Part 2 — CHAPTER VIII INTERFERENCE WITH ADVANTAGEOUS RELATIONS (continued 3)

The effect of the two first counts is, that a person, under a binding contract to perform at a theatre, is induced by the malicious act of the defendant to refuse to perform and entirely to abandon her contract; whereby damage arises to the plaintiff, the proprietor of the 875theatre. The third count differs, in stating expressly that the performer had agreed to perform as the dramatic artiste of the plaintiff, and had become and was the dramatic artiste of the plaintiff for reward to her; and that the defendant maliciously procured her to depart out of the employment of the plaintiff as such dramatic artiste; whereby she did depart out of the employment and service of the plaintiff; whereby damage was suffered by the plaintiff. It was said, in support of the demurrer, that it did not appear in the declaration that the relation of master and servant ever subsisted between the plaintiff and Miss Wagner; that Miss Wagner was not averred, especially in the two first counts, to have entered upon the service of the plaintiff; and that the engagement of a theatrical performer, even if the performer has entered upon the duties, is not of such a nature as to make the performer a servant, within the rule of law which gives an action to the master for the wrongful enticing away of his servant. And it was laid down broadly, as a general proposition of law, that no action will lie for procuring a person to break a contract, although such procuring is with a malicious intention and causes great and immediate injury. And the law as to enticing servants was said to be contrary to the general rule and principle of law, and to be anomalous, and probably to have had its origin from the state of society when serfdom existed, and to be founded upon, or upon the equity of, the Statute of Laborers. It was said that it would be dangerous to hold that an action was maintainable for persuading a third party to break a contract, unless some boundary or limits could be pointed out; and that the remedy for enticing away servants was confined to cases where the relation of master and servant, in a strict sense, subsisted between the parties; and that, in all other cases of contract, the only remedy was against the party breaking the contract.

Whatever may have been the origin or foundation of the law as to enticing of servants, and whether it be, as contended by the plaintiff, an instance and branch of a wider rule, or whether it be, as contended by the defendant, an anomaly and an exception from the general rule of law on such subjects, it must now be considered clear law that a person who wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same thing, with notice, interrupts the relation subsisting between master and servant by procuring the servant to depart from the master’s service, or by harboring and keeping him as servant after he has quitted it and during the time stipulated for as the period of service, whereby the master is injured, commits a wrongful act for which he is responsible at law. I think that the rule applies wherever the wrongful interruption operates to prevent the service during the time for which the parties have contracted that the service shall continue; and I think that the relation of master and servant subsists, sufficiently for the purpose of such action, during the time for which there is in existence a binding contract of hiring and service between the parties; and I think that it is 876a fanciful and technical and unjust distinction to say that the not having actually entered into the service, or that the service not actually continuing, can make any difference. The wrong and injury are surely the same, whether the wrong-doer entices away the gardener, who has hired himself for a year, the night before he is to go to his work, or after he has planted the first cabbage on the first morning of his service; and I should be sorry to support a distinction so unjust, and so repugnant to common sense, unless bound to do so by some rule or authority of law plainly showing that such distinction exists....^[569]

The objection as to the actual employment not having commenced would not apply in the present case to the third count, which states that Miss Wagner had become the artiste of the plaintiff, and that the defendant had induced her to depart from the employment. But it was further said that the engagement, employment or service, in the present case, was not of such a nature as to constitute the relation of master and servant, so as to warrant the application of the usual rule of law giving a remedy in case of enticing away servants. The nature of the injury and of the damage being the same, and the supposed right of action being in strict analogy to the ordinary case of master and servant, I see no reason for confining the case to services or engagements under contracts for services of any particular description; and I think that the remedy, in the absence of any legal reason to the contrary, may well apply to all cases where there is an unlawful and malicious enticing away of any person employed to give his personal labor or service for a given time under the direction of a master or employer who is injured by the wrongful act; more especially when the party is bound to give such personal services exclusively to the master or employer; though I by no means say that the service need be exclusive....^[570]

In deciding this case on the narrower ground, I wish by no means to be considered as deciding that the larger ground taken by Mr. Cowling is not tenable, or as saying that in no case except that of master and servant is an action maintainable for maliciously inducing another to break a contract to the injury of the person with whom such contract has been made. It does not appear to me to be a sound answer, to say that the act in such cases is the act of the party who breaks the contract; for that reason would apply in the acknowledged case of master and servant. Nor is it an answer, to say that there is a remedy against the contractor, and that the party relies on the contract; for, besides that reason also applying to the case of master and servant, the action on the contract and the action against the malicious wrong-doer may be for a different matter; and the damages occasioned by such malicious injury might be calculated on a very different principle from 877the amount of the debt which might be the only sum recoverable on the contract. Suppose a trader, with a malicious intent to ruin a rival trader, goes to a banker or other party who owes money to his rival, and begs him not to pay the money which he owes him, and by that means ruins or greatly prejudices the party: I am by no means prepared to say that an action could not be maintained, and that damages, beyond the amount of the debt if the injury were great, or much less than such amount if the injury were less serious, might not be recovered. Where two or more parties were concerned in inflicting such injury, an indictment, or a writ of conspiracy at common law, might perhaps have been maintainable; and, where a writ of conspiracy would lie for an injury inflicted by two, an action on the case in the nature of conspiracy will generally lie; and in such action on the case the plaintiff is entitled to recover against one defendant without proof of any conspiracy, the malicious injury and not the conspiracy being the gist of the action.^[571] In this class of cases it must be assumed that it is the malicious act of the defendant, and that malicious act only, which causes the servant or contractor not to perform the work or contract which he would otherwise have done. The servant or contractor may be utterly unable to pay anything like the amount of the damage sustained entirely from the wrongful act of the defendant; and it would seem unjust, and contrary to the general principles of law, if such wrong-doer were not responsible for the damage caused by his wrongful and malicious act. Several of the cases cited by Mr. Cowling on this part of the case seem well worthy of attention.

Without however deciding any such more general question, I think that we are justified in applying the principle of the action for enticing away servants to a case where the defendant maliciously procures a party, who is under a valid contract to give her exclusive personal services to the plaintiff for a specified period, to refuse to give such services during the period for which she had so contracted, whereby the plaintiff was injured.

I think, therefore, that our judgment should be for the plaintiff.

Erle, J. The question raised upon this demurrer is, Whether an action will lie by the proprietor of a theatre against a person who maliciously procures an entire abandonment of a contract to perform exclusively at that theatre for a certain time; whereby damage was sustained? And it seems to me that it will. The authorities are numerous and uniform, that an action will lie by a master against a person who procures that a servant should unlawfully leave his service. The principle involved in these cases comprises the present; for there, the right of action in the master arises from the wrongful act of the defendant in procuring that the person hired should break his contract, by putting an end to the relation of employer and employed; 878and the present case is the same. If it is objected that this class of actions for procuring a breach of contract of hiring rests upon no principle, and ought not to be extended beyond the cases heretofore decided, and that, as those have related to contracts respecting trade, manufactures, or household service, and not to performance at a theatre, therefore they are no authority for an action in respect of a contract for such performance; the answer appears to me to be, that the class of cases referred to rests upon the principle that the procurement of the violation of the right is a cause of action, and that, when this principle is applied to a violation of a right arising upon a contract of hiring, the nature of the service contracted for is immaterial. It is clear that the procurement of the violation of a right is a cause of action in all instances where the violation is an actionable wrong, as in violations of a right to property, whether real or personal, or to personal security; he who procures the wrong is a joint wrong-doer, and may be sued, either alone or jointly with the agent, in the appropriate action for the wrong complained of. Where a right to the performance of a contract has been violated by a breach thereof, the remedy is upon the contract against the contracting party; and, if he is made to indemnify for such breach, no further recourse is allowed; and, as in case of the procurement of a breach of contract the action is for a wrong and cannot be joined with the action on the contract, and as the act itself is not likely to be of frequent occurrence nor easy of proof, therefore the actions for this wrong, in respect of other contracts than those of hiring, are not numerous; but still they seem to me sufficient to show that the principle has been recognized. In Winsmore v. Greenbank it was decided that the procuring of a breach of the contract of a wife is a cause of action. The only distinction in principle between this case and other cases of contracts is, that the wife is not liable to be sued; but the judgment rests on no such grounds; the procuring a violation of the plaintiff’s right under the marriage contract is held to be an actionable wrong. In Green v. Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707, it was decided that the procuring a breach of a contract of sale of goods by a false claim of lien is an actionable wrong. Sheperd v. Wakeman, 1 Sid. 79, is to the same effect, where the defendant procured a breach of a contract of marriage by asserting that the woman was already married. In Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Peake’s N. P. C. 194; S. C. 1 Esp. N. P. C. 48, and in Taylor v. Neri, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 386, it was properly decided that the action did not lie, because the battery, in the first case, and the libel, in the second case, upon the contracting parties were not shown to be with intent to cause those persons to break their contracts, and so the defendants by their wrongful acts did not procure the breaches of contract which were complained of. If they had so acted for the purpose of procuring those breaches, it seems to me they would have been liable to the plaintiffs. To these decisions, founded on the principle now relied 879upon, the cases for procuring breaches of contracts of hiring should be added; at least Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Bird v. Randall, 3 Burr. 1345, is to that effect. This principle is supported by good reason. He who maliciously procures a damage to another by violation of his right ought to be made to indemnify; and that, whether he procures an actionable wrong or a breach of contract. He who procures the non-delivery of goods according to contract may inflict an injury, the same as he who procures the abstraction of goods after delivery; and both ought on the same ground to be made responsible. The remedy on the contract may be inadequate, as where the measure of damages is restricted; or in the case of non-payment of a debt where the damage may be bankruptcy to the creditor who is disappointed, but the measure of damages against the debtor is interest only; or, in the case of the non-delivery of the goods, the disappointment may lead to a heavy forfeiture under a contract to complete a work within a time, but the measure of damages against the vendor of the goods for non-delivery may be only the difference between the contract price and the market value of the goods in question at the time of the breach. In such cases, he who procures the damage maliciously might justly be made responsible beyond the liability of the contractor.

