APPENDICES
Reading edition
I
SUCHET’S ARMY IN VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF OCT. 1, 1811
Officers. Men. Total.
1st Division (Musnier):
Robert’s Brigade 114th Line (3 batts.) 58 1,579 1,637
1st of the Vistula (2 batts.) 27 836 863
Ficatier’s Brigade 121st Line (3 batts.) 44 1,156 1,200
2nd of the Vistula (2 batts.) 26 1,103 1,129 = 4,829
2nd Division (Harispe):
Paris’s Brigade 7th Line (4 batts.) 55 1,584 1,639
116th Line (3 batts.) 42 1,105 1,147
Chlopiski’s Brigade 44th Line (2 batts.) 35 1,191 1,226
3rd of the Vistula (2 batts.) 26 724 750 = 4,762
3rd Division (Habert):
Montmarie’s Brigade 5th Line (2 batts.) 31 771 802
16th Line (3 batts.) 56 1,261 1,317
Bronikowski’s Brigade 117th Line (3 batts.) 49 1,291 1,340 = 3,459
Palombini’s Italian Division:
Saint Paul’s Brigade 2nd Léger (3 batts.) 59 2,141 2,200
4th Line (3 batts.) 57 1,603 1,660
Balathier’s Brigade 5th Line (2 batts.) 37 893 930
6th Line (3 batts.). 51 1,378 1,429 = 6,219
Compère’s Neapolitan Division:
1st Léger (1 batt.) 27 419 446
1st Line (1 batt.) 24 536 560
2nd Line (1 batt.) 27 358 385 = 1,391
Cavalry (General Boussard):
4th Hussars (4 squadrons) 30 720 750
24th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 17 419 436
13th Cuirassiers (4 squadrons) 27 557 584
Italian ‘Dragoons of Napoleon’ 24 442 466
Neapolitan Chasseurs 13 156 169 = 2,405
Artillery (General Vallée) 48 1,757 1,805
Engineers (General Rogniat) 16 584 600
Équipages Militaires and Gendarmerie 10 653 663 = 3,068
916 25,217 26,133 26,133
N.B.—Ficatier’s Brigade, 3 battalions of Palombini’s division, and two squadrons of 4th Hussars were not present at the battle of Saguntum, being on the line of communications, and blockading Peniscola and Oropesa.
This return, lent me by Mr. Fortescue who found it in the Paris Archives, differs by over 2,000 men from Suchet’s figures given in his Mémoires, p. 436 of vol. ii. The Marshal has left out the 3 battalions and 2 squadrons on the line of communications, mentioned above.
II
STRENGTH OF BLAKE’S ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM
I. ‘The Expeditionary Corps.’
Officers. Men. Total.
Lardizabal’s Division: Africa (2 batts.), Murcia (2 batts.), 2nd of Badajoz (2 batts.), Campo Mayor (1 batt.), Tiradores de Cuenca (1 batt.) 149 2,823 2,972
Zayas’s Division: 2nd Spanish Guards, 4th ditto, 1st Walloon Guards, Voluntarios de la Patria, Toledo, Ciudad Rodrigo, Legion Estrangera (1 batt. each), Companies of Cazadores 177 2,373 2,550
Loy’s Cavalry: Granaderos (2 squadrons), Rey (1 ditto), Husares de Castilla (1 ditto) 50 244 294
Loy’s Cavalry: Granaderos (2 squadrons), Rey (1 ditto), Husares de Castilla (1 ditto) 11 214 225
Total of the ‘Expeditionary Corps’ 387 5,654 6,041
II. Valencian Troops (‘Second Army’).
Miranda’s Division: Valencia (3 batts.), Voluntarios de Castilla (2 batts.), 1st of Avila (1 batt.), 2nd Cazadores de Valencia (1 batt.) 120 3,844 3,964
Obispo’s Division: Cariñena (2 batts.) 2nd of Avila (1 batt.), 1st Voluntarios de Aragon (1 batt.), Daroca (1 batt.), Tiradores de Doyle (1 batt.) 110 3,290 3,400
Villacampa’s Division: Princesa (2 batts.), Soria (2 batts.), 2nd Voluntarios de Aragon (1 batt.), 1st Cazadores de Valencia (1 batt.), Molina (1 batt.) 162 3,190 3,352
Reserve (General Velasco): 3rd Battalions of Voluntarios de Castilla, Don Carlos, Avila, Cazadores de Valencia, and Voluntarios de Orihuela 75 3,595 3,670
San Juan’s Cavalry: Cuenca, Dragones del Rey, Reina, Numancia, Husares de Aragon, Cazadores de Valencia, Alcantara, Husares Españoles, Husares de Granada (none over two squadrons strong) 111 1,610 1,721
Artillery: 1 horse, 2 field batteries 21 340 361
Total ‘2nd Army’ 599 15,869 16,468
III. Murcian Troops (‘3rd Army’).
Creagh’s Brigade: Corona, Alcazar, Tiradores de Cadiz (1 batt. each) 97 2,121 2,218
Montijo’s Brigade: 1st of Badajoz, 1st of Cuenca, Voluntarios de Burgos, Sappers (1 batt. each) 108 2,302 2,410
Cavalry: Reina (2 squadrons), Pavia (2 squadrons), Granada (2 squadrons), Madrid (1 squadron), Husares de Fernando 7me (1 squadron) 83 743 826
Horse Artillery: 1 battery 3 78 81
Total ‘3rd Army’ 291 5,244 5,535
General Total of the Army: 1,277 officers, 26,767 men = Total, 28,044.
III
SUCHET’S ARMY AT THE SIEGE OF VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF DEC. 31
N.B.—The regiments of the Army of Aragon are the same as in Appendix I.
I. Army of Aragon (officers and men).
Musnier’s Division (10 battalions) 3,727
Harispe’s Division (10 battalions) 4,828
Habert’s Division (8 battalions) 3,150
Palombini’s Division (10 battalions) 3,591
Compère’s Division (3 battalions) 1,092
Boussard’s Cavalry (13 squadrons) 1,839
Artillery 1,511
Engineers, &c. 857
Total Army of Aragon 20,595
II. Reille’s Corps (officers and men).
Pannetier’s Brigade 10th and 81st Line (7 battalions) 2,834
Bourke’s Brigade 20th and 60th Line (7 battalions) 3,961
Severoli’s Italian Division 1st Line (3 batts.) 4,370
7th Line (2 batts.)
1st Léger (3 batts.)
Cavalry 9th Hussars 543
1st Italian Chasseurs 262
Artillery 1,153
Total Reille’s Corps 13,123
General Total of combined forces, 33,718.
IV
SURRENDER-ROLL OF BLAKE’S ARMY OF VALENCIA, JAN. 9, 1812
Officers. Rank and file.
Zayas’s Division 96 1,319
Lardizabal’s Division 165 3,385
Miranda’s Division 237 5,513
Division of Reserve, &c. 130 3,171
Cavalry 77 818
Artillery 73 1,581
Engineers and Sappers 38 383
Total 816 16,170
General total, 16,986 of all ranks, not including 62 officers in staff or administrative employments, 23 chaplains, and 19 surgeons.
Of the remainder of Blake’s army there had rallied at Alicante by January 14 of infantry 361 officers and 5,125 men, of cavalry 164 officers and 671 men, of artillery 30 officers and 720 men—total of all arms, 7,071.
V
FRENCH TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF TARIFA (DEC. 1811-JAN. 1812)
[From the table in Belmas, iv. pp. 40-2.]
Of all ranks.
From Leval’s Division, 43rd Line, 7th and 9th Poles (2 batts. each) 3,000
From Barrois’s Division, 16th Léger (3 batts.), 51st Ligne (2 batts.), 54th Ligne (2 batts.) 4,200
From Villatte’s Division, 27th Léger (1 batt.), 94th and 95th Ligne (1 batt. each) 1,800
Cavalry, 16th Dragoons, and one squadron 21st Dragoons 585
Artillery 469
Engineers, Sappers, Marines, &c. 385
Total 10,439
In addition three battalions of the 8th and 63rd line and two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons were occupied on the lines of communications, between Vejer and Fascinas.
ANGLO-SPANISH GARRISON OF TARIFA
Of all ranks.
British (Colonel Skerrett):
2/47th 570
2/87th 560
Battalion of Flank Companies 400
1 company 95th regiment 75
1 troop 2nd Hussars K.G.L. 70
Artillery (Hughes’s Company R.A.) 83
Total 1,758
Spanish (General Copons):
Cantabria (1 batt.) 450
Irlanda (1 batt.) 357
Cazadores 333
Artillery 106
Sappers 83
Cavalry 17
Total 1,346
N.B.—Another return makes the total of the British part of the garrison 67 officers and 1,707 men, a total of 1,774.
VI
CIUDAD RODRIGO
A.
THE FRENCH GARRISON
The garrison, according to Belmas, iv. pp. 282-3, stood on the day of the investment as follows:
34th Léger, one battalion 975 officers and men effective.
113th Ligne, one battalion 577 ” ”
Artillery, 2 companies 168 ” ”
Engineers 15 ” ”
Non-combatants (Civil officers, &c.) 36 ” ”
Sick in Hospital 163
Staff 3
Total 1,937
B.
