, and no doubt did, borrow in excess of their immediate requirements, although this was not recognised during the period of general inflation; but assuming a portion of the Government loans to have been unjustified, far worse was the condition of the large private investments, chiefly in joint stock companies, many of which supplemented their resources by deposits—equivalent in some cases to as much as three times the paid-up capital—which had been drawn, by reason of the high rates of interest offered, from all sections of the community, both in England and Australia. Between the 1st of January, 1887, and the 30th of June, 1893, but for the most part in 1888, 1,154 companies with a paid-up capital of no less than £28,436,500 (subscribed capital £54,300,000) were registered in Victoria alone, and of these, 397, with a paid-up capital of £9,469,000 (subscribed capital £19,526,000) are known to have become defunct, to say nothing of numerous others, of which no information has been furnished to the Registrar-General." The crisis was most acute in Victoria, but its effects were felt largely, and are still felt in calls upon shareholders, in other Provinces. In conclusion, while British capitalists are still chary of industrial investments, they appear to be willing to meet the Australasian Governments in their resumption of applications for loans.

The danger is accentuated by the tendency towards State socialism, the origin of which I had begun to discuss before this long digression. The earliest concessions for the construction of railways were granted in New South Wales in 1848 and 1853, but the companies were unable to carry out their undertakings, owing to the scarcity of workmen caused by the rush to the goldfields, and the Government stepped in and completed the railways out of public funds. This assumption by the State of a function which had been delegated to private enterprise, coupled with the growing confidence of the British investor and the elasticity of the revenue, both from the Customs and from the disposal of land, which had been accelerated by the rapid increase of population, appears to have convinced the political leaders of the advisability of the Governmental extension of the railway lines. They were enabled to carry out this policy without difficulty, as the bulk of the electors were engrossed in material pursuits and did not trouble themselves about political issues. In Victoria three short lines of railways were constructed during the fifties by private companies, but were subsequently purchased by the Government, which thenceforward monopolised the construction of new lines. Why Victoria and the other Provinces should have decided in favour of State ownership and management of railways I am unable to explain, except upon the hypothesis that they were influenced by the example of New South Wales, that they wished to open up the country more quickly than would otherwise have been possible, and that they were tempted by the funds at their disposal in surpluses of revenue over expenditure. Then, the railways having in many instances preceded population, it was necessary, if the lines were not to be unprofitable, that special steps should be taken in order to promote settlement. This was done, partly by the offer of land upon favourable conditions, partly by the payment out of the National Exchequer of all the expenses of Local Government. In New South Wales this state of things still prevails in many of the rural districts; in the other Provinces pro rata subsidies are paid to the Local Authorities, but are limited, in some cases, to a fixed term of years. The Local Bodies have had no spontaneous evolution; they are the creation of the Central Government, they are supported and controlled by it, and look to it for assistance whenever they are in financial difficulties. It would seem that, accustomed to State railways and to dependency upon the State in their local affairs, Australasians have been led insensibly to magnify the efficacy of its intervention and to welcome every enlargement of its sphere of action. The protective tariff appears to have had a similar effect, unless it is to be regarded as a mere coincidence that South Australia, New Zealand, and Victoria, which alone are avowedly Protectionist, have authorised the widest extension of the functions of the State.

Throughout Australasia all parties in the several Parliaments are agreed on the principle of the State ownership of railways. In Victoria and Queensland the railways are entirely in the hands of the Government; in New South Wales and South Australia they are so with some trifling exceptions; in Tasmania, Western Australia, and New Zealand a few private lines have been authorised because it has been advisable, in the interests of settlement, that they should be constructed, and the Governments have been unable or unwilling to undertake further financial obligations. The recent action of Western Australia may be mentioned in evidence of the prevalent feeling, it having taken advantage of its improved credit to purchase one of the private lines. The waterworks of the capitals, also, are national or municipal property; but other municipal monopolies, such as gasworks and tramways, are mostly in the hands of private companies.

