APPENDIX. (continued 2)

"In all the present territory south of that line, the status of persons held to involuntary servitude or labor, as it now exists, shall not be changed." What is the meaning of that word "status"? What is the status? The word status may be applied to different things; there may be a local status or a political status. In some countries a slave may hold property, and, in a certain form, sue; in others, he cannot. Or it may be the social and legal relation, that of the slave to his master, which constitutes the status that is referred to; and I presume it is that which it is declared shall not be changed. But, sir, shall not be changed by whom? By Congress? It does not say so. By the Territorial Legislature? It does not say so in terms. Does it mean that it shall not be changed by Congress or by the government of the Territory? Does it mean that it shall not be changed at all by anybody? Does it mean the master shall not emancipate him if he chooses? Is it an absolute prohibition of any change of the status of the slave, of any sort or description?

These are the terms which we are obliged to resort to in order to escape from the manly declaration of the Crittenden resolution, that south of that line slavery shall be recognized and protected. It was eminently proper, as we excluded them north of it, that our institutions should be recognized and protected south of that line. That, sir, was plain English; that everybody could understand; but here we are interpolating law Latin into the Constitution; this word "status" is introduced; and who is to determine what the status was? I thought it had been considered a march forward, a step of progress, an evidence of improvement in English legislation, when it abandoned Norman French and law Latin, and resorted to the mother tongue; and especially it should be so, when we are making constitutions for American people of English descent, and who speak the English tongue. A constitution is for the millions, and the millions should be able to understand it.

But, Mr. President, let us proceed a little further. This whole matter is to be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the course of common law. That embraces the right of the master to his slave as a matter of cognizance under the common law before the courts; because what do they mean by the status of all persons held to involuntary servitude or labor? They mean rightfully held. They do not mean if a man is kidnapped and held illegally to involuntary service or labor that he is always to be so held. It means that the status of persons who are rightfully and legally held shall not be changed; and who is to determine that? The courts are to determine it according to the common law. That is to be determined by judges who are to be appointed from a party, and by a party who believe that there cannot be property in man; by a party who believe that, in the Somerset case, Lord Mansfield has laid down the common law properly; by a party who will probably believe that the decision of the English courts, in regard to the slave Anderson, that it was no murder for a slave when escaping to kill his master, was a correct exposition of the common law.

How, then, do we stand? Why, sir, in relation to our right to slaves, we have to try that right before judges who are thus appointed, and appointed from a party who we know entertain these opinions. Why, sir, you might poll that party through the whole United States, and I would venture any thing upon the assertion that you cannot get one in a hundred thousand who would not deny that there could be property in man, especially under the common law. We thus lose the advantage of the Dred Scott decision. According to the Dred Scott decision, we can carry them into the territory of the United States and hold them, and it is decided that there is property in slaves—decided under the Constitution. The court maintain that the Constitution recognizes it. It is upon constitutional ground that we have made our claims, and so far, it is upon this that we have fought and won the battle, not upon common law; and now we are to abandon the advantages that we have got from that ground of title under the Dred Scott decision, and go into court and try a case that has been already decided in our favor; and under the common law, try it before judges who are to be selected by a party entertaining such opinions as I have just described; and I am sorry to say, without appeal to the Supreme Court; because, in the territorial bills which have been lately passed, that right has been taken from us. My friend from North Carolina will be kind enough to read an article in the Chicago platform, showing what is held on that subject by those who wield the power of this Government.

Mr. CLINGMAN read, as follows:

Eighth. "That the normal condition of all the territory of the United States is that of freedom; that as our republican fathers, when they had abolished slavery in all our national territory, ordained that 'no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,' it becomes our duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary, to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it; and we deny the authority of Congress, of a Territorial Legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any Territory of the United States."

Mr. HUNTER:—Thus much, Mr. President, in regard to the status; and it is to be observed that the same word is used in reference to persons who are now held to involuntary servitude in the Territories and to those whom we are to have the right to take into the Territories from the States recognizing slavery. So that we submit this question of our right to slaves, when it reaches the Territories, to be tried under the common law, by courts appointed by the party entertaining the opinions I have described, and that without appeal. This is in regard to the Territories which we now own. What is the settlement provided for in regard to territory hereafter to be acquired? Here it is, in the third section:

Section 3. Neither the Constitution, nor any amendment thereof, shall be construed to give Congress power to regulate, abolish, or control, within any State, the relation established or recognized by the laws thereof touching persons held to labor or involuntary service therein, nor to interfere with or abolish involuntary service in the District of Columbia without the consent of Maryland, and without the consent of the owners, or making the owners who do not consent just compensation; nor the power to interfere with or prohibit Representatives and others from bringing with them, to the District of Columbia, retaining and taking away, persons so held to labor or service; nor the power to interfere with or abolish involuntary service in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within those States and Territories where the same is established or recognized.

That is, they shall not prohibit it as to future acquired territory, where it is established or recognized. Will not the inference be claimed from such an expression, that where it is not established and not recognized, they may prohibit it? Will it not be said that the expression of one exception to the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the Territories excludes the idea of an exception to that power when slavery is not recognized in the Territories?

Mr. COLLAMER:—If the gentleman will indulge me a moment, I desire to say that is a section declaring that Congress shall not abolish slavery in the dock-yards, &c., in the States where it is recognized. There is nothing in it about future acquired territory.

Mr. HUNTER:—This third section applies not only to present but to future acquired territory. It is not confined, like the first section, to the territory at present acquired. It is not confined to dock-yards and arsenals in the Territories and States. If the Senator will examine it, he will find that it is applied to all places where the United States have exclusive jurisdiction. "Exclusive jurisdiction" is the word. Will it not be claimed that they have exclusive jurisdiction in the Territories of the United States? Will not those who have the power to construe, and carry out their construction, so construe it? Will they not say it is a prohibition to Congress to prohibit slavery where it is recognized in the Territories or States, but not a denial of the right to prohibit slavery in Territories where it is not recognized by law, although that Territory may be vacant and uninhabited?

Mr. COLLAMER:—That clause of the section is, that Congress shall not have power—

"To interfere with or abolish involuntary service in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within those States and Territories where the same is established or recognized."

That, so far as I have read, is confined only to where they have local jurisdiction in the States holding slaves.

Mr. HUNTER:—I thought so at first myself; but the Senator will find, on a further examination, I think, that he is mistaken. They shall not prohibit it wherever they have exclusive jurisdiction in places where slavery "is established or recognized." It is not confined to dock-yards, forts, and arsenals. Why should it be in the Territories? They have exclusive jurisdiction over the whole. There is reason for confining it to dock-yards in the States; but there is no reason for confining it to dock-yards, &c., in the Territories. But that is not the construction which will be given; the construction given to it will be, that they shall not prohibit it where they have exclusive jurisdiction, if it is recognized in such places; but if it be not recognized in such places, where they have exclusive jurisdiction, I say the inference will be drawn, plausibly, if not justly, that they shall have power to prohibit; and I say if this be so, then it is a power (so far as Mexican territories are concerned, if there should be any acquisition there) by which the South will be forever estopped; because there the Mexicans have abolished slavery, and there, under this clause giving in that territory exclusive jurisdiction, the party now controlling the Government would claim the right to prohibit it. And what a difference between our position then and our position now under the decision of the Supreme Court! Under the decision of that court, all the people of all the States have a right to go into the common territory with their institutions. It belongs to all in common, and Congress cannot prohibit them from taking their property there.

I say that those who have the power to carry out any construction they choose to give, would be interested in putting upon it the construction which I fear; and it would be difficult to raise an argument which they would deem conclusive against it. But take it the other way; suppose that the Senator from Vermont is right in his first supposition, that it was only meant to be applied to forts, arsenals, and dock-yards, then I ask what settlement does this proposition give us in regard to future acquired territories; what earthly settlement is it? We have all the old difficulties to encounter that we have to meet now, every one of them. We not only have all the old difficulties to encounter, but the slaveholder would have an additional obstacle which this first clause would put in his way. It requires that the right to slaves in the present territory shall be tried by the common law, and it might be said in court that the inferences drawn heretofore from those provisions of the Constitution recognizing slavery were to be overruled by the fact that the people in their latest action—by way of constitutional amendment—had introduced another rule in order to determine the status of those held to involuntary service or labor, and the consequence of that would be that the South never could acquire another foot of territory; that is, the few southern States who are left in the Union.