BRITISH LOSSES DURING THE SIEGE
The British losses between the investment and the storm were, according to the official returns at the Record Office, 1 officer and 69 men killed, 19 officers and 462 men wounded, 2 men (both Portuguese) missing, or a total of 553. These figures added to the 568 lost in the storm (for details see below), make altogether 1,121, which does not agree with the statement in Wellington Dispatches, viii. p. 557; this gives as the total for the siege 9 officers and 169 men killed, 70 officers and 748 men wounded, 7 men missing, or only 1,003, over a hundred less than the total from the return quoted above. Napier gives 1,290 as the casualties for the whole siege, which much exceeds the return in the Record Office; he also makes the total for the storm 60 officers and 650 killed and wounded, while the official return here printed makes it only 59 officers and 509 men. Lord Londonderry and Sir John Jones also give figures agreeing with no others. I prefer to take the total of the official report, which is here appended.
C.
BRITISH LOSSES AT THE STORM OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.
JANUARY 19, 1812
Killed. Wounded.
Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Total.
Engineers — — 2 2 4
3rd Division:
Mackinnon’s Brigade 1/45th 3 14 4 27 48
5/60th — 1 1 3 5
74th — 4 4 13 21
1/88th — 7 4 23 34
Campbell’s Brigade 2/5th 1 33 8 52 94
77th — 14 5 31 50
2/83rd — 1 — 4 5
94th 2 13 6 48 69
Divisional Total 326
Light Division:
Vandeleur’s Brigade 1/52nd 1 2 2 23 28
2/52nd — 1 1 7 9
3/95th — — — 9 9
Barnard’s Brigade 1/43rd — 7 3 31 41
1/95th — 1 3 16 20
2/95th — — 2 4 6
Divisional Total 113
Portuguese — 19 4 91 114
Grand Total 8 117 51 384 560
Adding 5 British and 3 Portuguese missing, the total loss is 568 in the storm.
VII
NOTE ON SOME POINTS OF CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE STORM OF CIUDAD RODRIGO
Beside the controversy alluded to on page 183 about the exact amount of co-operation by the Light Division in helping the 3rd to clear the French from behind the Greater Breach, there are several other vexed points concerning the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo. The one on which most dispute arose was that concerning the capture of General Barrié. Gurwood of the 52nd claimed to have been the first officer to enter the Castle, and to receive the surrender of the governor and his staff. He is mentioned as doing so in Wellington’s Rodrigo dispatch, and generally had the credit at the time. But Lieutenant Mackie of the 88th, who had led the forlorn hope of the 3rd Division, also put in a claim, and had many supporters. Many years after the war was over, Maxwell (the author of one of the several Lives of the Duke of Wellington, which came out in early Victorian times) championed Mackie’s claim with such vehemence that Gurwood issued a pamphlet defending his own credit. Considerable controversy arose in the United Service Journal for 1843, and elsewhere. Mackie’s story was that he, with some of the 88th, arrived first at the Castle, summoned the governor to surrender, and was received by several French officers, who handed him over a sword and announced that the general yielded. Some moments after, according to Mackie, Gurwood came up, spoke to the governor himself, and obtained his sword, which, when the prisoners were brought before Wellington, he presented to his commander, who gave it him back, telling him to retain it as a trophy, and entered Gurwood’s name in his dispatch as the officer who had received the surrender. Gurwood’s story, told with as much detail and circumstance as Mackie’s, is that he, with two soldiers of the 52nd, arrived at the citadel, got the gate opened by threatening the officer in charge that no quarter would be given if resistance were made, and was received by Barrié, who in a great state of nervousness, threw his arms round his neck, kissed him, and said, ‘je suis le Gouverneur de la place—je suis votre prisonnier,’ handing over his sword at the same time. He accompanied the captive staff-officers to Wellington’s presence, and presented them to him. It is difficult to come to any certain conclusion in face of two such contradictory tales, but there is a bare possibility of reconciling them, by supposing that Mackie entered first, that the door was closed behind him and his party, and that Gurwood was let in a moment later, and spoke to the governor, while Mackie had been dealing only with his aide-de-camp, whose sword he had received. But if so, it is odd that Gurwood never saw Mackie: Mackie is quite positive that he saw Gurwood, and that he came in some minutes later than himself. The dispute tended to become a controversy between Light Division and 3rd Division veterans, each backing their own man. A synopsis of the papers may be found in the last two chapters of vol. i of Grattan’s second series of Adventures with the Connaught Rangers (London, 1853). Napier, who was much interested in the discussion, put in his final definitive edition the non-committal statement that ‘the garrison fled to the Castle, where Lieutenant Gurwood, who though severely wounded had entered among the foremost at the Lesser Breach, received the governor’s sword’ (iv. p. 90). Harry Smith says (i. p. 58): ‘Gurwood got great credit here unfairly. Johnstone and poor Uniacke were the first on the ramparts, Gurwood having been knocked down in the breach, and momentarily stunned. However, Gurwood’s a sharp fellow, and he cut off in search of the governor and brought his sword to the Duke. He made the most of it.’
Another controversy is as to which troops of the 3rd Division got first into the body of the town. The 88th claimed the priority, but also the 94th. The late Mr. Andrew Lang lent me a very interesting letter of his kinsman, William Lang of the 94th, very clearly stating that a solid body of 200 men of his regiment were the first troops that penetrated in force to the Plaza Mayor, and received the surrender of the garrison there.
Still another controversy, about which there is much in the Rice Jones papers, in the possession of Commander Hon. Henry Shore, R.N., is as to what engineer officers conducted the storming-columns. Apparently some credit has been misplaced among individuals here, but to decide upon the point would take more space than a book like this can afford.
VIII
ARMY OF THE SOUTH
REORGANIZED AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE POLES AND OTHER REGIMENTS
Return of March 1, 1812
[From the returns in the Archives Nationales. Lent me by Mr. Fortescue.]
Officers. Men.
1st Division: Conroux. Head-quarters: Villamartin (near Bornos).
1st Brigade, Meunier; 9th Léger (2 batts.)*, 24th Ligne (3 batts.).
2nd Brigade, Mocquery; 96th Ligne (3 batts.).
Total, including artillery 182 5,263
2nd Division: Barrois. Head-quarters: Puerto Real (near Cadiz).
1st Brigade, Cassagne: 16th Léger, 8th Ligne (3 batts. each).
2nd Brigade, Avril: 51st Ligne, 54th Ligne (3 batts. each).
Total, including artillery 225 7,551
3rd Division: Villatte. Head-quarters: Santa Maria (near Cadiz).
1st Brigade, Pécheux: 27th Léger, 63rd Ligne (3 batts. each).
2nd Brigade, Lefol: 94th Ligne, 95th Ligne (3 batts. each).
Total, including artillery 244 7,115
4th Division: Leval. Head-quarters: Granada.
1st Brigade, Rey: 32nd Ligne, 43rd Ligne (4 batts. each).
2nd Brigade, Vichery: 55th Ligne (4 batts.), 58th Ligne* (3 batts.).
Total, including artillery 273 9,131
5th Division: Drouet D’Erlon. Head-quarters: Zafra (Estremadura).
1st Brigade, Dombrowski: 12th Léger, 45th Ligne (3 batts. each).
2nd Brigade, Reymond: 64th Ligne* (2-2/3 batts.), 88th Ligne* (2 batts.)
Total, including artillery 192 5,927
6th Division: Daricau. Head-quarters: Zalamea (Estremadura).
1st Brigade, Quiot: 21st Léger, 100th Ligne (3 batts. each).
2nd Brigade, St. Pol: 28th Léger*, 103rd Ligne* (2 batts. each).
Total, including artillery 174 4,854
Total of six divisions 1,290 39,841
The regiments marked * had each one battalion in garrison at Badajoz, except the 64th, which had two companies there only [9th Léger, 28th Léger, 58th, 88th, 103rd Ligne]. The total of these 5-1/3 battalions was 2,951 officers and men. Adding these to the six divisions the total was 44,082 French infantry present under arms.
Cavalry.
Officers. Men.
1st Division. Head-quarters: Ribera (Estremadura).
1st Brigade, Perreymond: 2nd Hussars, 21st Chasseurs, 26th Dragoons.
2nd Brigade, Bonnemain: 5th Chasseurs, 27th Chasseurs.
Total 116 1,840
2nd Division. Head-quarters: Cordova.
1st Brigade, Digeon: 2nd, 4th, 5th Dragoons.
2nd Brigade, Lallemand: 14th, 17th, 27th Dragoons.
Total 170 3,307
3rd Division, Pierre Soult. Head-quarters: Granada.
1st Brigade, Boille: 10th Chasseurs, 12th Dragoons.
2nd Brigade, Ormancey: 16th Dragoons, 21st Dragoons.
Total 135 2,203
Total Cavalry 421 7,350
N.B.—7th Lancers, a Polish regiment, is omitted here, but actually stayed with the Army of the South till the end of 1812.
Officers. Men.