The railways of Australasia are worked, as far as is consonant with national interests, for the direct benefit of producers, who, as has been seen in the chapters dealing with individual Provinces, have been the special object of the paternal solicitude of their Governments. The various efforts in this direction may briefly be recapitulated. South Australia, Victoria, Western Australia, and New Zealand make advances to settlers at low rates of interest; South Australia sells its wines in London; Queensland facilitates the erection of sugar mills, and is proposing to establish depôts in London and the provinces for the receipt and distribution of its frozen meat; Victoria and South Australia have given a bonus upon the exportation of dairy produce. These Provinces and New Zealand receive such produce, grade and freeze it free of charge or at a rate which barely covers the expenses. Victoria has given subsidies towards the erection of butter factories; Victoria and New Zealand have subsidised the mining industry; and Western Australia has adopted a comprehensive scheme for the supply of water to the Coolgardie Goldfields.

The above brief summary shows that action by the State for the promotion of enterprise has met with approval in Queensland and Western Australia as well as in the Provinces which have adopted the widest extensions of the franchise. It maybe noted, however, that Sir Hugh Nelson, the Premier of Queensland, is an individualist at heart, and consents to extensions of the functions of the State unwillingly upon a conviction of their necessity; while, in Western Australia, Sir John Forrest is a strong advocate of State socialism, and opposed to private-enterprise in any matter which is of the nature of a monopoly. New South Wales and Tasmania have not hitherto followed the lead of the other Provinces. This tendency is one of the most marked of recent years, and received a strong impetus from the financial crisis of 1893, which burst the bubble of a fictitious prosperity and compelled attention to the strenuous development of the resources of the soil. It is likely to lead to closer relations between the Provinces, from the appreciation of the fact that the exports of one Province, if unregulated and allowed to fall into disrepute, may prejudicially affect the interests of the whole continent.

As regards the intervention of the State in the direction of industrial legislation, the Governments of Western Australia and Tasmania have had little cause to take action, in the absence of crowded centres and of manufacturing activity; but New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, and New Zealand have placed stringent Factory Acts upon their Statute Books. Measures have also been passed, largely under the influence of Labour Representatives, dealing with the liability of employers, the regulation of mines, the protection of shop assistants, and other matters affecting the welfare of the working classes. Upon their enactment complaints have been made of undue interference with employers; but the administration is now, in most cases, carried out efficiently and without unnecessary friction.

Indirectly, the various Provinces have, through their schemes of public works, exercised considerable influence upon the demand for labour and have, upon the completion of the more important undertakings, been subject to continual pressure with the object of inducing them to authorise special works for the benefit of those who have been deprived of their livelihood. New South Wales, indeed, and, to a lesser extent, Victoria, have almost admitted an obligation to provide work or rations for the unemployed. In Victoria the tension has been relaxed by the formation of the Labour Colony of Leongatha, at which the destitute can obtain temporary subsistence. Australian politicians, generally, were appalled by the undeserved misery which resulted from the cessation of public works and from the financial disturbances, and, under the stress of humanitarian motives, failed to temper their humanity with discretion, and initiated a policy of indiscriminate assistance from which, once entered upon, it has been difficult for them to draw back. The formation of village settlements in all the Provinces except Western Australia was based upon the necessity for special efforts in the face of the prevailing distress. Australians have never been able to regard the unemployed as a necessary factor in their economic system. The ordinary problems of pauperism have been felt acutely in Australasia and have been met in somewhat similar fashion in the different Provinces. Destitute children are, in most cases, boarded out; the aged and incapable are provided for in Benevolent Asylums. In Victoria, New South Wales, and New Zealand a movement has recently arisen for the adoption of a system of old-age pensions, which has had no appreciable results in the former Province, but has led in New South Wales to the appointment of a Parliamentary Committee which reported favourably and suggested forms of additional taxation by which the necessary funds might be obtained, and in New Zealand to the introduction of a Ministerial measure which sought to establish the general principle and left to the House the elaboration of the financial details. The Bill was accepted on its second reading, but in Committee an amendment was carried against the Government to the effect that all persons above the age of sixty-five, irrespectively of their means, should be entitled to receive a pension. An Act was, however, subsequently passed of which the object is to ascertain the probable cost of a pension fund. All persons of the age of sixty-five and upwards, who have resided in the Province for twenty years, imprisonment being reckoned as absence, and are not possessed of an income exceeding £50 a year, are entitled to apply for a pension certificate which will be issued to them upon the verification of their claims, and will be regarded as conclusive if a pension fund be established hereafter. The success of the Government at the recent elections renders it probable that the matter will shortly receive attention. In neither of the Provinces in which the subject has been discussed is it proposed that the pension should be earned by previous contributions; it is to be offered as a free gift in recognition of the services which every worker must have rendered to the community.