I am told that here is a provision that you cannot acquire territory except by the assent of a majority of the Senators from both sections. Does any man believe that the North, with its eighteen, soon to be twenty, or thirty, non-slaveholding States, would allow a majority of six, or seven, or eight slave States, that are now attached to them, to prevent them from acquiring any territory hereafter? Would they agree to such an amendment, in the first instance; and if they did, how long before they would change this restriction in the Constitution? Indeed, it is hardly to be supposed that they will agree to it in the first instance, so far as it regards the acquisition of territory; but of what avail would it be to the South? There is but one conceivable acquisition—I speak of possible things, and I hope gentlemen will not understand me as coveting my neighbor's goods, or desiring to lay violent hands on the property of any other States or nations—but, if things should so happen that we could rightfully acquire Cuba, under my view of the probable construction to be given to this clause, and because slavery there is recognized, Congress might be prevented from prohibiting it; but, everywhere else, the South would be shut out and excluded.

Then, sir, what would be its position? It would be prevented from acquiring any territory under this Government as an outlet for its slaves; and the only chance of securing that necessity of its condition would be to quit this Union and join the Southern Confederacy, which can acquire territory. It would be an inducement to disunion so strong as would almost force them to it.

Let us go a little further. Here is another clause holding out the same temptation:

"The foreign slave-trade is hereby forever prohibited, and it shall be the duty of Congress to pass laws to prevent the importation of slaves, coolies, or persons held to service or labor, into the United States and the Territories from places beyond the limits thereof."

This is to be the duty of Congress. As it now stands, it is in the power of Congress. When it was merely given as a power to Congress, was there a failure to execute that power? Do we not know that every State in the present Confederation has desired to suppress the African slave-trade? Some do it from sentiment and principle; some from interest; but there is a controlling motive with each and all of them. It is safe enough to leave it where it stood, giving Congress the power merely. Here you make it their duty. Suppose this case: the States that have left us have set up another Government, another Confederation; under this clause you forbid us to buy their slaves, to interchange and trade in slaves with them: what will be the consequence? They will exclude us from selling our slaves in their territory, and where then do we stand? If you should think it prudent, if you should think it politic, you would have no means, under this proposed amendment, of allowing that to be done between these two coterminous countries. Though it would be to the advantage of both Confederacies that there should be this interchange, you preclude Congress from allowing it; and then where would that place the border slave States? They would not be able to sell their slaves in the States further South; and if they carried them there, they would have to emigrate with them. You would thus prevent Congress from adopting a regulation which would make it possible for them to remain in this Union with safety, with advantage, to themselves. Why was this put in? Why not have left it where it stood, giving Congress the power, when we all know that there is no State in the present Confederation that would not exercise that power for the purpose of suppressing the slave-trade from Africa? This probably would constitute the only exception. Why shut ourselves out from allowing the exception?

But, Mr. President, my desire is to be brief; I do not want to consume the time of the Senate; I am merely endeavoring to state the points of objection as briefly as I can. Here is, at the close of it, another provision which, it seems to me, contains the seeds of civil war; and that is this: "Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States;" that is to say, Congress shall have power to pass laws to force the States to receive those persons whom they have excluded from police considerations—considerations of domestic safety. Yes, sir, to force the States to receive persons who would be dangerous to their peace; to force upon them, if you will, abolition lecturers; to force upon them persons whom they regard as the most dangerous emissaries that could be sent among them; to enable Congress to obtrude, in fact, into all the business of the States. That was not intended when the Constitution was framed, and never ought to have been. The present provision in regard to the rights of citizens in the several States, I regard as in the nature of an inter-treaty stipulation. It is a duty imposed on each State, for the violation of which there is no remedy; no remedy, unless the State aggrieved may resort sometimes to retaliation.

There are various things of that sort in the Constitution. Duties imposed upon the States, but without a remedy for the failure to execute them. No State shall keep a standing army; but suppose it does: what are you to do? Congress cannot remedy it; and it would not be right to give Congress the power to remedy it. You have to trust something to the sense of right and duty of the States themselves; and so it should be in regard to this matter of citizens. Suppose one State should say that the citizens of another should not sue in its courts; how is Congress to enforce their right? Is Congress to say they shall be allowed to sue, and that the Sheriffs and officers of the State shall execute the process? Is it proposed to allow Congress, by law, to interpose in all these delicate matters? Is it not far better to leave it to the sense of justice of the States—to their sense of duty and of honor? Have we not got along very well while we left it there? If there be any instances in which there have been exceptions, they are instances in which persons have been excluded on account of police considerations, deemed to be dangerous to the safety of the people who excluded them. Is it proposed so to amend the Constitution as to take from the people of the States this right of self-defence?

If we once introduced this as an amendment to the Constitution, what would become of the feeble southern States, six or seven (for Delaware can hardly be considered as a slave State), that would be left? Arkansas may conclude to secede when she shall determine finally upon her position in the Union. What would become of us in the hands of this powerful majority, who would pass what laws they pleased in regard to the introduction of their citizens among us, and the rights of those citizens to do as they pleased after they got there? Is it not obvious that these various changes would lead to endless discontents, to irreparable breaches between these States? Would you not certainly drive out the Border States? They would say, "If we go south, we ally ourselves to a homogeneous people; we shall have none of these difficulties; we have no reason to fear their citizens; we can grant all these privileges without the least difficulty or danger; we can send our slaves south from a country where they are not profitable, to one where they are; but if we stay here, we are forbidden to do any of these things; if we stay here, we are prevented from ever obtaining any outlet for our slave property." Will you not offer them the highest inducements, nay, will you not make it almost necessary for them to leave you, if you should adopt such a proposition as this?

Nor is that all, Mr. President. Our present Constitution—for I am comparing our position under it with that in which this would place us—in most of its difficult provisions has been expounded—expounded by the action of the State Governments, by the action of all the departments of the Federal Government. We have had legal interpretations in the decisions of the State and Federal courts. We have come almost to a point—indeed, I, who believe that the Dred Scott decision is law, think we have come to a point—where we have a legal exposition on the whole of these matters. Are we to be turned aside from that, to wander into a new sea of doubt and difficulty and ambiguity? No candid man can take this up and say it is not full of double constructions, full of ambiguities, giving ground for new quarrels between the sections, to new constructions of courts, to new lawsuits.

Mr. COLLAMER:—And to be perpetual.

Mr. HUNTER:—Yes, sir; and to be made perpetual. We cannot change them afterwards, if we want to do it. I can conceive nothing that would endanger what is left of this Union so much as the adoption of this proposition, although it has been produced by persons so eminent and so respectable as those who composed the Peace Congress.

I know that this measure does emanate from a body eminently patriotic and wise, entitled to the public deference and affection; and for their work I feel all possible respect. Against that work I will pronounce nothing except what the necessities of the occasion may require. But when the peace, the safety, the rights of the State which I seek to represent—when the peace of the whole country, as it seems to me, would be so seriously imperilled as it would be if this were adopted, I feel bound by a sense of what I owe to those who sent me here, bound by a sense of what I owe to those who have some respect for my opinions, to express them here on this occasion, and to give briefly the points and the heads upon which I differ from the conclusions of that Congress. Indeed, sir, before taking my seat, I may suggest a doubt whether I am in truth acting against any thing which they have really done. I was informed by a member of that Congress that they never did take a vote upon this proposed article, as a whole.

Mr. DOOLITTLE:—If the Senator will allow me, I beg leave to state that I was informed of the same fact by a distinguished member of the Convention; and I was further informed that the person who claims to be the secretary of the Convention was never elected as such. And there is another fact stated in the preamble that I know is not correctly stated: that the State of Wisconsin was in that Convention, or took any part in it. How many more mistakes there are in the preamble, I am unable to say.