Spanish Troops [by return of April 1]:
Infantry 218 2,732
Cavalry 163 2,358
Total Juramentados 381 5,090
Artillery (deducting divisional batteries) 100 2,800
Engineers and Sappers 20 900
Three naval battalions (43rd and 44th équipages de flotte, and a battalion of ouvriers de marine) 60 1800
Gendarmerie, &c. 10 600
General Total of army 2,282 58,381
Or adding the garrison of Badajoz (2,951 infantry, 268 artillery, 265 sappers, 42 cavalry, of the Army of the South, not including 910 Hessians of the Army of the Centre), a total of 64,189, without sick, &c.
When Soult on April 1st, 1812 marched to attempt the relief of Badajoz, he drew up the following statistics as to the strength of his army, omitting the naval troops, and the gunners of the Cadiz Lines:
Officers. Men.
(1) Marched for Badajoz:
Infantry 600 17,964
Cavalry 237 3,944
Artillery 26 613
Engineers 2 116
Total 865 22,637 = 23,502
(2) Left before Cadiz and in Granada, &c.:
Infantry 611 18,312
Cavalry 152 2,555
Total 763 20,867 = 21,630
(3) Garrisons of the Provinces of Cordova, Jaen, Granada, and Seville:
Infantry 90 2,547
Cavalry 57 1,654
Total 147 4,201 = 4,348
(4) Spanish troops:
Infantry 218 2,732
Cavalry 163 2,358
Total 381 5,090 = 5,471
Adding up these four totals we get officers 2,156, rank and file 52,795 = 54,951. This total omits the artillery in the Cadiz Lines and other fortified places, and the three marine regiments, and such sappers, gendarmes, military train, &c., as did not form part of the expedition that marched with Soult to relieve Badajoz. Adding these, at their strength of March 1, we get a total of about 59,000 of all ranks, not including the garrison of Badajoz. This agrees well enough with the March total of 60,663, allowing for a month’s wear and tear.
IX
THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ, MARCH 15-APRIL 6, 1812
(A) STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH GARRISON ON MARCH 15
[See the Tables in Belmas, iv. pp. 364-5 and in Jones, i. p. 229.]
Staff 25
Infantry:
3/9th Léger officers and men 580
1/28th Léger ” ” 597
1/58th Ligne ” ” 450
3/88th Ligne ” ” 600
3/103rd Ligne ” ” 540
64th Ligne (2 companies) ” ” 130
Hesse-Darmstadt (2 batts.) ” ” 910
Juramentados 54 = 3,861 infantry.
Cavalry 42
Artillery 261
Engineers and Sappers 260
Sick in Hospital 300
Civil Departments, non-combatants, &c. 254
5,003
A report of the governor at noon on April 5, found among his papers after the storm, gave the following as surviving under arms (sick excluded)—infantry 3,403, artillery 282, engineers 217, cavalry 50, Juramentados 86. This report, printed in Jones, i. p. 230, implies a higher original total than Belmas allows—the artillery and Juramentados are actually more numerous on April 5 than on March 15! And the infantry are only 458 less, despite of losses of a considerably higher figure, for another paper of the commandant shows (Jones, i. p. 230)—Sortie of March 19: killed 30, wounded 287=317[769]. Storm of Picurina Fort: killed or prisoners, 8 officers, 278 men = 286. We have thus 603 casualties in these two affairs only, beside the ordinary wear and tear of the siege.
Noting the considerable number of ‘round figures’ in Belmas’s table, I am inclined to think that the total of the garrison must have been a few hundreds over what he allows.
(B) LOSSES AT STORM OF BADAJOZ, APRIL 6, 1811
[From the Returns at the Record Office.]
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Total.
General Staff 1 — 16 — — — 17
Royal Artillery 1 6 1 9 — — 17
Royal Engineers 2 — 3 5 — — 10
Assistant Engineers — — 3 — — — 3
Third Division.
Kempt’s Brigade:
1/45th Foot 6 19 8 64 — — 97
3/60th Foot 1 4 4 26 — — 35
74th Foot — 12 7 33 — 2 54
1/88th Foot 3 28 7 106 — — 144
J. Campbell’s Brigade:
2/5th Foot 1 11 3 28 — — 43
77th Foot — — 3 11 — — 14
2/83rd Foot 1 22 7 39 — — 69
94th Foot 1 12 1 51 — — 65
Total 3rd Division 13 108 40 358 — 2 521
Fourth Division.
Kemmis’s Brigade:
3/27th Foot 4 37 12 132 — — 185
1/40th Foot 2 51 13 170 — — 236
Bowes’s Brigade:
1/7th Foot 5 44 12 119 — — 180
1/23rd Foot 3 22 14 92 — 20 151
1/48th Foot 3 32 16 122 — — 173
Total 4th Division 17 186 67 635 — 20 925
Fifth Division.
Hay’s Brigade:
3/1st Foot — — — — — — —
1/9th Foot — — — — — — —
2/38th Foot 2 37 7 88 — — 42
Walker’s Brigade:
1/4th Foot 2 40 15 173 — — 230
2/30th Foot — 38 6 86 — — 130
2/44th Foot 2 37 7 88 — — 134
Total 5th Division 5 127 31 373 — — 536
Light Division:
1/43rd Foot 3 74 15 249 — — 341
1/52nd Foot 5 53 14 248 — — 320
1/95thd Foot 3 27 10 154 — — 194
3/95th Foot 4 9 4 47 — — 64
Total Light Division 15 163 43 698 — — 919
Brunswick Oels, dispersed in companies in 4th and 5th Divisions — 7 2 26 — — 35
Total British loss 54 597 206 2,104 — 22 2,983
Portuguese 8 147 45 500 — 30 730
General Total 62 744 251 2,604 — 52 3,713
Losses during previous operations 10 219 54 661 — 13 957
The total loss during the siege and storm would therefore appear to have been 4,670.
X
WELLINGTON’S ARMY AT SALAMANCA. STRENGTH AND LOSSES
N.B.—Strength by the morning state of July 15, 1812. Losses of the British by the return annexed to Wellington’s dispatch: those of the Portuguese from the official returns at Lisbon. The fighting strength on July 22, owing to losses at Castrejon and Castrillo, and to weary men falling out during the retreat, may have been perhaps 1,000 less.
I. BRITISH TROOPS
Losses.
Strength. Killed. Wounded. Missing Men. Total Loss.
Offs. Men. Total. Offs. Men. Offs. Men.
Cavalry (Stapleton Cotton):
Le Marchant’s Brigade 3rd Dragoons 17 322 339 1 6 — 11 2 20
4th Dragoons 22 336 358 — 7 1 21 — 29
5th Dragoon Guards 22 313 325 — 9 2 42 3 56
G. Anson’s Brigade 11th Light Dragoons 30 361 391 — — — — — —
12th Light Dragoons 19 321 340 1 2 — 2 — 5
16th Light Dragoons 14 259 273 — — — — — —
V. Alten’s Brigade 14th Light Dragoons 23 324 347 — 1 — 2 — 3
1st Hussars K.G.L. 23 324 347 — 2 5 16 — 21
Bock’s Brigade 1st Dragoons K.G.L. 25 339 364 — — — — — —
2nd Dragoons K.G.L. 23 384 407 — — — — — —
Total British Cavalry 218 3,335 3,543 2 27 8 94 5 136
Infantry.