To conclude a superficial summary of the functions undertaken, or likely to be undertaken, by the State in Australasia, it may be mentioned that the State system of primary education is in all the Provinces compulsory and undenominational. In South Australia, Victoria, Queensland, and New Zealand it is also free; in the other Provinces fees are charged but may be remitted, wholly or partly, in the case of the inability of parents to pay them. There are no signs that the advocates of grants in aid of denominational education are gaining ground; in the direct reference to the electors taken in South Australia they were defeated by a large majority, and have equally little chance of securing subsidies to religious bodies.

In the presence of great activity on the part of the State, it is interesting to note to what extent the working classes have exerted themselves on their own behalf. Distributive co-operation has not become popular owing, partly, according to the Australasian,[3] "to the vicissitudes in trade which are inseparable from new countries, and to the temptations which are consequently held out to the workers from time to time to change their occupations and abodes. Partly, too, an explanation may be found in the efficacy of existing agencies for distribution. But we cannot help thinking that it is due also, in part, to the pernicious ideas which lead so many of our artisans to cry out against capital, and to seek the aid of the State, instead of trusting to their own efforts and determining to become capitalists themselves in a way which has been proved by the co-operative societies at home to be thoroughly practical." Though the Australasian is strongly individualistic in its bias, it appears to be justified in its reference to a certain lack of initiative shown by Australasian workmen; they are inclined to look upon the State as a gold mine from which they can draw permanent dividends, especially as they are scarcely, if at all, affected directly by the periodical calls upon the shareholders; but, in his strictures upon the attitude of labour towards capital, the writer should have added that the wealthy classes are at least as ready to misjudge every effort made by the Labour Representatives to pass remedial measures through the legislatures. Proceeding to deal with the co-operation of producers, he says that "there is co-operation of this kind already in our butter and cheese factories, where the farmer who conveys his produce to the factory may also be a shareholder, and at the end of the half-year may receive a dividend on his shares and a bonus on the milk supplied, in addition to the established price. Co-operation of a like kind prevails, to some extent, though not so largely as might be desired, between the graziers and the companies for the export of Australian meat." These remarks, which refer primarily to Victoria, are generally true of Australasia.

But, while the working classes look constantly to the State for assistance in various forms, they can be shown to have made considerable provision against the future. In spite of bad times, the number of depositors in Australasian Savings Banks rose from 742,000 in 1891 to 895,000 in 1895, and the total amount of deposits from 19 to 26 millions. Victoria and South Australia, which are followed closely by New Zealand, have the largest number of depositors in proportion to population, 29 and 24 per 100 respectively, and Queensland and New South Wales the highest average amount of deposits.[4] In the three Provinces, therefore, in which the paternal action of the Government is carried to the furthest extent, we find the widest diffusion of an important exemplification of the spirit of thrift. I am far from suggesting a relation of cause and effect, as the amount of savings must depend largely upon the rate of wages, the abundance or scarcity of employment, the cost of living, and many other factors, and would merely point out that the policy in question does not appear to have deterred the working classes from individual efforts.