With respect to the objection that the contracting party had not begun the performance of the contract, I do not think it a tenable ground of defence. The procurement of the breach of the contract may be equally injurious, whether the service has begun or not, and in my judgment ought to be equally actionable, as the relation of employer and employed is constituted by the contract alone, and no act of service is necessary thereto.

The result is that there ought to be, in my opinion, judgment for the plaintiff.

[The concurring opinion of Wightman, J., is omitted.]

Coleridge, J. It may simplify what I have to say, if I first state what are the conclusions which I seek to establish. They are these: that in respect of breach of contract the general rule of our law is to confine its remedies by action to the contracting parties, and to damages directly and proximately consequential on the act of him who is sued;^[572] that, as between master and servant, there is an admitted exception; that this exception dates from the Statute of Laborers, 23 Edw. III., and both on principle and according to authority is limited by it. If I am right in these positions, the conclusion will be for the defendant, because enough appears on this record to show, as to the first, that he, and, as to the second, that Johanna Wagner, is not within the limits so drawn.

880First, then, that the remedy for breach of contract is by the general rule of our law confined to the contracting parties. I need not argue that, if there be any remedy by action against a stranger, it must be by action on the case. Now, to found this, there must be both injury in the strict sense of the word (that is a wrong done), and loss resulting from that injury: the injury or wrong done must be the act of the defendant; and the loss must be a direct and natural, not a remote and indirect consequence of the defendant’s act. Unless there be a loss thus directly and proximately connected with the act, the mere intention, or even the endeavor, to produce it will not found the action. The existence of the intention, that is the malice, will in some cases be an essential ingredient in order to constitute the wrongfulness or injurious nature of the act; but it will neither supply the want of the act itself, or its hurtful consequences: however complete the injuria, and whether with malice or without, if the act be after all sine damno, no action on the case will lie. The distinction between civil and criminal proceedings in this respect is clear and material; and a recollection of the different objects of the two will dispose of any argument founded merely on the allegation of malice in this declaration, if I shall be found right in thinking that the defendant’s act has not been the direct or proximate cause of the damage which the plaintiff alleges he has sustained. If a contract has been made between A. and B. that the latter should go supercargo for the former on a voyage to China, and C., however maliciously, persuades B. to break his contract, but in vain, no one, I suppose, would contend that any action would lie against C. On the other hand, suppose a contract of the same kind made between the same parties to go to Sierra Leone, and C. urgently and bona fide advises B. to abandon his contract, which on consideration B. does, whereby loss results to A.; I think no one will be found bold enough to maintain that an action would lie against C. In the first case no loss has resulted; the malice has been ineffectual; in the second, though a loss has resulted from the act, that act was not C.’s, but entirely and exclusively B.’s own. If so, let malice be added, and let C. have persuaded, not bona fide but mala fide and maliciously, still, all other circumstances remaining the same, the same reason applies; for it is malitia sine damno, if the hurtful act is entirely and exclusively B.’s, which last circumstance cannot be affected by the presence or absence of malice in C. Thus far I do not apprehend much difference of opinion: there would be such a manifest absurdity in attempting to trace up the act of a free agent breaking a contract to all the advisers who may have influenced his mind, more or less honestly, more or less powerfully, and to make them responsible civilly for the consequences of what after all is his own act, and for the whole of the hurtful consequences of which the law makes him directly and fully responsible, that I believe it will never be contended for seriously. This was the principle on which Lord Kenyon 881proceeded in Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Peake’s N. P. C. 194; S. C. 1 Esp. N. P. C. 48. There the defendant libelled Madame Mara; the plaintiff alleged that, in consequence, she, from apprehension of being hissed and ill-treated, forbore to sing for him, though engaged, whereby he lost great profits. Lord Kenyon nonsuited the plaintiff: he thought the defendant’s act too remote from the damage assigned. But it will be said that this declaration charges more than is stated in the case last supposed, because it alleges, not merely a persuasion or enticement, but a procuring. In Winsmore v. Greenbank the same word was used in the first count of the declaration, which alone is material to the present case; and the Chief Justice, who relied on it, and distinguished it from enticing, defined it to mean “persuading with effect;” and he held that the husband might sue a stranger for persuading with effect his wife to do a wrongful act directly hurtful to himself. Although I should hesitate to be bound by every word of the judgment, yet I am not called on to question this definition or the decision of the case. Persuading with effect, or effectually or successfully persuading, may no doubt sometimes be actionable—as in trespass—even where it is used towards a free agent; the maxims, qui facit per alium facit per se, and respondeat superior, are unquestionable; but, where they apply, the wrongful act done is properly charged to be the act of him who has procured it to be done. He is sued as a principal trespasser, and the damage, if proved, flows directly and immediately from his act, though it was the hand of another, and he a free agent, that was employed. But, when you apply the term of effectual persuasion to the breach of a contract, it has obviously a different meaning; the persuader has not broken and could not break the contract, for he had never entered into any; he cannot be sued upon the contract; and yet it is the breach of the contract only that is the cause of damage: Neither can it be said that in breaking the contract the contractor is the agent of him who procures him to do so; it is still his own act; he is principal in so doing, and is the only principal. This answer may seem technical; but it really goes to the root of the matter. It shows that the procurer has not done the hurtful act; what he has done is too remote from the damage to make him answerable for it. The case itself of Winsmore v. Greenbank seems to me to have little or no bearing on the present: a wife is not, as regards her husband, a free agent or separate person; if to be considered so for the present purpose, she is rather in the character of a servant, with this important peculiarity, that, if she be induced to withdraw from his society and cohabit with another or do him any wrong, no action is maintainable by him against her. In the case of criminal conversation, trespass lies against the adulterer as for an assault on her, however she may in fact have been a willing party to all that the defendant had done. No doubt, therefore, effectual persuasion to the wife to withdraw and conceal herself from her husband is in the eye of the 882law an actual withdrawing and concealing her; and so, in other counts of the declaration, was it charged in this very case of Winsmore v. Greenbank. A case explainable and explained on the same principle is that of ravishment of ward. The writ for this lay against one who procured a man’s ward to depart from him; and, where this was urged in a case hereafter to be cited (Mich. 11 H. 4, fol. 23 A. pl., 46, 2 E. & B. 255), Judge Hankford^[573] gives the answer: the reason is, he says, because the ward is a chattel, and vests in him who has the right. None of this reasoning applies to the case of a breach of contract; if it does, I should be glad to know how any treatise on the law of contract could be complete without a chapter on this head, or how it happens that we have no decisions upon it. Certainly no subject could well be more fruitful or important; important contracts are more commonly broken with than without persuaders or procurers, and these often responsible persons when the principals may not be so. I am aware that with respect to an action on the case the argument primæ impressionis is sometimes of no weight. If the circumstances under which the action would be brought have not before arisen, or are of rare occurrence, it will be of none, or only of inconsiderable weight; but, if the circumstances have been common, if there has been frequently occasion for the action, I apprehend it is important to find that the action has yet never been tried. Now we find a plentiful supply both of text and decision in the case of seduction of servants; and what inference does this lead to, contrasted with the silence of the books and the absence of decisions on the case of breach of ordinary contracts? Let this too be considered: that, if by the common law it was actionable effectually to persuade another to break his contract to the damage of the contractor, it would seem on principle to be equally so to uphold him, after the breach, in continuing it. Now upon this the two conflicting cases of Adams v. Bafeald, 1 Leon. 240, and Blake v. Lanyon, 6 T. R. 221, are worth considering. In the first, two judges against one decided that an action does not lie for retaining the servant of another, unless the defendant has first procured the servant to leave his master; in the second, this was overruled; and, although it was taken as a fact that the defendant had hired the servant in ignorance and, as soon as he knew that he had left his former master with work unfinished, requested him to return, which we must understand to have been a real, earnest request, and only continued him after his refusal, which we must take to have been his independent refusal, it was held that the action lay; and this reason is given: “The very act of giving him employment is affording him the means of keeping out of his former service.” Would the judges who laid this down have held it actionable to give a stray servant food or clothing or lodging out of charity? Yet these would have been equally 883means of keeping him out of his former service. The true ground on which this action was maintainable, if at all, was the Statute of Laborers, to which no reference was made. But I mention this case now as showing how far courts of justice may be led if they allow themselves, in the pursuit of perfectly complete remedies for all wrongful acts, to transgress the bounds which our law, in a wise consciousness as I conceive of its limited powers, has imposed on itself, of redressing only the proximate and direct consequences of wrongful acts. To draw a line between advice, persuasion, enticement and procurement is practically impossible in a court of justice; who shall say how much of a free agent’s resolution flows from the interference of other minds, or the independent resolution of his own? This is a matter for the casuist rather than the jurist; still less is it for the juryman. Again, why draw the line between bad and good faith? If advice given mala fide, and loss sustained, entitle me to damages, why, though the advice be given honestly, but under wrong information, with a loss sustained, am I not entitled to them? According to all legal analogies the bona fides of him who, by a conscious wilful act, directly injures me will not relieve him from the obligation to compensate me in damages for my loss. Again, where several persons happen to persuade to the same effect, and in the result the party persuaded acts upon the advice, how is it to be determined against whom the action may be brought, whether they are to be sued jointly or severally, in what proportions damages are to be recovered? Again, if, instead of limiting our recourse to the agent, actual or constructive, we will go back to the person who immediately persuades or procures him one step, why are we stop there? The first mover, and the malicious mover too, may be removed several steps backward from the party actually induced to break the contract; why are we not to trace him out? Morally he may be the most guilty. I adopt the arguments of Lord Abinger and my brother Alderson in the case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109; if we go the first step, we can show no good reason for not going fifty. And, again, I ask how is it that, if the law really be as the plaintiff contends, we have no discussions upon such questions as these in our books, no decisions in our reports? Surely such cases would not have been of rare occurrence; they are not of slight importance, and could hardly have been decided without reference to the Courts in Banc. Not one was cited in the argument bearing closely enough upon this point to warrant me in any further detailed examination of them. I conclude therefore what occurs to me on the first proposition on which the plaintiff’s case rests.