1st Division (H. Campbell):
Fermor’s Brigade 1st Coldstream Guards 26 928 954 — 7 1 22 8 38
1st Third Guards 23 938 961 — 1 1 20 2 24
1 comp. 5/60th Foot 1 56 57 — — — — — —
Wheatley’s Brigade 2/24th Foot 23 398 421 — — — 5 — 5
1/42nd Foot 40 1,039 1,079 — — — 3 — 3
2/58th Foot[770] 31 369 400 — — — 3 1 4
1/79th Foot 40 634 674 — — — 1 3 4
1 comp. 5/60th 1 53 54 — — — — — —
Löwe’s Brigade 1st Line Battalion K.G.L. 26 615 641 — 1 — 8 — 9
2nd Line Battalion K.G.L. 26 601 627 — 1 2 40 4 47
5th Line Battalion K.G.L. 30 525 555 — 1 1 17 — 19
Total 1st Division 267 6,156 6,423 — 11 5 119 18 158
3rd Division (Pakenham):
Wallace’s Brigade 1/45th Foot 26 416 442 — 5 5 45 — 55
74th Foot 23 420 443 — 3 2 40 4 49
1/88th Foot 21 642 663 2 11 4 110 8 135
3 comps. 5/60th Foot 11 243 254 — 6 3 24 3 36
J. Campbell’s Brigade 1/5th Foot 32 870 902 — 10 6 110 — 126
2/5th Foot 19 289 308 — 1 2 21 — 24
2/83rd Foot 24 295 319 — 2 2 30 — 34
94th Foot 24 323 347 1 3 3 21 — 28
Total 3rd Division 180 3,498 3,678 3 41 27 401 15 487
4th Division (Lowry Cole):
W. Anson’s Brigade 3/27th Foot 19 614 633 — — 1 7 — 8
1/40th Foot 24 558 582 — 12 5 115 — 132
1 comp. 5/60th 2 44 46 — — — — — —
Ellis’s Brigade 1/7th Foot 24 471 495 1 19 10 165 — 195
1/23rd Foot 19 427 446 1 9 6 90 — 106
1/48th Foot 22 404 426 — 9 10 60 — 79
1 comp. Brunswick Oels[771] 1 53 54 — — — — — —
Total 4th Division 111 2,571 2,682 2 49 32 437 — 520
5th Division (Leith):
Greville’s Brigade 3/1st Foot 32 729 761 — 23 8 129 — 160
1/9th Foot 31 635 666 — 3 1 42 — 46
1/38th Foot[772] 36 764 800 2 14 12 115 — 143
2/38th Foot 20 281 301 — 9 2 40 1 52
1 comp. Brunswick Oels[773] 2 76 78 — — — — — —
Pringle’s Brigade 1/4th Foot 36 421 457 — — 1 17 — 18
2/4th Foot 27 627 654 — 2 — 23 6 31
2/30th Foot 20 329 349 — 3 1 22 1 27
2/44th Foot 20 231 251 2 4 — 23 — 29
1 comp. Brunswick Oels[773] 3 66 69 — — — — — —
Total 5th Division 227 4,159 4,386 4 58 25 411 8 506
6th Division (Clinton):
Hulse’s Brigade 1/11th Foot 31 485 516 1 44 14 281 — 340
2/53rd Foot 25 316 341 — 26 11 105 — 142
1/61st Foot 29 517 546 5 39 19 303 — 366
1 comp. 5/60th 2 59 61 — — — — — —
Hinde’s Brigade 2nd Foot 27 381 408 1 13 6 77 12 109
1/32nd Foot 33 576 609 2 15 9 111 — 137
1/36 Foot 29 400 429 4 16 5 74 — 99
Total 6th Division 176 2,734 2,910 13 153 64 951 12 1,193
7th Division (Hope):
Halkett’s Brigade 1st Light Batt. K.G.L. 25 544 569 — — 2 7 — 9
2nd Light Batt. K.G.L. 21 473 494 1 5 1 9 — 16
Brunswick Oels[773] (9 companies) 23 573 596 — 4 2 42 1 49
De Bernewitz’s Brigade 51st Foot 27 280 307 — — — 2 — 2
68th Foot 21 317 338 1 3 2 14 — 20
Chasseurs Britanniques 27 686 713 — 5 — 10 14 29
Total 7th Division 144 2,873 3,017 2 17 7 84 15 125
Light Division (Chas. Alten):
Barnard’s Brigade 1/43rd Foot 30 718 748 — — 1 15 — 16
Detachments 2/95th and 3/95th Rifles 19 373 392 — — — 5 — 5
Vandeleur’s Brigade 1/52nd Foot 28 771 799 — — — 2 — 2
8 comps. 1/95th 27 515 542 — — — 2 2 4
Total Light Division 104 2,377 2,481 — — 1 24 2 27
Royal Horse Artillery (troops of Ross, Macdonald, and Bull, and drivers) 18 403 421 — 1 — 2 — 3
Field Artillery (companies of Lawson, Gardiner, Greene, Douglas, May, and drivers) 35 650 685 — 1 — 4 — 5
King’s German Legion Artillery (battery of Sympher) 5 75 80 — 2 — 4 — 6
Artillery Total 58 1,128 1,186 — 4 — 10 — 14
Engineers 12 9 21 — — — — — —
Staff Corps 5 81 86 — — — — — —
Wagon Train 24 115 139 — — — — — —
BRITISH TOTAL
Infantry 1,209 24,368 25,577 24 329 159 2,387 69 2,968
Cavalry 218 3,335 3,553 2 27 8 94 5 136
Artillery 58 1,128 1,186 — 4 — 10 — 14
Engineers 12 9 21 — — — — — —
Staff Corps 5 81 86 — — — — — —
Train 24 115 139 — — — — — —
General Staff ? ? ? 2 — 9 — — 11
Total 1,526 29,036 30,562 28 360 176 2,491 74 3,129
II. PORTUGUESE TROOPS
Cavalry:
D’Urban’s Brigade: 1st and 11th Dragoons (12th Dragoons absent)[774] 32 450 482 2 5 2 18 10 37
Infantry:
Power’s Brigade, 3rd Division: 9th and 21st Line, 12th Caçadores 90 2,107 2,197 1 29 9 23 14 76
Stubbs’s Brigade, 4th Division: 11th and 23rd Line, 7th Caçadores 137 2,417 2,554 3 177 18 267 11 476
Spry’s Brigade, 5th Division: 3rd and 15th Line, 8th Caçadores 156 2,149 2,305 3 45 4 64 7 123
Rezende’s Brigade, 6th Division: 8th and 12th Line, 9th Caçadores 134 2,497 2,631 8 113 10 336 20 487
Collins’s Brigade, 7th Division: 7th and 19th Line, 2nd Caçadores 132 2,036 2,168 — 5 1 10 1 17
Pack’s Independent Brigade: 1st and 16th Line, 4th Caçadores 85 2,520 2,605 5 97 15 242 17 376
Bradford’s Independent Brigade: 13th and 14th Line, 5th Caçadores 112 1,782 1,894 — 8 — 3 6 17
Attached to Light Division: 1st and 3rd Caçadores 30 1,037 1,067 — 5 — 12 — 17
Artillery:
Arriaga’s battery 4 110 114 — — — 1 — 1
Total 912 17,105 18,017 22 484 59 976 86 1,627
III. SPANISH TROOPS
Carlos de España’s Division: 2nd of Princesa, Tiradores de Castilla, 2nd of Jaen, 3rd of 1st Seville, Caçadores de Castilla, Lanceros de Castilla 160 3,200 3,360 — 2 — 4 — 6
GENERAL TOTAL
British 1,526 29,036 30,562 28 360 176 2,491 74 3,129
Portuguese 912 17,105 18,017 22 484 59 976 86 1,627
Spanish 160 3,200 3,360 — 2 — 4 — 6
XI
STRENGTH AND LOSSES OF MARMONT’S ARMY AT SALAMANCA
To fix the fighting strength of Marmont’s army at Salamanca is comparatively easy. It consisted of the 49,636 officers and men accounted for by the return of July 15th printed on the next page, minus some 700 men lost at the combats of Castrillo and Castrejon [also called ‘combat of the Guarena’] on July 18, and such few hundreds more as may have fallen behind from fatigue during the long marches of July 20-1. Roughly speaking, it must have counted some 48,500 men, as opposed to Wellington’s 50,000. The French translators of Napier’s Peninsular War (Mathieu Dumas and Foltz) only give a table of June 15, which is of course a month out of date for Salamanca, and append a note that ‘deducting artillery, engineers, équipages militaires, officers, sergeants, and garrisons, as also losses between June 15 and July 15 they find the result of about 42,000 sabres and bayonets for the battle.’ Why any sane person should deduct officers, sergeants, and artillerymen from a fighting total I am unable to conceive, though contemporary British writers, including Wellington himself, often did so. But the results of adding to their ‘42,000 sabres and bayonets’ the list of 1,925 officers, 3,244 artillerymen and artillery train (both in the divisions and in the reserve), 332 engineers, and 742 équipages militaires, is to give the figure 48,343, which practically agrees with the total that I state above; if sergeants are added it would much exceed that total. We may take this, therefore, as fairly correct—bearing in mind that the 26 officers and 742 men of the équipages militaires cannot be counted as combatants.
These totals do not include the 23rd Léger (2 batts.) and the 2/1st Line, both from Thomières’s division, which were garrisoning Astorga, about 1,500 strong. Nor do they include the minor garrisons left at Toro, Zamora, Olmedo, Valdestillas, Tordesillas, Simancas, Cabezon, Medina del Campo, Puente de Duero, Tudela de Douro, Amagro, &c., which appear to have been altogether about 4,184 strong, nor the dépôts at Valladolid, 3,307 strong on June 15, but probably much less on July 15, when Marmont had remounted nearly 1,000 dismounted dragoons and picked up all detachments and convalescents that he could gather. Nor do they include the sick, who had been 8,633 on June 15th, and 8,332 on May 15th—probably the total in hospital was a trifle more on July 15, owing to the fatigues of the campaigns round San Cristobal in the latter days of June.
Parallel with the return of July 15th, I have printed that of August 1. The difference between the two—211 officers and 10,124 men—might be supposed to represent the losses in the campaign between those dates. It does not, however, because the total of August 1 represents not only the survivors from the battle of Salamanca, but all the men from garrisons evacuated after it, and from the Valladolid dépôt, who joined the colours after the disaster of July 22, in consequence of the district in which they were lying having been evacuated by the army. The garrisons of Toro and Zamora held out till they were relieved, that of Tordesillas surrendered to the Galicians: but the men from the other smaller garrisons and from the dépôts fell in to their respective corps before August 1. I imagine that we may take these additions to be some 5,000 men at least, but cannot give the exact figures, through being unable to say what the Valladolid dépôts (3,307 strong on June 15) amounted to on July 15.
After comparing the totals of the brigades and regiments shown under July 15 and August 1, we must proceed to show the reasons why, in individual cases, the regimental differences between the two sets of figures cannot be taken to represent the sum of the losses in the Salamanca campaign. The proof is clear.
THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL BEFORE AND AFTER THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA
From two returns of effectives in the Archives of the Ministry of War, Paris, dated July 15 and August 1, respectively.
July 15. August 1.
Officers. Men. Officers. Men.