As regards Friendly Societies, South Australia takes the lead with a membership exceeding one in ten of the population; Victoria comes next with one in fifteen, and is third in the average amount of funds per member. Under the latter head New Zealand occupied the first place with £18 8s. 2d., and is followed by Western Australia with £17 10s. 4d., but the latter amount is of no comparative importance owing to the very small number of subscribers.[5]

In 1895 the average amount of assurance per head of the population in Australasia was £20, the average sum assured per policy £285, and the average number of policies per 1,000 of the population, 70. Compared with the United Kingdom, Australasia has a considerable advantage in the first of these figures, has the proportion reversed in the second, but wins by more than two to one on the last, which is the most interesting as a further indication of the prevalence of the instinct of providence among Australasian workmen.[6] Prior to the recent crisis the working classes had availed themselves largely of the opportunities which Building Societies offered to them to secure the freehold of their homes by payments spread over a term of years; but a run upon the deposits lodged in these institutions, which set in towards the end of 1891, and continued during 1892, affected them disastrously, and the large majority of even the soundest of them were obliged eventually, owing to the heavy withdrawal of deposits, to close their doors. Though some have since been re-opened, upon terms agreed to between the shareholders and depositors, their business has collapsed for the time, the amount of advances in Victoria having fallen from over two millions in 1890 and in 1891 to less than a hundred thousand pounds in 1893.[7] In the apparent absence of statistics of the number of freeholders in several Provinces, no general idea can be formed of the extent to which the working classes have, through Building Societies and otherwise, invested their savings in the acquisition of freehold properties. The only figures that I have been able to obtain give the estimated number of owners as 30,600, 91,500, and 184,500 for New South Wales, New Zealand, and Victoria respectively. As far as the two latter Provinces are concerned, the total populations being only 699,000 and 1,174,000, it is absurd to suppose that the electors, a large proportion of whom are freeholders, will be captivated by the advocates of the Single Tax. It cannot too often be repeated that the Australasian Governments, all of which are, to a greater or lesser degree, aiming at the multiplication of small owners or perpetual lease-holders, are rendering it practically impossible that an agitation for the confiscation of land values should be successful, and are fostering the growth of that class of settlers which is believed to be Conservative in the best sense of the word. But large estates, except in the case of certain kinds of pastoral land, are doomed to extinction, either in the natural course of events, owing to the costliness of labour, or from the pressure of heavy graduated taxation, the workmen of Australasia being thoroughly convinced of its justice as a means of raising revenue and of its efficacy as a means of causing land to be subdivided or placed upon the market. They have also, as has been seen, supported legislation which has authorised the re-purchase and subdivision of landed estates.

Lastly, they have realised since 1890 that, for the furtherance of their aspirations, the strength of their Unions should be devoted mainly to the promotion of the representation of Labour in Parliament. The great strike of that year has been described so fully that it is unnecessary to say more than that a strong combination of labour, which had made itself master of the situation, was confronted upon the outbreak of hostilities by rapidly organised but powerful associations of employers; that the struggle, which spread over the whole Continent and New Zealand, terminated in the success of the latter, and that the workmen realised that, even had they succeeded, the victory would have been won at too heavy a cost in the misery entailed upon themselves and their families. Many of them were dissatisfied with the generalship of their leaders during the strike, and realised that the exhaustion of their funds rendered them unable to engage again in a huge industrial struggle. In the following years low prices, the financial crisis, and the consequent scarcity of employment and fall in wages, further weakened the Unions and intensified the conviction that strikes should be superseded by the ballot-box. In some Provinces, also, it was felt that the rivalry of parties had degenerated into a contest between the ins and the outs, and that progressive measures would not be passed until Labour had entered as a compact body into the arena.

I have discussed in the earlier chapters the history and results of Labour representation in several of the Provinces, and have shown that the Labour Party has been successful in South Australia, where it has formed an alliance with the Government, though maintaining a separate organisation, and in New South Wales, where it has held the balance of power between the Protectionists and Free Traders, but has failed utterly in Queensland, where mainly through its own fault, but partly through the astuteness of its opponents, it has occupied a position of antagonism to all the vested interests of the community. In Victoria the Labour Party acts usually with the Government, but seeks to obtain its objects by the exercise of its strength more than by friendly negotiations. In New Zealand no distinct Party was formed, but the working-men representatives threw in their lot with the Government and, by consistent support, helped to secure the imposition of graduated taxation and the enactment, among other measures, of a compulsory Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and of a large number of Industrial Statutes.