Judgment for plaintiff.^[574]

884

BOWEN v. HALL In the Court of Appeal, February 5, 1881. Reported in 6 Queen’s Bench Division, 333.

Brett, L. J.^[575] The Lord Chancellor agrees with me in the judgment I am about to read, and it is to be taken therefore as the judgment of the Lord Chancellor as well as of myself.

In this case, we were of opinion at the hearing, that the contract was one for personal service, though not one which established strictly for all purposes the relation of master and servant between the plaintiff and Pearson. We were of opinion that there was evidence to justify a finding that Pearson had been induced by the defendants to break his contract of service, that he had broken it, and had thereby, in fact, caused some injury to the plaintiff. We were of opinion that the act of the defendants was done with knowledge of the contract between the plaintiff and Pearson, was done in order to obtain an advantage for one of the defendants at the expense of the plaintiff, was done from a wrong motive, and would therefore justify a finding that it was done in that sense maliciously. There remained nevertheless the question, whether there was any evidence to be left to the 885jury against the defendants Hall and Fletcher, it being objected that Pearson was not a servant of the plaintiff. The case was accurately within the authority of the case of Lumley v. Gye. If that case was rightly decided, the objection in this case failed. The only question then which we took time to consider was whether the decision of the majority of the judges in that case should be supported in a Court of Error. That case was so elaborately discussed by the learned judges who took part in it, that little more can be said about it, than whether, after careful consideration, one agrees rather with the judgments of the majority, or with the most careful, learned, and able judgment of Mr. Justice Coleridge. The decision of the majority will be seen, on a careful consideration of their judgments, to have been founded upon two chains of reasoning. First, that wherever a man does an act which in law and in fact is a wrongful act, and such an act as may, as a natural and probable consequence of it, produce injury to another, and which in the particular case does produce such an injury, an action on the case will lie. This is the proposition to be deduced from the case of Ashby v. White, 1 Sm. L. C. (8th ed.), p. 264. If these conditions are satisfied, the action does not the less lie because the natural and probable consequence of the act complained of is an act done by a third person: or because such act so done by the third person is a breach of duty or contract by him or an act illegal on his part, or an act otherwise imposing an actionable liability on him. It has been said that the law implies that the act of the third party, being one which he has free will and power to do or not to do, is his own wilful act, and therefore is not the natural or probable result of the defendants’ act. In many cases that may be so, but if the law is so to imply in every case, it will be an implication contrary to manifest truth and fact. It has been said that if the act of the third person is a breach of duty or contract by him, or is an act which it is illegal for him to do, the law will not recognize that it is a natural or probable consequence of the defendant’s act. Again, if that were so held in all cases, the law would in some refuse to recognize what is manifestly true in fact. If the judgment of Lord Ellenborough in Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East, 1, requires this doctrine for its support, it is in our opinion wrong.

We are of opinion that the propositions deduced above from Ashby v. White, 1 Sm. L. C. (8th ed.), p. 264, are correct. If they be applied to such a case as Lumley v. Gye, the question is whether all the conditions are by such a case fulfilled. The first is that the act of the defendants which is complained of must be an act wrongful in law and in fact. Merely to persuade a person to break his contract, may not be wrongful in law or fact as in the second case put by Coleridge, J., supra. But if the persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefiting the defendant at the expense 886of the plaintiff, it is a malicious act which is in law and in fact a wrong act, and therefore a wrongful act, and therefore an actionable act if injury ensues from it. We think that it cannot be doubted that a malicious act, such as is above described, is a wrongful act in law and in fact. The act complained of in such a case as Lumley v. Gye, and which is complained of in the present case, is therefore, because malicious, wrongful. That act is a persuasion by the defendant of a third person to break a contract existing between such third person and the plaintiff. It cannot be maintained that it is not a natural and probable consequence of that act of persuasion that the third person will break his contract. It is not only the natural and probable consequence, but by the terms of the proposition which involves the success of the persuasion, it is the actual consequence. Unless there be some technical doctrine to oblige one to say so, it seems impossible to say correctly, in point of fact, that the breach of contract is too remote a consequence of the act of the defendants. The technical objections alluded to above have been suggested as the consequences of the judgment in Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East, 1. But that judgment when so used or relied on seems to us to be disapproved in the opinions given in the House of Lords in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. C. 577, and seems to us when so used to be unreasonable. In the case of Lumley v. Gye, and in the present case, the third condition is fulfilled, namely, that the act of the defendant caused an injury to the plaintiff, unless again it can be said correctly that the injury is too remote from the cause. But that raises again the same question as has been just dismissed. It is not too remote if the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the alleged cause. That is stated in all the opinions in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. C. 577. The injury is in such a case in law as well as in fact a natural and probable consequence of the cause, because it is in fact the consequence of the cause, and there is no technical rule against the truth being recognized. It follows that in Lumley v. Gye, and in the present case, all the conditions necessary to maintain an action on the case are fulfilled.

Another chain of reasoning was relied on by the majority in Lumley v. Gye, and powerfully combated by Coleridge, J. It was said that the contract in question was within the principle of the Statute of Laborers, that is to say, that the same evil was produced by the same means, and that as the statute made such means when employed in the case of master and servant, strictly so called, wrongful, the common law ought to treat similar means employed with regard to parties standing in a similar relation as also wrongful. If, in order to support Lumley v. Gye, it had been necessary to adopt this proposition we should have much doubted, to say the least. The reasoning of Coleridge, J., upon the second head of his judgment seems to us to be as nearly as possible, if not quite, conclusive. But we think it is not necessary to base the support of the case upon this latter proposition. 887We think the case is better supported upon the first and larger doctrine. And we are therefore of opinion that the judgment of the Queen’s Bench Division was correct, and that the principal appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.^[576]

GLAMORGAN COAL CO., LIMITED v. SOUTH WALES MINERS’ FEDERATION In the Court of Appeal, August 11, 1903. Reported in [1903] 2 King’s Bench, 545. SOUTH WALES MINERS’ FEDERATION v. GLAMORGAN COAL CO., LIMITED In the House of Lords, April 14, 1905. Reported in [1905] Appeal Cases, 239.