Mr. HUNTER:—I believe it is certain that they never did take a vote on this article as a whole, but upon its separate sections. I think it equally probable that it could not have passed as a whole. That opinion was expressed to me by a member. As it did pass, I think there were three or four States not voting; and the States not voting were supposed to be against it. Under such circumstances, I do not know that this is to be taken as an expression of the will of that Congress. Further: I will say, in regard to myself, that a majority of the members from my own State voted against it, and were very decided in their opposition to it. They believed it was not such a proposition as the South could safely accept; and that majority, I believe, have returned home to express that opinion to the State Convention, and to give their reasons for it. Under all these circumstances, I have thought that I ought to present, as a counter proposition (believing that the people whom I represent cannot and ought not to accept these), resolutions upon which they have said they were willing to settle this controversy. I believe the State of Kentucky has declared the same thing. I understand the State of California has done likewise. I believe, though I may be mistaken, that Tennessee has said the same. The State of North Carolina has made the same declaration unanimously. To the last, I believe I may add Missouri.

Now, I am making a proposition to amend, by inserting the resolutions of the honorable Senator from Kentucky; upon which so many of the border slaveholding States have said they would settle the difference. Why not send them out to the States and the people? We know that some of them would settle on that. Why should we send out such a proposition as this, which there is every reason to believe they will not accept, and which will have the effect of dividing the conservative men of the North? Those northern men who are willing to settle on some proposition that would give satisfaction to the Border States, would just as soon vote for the Crittenden resolutions as for these, and some probably would prefer to do so. They will waste all their strength, and efforts, and energies, in going for a proposition which the South in the end will not accept, or at least which I do not believe they will accept, as there is every reason to suppose they will not accept it. Then, when we know there are propositions upon which so many of the Border States have said they would be willing to settle existing difficulties, why not submit them? I think, under such circumstances, notwithstanding the respect which I feel for the members composing the Peace Congress, my duty to my own State, whose Legislature has spoken in regard to it, and my sympathy with so many of the Southern States who have declared the same opinion, should induce me to present the proposition which they desire instead of one to which none of them have as yet given their adhesion, and to which I have no idea they will ever agree.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I suppose, Mr. President, not only out of deference to the Presiding Officer of this body, but because it seems to me to be entirely reasonable, that the decision of the Chair on the question of order which was made as to the admissibility of these amendments, was correct. The question which these amendments present, I think, is a question of consistency or inconsistency with the proceeding in which we are engaged, with the resolutions offered by the Peace Conference; and each member, in deciding ultimately upon the question for or against the proposed amendment, will consider that question of consistency or inconsistency, and regulate his vote accordingly. It is not, perhaps, strictly a question of order, to be decided on the consistency or inconsistency of amendments. So I take it. I am willing it should be decided by this body. Now, what is it? The proposed amendment contravenes the whole nature of the transaction, and changes its character. The representatives of twenty-one or twenty-two States—we will not make any question about Kansas; whether it be in or not, is not material—the representatives and delegates of over twenty States of the Union have recommended to us the adoption of certain amendments to the Constitution, which they say will arrest the troubles of the country and adjust those great differences which now so much threaten us; and they ask Congress to propose these amendments to the several States, according to the fifth article of the Constitution, for their adoption. These amendments have been submitted to us, and the question is, whether we will submit them to the States or not? That I take to be the specific and solitary question. This imposes no obligation on us to sanction these constitutional amendments by proposing them to the people. We can do as we please upon that point; but what is the question and the only question? It is not whether we ourselves will propose amendments to the Constitution, but whether we will propose to the people the amendments which this Convention has proposed to us. Now, that whole character is effaced, and a new character is given to the transaction, if any one of the amendments proposed by Senators be adopted.

Suppose these same States, by their Legislatures, had respectively recommended to us these particular and specific constitutional amendments, asking us to propose them according to the Constitution: would it have been proper for us then to undertake to amend their resolutions? It would be a different transaction altogether. In the one instance, out of respect to the States, we are proposing their resolutions; in the other case, we are proposing our own to the States. Now, the question here is, whether the resolutions have come to us with a sufficient sanction to constitute in our minds a reason for referring to the States the amendments which the States themselves have asked. That is all. It seems to my mind to be a clear question. They have asked us, they have requested us, to submit their resolutions, and not any others, to the States; and the question is, will we comply with their request, not whether we will fabricate amendments of our own and refer them to the people. They have asked of us to submit their proposals; and the question is, whether we will do it.

This amendment implies, in the first instance, that we will not do that, because the moment we adopt the amendment of the Senator from Virginia, that moment we say in effect, "We will not propose your recommendations to the people; while proposing our own, which we will substitute for yours." That is passing by this Convention altogether; it is negativing the States represented in it.

If gentlemen take this view it will be a sufficient reason, I trust, in itself, for voting against the proposed amendment. These propositions which the Convention has recommended may be such as we may refuse; it is in our power to refuse; but the question is, whether a recommendation, coming so sanctioned to us, is not, in itself, a sufficient reason why Congress, if disposed to satisfy the people, shall do the small act of presenting this to the people themselves, for their adoption. We may reject it, if we please. The people, when it is sent to them, will, of course, have the power to reject or adopt it. The only question now is, whether we will give the States an opportunity of saying whether this proposition is satisfactory or not.

Sir, I do not wish to occupy time; but I cannot perceive the justice of the criticisms made upon these resolutions of the Convention. They seem to me to be perspicuous and intelligible in every part and in every sentence. I do not see where the difficulty is to arise. Gentlemen need not tell us here, in respect to these resolutions, that a member of the Convention told them thus and so. No matter what a member of the Convention told this one or that one about the votes that were given, it is certified to us, in a formal manner, by the President of the Convention—himself a Virginian, and once a President of the United States—that this is the result of the proceedings of the Convention.

Mr. HUNTER:—If the Senator will allow me, I will state to him how that occurred. It was decided, as it will be seen when we get the Journal, that, according to some rules of the old Convention, they should not vote upon a proposition as a whole, but upon each particular provision. That was the rule of the Convention; and therefore he certified it as the Convention had instructed. The vote was taken only section by section, and the vote was never taken on it as a whole. There is no inconsistency between what I have said, and the certificate of the President of the Convention, because, according to the rules adopted by them, he had to certify it if it was adopted by sections, though it was not voted upon as a whole.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I suppose this remark is intended to annul the Convention, and discredit all their proceedings, though the Senate have received the letter of the President and Secretary as authentic evidence that this does contain the result of the deliberations and the proceedings of the body. I take it so, whatever a discontented member here and there may have said to the contrary notwithstanding. He may have said it all truly, for aught I know, but we must regard this as the authentic act of the Convention; otherwise it was nothing; and it is certified to us by the proper authority as its act, by the President of the Convention, with the request that we shall adopt it. It must have had, in some form or shape, the sanction of a majority of the Convention, or it could not have been so certified to us. How they voted, whether upon parts or the whole, they gave such votes as, they thought were necessary to ascertain the meaning of the body, and the expression of their will and opinion upon the subject. This is what they have done.

I do not stop to inquire whether I like these resolutions better than I do those proposed by myself, or the amendments now offered by the Senator from Virginia. We are near the close of our session. I have looked upon the proceedings of this great and eminent body of men as the best evidence of public opinion outside of this body, and of the wish and will of the States they represent. I am for peace. I am for compromise. I have not an opinion on the subject of what would be best that I would not be perfectly willing to sacrifice to obtain any reasonable measure of pacification that would satisfy the majority. I want to save the country and adjust our present difficulties. [Applause in the galleries.]