1st Division (Foy):
Brigade Chemineau 6th Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,055 41 684
69th Ligne (2 batts.) 50 1,408 47 1,322
Brigade Desgraviers-Berthelot 39th Ligne (2 batts.) 49 918 49 872
76th Ligne (2 batts.) 56 1,351 45 887
Artillery Train, &c. 7 207 7 207
Divisional Total 208 4,939 189 3,972
2nd Division (Clausel):
Brigade Berlier 25th Léger (3 batts.) 54 1,485 43 1,222
27th Ligne (2 batts.) 40 1,637 31 1,248
Brigade Barbot 50th Ligne (3 batts.) 52 1,490 46 1,177
59th Ligne (2 batts.) 47 1,531 38 1,278
Artillery Train, &c. 7 219 7 216
Divisional Total 200 6,362 165 5,141
3rd Division (Ferey):
Brigade Menne 31st Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,359 45 1,325
26th Ligne (2 batts.) 44 1,145 43 1,116
? 47th Ligne (3 batts.) 67 1,558 62 1,650
70th Ligne (2 batts.) 49 1,114 36 1,061
Artillery Train, &c. 5 302 3 193
Divisional Total 211 5,478 189 5,345
4th Division (Sarrut):
Brigade Fririon 2nd Léger (3 batts.) 66 1,772 68 1,702
36th Ligne (3 batts.) 69 1,570 71 1,514
Brigade ? 4th Léger (3 batts.) 63 1,219 63 989
130th Ligne (absent) — — — —
Artillery Train, &c. 5 238 5 214
Divisional Total 203 4,799 207 4,419
5th Division (Maucune):
Brigade Arnaud 15th Ligne (3 batts.) 52 1,615 46 1,229
66th Ligne (2 batts.) 38 1,131 34 661
Brigade Montfort 82nd Ligne (2 batts.) 41 966 39 729
86th Ligne (2 batts.) 30 1,155 28 961
Artillery Train, &c. 4 212 4 212
Divisional Total 165 5,079 151 3,792
6th Division (Brennier):
Brigade Taupin 17th Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,074 42 855
65th Ligne (3 batts.) 59 1,527 52 1,302
? 22nd Ligne (3 batts.) 61 1,486 40 716
Régiment de Prusse (remnant of) 9 79 9 79
Artillery Train, &c. 4 213 4 213
Divisional Total 179 4,379 147 3,165
7th Division (Thomières):
Brigade Bonté 1st Line (3 batts.)[775] 80 1,683 79 1,454
62nd Line (2 batts.) 47 1,076 45 1,048
? 23rd Léger (absent)[776] — — — —
101st Line (3 batts.) 61 1,388 29 412
Artillery Train, &c. 5 203 nil nil
Divisional Total 193 4,350 153 2,914
8th Division (Bonnet):
Brigade Gautier 118th Line (3 batts.) 53 1,584 37 1,024
119th Line (3 batts.) 64 1,265 48 831
? 120th Line (3 batts.) 63 1,745 66 1,152
122nd Line (3 batts.) 55 1,582 40 1,000
Artillery Train, &c. 3 107 nil nil
Divisional Total 238 6,283 191 4,007
Light Cavalry Division (Curto):
? 3rd Hussars (3 squadrons) 17 231 14 165
22nd Chasseurs (2 squadrons) 17 236 18 233
26th Chasseurs (2 squadrons) 16 278 18 225
28th Chasseurs (1 squadron) 7 87 3 52
? 13th Chasseurs (5 squadrons) 20 496 28 426
14th Chasseurs (4 squadrons) 14 308 18 332
Escadron de marche 11 141 9 52
Divisional Total 102 1,777 108 1,472
Heavy Cavalry Division (Boyer):
? 6th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 19 376 19 332
11th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 19 411 18 359
Brigade Carrié 15th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 15 328 16 294
25th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 18 314 18 282
Artillery attached to cavalry 3 193 3 148
Divisional Total 74 1,622 74 1,415
Total Cavalry Divisions 176 3,399 182 2,887
Artillery Reserve, Park, &c. 50 1,450 22 707
Engineers and Sappers 17 332 16 345
Gendarmerie 6 129 6 186
Équipages militaires 26 742 22 707
État-Major Général 54 — 54 —
General Total Infantry Divisions 1,597 41,669 1,392 32,755
Cavalry Divisions 176 3,399 182 2,887
Auxiliary Arms 153 2,653 120 1,945
1,925 47,721 1,694 37,587
N.B.—Guns, July 15, 78; August 1, 58; lost 7 12-pounders, 3 8-pounders, 9 4-pounders, 1 3-pounder. Horses, July 15, 4,278; August 1, 3,231. Draught horses, July 15, 2,037; August 1, 1,847. Équipages militaires, horses, July 15, 800; August 1, 331.
To these two tables we must append, as a side-light, the results of a compilation of the totals of officers killed and wounded at Salamanca, from Martinien’s admirable Liste des officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de l’Empire. This of course does not include unwounded prisoners.
Killed. Wounded.
Foy’s Division (including losses at Garcia Hernandez on July 23rd):
6th Léger 1 10 = 11
69th Line 2 8 = 10
39th Line — 2 = 2
76th Line 1 7 = 8
Total 31
Clausel’s Division:
25th Léger 4 10 = 14[777]
27th Line 2 5 = 7
50th Line 9 17 = 26
50th Line 4 15 = 19
Total 66
Ferey’s Division:
31st Léger 1 6 = 7
26th Line — 6 = 6
47th Line 5 13 = 18
70th Line 2 3 = 5
Total 36
Sarrut’s Division:
2nd Léger — 3 = 3
36th Line — 3 = 3
4th Léger — 2 = 2
Total 8
Maucune’s Division:
15th Line 4 12 = 16
66th Line 2 15 = 17
82nd Line 1 7 = 8
86th Line — 3 = 3
Total 44
Brennier’s Division:
17th Léger 1 3 = 4[778]
65th Line 1 8 = 9[779]
22nd Line 2 19 = 21[780]
Total 34
Thomières’s Division:
1st Line — 4 = 4
62nd Line 1 14 = 15
101st Line 6 19 = 25
Total 44
Bonnet’s Division:
118th Line 2 18 = 20
119th Line 3 23 = 26
120th Line — 8 = 8
122nd Line 3 13 = 16
Total 70
Curto’s Light Cavalry:
3rd Hussars — 2[781]
13th Chasseurs — 7
14th Chasseurs — 5[782]
22nd Chasseurs — 5
26th Chasseurs — 4
28th Chasseurs — 2
Total 25
Boyer’s Division of Dragoons:
6th Dragoons — 9
11th Dragoons — 2[783]
15th Dragoons — 1[784]
25th Dragoons — 6[785]
Total 18
Artillery, Horse — 1
Artillery, Field — 5
Artillery, Train — 1
Total 7
Engineers — 3 = 3
Staff 3 17[786] = 20
Miscellaneous officers, whose regiments were not present at Salamanca — 2 = 2
General total 60 officers killed, 347 wounded at Salamanca and Garcia Hernandez; plus 7 officers killed and 27 wounded at the Guarena on July 18, and 2 wounded in minor engagements.
Loss in killed and wounded, not including unwounded prisoners, during the campaign, 67 killed, 376 wounded = 443 officers in all.
After arriving at this general loss in killed and wounded officers, so far as is possible from Martinien’s tables, which are not quite complete for all corps, it only remains to estimate the unwounded prisoners. I searched the immense volumes of rolls of French officers in captivity at the Record Office, and found 63 names of prisoners taken at Salamanca, the Guarena, and Garcia Hernandez. A few of these duplicate the names of wounded officers to be found in Martinien’s tables, the remainder must represent the unwounded prisoners. Wellington in his Salamanca dispatch wrote that he had 137 French officers prisoners—evidently the larger number of them must have been wounded, as only 63 were sent off to England that autumn. Probably many died in hospital. Prisoners are most numerous from the 101st, 22nd, and from Foy’s two regiments cut up at Garcia Hernandez, the 76th and 6th Léger.
In the Library of the Archives de la Guerre at the Paris Ministry of War I went through the regimental histories of all the French infantry regiments present at Salamanca. Like our own similar compilations, they differ much in value—some are very full and with statistics carefully worked out from regimental reports and pay-books; others are very thin and factless. Fourteen units give their losses, which I herewith annex:
Clausel’s Division: 25th Léger, 336; 27th Line, 159; 59th Line, 350.
Ferey’s Division: 70th Line, 111; 31st Léger, 340.
Sarrut’s Division: 2nd Léger, 202.
Maucune’s Division: 15th Line, 359.
Brennier’s Division: 17th Léger, 264; 65th Line, 359.
Thomières’s Division: 1st Line, 227; 62nd Line, 868; 101st Line, 1,000.
Bonnet’s Division: 120th, 458; 122nd, 527.
The total of this makes 5,560 for these fourteen corps; we leave fifteen others unaccounted for. As a rough calculation I suppose that we may hold that as these regiments lost, as we know from Martinien’s lists [which are not quite complete], at least 152 officers out of 5,560 of all ranks, then the other fifteen regiments with 181 officers killed or wounded must have lost something like 6,000. The vagaries of the proportion between officers and men hit are extraordinary in individual units, but these tend to rectify themselves on a large total consisting of many regiments. I therefore believe that 11,560 would be something very like the total loss killed and wounded in the French infantry. We have then to allow for some 40 unwounded officers taken prisoners, and corresponding to them perhaps 1,200 unwounded men. The total loss for the infantry would thus be 12,800. For cavalry and artillery, &c., 53 officers hit—as by Martinien’s tables—must imply something over a thousand men lost. We should thus arrive at a total of 14,000 for the casualties—the sum which I suggest in my text (p. 469).