Appeal by the plaintiffs from the decision of Bigham, J., [1903] 1 K. B. 118.^[577]

The action was brought by the Glamorgan Coal Company, Limited, and seventy-three other plaintiffs, owners of collieries in South Wales, against the South Wales Miners’ Federation, its trustees, its officers, and a number of members of its executive council, claiming damages for wrongfully and maliciously procuring and inducing workmen employed in the plaintiffs’ collieries to break their contracts of service with the plaintiffs. In the alternative the plaintiffs sued the defendants for wrongfully, unlawfully, and maliciously conspiring together to do the acts complained of. The plaintiffs claimed both damages and an injunction.

The defence consisted of denials of the material allegations in the statement of claim, and of a plea that the acts complained of were done, if at all, with reasonable justification and excuse. The trial 888of the action was commenced with a special jury; but ultimately the jury was discharged, and all questions of law and fact, as well as the ascertainment of damages, if any, were by consent left to the determination of the learned judge.

The following facts (inter alia) were stated, in substance, by Bigham, J., in his written opinion:—

The plaintiffs are seventy-four limited liability companies associated together for the protection of their own interests under the style of the Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Owners’ Association. They work upwards of 200 collieries in the South Wales district, and in these collieries they employ about 100,000 men.

For the last twenty or twenty-five years the masters and the men in the South Wales colliery district have worked together under an agreement, called the sliding scale agreement, by which the rate of wages paid to the men is made to depend on the price for the time being of a certain agreed class of coal—that is to say, as the price of that coal rises or falls so the rate of wages moves up or down. Clause 23 of the sliding scale agreement is as follows: “It is hereby agreed that all notices to terminate contracts on the part of the employers as well as employed, shall be given only on the first day of any calendar month, and to terminate on the last day of the same month.”

The defendant federation was formed in 1898, and in 1899 was registered under the Friendly Societies Act. Practically all the miners in the South Wales district became members of it. There are about 128,000 members; including all, or very nearly all, the men who work for the plaintiffs. In 1900 the federation was in the possession of funds amounting to 100,000l. By its rules its objects are declared to be to provide funds to carry on the business of the federation; taking into consideration the question of trade and wages; to protect workmen generally, and regulate the relations between them and employers; and to call conferences to deal with questions affecting the workmen of a trade, wage, and legislative character.

In November, 1900, the executive council of the federation requested the workmen to hold meetings for the purpose of electing delegates to attend a conference on November 12. Delegates were accordingly elected, and at the conference a resolution was passed authorizing the council of the federation to declare a general holiday at any time they might think it necessary for the protection of wages and of the industry generally.

On October 23, 1901, a “manifesto” to the workmen was published, stating that it had been resolved that the workmen shall observe as general holidays Friday and Saturday next. Subsequently two other stop-days were ordered, viz.: for October 31 and November 6. (The reasons for issuing the manifesto are stated in the opinion of Stirling, L. J., post.) The result was that the men stayed away from work on the four days, and so broke their contracts with the masters.

889The manifesto purported to be issued by the sliding scale committee, and was signed by the members of that committee, who were also members of the executive council of the federation. But in fact the issuing of the manifesto was caused by the executive council of the federation. In truth it was the federation who were acting; the name of the sliding scale committee being used as a blind, with the purpose of securing the funds of the federation from possible liability under the decision in the Taff Vale Case, [1901] App. Cas. 426.

Bigham, J., concluded his findings of fact with the following statement:—

“The evidence satisfies me that the action of the federation, and of the other defendants in 1901, was dictated by an honest desire to forward the interest of the workmen, and was not, in any sense, prompted by a wish to injure the masters. Neither the federation nor the other defendants had any prospect of personal gain from the operation of the stop-days. Having been requested by the men by the resolution of November 12, 1900, to advise and direct them as to when to stop work, the federation and the other defendants, who were its officers, in my opinion, did to the best of their ability advise and direct the men. Whether they advised them wisely I cannot say, though I am inclined to think not. But I am satisfied that they advised them honestly, and without malice of any kind against the plaintiffs.

“I have to decide, in these circumstances, whether an action in tort will lie against the defendants. The advice and guidance of the defendants was solicited and given. If followed, it involved, as the defendants knew, the breaking of the subsisting contracts. It was followed, as the defendants wished it should be, and damage resulted to the masters; but there was no malicious intention to cause injury, no profit was gained for themselves by the defendants, and their sole object was to benefit the men whom they were advising and directing.”

The learned judge gave judgment for the defendants on both branches of the plaintiffs’ claim. His opinion is reported in [1903] 1 K. B. 118.

Plaintiffs appealed.

[The opinion of Vaughan Williams, L. J., in favor of affirmance, is omitted.]

Romer, L. J. The law applicable to this case is, I think, well settled. I need only refer to two passages in which that law is shortly and comprehensively stated. In Quinn v. Leathem [1901], A. C. 495, at p. 510, Lord Macnaghten said: “A violation of legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and it is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized by law if there be no sufficient justification for the interference.” And in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q. B. D. 598, at p. 614, Bowen, L. J., included in what is forbidden “the intentional procurement of a violation of individual rights, contractual or other, assuming 890always that there is no just cause for it.” But although, in my judgment, there is no doubt as to the law, yet I fully recognize that considerable difficulties may arise in applying it to the circumstances of any particular case. When a person has knowingly procured another to break his contract, it may be difficult under the circumstances to say whether or not there was “sufficient justification or just cause” for his act. I think it would be extremely difficult, even if it were possible, to give a complete and satisfactory definition of what is “sufficient justification,” and most attempts to do so would probably be mischievous. I certainly shall not make the attempt. In particular I do not think it necessary or useful to discuss the point as to how far the question of justification can be assimilated to the question of malice in cases of libel and slander. As Collins, M. R., said in Read v. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons, [1902] 2 K. B. 732, at p. 739: “It is not at all necessary in this case to embark upon the question whether ‘without just cause’ is a complete equivalent for what was meant in the common law by ‘malice.’ I am inclined to think that, though in many cases adequate as a description, it is not co-extensive with it, nor do I think that in civil actions any more than in criminal it will be possible to eliminate motives from the discussion.” I respectfully agree with what Bowen, L. J., said in the Mogul Case, when considering the difficulty that might arise whether there was sufficient justification or not: “The good sense of the tribunal which had to decide would have to analyze the circumstances and to discover on which side of the line each case fell.” I will only add that, in analyzing or considering the circumstances, I think that regard might be had to the nature of the contract broken; the position of the parties to the contract; the grounds for the breach; the means employed to procure the breach; the relation of the person procuring the breach to the person who breaks the contract; and I think also to the object of the person in procuring the breach. But, though I deprecate the attempt to define justification, I think it right to express my opinion on certain points in connection with breaches of contract procured where the contract is one of master and servant. In my opinion, a defendant sued for knowingly procuring such a breach is not justified of necessity merely by his showing that he had no personal animus against the employer, or that it was to the advantage or interest of both the defendant and the workman that the contract should be broken. I take the following simple case to illustrate my view. If A. wants to get a specially good workman, who is under contract with B., as A. knows, and A. gets the workman to break his contract to B.’s injury by giving him higher wages, it would not, in my opinion, afford A. a defence to an action against him by B. that he could establish he had no personal animus against B., and that it was both to the interest of himself and of the workman that the contract with B. should be broken. I think that the principle involved in this simple case, taken 891by me by way of illustration, really governs the present case. For it is to be remembered that what A. has to justify is his action, not as between him and the workman, but as regards the employer B. And, if I proceed to apply the law I have stated to the circumstances of the present case, what do I find? On the findings of fact it is to my mind clear that the defendants, the federation, procured the men to break their contracts with the plaintiffs—so that I need not consider how the question would have stood if what the federation had done had been merely to advise the men, or if the men, after taking advice, had arranged between themselves to break their contracts, and the federation had merely notified the men’s intentions to the plaintiffs. The federation did more than advise. They acted, and by their agents actually procured the men to leave their work and break their contracts. In short, it was the federation who caused the injury to the plaintiffs. This was practically admitted before us by the counsel for the federation, and, indeed, such an admission could not, in my opinion, be avoided, having regard to the facts stated by the learned judge in his judgment. And it is not disputed that the federation acted as they did knowingly. So that the only question which remains is one of justification. Now the justification urged is that it was thought, and I will assume for this purpose rightly thought, to be in the interest of the men that they should leave their work in order to keep up the price of coal, on which the amount of wages of the men depended. As to this, I can only say that to my mind the ground alleged affords no justification for the conduct of the federation towards the employers; for, as I have already pointed out, the absence on the part of the federation of any malicious intention to injure the employers in itself affords no sufficient justification. But it was said that the federation had a duty towards the men which justified them in doing what they did. For myself I cannot see that they had any duty which in any way compelled them to act, or justified them in acting, as they did towards the plaintiffs. And the fact that the men and the federation, as being interested in or acting for the benefit of the men, were both interested in keeping up prices, and so in breaking the contracts, affords in itself no sufficient justification for the action of the federation as against the plaintiffs, as I have already pointed out. I think, therefore, that the appeal must succeed.