The Presiding Officer (Mr. Bright in the chair) called to order.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—That is what I want to do. That is the object I am aiming at. I attach no particular importance—I feel, at least, no selfish attachment—to any opinions I may have proclaimed on the subject heretofore. I proclaimed those opinions because I thought them right; but I am ready to sacrifice them, any and every one of them, to any more satisfactory proposition that can be offered. I look upon the resolutions proposed by this Convention as furnishing us, if not the last, the best hope of an adjustment; the best hope for the safety of the people and the preservation of the Government. I will not stop to cavil about the construction of these words; but I see none of the difficulties that suggest themselves to the mind of my friend from Virginia. Look at that third section, which has been the subject of his particular criticism. Every part and portion of it is a negation of power to Congress, and nothing else; and yet he has argued as if it gave Congress power; as if it conferred more power upon Congress. It leaves to the States all the rights they now have; all the remedies which they now have; and consists merely in a negation of power to Congress. How can that take away the rights of the people? How can that make our condition worse? I cannot possibly see. It is nothing but a negative from beginning to end, and therefore it cannot take away any thing from the people. It may take from Congress, but cannot take away from the States, or the people, any thing. It is a negative in its form and in its language, from beginning to end, that Congress shall have no power to do this, that, or the other. If they have that power under the present Constitution, it is taken away. That is all. It takes away no power from the States. It takes away no rights from individuals. Its simple office is the negation of power to Congress. That is all there is in it; and how, under that, can the gentleman find constructions which are to increase our difficulties and diminish our rights? He says the language will need construction. So does all language need construction. I do not see that this is particularly so.

Now, sir, the Senator offers my own proposition as an amendment to this. I shall vote against my own proposition here; I shall vote for this. [Applause in the galleries.]

Mr. MASON:—I shall be constrained to require that the galleries be cleared, if there be any further demonstrations in that quarter.

Mr. BAKER:—I hope the galleries will not be cleared. The admiration of a noble sentiment is never out of place.

The PRESIDING OFFICER:—There is no motion to clear the galleries.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I shall vote for the amendments proposed by the Convention, and there I shall stand. That is the weapon offered now, and placed in my hand, by which, as I suppose, the Union of these States may be preserved; and I will not, out of any selfish preference for my own original opinions on this subject, sacrifice one idea or one particle of that hope. I go for the country; not for this resolution or that resolution, but any resolution, any proposition, that will pacify the country. Therefore, I vote against my own, to give place to a proposition which comes from an authority much higher than mine—from one hundred and thirty of the most eminent men of this country, out of which number a Senate might be selected that might well compare in point of talent and intellect and ability even with this honorable body. They have recommended this on arduous, laborious consultation with one another; through many difficulties, through many diversities of opinion, they have at last arrived at these conclusions, and sent them to us. Shall any Senator stand upon the little consideration, "this changes my resolution," and shall he compare that little atom of his production with the great end and object proposed to be attained for a whole nation? No, sir; not a moment. I believe our best hope of preservation is in adopting the resolutions proposed by this Convention, and I adhere to them against all amendments.

Mr. President, the only material or substantial change in respect to the first section of this proposed amendment from my first proposition is, that it omits all reference to territory hereafter acquired, limiting our consideration and our settlement to territory which we now have. When I first offered my resolutions, I explained somewhat in reference to that particular provision which related to future territory. I said that I wanted no more territory. Our great trouble now is from the magnitude of the territory which we have already acquired. New Mexico is one of our acquisitions, and what a subject of dispute it has been! I want no more acquisitions. My country is big enough, and great enough. I say that further acquisitions are dangerous. We have found them to be so. Our experience and our reason, then, unite in teaching us "to beware of that sin, ambition." National aggrandizement! I want no more. I proposed that, however, as the idea then was, that we wanted a settlement that was to last forever; to be eternal; to embrace the present and to embrace the future, with all its acquisitions, all its changes. Reflection since, and the arguments of others, I will say, have changed my opinion on that point. If they had not changed it, however, I should be ready here to sacrifice it and give it up, if thereby I could obtain the assent of any respectable portion of my countrymen to the propositions for peace. If we can settle in respect to what we have, in God's name let us do it; and if we are to have future acquisitions, let us leave the troubles they may bring upon us to a future day. We have enough for to-day. I do not object, therefore, to the first section of the proposition of the Convention, that it is confined to the territory which we now have. The adjustment which they have made varies but little in substance in regard to the territorial question, and the question of slavery as connected with it, from my original proposition. South of the line which we propose to establish, 36° 30´, you have no foot of territory left, but what is embraced in the Territory of New Mexico. In New Mexico, by law of the Territory—a constitutional law, a valid law of the Territory—slavery exists as fully and completely as the law can establish it, or has established it.

Now, this proposition is, that the status of things shall continue as it is until that Territory becomes a State; and when it becomes a State, let it dispose of the question of slavery as it chooses. There is no ambiguity about this. In substance, though in a different form of words, the same is expressed in my proposition. The proposition of the Convention is the same in substance, only omitting the words—a very proper and a very timely omission—supposed to be offensive in certain parts of the country, and substituting others that are equally well understood in all parts of the country, and which were less offensive to some.

Sir, now is the time for mediation; now is the time for pacification; now is the time to omit every word that can give offence or add to the irritation under which the country is. I desire, by the most moderate terms, by the most unoffending language, to reach some mode of adjustment that can give satisfaction to the whole country and reunite us all.

My friend from Virginia seems to apprehend that under these amendments we shall be worse off in respect to territory hereafter acquired. That is supposed to be sufficiently provided for and secured in the provision, that no future acquisition shall be made, by purchase or by treaty, except that treaty or that purchase be ratified by a majority of the Senators from the slaveholding States, as well as a majority of Senators from the non-slaveholding States. Does not this give the South a safe assurance, an assurance to be relied upon? My friend from Virginia says, however, do we believe the North, with its superior number, would submit to this provision of the Constitution? Why, sir, the Convention have had the caution to make this provision, if I understand them, irrepealable by any future amendment of the Constitution. There it stands, then, in the most solemn form that men can enter into any compact, in the most formal language by any terms that Government can establish, that all are bound by that provision of the Constitution which requires a majority from each section. When the gentleman asks whether we can believe for a moment that this law will be acquiesced in and adhered to, I say we must to some extent have confidence in one another, or all human society must lose its basis, not merely of government, but its foundation, and all society would be torn up at once by the roots. That confidence is the root of society; it is the root of all the associations of men in public or private life; it is the root and foundation of all government. What more can you have, what better security can you have than written, solemn terms upon any subject which is to regulate government? There is nothing more solemn among men, unless you would require angels to come down and make responses for them. Here you have the very highest security that can be given; and when any gentleman shall say these are not to be relied upon, he says there is no Government that stands upon any foundation that can be relied upon. Such an assertion strikes not at this provision; it strikes at the root of all government. What further security can be had? If our brethren of the other section were willing to give the highest possible security they could, what can they give more? Nothing. This argument, then, can avail nothing.

Mr. President, I have gone perhaps a little further than I ought to have done. It is not now necessary that I should enter into a vindication of every provision of these amendments offered by the Convention. It is sufficient to speak to the amendment which the gentleman has offered. Excluding territory hereafter to be acquired, I think, in substance, we ought to be satisfied with that; I believe that will make peace; I believe that will give substantial security to our rights, and to the rights which the Southern States claim. With that I am satisfied. It is enough for the dreadful occasion. It is the dreadful occasion that I want to get rid of. Rid me of this, rid the nation of this, and I am willing to take my chance for the future and meet the perils of every day that may come. Now is the appointed time upon which our destiny depends. Now is the emergency and exigency upon us. Let us provide for them. Save ourselves now, and trust to posterity and that Providence which has so long and so benignly guided this nation, to keep us from the further difficulties which in our national career may be in our way.

I prefer the propositions which the Convention have made to my own propositions, because I have no hope for my propositions. They have not been so fortunate as to receive the favor of my colleagues of the Senate from the North, the men whose sanction of them was necessary to give them effect. I transfer all my hopes of peace to these propositions and terms proposed by the Convention representing twenty-odd of the States of this Union—a large majority of all the States. I will not go into particulars about it; but since gentlemen have made some allusion to the out-of-door rumors and reports and sayings in respect to this Convention, I believe that perhaps a majority of those who voted for these amendments were men representing non-slaveholding States. I do not know the fact, and I will not state it, but I am under that impression now, and that impression encourages my hopes that the Senate, rather than see the country fall into ruin, fall into dismemberment, limb from limb, and blood flowing at the plucking out of every limb, will supply the remedy which is proposed. It seems to me proper and just. But little is asked, and great is the reward, and mighty are the consequences that are to flow from it.