To show the worthlessness of any attempt to deduce the French losses by a mere comparison of the official ‘morning states’ of July 15 and August 1, the following instances may suffice.
The 65th Line shows 59 officers and 1,527 men present on July 15, 52 officers and 1,302 men on August 1. The apparent loss is 7 officers and 225 men. But this unit’s regimental report shows 3 officers killed, 5 officers wounded, 204 men killed or prisoners, 106 men wounded, 39 missing; total, 8 officers and 349 men. Therefore, as is obvious, one officer and 124 men must have joined from somewhere (dépôt at Valladolid?) between the two dates, or the deficiency would be 125 greater between the ‘present under arms’ of the two dates than is shown.
A more striking case is the 62nd Line, of Thomières’s Division. It shows present on July 15, 47 officers and 1,076 men, on August 1st 45 officers and 1,048 men—the apparent loss is only 2 officers and 28 men. But Martinien’s lists show us that the regiment lost at least 15 officers, killed and wounded, and the regimental report gives 20 officers and 848 men killed, wounded, or missing! The real loss is 868 not 30! Therefore 18 officers and about 800 men, the equivalent of a strong battalion, must have joined between July 15 and August 1. This corresponds to the fact that the 62nd showed only 2 battalions[787] at Salamanca, while the ‘morning state’ of June 15th showed it as having at the front three battalions and 1,900 rank and file. Clearly the third battalion rejoined the colours after the battle—having presumably been quartered in the small garrisons of Castile evacuated after the disaster of July 22. Many men must also have rejoined the other two battalions.
But the most absurd case of all is that of the 47th Line, whose total figures actually go up from 1,625 to 1,712 of all ranks between July 15th and August 1st—in despite of the fact that it lost (as Martinien’s lists show), 18 officers and not less therefore than 360 rank and file (20 men per officer is a low allowance) at Salamanca. It must have picked up from Valladolid and the small garrisons 13 officers and 452 men at least[788].
Clausel, writing to King Joseph on July 25, said that of the whole Army of Portugal he could not yet show in the field on that day 20,000 men. This tallies well enough with the conclusion that we have already drawn, that the total loss from the army, which on July 15 had about 48,000 men, must have been some 14,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, and over 10,000 men dispersed who were only just rallying.
XII
BRITISH LOSSES AT THE COMBATS OF CASTREJON AND CASTRILLO[789], JULY 18, 1812
Officers. Men. Missing Men. Total.
Killed. Wounded. Killed. Wounded.
G. Anson’s Brigade:
11th Lt. Dragoons — 2 3 10 — 15
12th Lt. Dragoons — 1 5 11 1 18
16th Lt. Dragoons — — — — — —
V. Alten’s Brigade:
1st Hussars K.G.L. — 4 7 45 4 60
14th Lt. Dragoons — 3 14 49 9 75
Bock’s Brigade:
1st Dragoons K.G.L. — — — 1 — 1
2nd Dragoons K.G.L. — — 5 1 1 7
Le Marchant’s Brigade:
3rd Dragoons — 1 — 9 — 10
4th Division.
W. Anson’s Brigade:
3/27th Foot 2 1 11 58 — 72
1/40th Foot — 1 8 59 1 69
Ellis’s Brigade:
1/7th Foot — 1 1 14 3 19
1/23rd Foot — — — 2 2 4
1/48th Foot — — — 5 1 6
5th Division.
Greville’s Brigade:
3/1st — — — 2 — 2
Detached Companies of 5/60th — — — 1 2 3
Horse Artillery — 1 2 2 — 5
German Artillery — — — 2 — 2
Portuguese 1 6 33 90 27 157
Total 3 21 89 361 51 525
XIII
SPANISH TROOPS ON THE EAST COAST OF SPAIN IN THE SPRING OF 1812
(A) REMAINS OF THE 2nd (VALENCIAN) AND 3rd (MURCIAN) ARMIES, MARCH 1
Officers. Men.
1st Division: Conde de Montijo, 1st of Badajoz (2 batts.), Cuenca (2 batts.), 2 squadrons cavalry 110 2,049
2nd Division: General Luis Riquelme, 2nd Walloon Guards, Guadalajara (3 batts.), 1st of Burgos (3 batts.), Guadix (2 batts.), Baden (1 batt.), Alpujarras (1 batt.), dismounted cavalry (1 batt.) 335 5,214
Reserve Division: General Philip Roche. Voluntarios de Aragon, Canarias, Alicante, 2nd of Murcia, Alcazar de San Juan, Chinchilla (1 batt. each), 2 squadrons of Husares de Fernando 7º 300 5,576
Cavalry: General A. Rich. Principe (2 squadrons), España (2 squadrons), Reina (2 squadrons), Carabineros Reales, Farnesio, Montesa, Dragones del Rey, Cazadores de Valencia, Pavia, Rey, Granaderos a caballo, Husares de Castilla (one squadron each), three provisional squadrons 321 1,565
Cadres of dispersed battalions, now reorganizing: Lorca, Velez Malaga, Almanza, America 98 1,079
Artillery (Field) 38 651
Artillery (Garrison) in Alicante and Cartagena 17 582
Engineers 8 202
Total 1,227 16,918
(B) JOSEPH O’DONNELL’S ARMY, JULY 21, 1812, AND ITS LOSSES AT CASTALLA
[The figures of the former from Los Ejércitos españoles. The list of prisoners from Suchet’s dispatch in the Paris Archives de la Guerre.]
Strength. Unwounded prisoners reported by Suchet.
Officers. Men. Total.
Michelena’s Brigade Corona (1 Batt.) 24 630 2,035 255
Velez Malaga (1 batt.) 36 834 —
Guadix 24 487 337
Montijo’s Brigade 2nd Walloon Guards (1 batt.) 20 569 2,152 350
Cuenca (2 batts.) 33 890 112
1st of Badajoz (1 batt.) 27 613 —
Mijares’s Brigade Bailen (1 batt.) 32 708 2,187 405
Alcazar de San Juan (1 batt.) 31 855 434
Lorca (1 batt.) 25 536 242
Cavalry (Provisional Regiment, 2 squadrons) 29 207 —
Engineers 26 325 —
Roche’s Division:
1st of Burgos (2 batts.) 27 786 —
Canarias (1 batt.) 34 818 —
Alicante (2 batts.) 35 1,110 —
Chinchilla (2 batts.) 26 918 —
Total 429 10,286 2,135
Suchet also reports 697 wounded prisoners, of whom 56 died of their wounds.
No figures are given for the detached cavalry division of Santesteban, which was not in action at Castalla.
XIV
THE BRITISH FORCES ON THE EAST COAST OF SPAIN IN 1812
[A NOTE BY MR. C. T. ATKINSON]
I. MAITLAND’S FORCE, EMBARKATION RETURN, JUNE 25, 1812
(War Office: Secretary of State’s Original Correspondence, Series I, vol. 311.)
Officers. N.C.O.’s and Men.
20th Light Dragoons 9 158
Foreign Troop of Hussars 3 68
R.A. (including drivers) 8 73
Marine Artillery 1 29
R.E. 5 42
Staff Corps 1 13
1/10th Foot 33 902
1/58th Foot 31 840
1/81st Foot 44 1,230
4th Line Battalion, K.G.L. 36 953
6th Line Battalion, K.G.L. 33 1,041
De Roll’s Regiment (3 companies) 11 320
Dillon’s Regiment (5 companies) 18 536
Calabrian Free Corps (1 division)[790] 14 338
Total 247 6,543
II. CAMPBELL’S CORPS, EMBARKATION RETURN, PALERMO, NOVEMBER 14, 1812
(Ibid., vol. 312.)
Officers. N.C.O.’s and Men.
20th Light Dragoons — 13
Guides — 14
R.A. (including drivers) 4 131
Grenadier Battalion[791] 35 924
Light Infantry Battalion[792] 21 582
1/27th Foot 25 828
2nd Battalion, Anglo-Italian Levy[793] 33 1,184
Sicilian Artillery — 155
Sicilian Grenadiers[794] — 605
Total 118 4,436[795]
III. SUBSEQUENTLY EMBARKED, DECEMBER 25[796]
Officers. N.C.O.’s and Men.
20th Light Dragoons 8 223
R.A. — 60
2nd Anglo-Italians 2 176
Calabrian Free Corps (1 division) 14 325
Sicilian Cavalry 22 204
Sicilian Infantry (the Estero Regiment) 77 1,185
Total 123 2,173
It may be well to give here the garrisons of Cadiz and Gibraltar in 1812, as both of them supplied troops to the field army during that year.
In Gibraltar, under General Campbell, there were the 2/9th, 2/11th, 37th, and the 4th and 7th Veteran Battalions throughout the year. The 1/82nd was there till the summer, when it was relieved by the 1/26th, sent back from Portugal by Wellington. The 1/82nd sailed for Lisbon and marched up to the front, but arrived just too late for the battle of Salamanca.