Stirling, L. J.

That interference with contractual relations known to the law may in some cases be justified is not, in my opinion, open to doubt. For example, I think that a father who discovered that a child of his had entered into an engagement to marry a person of immoral character would not only be justified in interfering to prevent that contract from being carried into effect, but would greatly fail in his duty to his child 892if he did not. This duty is recognized by the courts; for the Court of Chancery and the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice have continually so interfered on behalf of wards of Court, sometimes with a heavy hand; and the principle on which the judges of those courts have acted is simply that of doing on behalf of the ward that which a right-minded father would do in the true interest of his child. I conceive that circumstances might occur which would give rise to the same duty in the case of a contract of service. I need not say that the present is a very different case from that which I have just put. It would no doubt be desirable if a general rule could be formulated which would determine in what cases such a justification exists; but no such rule has been laid down, and I doubt whether this can be done; so far as I can see it must be left (in the language of Lord Bowen) to the tribunal to analyze the circumstances of each particular case and discover whether a justification exists or not.

In the present case the learned judge finds that the federation and the other defendants “had lawful justification or excuse for what they did in this, that having been solicited by the men to advise and guide them on the question of stop-days, it was their duty and right to give them advice, and to do what might be necessary to secure that the advice should be followed;” and the existence of this duty has been strongly pressed upon us in argument by the learned counsel for the several defendants. It will be observed that the learned judge expressly finds that the defendants were not merely advisers, but also agents “to do what might be necessary to secure that the advice should be followed.” In the view which I take of the facts the defendants not only gave advice, but acted, and their action took the form of interfering with the contractual relations between the masters and the men. If in so doing they committed a tort, it would be no answer to say that they acted upon the advice of a third person, as, for example, their own solicitor; and it is difficult to see how they can be in a better position simply because the advice on which they acted emanated from themselves.

In my judgment the liability of the defendants must turn on the answer to be given to the question whether the circumstances of the case were in fact such as to justify the defendants, or any of them, in acting as they did.

The circumstances were these: Middlemen at Cardiff were attempting to reduce the price of coal, and it was feared that some employers might yield to the pressure of competition and enter into agreements for the sale of coal at prices lower than those existing at the time, with the result that the wages of the miners, which were regulated by a sliding scale, would be reduced.

To counteract this it was considered desirable by the men’s advisers that prices should be sustained by diminishing the output of coal, and that this should be effected by the men taking the holidays complained 893of. It was not contended or suggested that a limitation of the output of coal was an illegitimate object or aim on the part of the men, or that, if it could have been attained without the breach of contracts (as, for example, by the service of proper notices putting an end to those contracts), the men would not have been within their legal rights. The difficulty which presented itself was this,—that one of the terms of the arrangement under which the sliding scale of wages existed was that notices of the determination of contracts of employment should only be given on the first day of a calendar month to terminate on the last day, and this prevented notices of determination being effective at the desired moment. The critical period was known to occur in October or November. The men persuaded themselves that it was the masters’ interest as well as their own that they should have power to take holidays at this period; but this was a point on which the masters were entitled to have their own opinion; and from what occurred in November, 1900, it was known to the men that the masters’ view did not agree with that of the men. If the men had faith in the soundness of their opinion, their course was to negotiate through the defendants for a modification of the sliding scale arrangement; what they actually thought fit to do was that while insisting on the benefit of the sliding scale they treated themselves as emancipated from the observance of one of the terms on which that scale had been agreed to, although the masters objected, and although the course taken by the men might result in serious damages to the masters, or some of them. This is, I think, a difficult position to maintain. The justification set up seems to me to amount to no more than this—that the course which they took, although it might be to the detriment of the masters, was for the pecuniary interest of the men; and I think it wholly insufficient. The defendants took active steps to carry this policy into effect, and, as I have said, interfered to bring about the violation of legal rights. In my judgment they fail to justify those acts, and the appeal ought to be allowed.

The Court declined to grant an immediate injunction, but reserved liberty to the plaintiffs to apply for an injunction in case it should be necessary to do so.

Appeal allowed.

The defendants appealed to the House of Lords.

The Earl of Halsbury, L. C., gave an opinion in favor of dismissing the appeal.

Lord Macnaghten.

But what is the alleged justification in the present case? It was said that the council—the executive of the federation—had a duty cast upon them to protect the interests of the members of the union, and that they could not be made legally responsible for the consequences of their action if they acted honestly in good faith and without 894any sinister or indirect motive. The case was argued with equal candor and ability. But it seems to me that the argument may be disposed of by two simple questions. How was the duty created? What in fact was the alleged duty? The alleged duty was created by the members of the union themselves, who elected or appointed the officials of the union to guide and direct their action; and then it was contended that the body to whom the members of the union have thus committed their individual freedom of action are not responsible for what they do if they act according to their honest judgment in furtherance of what they consider to be the interest of their constituents. It seems to me that if that plea were admitted there would be an end of all responsibility. It would be idle to sue the workmen, the individual wrong-doers, even if it were practicable to do so. Their counsellors and protectors, the real authors of the mischief, would be safe from legal proceedings. The only other question is, What is the alleged duty set up by the federation? I do not think it can be better described than it was by Mr. Lush. It comes to this—it is the duty on all proper occasions, of which the federation or their officials are to be the sole judges, to counsel and procure a breach of duty.

I agree with Romer and Stirling, L.JJ., and I think the appeal must be dismissed.

Lord James.

In order, therefore, to establish the existence of good cause and excuse, all the defendants can say is, “We, the federation, had the duty cast upon us to advise the workmen. We did advise them to commit an unlawful act, but in giving that advice we honestly believed that they would be in a better financial position than if they acted lawfully and fulfilled their contracts.” Even if it be assumed that such allegations are correct in fact, I think that no justification in law is established by them. The intention of the defendants was directly to procure the breach of contracts. The fact that their motives were good in the interests of those they moved to action does not form any answer to those who have suffered from the unlawful act. During the arguments that have been addressed to your Lordships I do not think quite sufficient distinction was drawn between the intention and the motives of the defendants. Their intention clearly was that the workmen should break their contracts. The defendants’ motives, no doubt, were that by so doing wages should be raised. But if in carrying out the intention the defendants purposely procured an unlawful act to be committed, the wrong that is thereby inflicted cannot be obliterated by the existence of a motive to secure a money benefit to the wrong-doers.

For these reasons I think the judgment of the Court of Appeal should be affirmed.^[578]

895Lord Lindley. My Lords, I agree so entirely with the judgments of Romer and Stirling, L.JJ., that I should say no more were it not for the great importance of some of the arguments addressed to your Lordships on this appeal and which deserve notice.

It is useless to try and conceal the fact that an organized body of men working together can produce results very different from those which can be produced by an individual without assistance. Moreover, laws adapted to individuals not acting in concert with others require modification and extension if they are to be applied with effect to large bodies of persons acting in concert. The English law of conspiracy is based upon and is justified by this undeniable truth.

But the possession of great power, whether by one person or by many, is quite as consistent with its lawful as with its unlawful employment; and there is no legal presumption that it will be or has been unlawfully exercised in any particular case. Some illegal act must be proved to be threatened and intended, or to have been committed, before any court of justice in the United Kingdom can properly make such conduct the basis of any decision.