Sir, I have occupied more of the time of the Senate on this particular question than I ought to have done.

Mr. MASON:—Mr. President, there is a very grave duty devolving upon the Senate on the proposition which is now before us. We are called upon, pursuant to the Constitution, to propose amendments to the Constitution. The fifth article of the Constitution says this:

"The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution."

Now, sir, I cannot agree, for one, to propose an amendment to this Constitution unless it has the sanction and the approbation of my judgment; and I suppose no other Senator will. I am bound, therefore, by every obligation of faith and honor to my State, when a proposition is submitted to the Senate as one that should be proposed to the States as an amendment to the Constitution, to examine it and understand it, and see it in all its bearings and effects, as far as my intellect will enable me, and to propose it or to withhold it by my vote, as I shall be guided by my judgment. I can see no other position of a Senator.

Now, sir, what are the facts? The country was convulsed by the success in the late presidential election of one of the political parties of the country. The tremor was evinced at once in all the Southern States, in a belief that their existence and their safety was imperilled by that election. Congress met. As was proper and necessary, the very first act in each House was to appoint a committee to take the condition of the country into consideration, and see if, by any mode of amendment to the Constitution, those perils could be avoided. A committee was raised in the collateral branch. A committee was raised in this Senate, I think upon the motion of the honorable Senator from Kentucky, actuated as he always is by principles of the highest patriotism. Those committees met. They remained in anxious deliberation for weeks. What was the result? They were unable to agree. I think the committee came before the Senate and admitted the fact. They could agree upon no form of amendment which they believed would remedy the evils and avert the perils under which the country suffered.

In that state of things, the Legislature of Virginia—my own honored State—having been called into special session on the 19th of January, passed a series of resolutions, one of which recites this:

"That on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia, an invitation is hereby extended to all such States, whether slaveholding or non-slaveholding, as are willing to unite with Virginia in an earnest effort to adjust the present unhappy controversies in the spirit in which the Constitution was originally formed, and consistently with its principles, so as to afford to the people of the slaveholding States adequate guarantees for the security of their rights."

That is the recital of the resolution of the Legislature of Virginia: "to afford to the people of the slaveholding States adequate guarantees for the security of their rights;" and there was a further provision, that, if those States should meet and agree upon any form of adjustment, it should be submitted to Congress. A number of the States—some twenty or twenty-one, it seems—some by their Legislatures, some by their Executives—met the invitation of Virginia, and deputed their commissioners to the conference in Washington, to see if they could agree upon a mode of adjustment. We have the report of that Conference before us now, presented through a committee of this body; and they propose an additional article to the Constitution. Mr. President, the honorable Senator from Kentucky, who has pronounced so deserved a eulogium upon that body, does not exceed me in the respect which I bear to it. If there be one more than another Senator upon whom it would devolve to treat the work of that Convention with peculiar respect, it would devolve upon me and my colleague, because they met at the invitation of my State. I yield to none in the respect which I bear to those gentlemen or to the purity of their motives in the results which they have attained in that Conference; but, sir, I am bound by my obligations to the Constitution, by my honor as a man, by my faith to my own State, to understand what they have done, and to exhibit it either in recommendation or disapproval, as my judgment may dictate. Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri.

I admit no authority to bind my judgment as a representative of one of the States of the Union. I yield my respect to what they have done; but I will scan it, and if, in my honest, unbiased judgment, I cannot recommend it as an amendment to the Constitution, I am bound to withhold that recommendation, and to give the reasons for it.

As I have said, sir, the State of Virginia, finding that Congress was at a loss for a mode of adjustment, invited the States to send commissioners here for this purpose:

"To agree upon something which would afford to the people of the slaveholding States adequate guarantees for the security of their rights."

Virginia knew that, under the Constitution as it was interpreted under the constituted authorities of the country as they have been elected, there was no security for their rights; and it was in the hope of obtaining such a security—Congress failing to agree upon it—that, at her invitation, these gentlemen from the different States met here in conference. I am to look, therefore, to their work, and to see if it affords that security for their rights; and if I am satisfied in my own judgment, as I honestly am—and the reasons for which I am now to announce to the world—that it not only affords no security for the rights of the South, but takes away what little they have, I should be a traitor if I would recommend it as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Now, sir, let us look at it. It is presented as an entire article, to be the thirteenth article, if adopted, of the Constitution. The first section of it relates to the Territories—the great and difficult point of division between the two sections. If that could be overcome—if these rights that are spoken of in the resolutions of Virginia in the Territories could be guaranteed by adequate securities to the slaveholding States—I believe the rest of the path would be smooth. It embraces almost the whole controversy. What securities are provided in the Territories to the slaveholding States by this first section of the thirteenth article? It proposes to divide the present Territories—for it is confined to them—by an east and west line, a parallel of latitude. North of that line, there is a clear cut entirely, unsusceptible of misinterpretation. None can doubt what the condition of servitude is north of that line. It is a clear cut; it is prohibited, and prohibited forever. No interpretation can mistake it; no casuist can doubt upon it; it is a work well done. North of that line involuntary servitude, except for crime, is prohibited. How is it south? My honorable colleague, I think, has well said that, south of that line, for our rights, at best we are remitted to a lawsuit. I will read the language:

"Nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the Territorial Legislature to hinder or prevent the taking of such persons—"

That is, persons held to service—

"from any of the States of this Union to said Territories, nor to impair the rights arising from said relation."

Neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature has power to interfere with the rights arising from the relation of master and servant, or master and slave. That is the meaning; that is clear. What next?

"But the same—"

The rights resulting from the relation of master and slave—

"shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the course of the common law."

There is the security for the rights of the South. South of that line they are remitted to the courts under the common law. Now, sir, let us examine that. By this section, if it is adopted as an article of the Constitution, the common law, eo nomine, is made a part of the Constitution, so far as it affects the relations of master and slave. Now, what is the common law? Who is there upon this floor that will tell me what common law is meant by this section? With all my respect for the thorough knowledge and the legal acquirements of the honorable Senator from Kentucky, I know he cannot tell me what common law is meant by that first section. We know, as jurists, what is meant by the term common law, for it is a technical term. The common law is the law of England, the unwritten law of England, the lex non scripta. That is the common law in its legal acceptation. Is it, then, the law of England that is made a part of the Constitution, and to which the master is remitted for the security of his rights between him and his servant? Will any gentleman tell me that it is the common law of England that is to be made a part of the Constitution to which we are to be remitted? If it is the common law of England, is it the common law of England as it stands at this day, on the first of March, 1861?

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—If my friend will allow me, I take it that that term applies only to the remedies known to the common law. The laws of the Territories are to be enforced, and the remedies under them are to be administered according to common law. The master is to have his rights according to the law of the Territory, and to secure those rights according to the common law.

Mr. MASON:—The language of the section is, that neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature shall interfere to impair the rights arising from this relation of master and slave; "but the same"—that is, this relation between master and slave—"shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the course of the common law."

Now, the honorable Senator says that means only the remedy of the common law; that you are to take the law of the Territory, whatever it may be, and administer that, by confining it to the remedies known to the common law. I deny the interpretation. The Senator may be right, or I may be right. I say the text does not warrant the interpretation. The text refers to the rights in the relation of master and slave, and says they (those rights) shall be the subject of judicial cognizance, according to the course of common law. Now, I ask, what is the common law that is thus made a part of the Constitution for the subject to which it refers? Is it the law of England? There is no common law, that I am aware of, known to jurists as the law of England. There is no law in the State of Virginia, and, I presume, none in the State of Kentucky, known as common law. The State of Virginia, when it became independent as a colony of Great Britain, adopted and made its own that which before had been the common law of England, and therefore the common law of the colony. The State of Virginia (and I instance that only because I am familiar with it), when it became independent, adopted as its law the common law of England, as that common law stood at the commencement of the fourth year of James I.; and thereby, by statute, made that which had been the common law, the law of Virginia. Now, it is the law of Virginia, not because it is the common law, but because statutes made it the law of Virginia. But is the common law of Virginia, if you will call it by that name, the common law of Kentucky; or is the common law of Kentucky the common law of Missouri; or is the law of those three States, or any other State, now the common law of England? I demand to know, therefore, when we make the common law a part of the Constitution, if this enactment should prevail, what is meant by the common law? To that vague, grand residuum of judicial legislation we are to be remitted for our rights between master and slave, if this is enacted.