At Cadiz General Cooke commanded, at the commencement of the year, the 3/1st Guards (which had arrived and relieved the ‘composite battalion of Guards’ before the end of 1811), also the 2/47th, 2/67th, 2/87th, two companies of the Chasseurs Britanniques, De Watteville’s regiment (which arrived before the end of 1811), the strange corps sometimes called the ‘battalion of Foreign Deserters,’ sometimes the ‘battalion of Foreign Recruits,’ two companies of the 2/95th, and a squadron of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., also the 20th Portuguese.
Early in the year the 2/67th and five companies of De Watteville’s regiment were sent off to Cartagena.
In September the 3/1st Guards, 2/47th, 2/87th, two companies 95th, and 20th Portuguese marched to join Hill at Madrid, taking with them the German squadron and two field-batteries: they were just 4,000 strong.
The 2/59th came out from home about the same time, and was in October the only British battalion at Cadiz. With them remained the ‘Foreign Deserters,’ seven companies of De Watteville, and two companies of Chasseurs Britanniques, as also some artillerymen.
XV
THE SCOVELL CIPHERS
By the very great kindness of Mr. G. Scovell of Brighton, I have had placed at my disposition the papers of his great-uncle, General Sir George Scovell, G.C.B., who served during the Peninsular War in the Intelligence branch of the Quartermaster-General’s department. In the beginning of 1812 the number of intercepted French dispatches in cipher which came into Wellington’s hands, through the happy activity of Julian Sanchez and other guerrillero chiefs, began to be so considerable that the Commander-in-Chief thought it worth while to detail a member of his staff to deal with them. Captain Scovell was selected because of his ingenuity in this line, and became responsible for attempting to interpret all the captured documents. They were made over to him, and, having done what he could with them, he placed the fair-copy of the ‘decoded’ result in Wellington’s hands, but seems to have been allowed to keep the originals—which were, of course, unintelligible because of their form, and therefore useless to his chief. The file of documents which thus remained with him is most interesting: they range in size from formal dispatches of considerable bulk—eight or ten folio pages long—down to scraps of the smallest size written on thin paper, and folded up so as to go into some secret place of concealment on the bearer’s person. Some of them look as if they had been sewed up in a button, or rolled under the leather of a whip handle, or pushed along the seam of a garment. I take it that these must all have been entrusted to emissaries sent in disguise, Afrancesados or peasants hired by a great bribe. Presumably each of these scraps cost the life of the bearer when it was discovered—for the guerrillero chiefs did not deal mildly with Spaniards caught carrying French secret orders. The large folio dispatches, on the other hand, must no doubt have been carried by French aides-de-camp or couriers, whose escorts were dispersed or captured by the partidas at some corner of the mountain roads between Madrid and the head-quarters of the Armies of Portugal and Andalusia.
The cipher letters are of two sorts—in the first (and more numerous) class only the names of persons and places, and the most important sentences are in cipher—invariably a numerical cipher of arbitrary figures. In the other class the whole dispatch is written in figures, not merely its more weighty clauses. The reason for adopting the former method was that it saved much time; the transliterating of unimportant parts of the dispatch (such as compliments, and personal remarks of no strategical import) would have taken many extra hours, when it was necessary to get a letter sent off in a hurry. But, as we shall see later on, there was grave danger in using this system, because the context might sometimes allow the decipherer to make a good guess at the disguised words, after reading that part of the letter which was not so guarded.
Occasionally a French dispatch is ciphered after the same infantile system that readers of romances will remember in Poe’s Gold Bug or Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, where letters or numbers are merely substituted for each other—where, for example, 2 always means letter e, or 25 letter r. This sort of cipher is dangerously easy to an expert reader, especially if the words are separated from each other, so that the number of letters in each can be counted. Take, for example, a letter sent to Soult in 1813 by Cassan, the blockaded governor of Pampeluna[797]. Only one precaution had been taken in this cipher-epistle, viz. that elaborate care has been taken to defeat the attempt of the reader to arrive at results by counting what figures appear most frequently, and so deducing by their repetition that these must be e (the most frequently used letter in French, as in English), s, i, a, t, and other common letters. This is done by having six alternative numbers for e, four each for a and i, three for t, s, and n. Taking the simple phrase
47.50.40.41.14.26 58.24 3.51.10.36.44.23.17.24.10.50.53.27 47.46 11.18.39.17.46.21,
which deciphers into ‘depuis le commencement du blocus,’ we see that e appears five times, but is represented by both 50, 24, and 44; u three times, but varied as 14 and 46; m thrice, varied as 10 and 36. This made the reader’s work harder, but not nearly so difficult as that required for certain other ciphers: for the whole set of signs, being not much over 60 in number, there was a limited amount of possibilities for each figure-interpretation. And the words being separated by spaces, there was a certainty that some of the two-letter units must represent et, de, ce, eu, du, and similar common French two-letter words. As a matter of fact this particular dispatch was deciphered in a few hours owing to the lucky guess that its initial words
10.45.23.21.16.2.41.25 5.24 10.4.25.24.3.9.8.5
might be ‘Monsieur le Maréchal,’ the preliminary address to the intended recipient. This hypothesis was verified at once by finding that this rendering made good sense for the two-letter words 23.24 = ne, and 10.2 = me, lower down in the letter. After this all was plain sailing.
But the usual French cipher, the ‘Great Paris Cipher’ as Scovell called it, was a very much more complicated and difficult affair, as the list of figures, instead of being only a few score, ran to many hundreds. And of these only some few represented individual letters, more were parts of a syllabary: ma, me, mi, mo, mu, for example, had each a figure representing them, and so had ab- ac- ad- af- ag- &c. Moreover, there was a multitude of arbitrary numbers, representing under a single figure words that must often be used in a dispatch, such as hommes, armée, général, marche, ennemi, corps d’armée, canons. In addition there was a code of proper names, e.g. 1216 meant the River Douro, 93 Portugal, 1279 Talavera, 585 King Joseph, 1391 General Dorsenne, 1327 the Army of the South, 1280 Soult, 1300 Wellington, 400 Ciudad Rodrigo, &c. If the King wished the Duke of Dalmatia to send 9,000 men of the Army of the South to Talavera, he had only to write
‘585 désire que 1280 dirige 1156 (neuf) 692 (mille) 1102 (hommes) de 1327 sur 1279.’
He would then cut up désire and dirige into the syllables de-si-re and di-ri-ge, for each of which the syllabary had set figures; there were also arbitrary numbers for sur, de, and que. So the whole sentence would take up only fourteen numbers when written out.
It would seem at first sight that to interpret such a dispatch would be a perfectly hopeless task, to any one who had not the key to the cipher before him. That the admirably patient and ingenious Scovell at last made out for himself a key from the laborious comparison of documents, was nevertheless the fact. He was started on the track by the fortunate circumstance that most of the intercepted dispatches were only partly in cipher. Marmont would write
‘Avec les moyens que j’ai, et 798, 1118, 602, 131, 1112.663.1135.502 au delà de Sabugal,’
or
‘J’avais donné l’ordre que 1003, 497, 1115, 1383, 69,711, 772, 530, de descendre cette rivière et de se mettre en communication avec moi.’
Clearly the cipher-figures in the first case have something to do with a march on Sabugal, in the second with orders to some general or body of troops (to be identified hereafter) to march down a river which the context shows must be the Tagus. This is not much help, and the task looked still very hopeless. But when intercepted dispatches accumulated in quantities, and the same cipher-figures kept occurring among sentences of which part was written out in full, it became evident that various cryptic figures must mean places and persons who could be guessed at, with practical certainty. Occasionally a French writer completely ‘gives himself away’ by carelessness: e.g. Dorsenne wrote on April 16 to Jourdan,
‘Vous voulez de renseignement sur la situation militaire et administrative de 1238:’
obviously the probable interpretation of this number is ‘the Army of the North,’ and this is rendered almost certain by passages lower down the same letter. Equally incautious is King Joseph when he writes to Marmont,
‘J’ai donné l’ordre au général Treillard de 117.8.7 la vallée du 1383, afin de marcher à 498.’
Considering the situation of the moment 117.8.7 must almost certainly mean evacuate, 1383 Tagus, and 498 some large town.[798] [The particular dispatch in which this occurs is on a most curious piece of paper, half an inch broad, a foot long, and excessively thin. It is bent into twelve folds, and would fit into any small receptacle of one inch by half an inch. I fear the bearer who had it on his person must have come to a bad end.] Suchet also made Scovell the present of some useful words when he wrote on September 17 to Soult,
‘Le Général Maitland commande l’expédition anglaise venue de 747: O’Donnell peut réunir 786 692 1102 en y comprenant le corps de l’Anglais Roche. Le 19 août je n’avais que 135 692 1102 à lui opposer.’
Here it is quite clear that ‘747’ means Sicily; that ‘692.1102’ in the two statements of forces means thousand men. A little guessing and comparison with other cryptic statements of forces would soon show that 135 meant 7 and 786 meant 12.