These remarks are as applicable to trade unions as to other less powerful organizations. Their power to intimidate and coerce is undoubted; its exercise is comparatively easy and probable; but it would be wrong on this account to treat their conduct as illegal in any particular case without proof of further facts which make it so. It is not incumbent on a trade union to rebut any presumption of illegality based only on their power to do wrong. Freedom necessarily involves such a power; but the mere fact of its existence does not justify any legal presumption that it will be abused.

In the case before your Lordships there is proof that the members of the mining federation combined to break and did break their contracts with their employers by stopping work without proper notice and without proper leave. There is also proof that the officials of the federation assisted the men to do this by ordering them to stop work on particular days named by the officials. To break a contract is an unlawful act, or, in the language of Lord Watson in Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. at p. 96, “a breach of contract is in itself a legal wrong.” The form of action for such a wrong is quite immaterial in considering the general question of the legality or illegality of a breach of contract. Any party to a contract can break it if he chooses; but in point of law he is not entitled to break it even on offering to pay damages. If he wants to entitle himself to do that he must stipulate for an option to that effect. Non-lawyers are apt to think that everything is lawful which is not criminally punishable; but this is an entire misconception. A breach of contract would not be actionable if nothing legally wrong was involved in the breach.

The federation by its officials are clearly proved in this case to have been engaged in intentionally assisting in the concerted breach of a 896number of contracts entered into by workmen belonging to the federation. This is clearly unlawful, according to Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, and Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A. C. 495, and the more recent case of Read v. Friendly Society of Stonemasons, [1902] 2 K. B. 732. Nor is this conclusion opposed to Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1, or the Mogul Steamship Company’s Case, [1892] A. C. 25, where there was no unlawful act committed.

The appellants’ counsel did not deny that, in his view of the case, the defendants’ conduct required justification, and it was contended (1) that all which the officials did was to advise the men, and (2) that the officials owed a duty to the men to advise and assist them as they did.

As regards advice, it is not necessary to consider when, if ever, mere advice to do an unlawful act is actionable when the advice is not libellous or slanderous. Nor is it necessary to consider those cases in which a person, whose rights will be violated if a contract is performed, is justified in endeavoring to procure a breach of such contract. Nor is it necessary to consider what a parent or guardian may do to protect his child or ward. That there are cases in which it is not actionable to exhort a person to break a contract may be admitted; and it is very difficult to draw a sharp line separating all such cases from all others. But the so-called advice here was much more than counsel; it was accompanied by orders to stop, which could not be disobeyed with impunity. A refusal to stop work as ordered would have been regarded as disloyal to the federation. This is plain from the speeches given in evidence on the trial; and in my opinion it is a very important element in the case which cannot be ignored.

As regards duty the question immediately arises—duty to do what? The defendants have to justify a particular line of conduct, which was wrongful, i. e., aiding and abetting the men in doing what both the men and the officials knew was legally wrong. The constitution of the union may have rendered it the duty of the officials to advise the men what could be legally done to protect their own interests; but a legal duty to do what is illegal and known so to be is a contradiction in terms. A similar argument was urged without success in the case of the Friendly Society of Stonemasons, [1902] 2 K. B. 732, already referred to.

Then your Lordships were invited to say that there was a moral or social duty on the part of the officials to do what they did, and that, as they acted bona fide in the interest of the men and without any ill-will to the employers, their conduct was justifiable; and your Lordships were asked to treat this case as if it were like a case of libel or slander on a privileged occasion. My Lords, this contention was not based on authority, and its only merits are its novelty and ingenuity. The analogy is, in my opinion, misleading, and to give effect to this contention would be to legislate and introduce an entirely new law, 897and not to expound the law as it is at present. It would be to render many acts lawful which, as the law stands, are clearly unlawful.

My Lords, I have purposely abstained from using the word “malice.” Bearing in mind that malice may or may not be used to denote ill-will, and that in legal language presumptive or implied malice is distinguishable from express malice, it conduces to clearness in discussing such cases as these to drop the word “malice” altogether, and to substitute for it the meaning which is really intended to be conveyed by it. Its use may be necessary in drawing indictments; but when all that is meant by malice is an intention to commit an unlawful act without reference to spite or ill-feeling, it is better to drop the word malice and so avoid all misunderstanding.

The appeal ought to be dismissed with costs.

Order of the Court of Appeal affirmed and appeal dismissed with costs.^[579]

JERSEY CITY PRINTING CO. v. CASSIDY Court of Chancery, New Jersey, December 11, 1906. Reported in 63 New Jersey Equity Reports, 759.

On motion, on order to show cause, for an injunction to restrain defendants, former employes of the complainant, and now on strike, from unlawful interference with the complainant’s business, the employment of workmen, &c. Heard on bill, answer and affidavits.

Upon filing the bill an order was made restraining the defendants “from in any manner knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to cause by threats, offers of money, payment of money, offering to pay or the payment of transportation expenses, inducements or persuasions to any employe of the complainant under contract to render service to it to break such contract by quitting such service; from any and all personal molestation of persons willing to be employed by complainant with intent to coerce such persons to refrain from entering such employment; from addressing persons willing to be employed by complainant against their will and thereby causing them personal annoyance with a view to persuade them to refrain from such employment; from loitering or picketing in the streets near the premises of 898complainant, Nos. 68 and 70 York street, and No. 37 Montgomery street, Jersey City, with intent to procure the personal molestation and annoyance of persons employed or willing to be employed by complainant and with a view to cause persons so employed to quit their employment, or persons willing to be employed by complainant to refrain from such employment; from entering the premises of complainant, Nos. 68 and 70 York street, Jersey City, against its will with intent to interfere with its business; from violence, threats of violence, insults, indecent talk, abusive epithets practiced upon any persons without their consent with intent to coerce them to refrain from entering the employment of complainant, or to leave its employment.”

Stevenson, V. C. (orally). The bill is filed to restrain a body of workmen, who are on a strike, and other persons associated with them, from doing certain things which are alleged to be injurious to the complainant, their former employer. The things that they are restrained from doing are specified in the restraining order. That order was not made hastily. It was formulated with care on the part of the court, and I do not understand that counsel for the defendant criticises its terms on the ground that they are too broad. The defence is that the persons who are enjoined have not been doing, and are not threatening now to do, any of those things that are interdicted. That is the sum and substance of the defence, which has been presented by a great many affidavits and with very great force.

The order does not interfere with the right of the workman to cease his employment for any reasons that he deems sufficient. It does not undertake to say that workmen may not refuse to be employed if certain other classes of workmen are retained in employment. It leaves the workman absolutely free to abstain from work—for good reasons, for bad reasons, for no reasons. His absolute freedom to work, or not to work, is not in any way impaired. The restraining order is based upon the theory that the right of the workman to cease his employment, to refuse to be employed, and to do that in conjunction with his fellow-workmen, is just as absolute as is the right of the employer to refuse further to employ one man, or ten men, or twenty men who have theretofore been in his employment. From an examination of the cases and a very careful consideration of the subject I am unable to discover any right in the courts, as the law now stands, to interfere with this absolute freedom on the part of the employer to employ whom he will, and to cease to employ whom he will; and the corresponding freedom on the part of the workman, for any reason or no reason, to say that he will no longer be employed; and the further right of the workmen, of their own free will, to combine and meet as one party, as a unit, the employer who, on the other side of the transaction, appears as a unit before them. Any discussion of the motives, purposes or intentions of the employer in exercising his absolute right 899to employ or not to employ as he sees fit, or of the free combination of employes in exercising the corresponding absolute right to be employed or not as they see fit, seems to me to be in the air.

Thus, there is a wide field in which employes may combine and exercise the arbitrary right of “dictating” to their common employer “how he shall conduct his business.” The exact correlative of this right of the employe exists, in an equal degree, in the employer. He may arbitrarily “dictate” to five thousand men in his employ in regard to matters in respect of which their conduct ought, according to correct social and ethical principles, to be left entirely free. But if the “dictation” is backed up solely by the announcement that, if it is not submitted to, the dictating party will refrain from employing, or refrain from being employed, as the case may be, no legal or equitable right belonging to the party dictated to, which I am able to discern, is thereby invaded.

Some of the expressions which I have used, and which are commonly used, in relation to this subject seem to me to be misleading. Union workmen who inform their employer that they will strike if he refuses to discharge all non-union workmen in his employ are acting within their absolute right, and, in fact, are merely dictating the terms upon which they will be employed. All such terms necessarily relate both to “how the employer shall conduct his business” and how the employes shall conduct their business.

The doctrine of the old cases, of which we have in New Jersey an interesting example in State v. Donaldson, 3 Vr. 151, which placed the employe, when acting in combination with his fellow-workmen, at a tremendous disadvantage as compared with his employer, I think may be regarded as entirely exploded. The authority of the deliverances of the supreme court in State v. Donaldson was largely, if not entirely, abolished by statute in 1883.