Now, sir, suppose it were so: my colleague has well said (and I will not repeat it after him, for I should only weaken it), that there is not one judicial interpreter or expounder of the common law, in any one of the free States, in reference to the relation of master and slave, that does not deny that the master has any property in his slave, at this day and this hour. Why, sir, what is the pending controversy between the State of Ohio, one of the free States, and the State of Kentucky, one of the slave States—a controversy depending here recently in the Supreme Court? The Governor of Kentucky demanded, under the Constitution, the rendition of a fugitive from justice, who had abducted a slave from Kentucky, and carried him into Ohio. The Governor of Ohio refused the demand, upon the ground that there could be no stealing of a man; that there could be no property in man; and that the slave, being a man, was not a subject of theft, of larceny; and he refused, and refuses up to this day, under the common law, to recognize the existence of property in man.

Now, take the common law of England at this day: here, within the last three or four weeks, the Queen's Bench, in England, has declared as the common law, that if a slave murders his master, or murders the agent of his master, in the attempt to recapture him, he is justified. That is the common law to which we are to be remitted for the rights resulting from the relations of master and slave. Sir, I have looked back a little to see what the common law was in England in this famous Somerset case, I find this in the argument of the counsel there, expounding the common law, which was afterwards sustained by Lord Mansfield in his decision:

"But it has been said by great authorities, though slavery, in its full extent, be incompatible with the natural rights of mankind, and the principles of good government, yet a moderate servitude may be tolerated, nay, sometimes must be maintained."

And again:

"There is now, at last, an attempt, and the first yet known, to introduce it [slavery] into England. Long and uninterrupted usage, from the origin of the common law, stands to oppose its revival."

And again:

"A new species has never arisen till now; for had it, remedies and powers there, would have been at law; therefore, the most violent presumption against it, is the silence of the laws, were there nothing more. It is very doubtful whether the laws of England will permit a man to bind himself by contract to serve for life; certainly will not suffer him to invest another man with despotism, nor prevent his own right to dispose of property."

And again:

"There are very few instances, few, indeed, of decisions as to slaves in this country. Two in Charles II., where it was adjudged trover would lie. Chamberlayne and Perrin, William III., trover brought for taking a negro slave; adjudged it would not lie. 4th Ann., action of trover; judgment by default. On arrest of judgment, resolved that trover would not lie. Such the determinations in all but two cases; and those the earliest, and disallowed by the subsequent decisions. Lord Holt: 'As soon as a slave enters England he becomes free.'"

In the opinion of the court, of Lord Mansfield, as to these principles of common law, that very distinguished and able judge, who made the law, as I understand, for the occasion, but certainly ruled it as the common law, says this:

"The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being introduced for any reasons, moral or political; but only by positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from whence it was created, is erased from memory. It's so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law. Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from a decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the law of England."

I need not go back to authority. We have it abundantly in our own country, in all the free States, so far as I know, without exception. They deny what the amendment of my honorable friend from Kentucky affirms. They deny that there is property in a slave. The amendment of the Senator affirms there is property in a slave. This section is silent, ominously silent, portentously and potentially silent. It is not only silent, Mr. President, but when it refers you to that code of law which is to protect the right of the master to the slave, it refers you to the common law, and the common law to be expounded by the Federal courts, and the common law, which is judicially and historically known to the whole country, to be expounded in all the free States as one that denies that very property which we say must be secured. That is our position under this section. Sir, the State of Virginia has said that we must have adequate guarantees; and I am asked here to vote away what little guarantees we have. I am asked, almost in the high ethics or morals of revealed religion, when my adversary takes away my cloak, that I shall give him my coat also. I am required to do that by this section. We believe that our rights are secured under the present Constitution; we know that they have been withheld by the political party which has now come into power; we believe that they are insecure unless there are further and adequate guarantees; but, so far from their being proposed by the section before us, in my judgment, what little we have is taken away. Sir, I cannot vote for these propositions. I regret it. I was prepared, whether it had the approval of my judgment or not, to follow the instructions of my State, and to vote for the amendment offered by the honorable Senator from Kentucky after it had been modified, as was required by the resolutions of my State.

The amendment of the Senator from Kentucky was so modified, I do not know whether at the instance of Virginia or not; but it was modified by a vote of this Senate, so as to embrace what was required in the resolutions of Virginia. I am not at liberty to recommend, or, in the language of the Constitution, to propose to the States this section of the thirteenth article; because it not only withholds, but denies by withholding, any security, far less that security which the State of Virginia requires.

There are further provisions in this proposition that are objectionable, one of which was pointed out by my colleague: that which calls upon Congress to legislate on that clause of the Constitution which secures to the citizens of one State all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States. I need not say that any legislation on that subject by Congress would be any thing but the messenger of peace to which the honorable Senator from Kentucky looks. Why, sir, it has been found indispensable in slaveholding States, as a part of their police regulations, to punish all persons who were either of the State or otherwise, who tamper with the slaves, who have intercourse with them that is forbidden by law, far more those who preach to them sedition, or insurrection, or revolt; and yet, if we were to be controlled within the body of the State by Federal relations in our interior police, we should be completely at the mercy of the free States.

Mr. President, I should have been certainly gratified, if my honored State of Virginia had been successful in the mediation which she invited of all the States, with a view to agree upon an adjustment which would guaranty the rights of the South. I deeply deplore, and I doubt not my State will deplore, that that mediation has not been effected. So far from impugning any motives or purpose of that honorable and distinguished body, I doubt not that, in the short time that was allowed to them, they got together the best mode of adjustment which would satisfy their judgment, but which I am sure will not satisfy the judgment of the Southern States, but would place them in still greater peril, if they were to admit that to become a part of the Constitution. I did not intend to do more than state my objections to it as briefly as I could. I have done so temperately and without heat, I regret that I cannot, as one Senator, propose this as an amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I wish only to reply for a single moment to the material objection urged by the Senator from Virginia. The portion of the article to which the Senator from Virginia objects, declares that the status of persons bound to service and labor shall remain unchanged; that neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature shall pass any law affecting the relation, or the rights growing out of the relation between master and servant—I do not pretend to recite the exact words; but that is the exact idea—well knowing that, according to the laws of the Territory, the status of slavery was fully established, and all the rights of the master in and to his servant established, as they exist in the State of Missouri, or the State of Virginia, by positive law of the Territory. It is therefore equivalent to saying that that law shall stand, when it says that the status shall continue unchanged. It then goes on to say (which I admit was altogether unnecessary) that the remedy for the violation of the rights of the master, whatever they might be, shall be had in the Federal courts, and according to the course of the common law. Now, sir, what right does this take away from any slaveholder? That law which secured and gave him a right, is declared to be unchangeable. That law acknowledges his property in any sense in which you please to take it, or in any sense in which it is applicable. It acknowledges it, and gives legal remedies for the violation of it; and in addition to all that, and, as I admit, by a sort of pleonasm of expression, it says that he shall have his remedy in the Federal court, according to the course of the common law.

Mr. MASON:—Will the Senator allow me a moment?

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—Certainly.

Mr. MASON:—With the permission of the Senator I will put this proposition to him: He says that the meaning of the language, "according to the course of the common law," is confined to the remedy. Now, admitting that to be the case, for the sake of the argument, suppose, in one of these Territories, a slave is purloined, seduced, got away; the slave of A gets into the possession of B, and he is there at work for him upon his farm, or in his house, and A brings an action of trover to recover him; that is an action known to the common law; and the decision of the Federal court is, that trover lies only to recover property, and a slave is not property: what is the remedy? That is the decision in England; and I presume it would be the decision in the free States, if the suit were brought.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—It was to avoid going into definitions of that sort that this language was employed in the amendments of the Convention. They saw and had before them the law of New Mexico, which did acknowledge the existence of this right as fully as it is acknowledged by the law of Virginia. However it may be disputed here, however legal opinions may differ about it, the law of New Mexico established property in slaves; and there the law stands; and the Convention now comes and says that status shall remain unchanged.

