Chapter I · THE WAR WITH FRANCE TILL 1693 (continued 2)

This was the end of what strictly speaking is called the battle of La Hogue, from the old spelling of La Hougue. The name is improperly used, for the actual battle was fought off Cape Barfleur. The battle of Barfleur was in fact the title commonly given by our ancestors, but it has been displaced by the name of the place which was the last scene of the four days’ pursuit following on the action. The pursuit began like a nightmare, in strenuous effort to act without the power to move. Both fleets had anchored during the night. When daylight came there was a thick haze and the French were invisible to the allied fleet. What little wind there was, was from the N.N.E. At about eight o’clock some of the Dutch ships caught sight of the enemy to the W.S.W. The pursuit was resumed, but, as the ships could not move more quickly than they were carried by the tide, the progress was very slow. At four o’clock in the afternoon the ebb-tide ceased, and both fleets again anchored, the French in order to avoid the risk of being carried among their pursuers, and the allies so that they should not lose ground. They had moved so little during the ebb-tide that they were still off Cape Barfleur, and at no great distance from the scene of the battle. As long as the tide was flowing it was useless to move, but at ten in the evening, when it turned, both fleets again got under way and began to drift to the west. About this time the fore-topmast of the Britannia, which had been seriously injured in the action, came down, and as Russell did not transfer his flag to another vessel, this delayed the Red Squadron under his immediate command. Many of them must have suffered in the action. Whether because they felt bound to remain about their admiral, or because they could not move any faster, the ships of the Red Squadron fell somewhat behind in the pursuit while the Blue and White pressed on ahead. At four in the morning of the 21st both fleets anchored again. They had now tided so far that they were almost off Cape La Hague. Both were much scattered. A part of the French had passed the Cape, the others had not. Among those which had failed to get beyond the headland was the Soleil Royal, Tourville’s flagship. She had suffered very severely in the action from the fire of the Britannia and the ships just ahead and astern. It has been said with some appearance of truth that if Tourville had had the resolution to set her on fire he might have brought the whole of his fleet round Cape La Hague. But she was the pride of the French Navy, and had been named from the king himself who was the royal sun of France, and the admiral could not make his mind up to sacrifice her. He had, however, transferred his flag to another ship the Ambitieux.

When the fleets were ordered to anchor, only a portion of the French was able to obey. Whether it was because they had slipped their cables on the previous night, and therefore could not anchor, or whether their anchors would not hold, it is certain that they were unable to stop themselves from being carried to the eastward towards the allies. The position then in the early hours of the 21st was this, one part of the French fleet was ahead, to the west another part was drifting eastward between the land and the allies. The best sailing ships of the White and Blue Squadrons were well ahead of Russell, who with the Red Squadron was furthest of all to the east. The inability of the ships immediately about him to anchor showed Tourville that it was useless to endeavour to keep his now divided fleet acting as one body any longer. If he summoned the ships to the west to his assistance he would bring the whole fleet into a trap between the land and the enemy, who was in overwhelming numbers. Since he could no longer exercise his powers as commander to any advantage there remained nothing for him but to abdicate. He therefore hauled down his flag of command from the main-topmast-head, as a signal that every captain was free to act as he thought best for the safety of his ship. The French fleet now split into fragments. One part, under the Chef d’escadre Pannetier made a push for the Channel between the coast of France and the island of Alderney. The easterly current of the flood-tide splits at Cape La Hague. While the main body flows up Channel a branch turns off, and runs with great speed between the west side of the Côtentin and the island of Alderney. This makes what we call the Race of Alderney, and the French the Raz Blanchard. The navigation is dangerous, and would, under ordinary circumstances, have been avoided by the heavy ships, but circumstances only left the French a choice of evils, and they ran through the Race to seek refuge under the guns of St. Malo.