The principles which I have endeavored to state are all recognized in the restraining order in this case, and are so plainly recognized that the intelligent and industrious counsel for the defendants is unable to point out any respect wherein the terms of the order should be modified. The things which the restraining order interdicts are things which, for the purposes of this argument, it is practically conceded the defendants have no right to do.

In this situation of the case it would seem to be unnecessary to further consider the legal propriety of the restraining order, much less to take it up clause by clause. I have, however, pointed out what conduct on the part of the defendants is excluded from the operation of this order, and I think that it is fair to all the parties to this suit who are concerned in the maintenance of the restraining order to explain, at least in a general way, what conduct is included within its prohibition. This can be most conveniently done by making plain the most important principles embodied in the order—principles which 900practically have been developed by the courts of this country and England during the last five or ten years.

The injunction in strike and boycott cases is of very recent use. Already a wide difference of opinion has been developed among judges in regard to the liability of a combination of workmen to actions at law for damages and suits in equity for an injunction.

It is only very recently, I think, that one of the most important rights which now are vindicated by the injunction in a strike case has been differentiated; in many cases it has been apparently half recognized or indirectly enforced.

That the interest of an employer or an employe in a contract for services is property is conceded. Where defendants, in combination or individually, undertake to interfere with and disrupt existing contract relations between the employer and the employe, it is plain that a property right is directly invaded. The effect is the same whether the means employed to cause the workman to break his contract, and thus injure the employer, are violence or threats of violence against the employe or mere molestation, annoyance, or persuasions. In all these cases, whatever the means may be, they constitute the cause of the breaking of a contract, and consequently they constitute the natural and proximate cause of damage. The intentional doing of anything by a third party which is the natural and proximate cause of the disruption of a contract relation, to the injury of one of the contracting parties, is now very generally recognized as actionable, in the absence of a sufficient justification, and the question, in every case, seems to turn upon justification alone.

Where the tangible property of an employer is seized or directly injured by violence, with intent to interfere with the carrying on of his business, the case, also is free from embarrassment.

In the case of Frank v. Herold, 18 Dick. Ch. Rep. 443, Vice-Chancellor Pitney amply discussed the whole subject of the unlawfulness of molestation and annoyance of employes, with intent and with the effect to induce them to abandon their employment, to the injury of their employer’s business.

But the difficult case presents itself when the workmen in combination undertake to interfere with the freedom of action on the part of other workmen who naturally would seek employment where they (the workmen in combination) desire and intend that no man shall be employed excepting upon their terms.

The difficulty is in perceiving how molestation and annoyance, not of the employes of a complainant, but of persons who are merely looking for work and may become employes of the complainant, can be erected into a legal or equitable grievance on the part of the complainant. But the difficulty is still further increased where the possible employes make no complaint to any court for protection, and the conduct of the molesting party does not afford a basis which the 901ancient common law recognized as sufficient to support an action of tort on their behalf, such as for an assault and battery or a slander. Abusive language is not necessarily actionable at the common law. If to call a man a “scab” in the street or to follow him back and forth from his home to his place of employment was formerly not actionable on behalf of the victim of this petty annoyance, the problem is to understand how one who is merely the victim’s possible employer can complain, either at law or in equity, there being no actual contract for service, but only a potential one, interfered with.

It is easier, I think, to obtain a correct idea of the legal and equitable right which underlies many of the injunctions which have been granted in these strike cases restraining combinations of workmen from interfering with the natural supply of labor to an employer, by means of molestation and personal annoyance, if we exclude from consideration the conduct of the defendants as a cause of action on behalf of the immediate victims of their molestation—i. e., of the workman or workmen whom the combination are seeking to deter from entering into the employment which is offered to them, and which they, if let alone, would wish to accept. I say this, although I firmly believe that the molested workman, seeking employment and unreasonably interfered with in this effort by a combination, has an action for damages at common law, and, where the molestation is repeated and persistent, has the same right to an injunction, in equity, which, under the same circumstances, is accorded to his contemplated employer.

The underlying right in this particular case under consideration, which seems to be coming into general recognition as the subject of protection by courts of equity, through the instrumentality of an injunction, appears to be the right to enjoy a certain free and natural condition of the labor market, which, in a recent case in the House of Lords, was referred to, in the language of Lord Ellenborough, as a “probable expectancy.” This underlying right has otherwise been broadly defined or described as the right which every man has to earn his living, or to pursue his trade or business, without undue interference, and might otherwise be described as the right which every man has, whether employer or employe, of absolute freedom to employ or to be employed. The peculiar element of this perhaps newly-recognized right is that it is an interest which one man has in the freedom of another. In the case before this court the Jersey City Printing Company claims the right, not only to be free in employing labor, but also the right that labor shall be free to be employed by it, the Jersey City Printing Company.

A large part of what is most valuable in modern life seems to depend more or less directly upon “probable expectancies.” When they fail, civilization, as at present organized, may go down. As social and industrial life develops and grows more complex these “probable expectancies” are bound to increase. It would seem to be inevitable 902that courts of law, as our system of jurisprudence is evolved to meet the growing wants of an increasingly complex social order, will discover, define and protect from undue interference more of these “probable expectancies.”

In undertaking to ascertain and define the rights and remedies of employers and employes, in respect of their “probable expectancies” in relation to the labor market, it is well not to lose sight altogether of any other analogous rights and remedies which are based upon similar “probable expectancies.” It will probably be found in the end, I think, that the natural expectancy of employers in relation to the labor market and the natural expectancy of merchants in respect to the merchandise market must be recognized to the same extent by courts of law and courts of equity and protected by substantially the same rules.

It is freedom in the market, freedom in the purchase and sale of all things, including both goods and labor, that our modern law is endeavoring to insure to every dealer on either side of the market. The valuable thing to merchant and to customer, to employer and to employe, manifestly is freedom on both sides of the market. The merchant, with his fortune invested in goods and with perfect freedom to sell, might be ruined if his customers were deprived of their freedom to buy; the purchaser, a householder, seeking supplies for his family, with money in his pocket and free to buy, might find his liberty of no value and might suffer from lack of food and clothing if the shopmen who deal in these articles were so terrorized by a powerful combination as to be coerced into refusing to sell either food or clothing to him.

It is, however, the right of the employer and employe to a free labor market that is the particular thing under consideration in this case.

A man establishes a large factory where working people reside, taking the risk of his being able to conduct his industry and offer these working people employment which they will be willing to accept. He takes the risk of destructive competition and a large number of other risks, out of which, at any time, may come his financial ruin and the suspension of his manufacturing works. But our law, in its recent development, undertakes to insure to him, not only that he may employ whom he pleases, but that all who wish to be employed by him may enter into and remain in such employment freely, without threats of harm, without unreasonable molestation and annoyance from the words, actions or other conduct of any other persons acting in combination. What is the measure or test by which the conduct of a combination of persons must be judged in order to determine whether or not it is an unlawful interference with freedom of employment in the labor market, and as such injurious to an employer of labor in respect of his “probable expectancies,” has not as yet been clearly defined. Perhaps no better definition could be suggested than that which may 903be framed by conveniently using that important legal fictitious person who has taken such a large part in the development of our law during the last fifty years—the reasonably prudent, reasonably courageous and not unreasonably sensitive man. Precisely this same standard is employed throughout the law of nuisance in determining what degree of annoyance on the part of one’s neighbor one must submit to, and what degree of such annoyance is excessive and the subject of an action for damages or a suit for an injunction.

A man may not be liable to an action for slander for calling a workman a “scab” in the street, but if a hundred men combine to have this workman denounced as a “scab” in the street, or followed in the streets to and from his home, so as to attract public attention to him and place him in an annoyingly conspicuous position, such conduct, the result of such combination, is held to be an invasion of the “probable expectancy” of his employer or contemplated employer, an invasion of this employer’s right to have labor flow freely to him. Without any regard to the rights and remedies which the molested workman may have, the injunction goes at the suit of the employer to protect his “probable expectancy”—to secure freedom in the labor market to employ and to be employed, upon which the continuance of his entire industry may depend.