Mr. BRAGG:—Oh, no.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—That is the resolution.

Mr. BRAGG:—Will the honorable Senator allow me a word, for I am very anxious to understand it?

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—Certainly.

Mr. BRAGG:—The Senator says it provides that that law, the law of New Mexico, whatever it may be, shall remain unchanged, if I understand him, and that that fixes the status of slavery in the Territory. I call the attention of the Senator to the language. I think that only fixes the status of persons now in the Territory, and not those to be carried there hereafter—not the status of slavery, but the status of persons who are there now, held to service or labor, and not the status of those who are to be carried there in future. That is provided for in the language which it follows in another part.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—Here it is, sir:

"In all the present territory south of that line"—

Which I have explained, and which gentlemen admit to be embraced in the Territory of New Mexico—

"the status of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now exists."

It is not as to such slaves as are now there, but such slavery as now exists.

Mr. BRAGG:—If it said that, I admit that it would cover the status of slavery.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—It does say that. It seems to me that is the only construction that can be given to the language. It could not be intended to confine it to the twenty-six slaves that are now held there, especially when they provided, in a subsequent article, that it shall be lawful for any one to carry slaves there.

Mr. BRAGG:—Will the honorable Senator again allow me to interrupt him?

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—Certainly.

Mr. BRAGG:—I have not the slightest doubt that a great many who voted for the proposition consider it as the Senator does. I have equally as little doubt that others intended it to mean precisely what I have stated. I cannot see, for my life, while they were framing a constitutional provision, why they did not place this matter beyond any sort of doubt. If they intended to recognize slavery, they could have said so in one word. If they intended not to recognize it, they could have said it in another word. If they intended to mystify and leave in doubt, then they have been very successful in accomplishing their purpose.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—"In all the present territory south of that line, the status of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now exists;" not as they now exist; not in respect to those that are there now; but part of the same sort of slavery which now exists, shall continue to exist unchanged until the Territory becomes a State; and in the mean time persons shall be admitted to go into that Territory and carry their slaves with them. Now, I submit it to my honorable friend if it is not entirely improbable that any such construction as he suggests can prevail before any court that seeks to attain the real intention of the parties who made this proposition? It is such slavery as now exists. Persons held to that service—you may carry as many there as you please. Put them both together, and they would read so; and they being in the same instrument, can there be a doubt that ought to alarm us here, that the construction will be given to it which I place upon it, that it was intended not to be confined merely to persons now there and held to servitude, but as well to those who might be carried there hereafter? This is all I will say in reference to that; and I submit it to the candor and the judgment of my honorable friend from North Carolina, in which I have entire confidence, whatever result he may come to, that if we put the two propositions together, all doubt would seem to be removed.

Now, sir, my friend from Virginia will argue this question as if the question of slavery was to be decided according to the course of the common law, and then refers us to the express declarations and decisions as though the common law decided that slavery could not exist. What sort of construction would that make of this provision? Here they have provided that the law establishing slavery shall exist, that the property of the master in him shall be recognized as it is there established by law; and then the gentleman supposes that to be exactly contradictory, to refer to the common law as furnishing the rule of decision, which common law says there can be no property, as he interprets it, in man, and that when trover was brought for a slave—

Mr. MASON:—Not as I interpret it, but as interpreted in England.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I know that. He says it may be so interpreted; that when trover was brought for a slave in England, the judges decided there was no property in man. Could the same judges, sitting in a court in New Mexico, have given that decision when the law there established such property? In such a case, their decision must be different. They are referring, according to him, to two contradictory rules: one establishing slavery and acknowledging property in the master, and the other the common law denouncing and deciding against the right of property in man. This could not have been their intention, nor can this be the construction. We cannot consider these gentlemen to have changed their opinion from one sentence to another, to have left an incongruity and a contradiction expressed upon the face of the same section.

Nor, sir, do they refer—and that is my answer to my friend from Virginia—to the common law as furnishing the rule of decision at all. The proceedings shall be according to the course of the common law; that is all. If any violation is done to the rights of the master, he may sue; and, for his greater security, he may sue in the Federal courts; and, for greater security still, the law shall be administered according to the course of the common law. The common law is referred to as determining the mode of trial. We say according to the course of the civil law, and we say according to the course of the common law. What do we mean? We mean this marked and characteristic and essential difference: the course of the civil law is for the judge, without the intervention of a jury, to decide facts as well as the law. The common law takes away from the judge the power of deciding the facts, and demands a trial by jury. What this convention mean, therefore, by this provision is, that trial shall be by jury, according to the course of the common law. That is the explanation of the difficulty, and thus all doubt is removed. By these plain provisions—plain in themselves, and made plainer still by being taken with the context—they say you shall have your rule of right, according to the law of the Territory, which is in your favor as to the right to hold persons as property; that law shall be your security; you shall have a remedy for any violation of that right in the Federal courts, and you shall have that remedy, not according to the course of the civil law, in which the judge is to decide, who might be against you, but in which a jury shall be called to decide the fact according to the course of the common law. That is the whole of it.

Mr. MASON:—Mr. President—

Mr. POLK:—If the Senator will allow me, before the Senator from Kentucky sits down, I will ask him if the Mexican law establishes slavery, or if it does any thing more than to protect the right of the master to his slave? If that is the only establishment of it, then it is established by implication merely.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I really do not know whether the gentleman would consider it as establishing or merely protecting. I do not know that there is a law in any State of the Union that eo nomine establishes slavery; I do not know.

Mr. POLK:—The object of the inquiry was this: it has been contended heretofore that, by the law of Mexico, there could be no slavery there; and then there is another law of New Mexico professing to protect the right of property. I have never seen that New Mexican law.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:—I believe I have answered the gentleman as far as my information extends. I have examined that law. It is as strong in favor of the master as the laws of Kentucky or Missouri. I believe it is the law of Mississippi transcribed literally, verbatim. That is my understanding. The law is as complete on the subject as the law of any State that I know of.

Mr. MASON:—Mr. President, if the Senator from Kentucky is right, and, in the interpretation of this section, the courts are necessarily to consider the expression, "according to the course of the common law," to which slaveholders are referred for the enforcing of the relation of master and slave, as referring only to common law remedies, then I am at no loss to conceive, after our experience of judicial interpretation against slavery, by what sort of artificial and sophistic reasoning those judges of the Federal courts may feel themselves bound to withhold the remedy. Why, sir, are we to shut our ears and our eyes against experience passing before us every day? What is the present Constitution? The second section of the fourth article is in these words:

"A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime."

That is the text of the Constitution. What is the interpretation in the free States? In the State of Kentucky an African is property, under their laws and usages, and has been so for two hundred years; for it was so when it was a part of Virginia; and did it ever enter into the mind of man to conceive that this plain text of the Constitution would be resisted, upon the ground that property in man was not acknowledged? And yet it is done. If I am not mistaken, the honorable Senator from New York [Mr. Seward], not now in his seat, when Governor of New York, made that very question with the Governor of Virginia; and seeing this, are we to be willingly blind to this as the actual, judicial, and executive interpretation in every thing that affects the question of slavery as it stands in that section, and that, too, while we are seeking equality? Sir, it never entered into the mind of man, at the time this Constitution was formed, to credit that the time could ever come in the relations of these States when a man who fled from the State of Kentucky because he had stolen a negro into the State of Ohio, was screened from the operation of the Constitution, because in Ohio they do not deem a negro to be the subject of property; and yet that is the fact, the very issue now depending between those States; and we are asked to be blind, willingly blind, to all that experience at the very time we are attempting to secure a guarantee for violated rights!