A great similarity of aims and aspirations can be traced between the different Labour Parties if we ignore side issues and exclude that of Queensland, which is affected by the taint of aggressive socialism. Judging from the respective programmes and from conversations which I have had with many of the leaders, I find that, subject to certain exceptions which I shall mention, they are united upon the following propositions:—

Manhood or adult suffrage, shorn of the plural vote, should be the basis of representation in the Assembly. The Legislative Council should be abolished, as it prevents the wishes of the people from being carried into effect.

Direct taxation should consist of graduated death duties and graduated taxes on incomes and land values.

Parliament should secure to every worker for wages sanitary and safe conditions of employment, and immunity from excessive hours of labour.

Machinery should be provided by Parliament by which industrial disputes may be referred to an impartial tribunal.

The workers should protect themselves not only against foreign goods, but against undesirable immigrants, whether they be Orientals or indigent Europeans.

The consideration of these questions, and of the wider issues with which they are concerned, will cover most of the points of recent interest in Australasian politics.

(1) It is doubtful whether Responsible Government, in the sense of government by a Ministry which carries out a definite policy approved by the country, and, in return, receives allegiance from its supporters in Parliament, has ever been acclimatised in Australasia except in New South Wales under the influence of the late Sir Henry Parkes. How, indeed, could it be otherwise, when it was sought to transplant a delicate system, hallowed by conventions and dependent for its success upon the election of a special class of representatives, among a community necessarily ruled by men who had little experience of public life? Australian Parliaments, save on the rare occasions when some important issue, such as that of the tariff, has come to the front, have not been divided on ordinary party lines, and have amused themselves with the excitement of a constant succession of new Ministries selected on personal and not on political considerations. New South Wales, South Australia, and Victoria, to take three Provinces at random, have had, respectively, 28, 42, and 26 Ministries in 40 years. The policy of the Opposition has often been almost identical with that of the Government. Again, coalitions between former opponents have been of frequent occurrence; the Ministries formed by Messrs. Deakin and Gillies in Victoria, and by Sir Samuel Griffith and Sir Thomas McIlwraith in Queensland, are recent instances of this tendency. In some rural constituencies, also, candidates appeal to the electorate on personal grounds and are not required to declare their adhesion to a party. I was struck, when present at the elections in South Australia and New Zealand, by the subsequent animated discussions in the newspapers as to the probable effect of the changes in the personnel of the Members upon the prospects of the Government. This is the more noticeable from the fact that the freedom of action allowed to representatives has been curtailed since the return to Parliament of Labour Members, who are pledged to a definite programme and have put forward questions on which there is a distinct line of cleavage. Proposals for the extension of the franchise, for the abolition of the plural vote, or for the imposition of a tax on incomes and land values, are such as divide the electorate into two camps and perpetuate the division in the House. This state of things, combined, perhaps, with the financial crisis which raised problems demanding continuity of administration for their solution, has contributed to the greater stability of Ministries. Another factor, which has given constituencies a greater hold on their representatives, and has tended thereby to make them adhere more closely to one or other of the parties, is the payment of Members, which has now been adopted in all the Lower Houses except that of Western Australia, and in the Upper Houses of South Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand. Australia has been confronted with the difficulty experienced by every young country, that the men who should naturally enter Parliament are prevented by commercial or professional duties from devoting the necessary time, and that, in the absence of men of leisure, constituencies are much hampered in their choice of candidates. The payment of Members, it is needless to say, offers no inducement to the successful merchant or lawyer, but has increased the competition among men to whom the salary is an inducement. My inquiries as to its effect upon the tone of politicians have elicited mutually contradictory replies. On the one hand I am assured that the attractions of the salary have led men to resort to disreputable practices in order to be selected as candidates and to seek to retain the fickle affections of their constituents by similar means; on the other, that necessitous Members have been raised by the salary above temptations which their poverty made it difficult for them to resist; and such temptations must increase in number with each extension of the functions of the State unless it be dissociated from political influence. It is clear that a knowledge of the inner life of a Parliament could alone supply materials for the adequate discussion of this question, and that a similar consideration applies to the discussion of the effects of State socialism upon political morality. The possible abuses are many: railways may be constructed with a view to popularity; the rents of Crown tenants may be remitted, and borrowers may be allowed to fall in arrears with the interest on their advances; subsidies and bonuses voted by Parliament may be misapplied; and the unemployed may be conciliated by unnecessary public works. Personal corruption, I am confident, does not exist, but that safeguards have been felt to be necessary is proved by the appointment of independent Railway Commissioners by New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and New Zealand, and of Public Works Committees by Victoria and New South Wales. In the latter country, as has been seen, the Commissioners have been most successful, but New Zealand has reverted to the system of political control, and Victoria, Queensland, and South Australia have reduced the number of Commissioners from three to one. This change, which must have lessened the efficacy of non-political control, was advocated on grounds of economy at a time when all forms of expenditure were being cut down to the lowest point. In Victoria the Leongatha Labour Settlement has diminished the difficulties connected with the unemployed, and its administration has been studied by the other Provinces with a view to similar action. The general political tone is healthy, and is stimulated, in all the Provinces, by a high-class press, which uses its great influence in a conscientious manner. But, as long as Treasurers can balance their accounts by recourse to loans, and are tempted, as is inevitable, to apply borrowed money to placatory enterprises, the dangers which are necessarily connected with State socialism are multiplied tenfold. They would be lessened if the objects for which loans might be contracted were defined, as has been suggested, by Act of Parliament, or if Federation were to eventuate at an early date and the right to borrow were limited to the Federal Authority.