I think it is safe to say that all through this development of strike law, during the last decade, no principle becomes established which does not operate equally upon both employer and employe. The rights of both classes are absolutely equal in respect of all these “probable expectancies.” An operator upon printing machines has the right to offer his labor freely to any of the printing shops in Jersey City. These shops may all combine to refuse to employ him on account of his race, or membership in a labor union, or for any other reason, or for no reason, precisely as twenty employes in one printing shop may combine and arbitrarily refuse to be further employed unless the business is conducted in accordance with their views. But in the case of the operative seeking employment, he has a right to have the action of the masters of the printing shops, in reference to employing him, left absolutely free. If, after obtaining, or seeking to obtain, employment in a shop, the master of that shop should be subjected to annoyances and molestation, instigated by the proprietors of other printing shops, who combine to compel by such molestation and annoyance, this one master printer, against his will and wish, to exclude the operative from employment, this operative, in my judgment, would have a right to an action at law for damages, and would have a right to an injunction if his case presented the other ordinary conditions upon which injunctions issue. But the common law courts have not had time to speak distinctly on this subject as yet, and it is necessary to be cautious in dealing with a subject in which both courts of law and courts of equity as yet are feeling their way.

904I think that the leading principle enforced in the restraining order in this case is not inconsistent with any authorities which control this court. This principle is that a combination of employers, or a combination of employes, the object of which is to interfere with the freedom of the employer to employ, or of the employe to be employed (in either of which cases there is an interference with the enjoyment of a “probable expectancy,” which the law recognizes as something in the nature of property), by means of such molestation or personal annoyance as would be liable to coerce the person upon whom it was inflicted, assuming that he is reasonably courageous and not unreasonably sensitive, to refrain from employing or being employed, is illegal and founds an action for damages on the part of any person knowingly injured in respect of his “probable expectancy” by such interference, and also, when the other necessary conditions exist, affords the basis of an injunction from a court of equity.

The doctrine which supports that portion of the restraining order in this case which undertakes to interdict the defendants from molesting applicants for employment as an invasion of a right of the complainant, is applicable to a situation presenting either an employer or an employe as complainant, and containing the following elements:

First. Some person or persons desiring to exercise the right of employing labor, or the right of being employed to labor.

Second. A combination of persons to interfere with that right, by molestation or annoyance, of the employers who would employ, or of the employes who would be employed, in the absence of such molestation.

How far the element of combination of a number of persons will finally be found necessary, in order to make out the invasion of a legal or equitable right in this class of cases, need not be discussed. We are dealing with cases where powerful combinations of large numbers, in fact, exist.

Third. Such a degree of molestation as might constrain a person having reasonable fortitude, and not being unreasonably sensitive, to abandon his intention to employ or to be employed, in order to escape such molestation.

Fourth. As the result of the foregoing conditions, an actual pecuniary loss to the complaining party, by the interference with his enjoyment of his “probable expectancies” in respect of the labor market.

I do not think that the constraining force brought to bear upon the employer or employe which the law can interdict can ever include the power of public opinion or even of class opinion. Every man, whether an employer or an employe, constitutes a part of a great industrial system, and his conduct is open to the criticism of the members of his own class. While, therefore, a combination of union men have no right to cry “scab” in the streets to non-union employes, or follow 905them in the street in a body to and from their homes, or do many other things in combination, which, if done once by a single individual, would not found an action of tort, such combinations, I think, have left a fairly wide field of effort towards the creation and application of public opinion as a constraining force upon conduct of any kind which they wish to discourage.

I have endeavored to explain, in a general way, my own view of the most important and least understood principle embodied in the restraining order in this case, in order that the defendants, and, in fact, all parties interested, may have all possible light in construing and applying the exact terms of the order. What I have said may be found to be subject to modifications, without subjecting the terms of the order to any change. All generalizations on such a subject—such a novel subject as the one under consideration—are dangerous. There may be conduct on the part of a combination of employers, or of employes, which would seem to come within the general definition or description of illegal and prohibited conduct, which I have attempted to frame, but which conduct, nevertheless, might be justified, and hence could not be adjudged illegal. Molestation and personal annoyance, however, the terms which I have employed, do not seem to be inclusive of any justifiable conduct, especially if no one is allowed to complain that he is molested or annoyed by being subjected peaceably to the judgment and criticism of public opinion.

The vice-chancellor then discussed at length the effect of the answer of the defendants and the affidavits annexed thereto, which denied all the charges of interference with existing labor contracts or molestation practiced to prevent new workmen from being employed. The conclusion was that, notwithstanding such denials, even when sustained by the greater weight of evidence, the restraining order should be held in force as to those defendants who stood fairly charged, under oath, with the interdicted misconduct, and should be vacated as to any other defendants not so charged; that the sole issue appeared to be one of fact, viz., whether the defendants had done, and were threatening to do, the acts complained of or not, and that such an issue could not properly be tried on ex parte affidavits, but should be reserved for the final hearing; that in a case like this, where the defendants were the only persons in sight apparently interested in having the unlawful conduct complained of continued, and were therefore subjected to a temptation to cause such conduct to be continued, an injunction which merely prevented them from doing acts which they disclaimed any right to do, and denied that they had done or threatened to do, should be retained until the final hearing.

906

THE MOGUL STEAMSHIP COMPANY LIMITED v. McGREGOR & COMPANY In the Court of Appeal, July 13, 1889. Reported in Law Reports, 23 Queen’s Bench Division, 598.

Bowen, L. J.^[580] We are presented in this case with an apparent conflict or antinomy between two rights that are equally regarded by the law—the right of the plaintiffs to be protected in the legitimate exercise of their trade, and the right of the defendants to carry on their business as seems best to them, provided they commit no wrong to others. The plaintiffs complain that the defendants have crossed the line which the common law permits; and inasmuch as, for the purposes of the present case, we are to assume some possible damage to the plaintiffs, the real question to be decided is whether, on such an assumption, the defendants in the conduct of their commercial affairs have done anything that is unjustifiable in law. The defendants are a number of shipowners who formed themselves into a league or conference for the purpose of ultimately keeping in their own hands the control of the tea carriage from certain Chinese ports, and for the purpose of driving the plaintiffs and other competitors from the field. In order to succeed in this object, and to discourage the plaintiffs’ vessels from resorting to those ports, the defendants during the “tea harvest” of 1885 combined to offer to the local shippers very low freights, with a view of generally reducing or “smashing” rates, and thus rendering it unprofitable for the plaintiffs to send their ships thither. They offered, moreover, a rebate of five per cent to all local shippers and agents who would deal exclusively with vessels belonging to the Conference, and any agent who broke the condition was to forfeit the entire rebate on all shipments made on behalf of any and every one of his principals during the whole year—a forfeiture of rebate or allowance which was denominated as “penal” by the plaintiffs’ counsel. It must, however, be taken as established that the rebate was one which the defendants need never have allowed at all to their customers. It must also be taken that the defendants had no personal ill-will to the plaintiffs, nor any desire to harm them except such as is involved in the wish and intention to discourage by such measures the plaintiffs from sending rival vessels to such ports. The acts of which the plaintiffs particularly complained were as follows:—First, a circular of May 10, 1885, by which the defendants offered to the local shippers and their agents a benefit by way of rebate if they would not deal with the plaintiffs, which was to be lost if this condition was not fulfilled. Secondly, the sending of special ships to Hankow in order by competition to deprive the plaintiffs’ vessels of profitable freight. 907Thirdly, the offer at Hankow of freights at a level which would not repay a shipowner for his adventure, in order to “smash” freights and frighten the plaintiffs from the field. Fourthly, pressure put on the defendants’ own agents to induce them to ship only by the defendants’ vessels, and not by those of the plaintiffs. It is to be observed with regard to all these acts of which complaint is made that they were acts that in themselves could not be said to be illegal unless made so by the object with which, or the combination in the course of which, they were done; and that in reality what is complained of is the pursuing of trade competition to a length which the plaintiffs consider oppressive and prejudicial to themselves. We were invited by the plaintiffs’ counsel to accept the position from which their argument started—that an action will lie if a man maliciously and wrongfully conducts himself so as to injure another in that other’s trade. Obscurity resides in the language used to state this proposition. The terms “maliciously,” “wrongfully,” and “injure” are words all of which have accurate meanings, well known to the law, but which also have a popular and less precise signification, into which it is necessary to see that the argument does not imperceptibly slide. An intent to “injure” in strictness means more than an intent to harm. It connotes an intent to do wrongful harm. “Maliciously,” in like manner, means and implies an intention to do an act which is wrongful, to the detriment of another. The term “wrongful” imports in its turn the infringement of some right. The ambiguous proposition to which we were invited by the plaintiffs’ counsel still, therefore, leaves unsolved the question of what, as between the plaintiffs and defendants, are the rights of trade. For the purpose of clearness, I desire, as far as possible, to avoid terms in their popular use so slippery, and to translate them into less fallacious language wherever possible.