Now, I said, Mr. President, that, if I were to tax my ingenuity, I might find a mode, even if the honorable Senator is right in ascribing to this clause of the section the necessary interpretation that it refers to remedies only. The Senator says the previous part of the section establishes the relation, as he construes it, not directly like the resolution of the honorable Senator which we offer here as an amendment, which establishes directly that there is property in slaves. This does not; but designedly avoids it; not from any improper motive—I do not ascribe that—but it is not only silent, but it avoids the very question. I suppose the honorable Senator is right in saying this language, judicial cognizance, according to the course of the common law, refers only to the remedy. Now, I tax my ingenuity to know how a court, in one of the free States, always leaning, of course, against slavery, would reason out that proposition, whether the remedy could be applied. Suppose an action of trover is brought. The inquiry would be, what is the remedy? We are told this is the remedy for which you are to apply to the law. A remedy is nothing in the world but a redress for wrong. Before you can apply the remedy, therefore, you must ascertain whether a wrong has been committed for which the remedy is adequate. Well, it comes from one side: the wrong was in taking the negro from the possession of the owner, against the local law of the Territory. The answer would be, "that may be true as far as the local law of the Territory is concerned; but here the Constitution adopts the common law as part of its text, and points the judges to the common law, and it applies the remedy." Now, the remedy is redress of the wrong, and we are bound to see that the wrong is one to which the remedy is applicable. The remedy is to recover property in the possession of one who is not entitled to it, and the common law, which applies that remedy to that wrong, says there is no wrong inflicted by taking the negro from the possession of his owner. It comes to that. It is suggested to me by the honorable Senator from Vermont [Mr. Collamer], that the common law, as a remedy, is one applicable to a common-law wrong. I do not say that the reasoning is just; I do not say that it is juridical; but I say, in our experience, we should be willingly blind if we take that for a security which will only be a snare.

Mr. PUGH:—Mr. President, it is very well known to the Senate that I prefer the proposition of the Senator from Kentucky, as a matter of individual choice, to the proposition which is proposed by the Peace Conference. Nevertheless, that Conference having been authorized, if not by Congress, at all events, so far as my State is concerned, by the act of her Legislature; and an overwhelming majority of the commissioners having agreed to this proposition as it stands, I shall hesitate very much in departing from it, whatever might be my individual opinion; but certainly if I thought the two Senators from Virginia had given it a correct interpretation, I should not agree to it. Now, as to this clause, it, in my judgment, had better have been omitted:

"The same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the course of the common law."

I suggest that the common law is referred to as fixing a right simply. The course of the common law is a phrase defined for more than two hundred years, in Latin, in English, and in Norman French. It means the formula of proceeding. I understood the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Mason] to say that it had been decided in several of the courts that an action of trover could not be brought for a negro slave in England. I think I am familiar with the case. It is reported in Salkeld's Reports, Lord Raymond's Reports, and in the Modern Reports—the same case reported three times; but the same court which decided that trover would not lie, because trover included the idea of property in the man himself, in the same opinion said that trespass on the case would lie for the loss of the service; so that it was all a question of pleading, and no question of right at all. It is within my recollection—and I believe the case was brought to the Supreme Court on a writ of error, and can be found in Howard's Reports—that a citizen of Kentucky declared in trespass on the case for taking away his slaves, and added two counts in trover. What is trover but an action of trespass on the case? Nothing more; and it never was any thing more. The measure of damages is the same in both actions—the value of the service of the servant; and yet that controversy on mere pleading—which, in nine-tenths of the States of this Union, has ceased to be of any value, because they have a code of procedure, is made a terrific objection here.

Now, sir, I have never read the code of New Mexico, and I do not propose to read it; but it is perfectly understood that that Territorial Legislature, pursuing the privilege, if you call it privilege, conferred by the compromise measures of 1850, has established the relation of master and slave, or master and servant, as perfectly as it is established in any of the fifteen so-called slaveholding States. I do not admire this word "status" which we find in the report of the Peace Conference; but as to the meaning of that word, I cannot be in any doubt. It does not refer to any persons in particular; it refers to a legal relation of servitude as between master and servant, and it provides that that relation, or condition, or status, shall not be changed; that for all wrongs or controversies arising out of that there shall be a remedy through the Federal judiciary.

I can see why the commission made this distinction. There have been many who have insisted that the Congress of the United States should pass laws for the protection of the right of the master to the services of his slave in a Territory; but it has always been my opinion, that the worst thing the slaveholding States ever could have would be to have that; for there would be a perpetual controversy here from session to session, and from day to day, whether the law went far enough in giving protection or went too far; and they would be remitting their right to the adjudication of the Senators and Representatives from the non-slaveholding States. Others have insisted, as the propositions of my honorable friend from Kentucky provided, that the relation should be protected by the legislation of the territorial authority. I would rather it were so, individually, if they chose to establish it. The peace commission do not want that. They evidently do not want to quarrel with the Territorial Legislatures about the measure of legislation; but they declare the right, and then say that this right shall be enforced in the Federal judiciary according to the course of remedies and forms of the common law. I do not see how there can be a doubt; and yet, as I have said, it seems to me that a great deal of it is unnecessary verbiage. I do not mean to debate that; I am not one of the peace commissioners; I am not to select my words to express the idea; but I am here; and my State with other States, having appointed commissioners in view of a crisis like this, as they esteem it, and as I esteem it, and they having agreed upon a great variety of propositions, some of which commend themselves to my judgment and some do not; but taking it altogether as one proposition, I am satisfied that I must either vote for all of it, or let all of it fall. I would rather vote for the proposition of my honorable friend from Kentucky. I said that sixty days ago; and I have said it in season and out of season. I have expressed my views frequently. I think the proposition of the commissioners would be better expressed, though it would come to the same thing, in these words: "in all the territory south of that line, it is hereby declared that no law or regulation shall ever be made or have any effect denying or impairing the right of the inhabitants to the service or labor of such persons as were held in that condition in any State of the Union; and thence taken into the said Territory." That would have expressed my idea more clearly, yet I am satisfied with this; it amounts to that. Whether the word "status" be good Latin or good English, the meaning is very clear.

I believe I admonished the Senate two hours ago that time was very precious; and I shall not detain them myself.

Mr. BAKER:—Mr. President, I mean to vote for the passage of these proposed amendments, just as they are, without any change; and I propose to give very briefly a few of the reasons which govern my judgment in that act. I will do it as pointedly as I can, and I will certainly do it very briefly.

In the first place, I feel that I am but submitting to the people of the whole country, amendments which they, and they only, can incorporate in the present Constitution; and I do not believe that, in any state of the case, I can do very wrong in doing that; but when I consider the immediate condition of the country, I feel that I am doing very right. Twenty States assemble in what is called the Peace Convention. They recommend to us, in times of great trial and difficulty, the passage of these resolutions. They are eminent men; they are able men; they are—very many of them, at least—great men; they have been selected by the States which they respectively represent, because of their purity of character and ability. The country is in great trouble. Six States have seceded; and I am told by very many men in whom I have great confidence, that their States are to-day trembling in the balance. I believe it. I am told—and upon that subject I have not yet made up my mind—that the adoption of these measures by the people will heal the differences with the Border States. I do not believe that I can do wrong, therefore, in giving the people of the whole Union a chance to determine these questions.

In the beginning, I voted against the propositions of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky. Even then I did not perceive any great harm in submitting any propositions to the people of the United States which circumstances might appear to render necessary for any good purpose. I refused to vote for them, for two reasons: first, I believed something better might be attained; and second, I did not believe that the people of the States would agree to them. I do not believe that now, and for one simple reason: I think I may consider myself in some respect a representative of the opinion as well as the power of my own people. I am a Republican, a zealous and determined one. I have all my life been of the opinion that Congress ought not to protect slavery, and to extend the dominion of this Government for that purpose or with that possibility. A great many in the North, who are not Republicans, but are what we call Douglas men, have shown, at the last election, under something of trial and sacrifice, that they too, do not believe that the Constitution does or ought to extend slavery. I am not disposed to give up that opinion; I do not believe they are. I was not disposed to give up when six States were in the Union who are now out, as they say; and I am not disposed to give it up yet. Independently of pride of opinion, I do not believe that kind of sacrifice would accomplish any good result.