Russell, seeing that the division of the French and the distress of the vessels drifting towards him made it no longer necessary to keep his fleet together, signalled to Ashby, and the Dutch to pursue Pannetier. Meanwhile he, with the Red Division and the laggards of the White and Blue, prepared to deal with those of Tourville’s ships which had failed to round La Hague. Ashby could not reach the enemy. Pannetier had time to get his ships over the bar of the Rance, and take refuge under the guns of the corsair town of St. Malo, before his pursuers reached him. Ashby returned next day and joined Sir Ralph Delaval, who, in the meantime, had done a good stroke of work at Cherbourg. When it became clear that they were trapped the ships of Tourville had no resource but to endeavour to fly to the eastward between Russell and the land, to round Cape Barfleur and to take refuge at La Hougue. Three of them were too crippled for further flight. These were the famous Soleil Royal, for whose sake so much had been risked, the Admirable, and the Triomphant. All three were run ashore at Cherbourg, and the others fled eastward. Russell left Sir Ralph Delaval to deal with the stranded ships, and followed the rest. Delaval could do nothing on the evening of the 21st, but on the following morning he sent in the boats and fireships, under the command of Captain Heath, Captain Greenaway, and Captain Foulis. The Admirable and Triomphant were burnt. But the fireship with which Captain Foulis endeavoured to burn the Soleil Royal was sunk by the Frenchmen’s fire. Hereupon, Delaval hauled in as close as he could and opened fire on the great stranded flagship. When he had battered her for some time, and found that no further resistance was made, he took his boats and boarded her. Sir Ralph Delaval’s report contains a detail which is discreditable to King Louis’s navy. He says he found many men and wounded men in the Soleil Royal, but no officers. She was burnt by the English. When the work was done Sir Ralph was disturbed by thirty sail approaching him from the west. This, however, turned out to be Sir John Ashby’s squadron, and the two officers united their forces, and followed the admiral to the east. A few of the French ships under command of Nesmond escaped by sailing round the British Isles.

Russell pursued Tourville round Cape Barfleur. The French admiral ran as close as he could to La Hougue, with the thirteen vessels still about him. It was not until the evening of the 22nd, so light was the wind and so slow were the ships of that time amid tides and variable breezes, that Russell was able to anchor in the neighbourhood of the fugitives. On the 23rd he sent in the boats and fireships under Rooke, who burnt six of the enemy. On the 24th the work was completed by the destruction of the other seven. The French indeed were panic-stricken, and the resistance was trifling. Not more than ten men were killed in this piece of service, which if attempted against an alert and resolute enemy must needs have been very costly.

The battle pursuit and destruction spread over these five days, and included under the name of “La Hogue” make nearly the last passage of naval warfare of a brilliant decisive character which we shall meet for three-quarters of a century. The navy had work of vital importance to do, and a function of unusual importance to fulfil. But it was no longer to meet equal fleets at sea, except on rare occasions, and when it did its own method of fighting was dull. The French fleet very soon ceased to contend with the allies in the ocean and channel altogether, and in the Mediterranean its efforts were spasmodic. The great change has been attributed to the disaster of La Hogue, without sufficient reason. We have seen that the operations of the French in previous years had been very languid. Their weakness during the rest of the war was to be mainly attributed to the French king’s want of money. His resources were overburdened by the war on land against the League of Augsburg, and he could not afford to fit out great fleets. But to our ancestors the importance of the battle of La Hogue was naturally a subject of high gratification. The material loss inflicted on King Louis was considerable, and the blow to his prestige greater still. They could feel that the Channel was now safe, not indeed from privateers, but from great fleets sent out to cover an invasion of England. Besides, after the spiritless straggling operations of the last three years, the resolution of Russell and the vigour of his pursuit were an immense change for the better.

The decline of the French navy was not immediately visible. An attempt to attack St. Malo at the close of 1692 was given up as hopeless, and the ships under Pannetier’s command were able to make their way to Brest undisturbed. In 1693 the French even achieved a considerable measure of success, partly through their own good management, and partly by the help of mistakes of the English Government. Russell was no longer at sea. The shifting politics of the time, and his own position as one of the leaders of the Whig party, combined with the king’s discovery of his intrigues with St. Germain to remove him from command. His place was taken by Killigrew, Delaval, and Shovell, who were combined in a joint commission as admiral. The practice of giving the command at sea to a committee was once more revived because the Government distrusted a single command. The result was to discredit for ever the appointment of several men to do work which most especially requires unity of will and authority.