In New Zealand alone have I found direct evidence of the misuse of political patronage. Upon the third reading of the Appropriation Bill in 1896, Captain Russell, the Leader of the Opposition, made use of the following words: "I maintain that for years past the administration of the Government has been anything but good. They have hunted for popularity and they have hunted their enemies. They have hunted their enemies to a very great extent. You find positions which were capably filled by old and valued servants now filled by friends of the Government. We have a system of espionage in existence which is disgusting.... The Civil Servants should not depend on the favour and their popularity with Ministers for promotion, but rather on good honest service, and that is not the case now. Why, a Civil Servant dare not come and speak to an Opposition Member for fear of that fact being reported to the Ministers. (An Hon. Member: No!) It is all very well to say 'No,' but I am acquainted with dozens of Civil Servants in Wellington, and they will not come and speak to me in the street for fear of being reported."[8] In his reply the Premier made no attempt to meet these charges, which I have quoted because I have gathered corroborative evidence in different parts of the country, though it is not such as admits of being adduced as definite proof, and because the Minister of Lands made an exceedingly candid admission shortly after the elections. In the course of a speech delivered at Geraldine he is reported by a Ministerial newspaper to have said: "They had endeavoured during their term of office to do what they could in the interests of the Colony as a whole, but they had been very badly treated by two classes of the public at the elections. In the session of 1895, they would remember, the Government passed a measure to give relief to pastoral Crown tenants who lost a large number of sheep in the snow. The Government did this in the interest of the people as a whole, as they thought, but how had they been treated by the people they helped in time of distress? (A voice: Very badly.) Yes, there might have been one or two exceptions, but generally speaking they fought tooth and nail against the Government. Then, again, the Government saved the Bank of New Zealand and the Colony from ruin, but still the old leaven of the Bank fought and voted against the Government at the elections. He considered this very unfair on their part, considering what the Government had done for them."[9] Sir Robert Stout, a former Premier of New Zealand, has also brought a grave indictment against the Government, from which I quote the portion referring to appointments:—