The fleet was collected under the joint admirals in April. It was not manned without great difficulty. Crews had to be found by taking men out of the privateers and by embarking five regiments of soldiers to serve as marines. Neither the Government nor the admirals had any definite plan of operations for the year. But an object was found for them by the necessity of escorting the Mediterranean trade safe on its way. The French privateers had been very active, and the convoy work at least of the English navy very badly done. Ships had remained in port rather than face the risk of making a passage. The necessities of the English and Dutch revenue compelled the Government to forward the trade, and so a squadron was told off under the command of Rooke and the Dutch admiral Van der Goes, to carry the outward-bound Smyrna convoy into the Mediterranean. The twenty-three ships, Dutch and English, appointed to protect the convoy would have been insufficient to deal with the Brest fleet, and the admirals were therefore ordered to see Rooke and his Dutch colleague well past Ushant. In the latter days of May the whole force was collected and sailed with the merchant ship under its protection in the beginning of June. By an oversight, which reflects very little credit on their intelligence, the admirals omitted to find out whether the French were in Brest or not. They had been ordered to accompany the convoy thirty leagues past Ushant, and they reached that point on the 4th of June. Not being satisfied that enough had been done for safety they exceeded their instructions so far as to continue with the merchant ships till they were fifty leagues W.S.W. off the island of Ushant. Then they left them and returned to the Channel. It is an example of the vices still prevailing in our naval administration that though the fleet had only just been collected it was in want of provisions already. When the admirals had returned to Torbay they learnt what they ought to have been at the trouble to find out before, namely, that Tourville had left Brest. At the same time the English Consul at Leghorn forwarded information that the French Toulon fleet was ready to sail from Toulon. This report did not reach the admirals till the 13th June. When it was too late they realised the extent of the danger threatening Rooke. Tourville had in fact sailed south in May with orders to wait for the convoy. Messages were sent in hot haste to warn Rooke of his danger, but the disaster had happened before they could reach him.

While the admirals and Government were realising their mistake and were looking forward to the inevitable outcry in the City and House of Commons, the great convoy had been rolling southward at a speed regulated by the slowest of the merchant ships, happy if it made three miles an hour in favourable circumstances. It reached Cape St. Vincent on the 17th June. Here Rooke despatched a look-out vessel ahead, to see if there were any enemies in Lagos Bay, on the south coast of Portugal between Cape St. Vincent and Faro. The wind was very light, and the convoy made little progress. Next day the frigates discovered ten sail of French ships standing out of Lagos. The position was an extremely difficult one. With a large force of men-of-war so close at hand there was little hope of safety in flight for heavily laden merchant ships. It was decided to make a push for the friendly Spanish port of Cadiz. The wind from the N.N.W. was still light, and it might be that the French being to leeward would be unable to work up. But this course, though perhaps the best, where all were bad, led the convoy right into the jaws of Tourville’s fleet of eighty-six sail. Battle was hopeless, and flight not much better. Yet to run was all there was to do. The French advanced squadron had fallen back merely to draw the convoy on, and even if the bait had not succeeded there could have been but one end to the meeting. A hurry and a scurry such as may easily be imagined followed. Some of the small ships ran close in shore, by Rooke’s orders, and endeavoured to find a refuge in Faro, San Lucar, or Cadiz. By these we must understand very small craft from 40 to 100 tons. The heavier ships, meaning boats from 150 to 300 tons, the size of a large merchant ship of those times, did their best to shelter themselves behind Rooke and Van der Goes, and they all struggled to get away into the open sea. The Dutch warships were in more danger than our own, for being in the van they were to leeward and nearer the French. Tourville must have suffered from a constitutional inability to act with energy except by fits and starts. He now repeated, and with even less excuse, the very mistake he made after the battle of Beachy Head. His pursuit was slack. Some of the Dutch ships were overtaken and captured after a gallant resistance. But Rooke was able to carry a great part of the convoy to Madeira, and from thence home to Cork. He joined the admiral in the Channel in August. Tourville, after giving up the pursuit of Rooke too early, returned to the Straits where he spent his time in capturing or destroying the smaller merchant vessels. The total loss to the Dutch and English was put down at twenty-nine vessels taken and fifty destroyed.

This business of the Smyrna convoy may be said to be the turning-point of the war. Louis XIV. had sent Tourville to capture the Smyrna convoy mainly because he looked to gain money. In the following year he ordered the Brest fleet into the Mediterranean, and he made no serious attempt to contend with the allies in the western seas during the remainder of the war. At the time, and while the smart of the loss was fresh in England and Holland, this could not be known. The capture of the convoy led to a furious outcry against the Admiralty in England, and to violent inconclusive discussions in Parliament. Yet it was the direct cause of a great change for the better. The Government was fully waked up to the necessity of taking its fleet more seriously in hand. The effort to conduct a war by a committee was given up. Russell was restored to the command. At the same time, the officers were stimulated to do their work with a better heart by increase of pay and the establishment of the half-pay list. With sinking energy on the side of the French and increasing efficiency on our own the naval war took a new character. From this time forward there was an overwhelming superiority on the side of the allies. England came to contribute an increasing proportion of the naval force employed, for the land war was straining Holland to the utmost. When the struggle with Louis XIV. came to an end at the Peace of Utrecht, England was much the one unrivalled sea power as she was when Napoleon surrendered to Captain Maitland of the Bellerophon.