Notwithstanding much useful help it was still a marvellous feat of Scovell to work out by the end of 1812 no less than nine hundred separate cipher-numbers, ranging in complexity from the simple vowel a to the symbol that represented ‘train des équipages militaires’! He must have had a most ingenious brain, and unlimited patience. Down to the end there remained numbers of unsolved riddles, figures that represented persons or places so unfrequently mentioned that there was no way of discovering, by comparison between several documents, what the number was likely to mean.
Sometimes very small fish came into the net of the guerrilleros, and were sent on to Wellington; take, for example, the tiny scrap containing the pathetic letter of the young wife of General Merlin, of the cavalry of the Army of the Centre—I fear that the bearer must have fallen into the hands of Julian Sanchez or one of his lieutenants, and have had short shrift:—
‘Mon cher Ami,—Depuis ton départ je n’ai reçu qu’un seul mot de toi—pendant qu’il arrive des courriers (c’est-à-dire des paysans) du quartier général. Mon oncle qui écrit régulièrement dit toujours qu’on se porte bien, mais tu peux te mettre à ma place! Je crains que ta goutte ne soit revenue, je crains tant de choses, qui peut-être passent le sens commun, mais qui me tourmentent. Je ne dors plus, et n’ai d’autre plaisir que celui de regarder ma fille, qui se porte bien. Encore si elle pouvait m’entendre et me consoler! Adieu! Je suis d’une tristesse insupportable, parce que je t’aime plus que moi-même.—Mercédes.’
It may suffice to show the general character of a typical cipher-dispatch if we give a few lines of one, with the interpretation added below—the following comes from a dispatch of Marmont written on April 22, 1812, to Berthier, from Fuente Guinaldo:—
Le roi après m’avoir donné l’ordre
1060 462 810 195 1034 1282 de faire par- tir deux divisions
971 216 13 192 614 20 90 92 et plus de la moi- ti- é de la
1265 582 637 851 809 388 177 cavalerie dis- po- ni- ble, et avoir
669 112 923 2 786 692 1102 ré- du- it à douze mille hommes
le nombre de troupes que j’ai disponible m’ordonne
13 1040 1003 370 860 400 817 69 862 718 1100 de chercher à pren-dre Ciudad Rodrigo lors que je ne ai
423 815 591 710 850 pas un canon de siège!
It will be noted that of all the words only partir, moitié, disponible, réduit, prendre, required to be spelled out in the syllabary: single fixed numbers existing for all the common words, and for the military terms siège, cavalerie, and division.
It was, of course, only by degrees that Scovell succeeded in making out the bulk of the French phrases. In Wellington’s dispatches there is often, during the spring and summer of 1812, an allusion to information only partly comprehensible, obtained from captured letters. On June 18 (Dispatches, ix. p. 241) Wellington writes to Lord Liverpool that he ‘is not able entirely to decipher’ the intercepted papers that have been passing between King Joseph and Soult and Marmont. On June 25th he sends to the same recipient the happy intelligence that he has now the key to King Joseph’s cipher. Yet again, on July 16th (Dispatches, ix. p. 290)—with No. 36 of the file catalogued below before him—he says: ‘I have this day got a letter from the King to Marmont of the 9th inst. in cipher, which I cannot entirely decipher: it appears, however, that he thinks Drouet will not cross the Tagus, and I suspect he orders General Treillard to collect some troops in the valley of the Tagus, and to move on Plasencia.’ The interpretation was correct, save that Treillard was to move not on Plasencia but on Aranjuez. The code-numbers for the two places were neither of them known as yet. But by September all essential words were discovered, and Wellington could comprehend nearly everything, unless Joseph or Soult was writing of obscure places or distant generals.
A list of the whole of Scovell’s file of 52 French dispatches may be useful: those whose number is marked with a star are wholly or partly in cipher, the remaining minority are in plain French without disguise. It is clear that Wellington had many more French papers not in cipher, which did not get into Scovell’s portfolio.
Date. Sender. Recipient. Contents.
1. Mar. 6, 1812 Col. Jardet Marmont Long interview with Berthier. He says you must ‘contain’ Wellington in the North. All else in Spain matters comparatively little.
2*. April 11 ” Marmont Brennier See that Silveira does not molest my communications.
3*. April 14 ” Soult Berthier Marmont has betrayed me, and caused the loss of Badajoz. Synopsis of Andalusian affairs.
4*. April 16 ” Marmont Berthier As I prophesied, my raid into Portugal produces no effect: we begin to starve.
5*. April 16 ” Dorsenne Jourdan I refuse to acknowledge the king as controlling my army.
6*. April 17 ” Soult Berthier Details of the fall of Badajoz, ‘événement funeste.’
7*. April 22 ” Marmont Berthier I have been starved out of Portugal. Have seen no British troops, save a few cavalry.
8*. April 23 ” Foy Jourdan Send me food. My division is nearly starved.
9*. April 25 ” King Joseph Dorsenne I am your Commander-in-Chief. Send me a report of your army.
10. April 26 ” Gen. Lafon- Blaniac[799] Gen. Treillard[800] News from Andalusia at last: Soult has failed to save Badajoz.
11*. April 28 ” Marmont Dorsenne Send me 8,000 quintals of wheat at once.
12*. April 28 ” Marmont Berthier I have sent Bonnet, as ordered, to invade the Asturias.
13. April 28 ” Gen. Lamar- tinière[801] Clarke I send parole of Colquhoun Grant, a suspicious character. The police should look to him[802].
14*. April 29 ” Marmont Jourdan If I keep troops on the Tagus, I am too weak on the Douro and Tormes. I must draw my divisions northward.
15*. April 29 ” Marmont Berthier I find that five British divisions were chasing me last week. Wellington is very strong in the North.
16*. April 30 ” Marmont Berthier Send me a siege-train, I am helpless without one: also plenty of money.
17. April 30 ” Marmont Gen. Tirlet[803] Come up at once to join my army.
18*. May 1 ” Jourdan Marmont We will keep unhorsed guns for you at Talavera, so when moving South bring gunners and horses only.
19*. May 1 ” King Joseph Dorsenne You are placed under my command. Obey my orders.
20*. May 1 ” Jourdan Dorsenne Send a division to Valladolid, to support Marmont.
21*. May 1 ” Jourdan Marmont You must send more troops to the Tagus: Drouet is hard pressed in Estremadura.
22*. May 1 ” Jourdan Berthier Wellington is advancing in Estremadura. Marmont must send troops southward.
23*. May 1 ” King Joseph Berthier Observations on the military situation.
24*. May 1 ” Col. Bousseroque Gen. Doguerau[804] Technical artillery matters.
25. May 20 ” Proclamation by Suchet The King is appointed Commander-in-Chief in Spain.
26*. May 26 ” King Joseph Soult Hill has stormed Almaraz. Why was not Drouet near enough to save it?
27*. May 26 ” Jourdan Soult Hill has stormed Almaraz. Try to re-open communications with Foy.
28*. June 1 ” Marmont Jourdan The fall of Almaraz means that Wellington will attack me next. He is not threatening Soult, but me.
29*. June 22 ” Marmont King Joseph I stop in front of Salamanca manœuvring. I dare not attack Wellington till Caffarelli’s reinforcements arrive.
30*. June 24 ” Marmont Caffarelli I am manœuvring opposite Wellington. Your reinforcements are required at once.
31*. July 1 ” Marmont King Joseph When the Salamanca forts fell, I retreated to the Douro. I cannot fight Wellington till I get 1,500 more horse and 7,000 more infantry.
32. July 1 ” Suchet King Joseph Narrative of guerrilla war in Aragon.
33. July 1 ” Suchet King Joseph Favour shall be shown to Afrancesados.
34*. July 6 ” Marmont Jourdan I had to retreat to the Douro because Caffarelli sent no help. Can you lend me Treillard’s cavalry division?
35*. July 7 ” King Joseph Soult Send 10,000 men to Toledo at once.
36*. July 7 ” King Joseph Marmont I shall march to your aid in a few days, when my troops are collected.
37*. July 22 ” Suchet King Joseph I am much worried by Maitland’s approach. Have beaten Joseph O’Donnell at Castalla.
38. July 29 ” Gen. Lafon- Blaniac[805] King Joseph Madrid remains tranquil.
41*. July 30 ” Marmont King Joseph We can never hope to unite. My army retires via Lerma on Burgos.
42. Aug. 2 ” Gen. Espert[806] King Joseph Wellington is marching on Segovia.
43*. Aug. 7 ” King Joseph Marmont Communicate with me by the Somosierra Pass.
44*. Aug. 12 ” Suchet King Joseph I am much alarmed at the possible results of Maitland’s landing.
45*. Aug. 12 ” Soult Clarke The King is betraying the Emperor and negotiating with the Cadiz Cortes[807].
46*. Sept. 17 ” Suchet Soult Explains situation in Valencia.
47*. Dec. 9 ” King Joseph Napoleon Plans for reorganizing the armies.
48*. Dec. 22 ” King Joseph Napoleon Plans for next year. Should I make Burgos my capital, and hold Madrid only as an outpost?
49*. Jan. 8, 1813 King Joseph Napoleon Soult is intolerable. Let D’Erlon replace him. Send us money.
50*. Jan. 28 ” King Joseph Napoleon Your decision about Soult shocks me. I shall send him away on my own authority.
51*. Mar. 14 ” King Joseph Gen. Reille D’Erlon shall look after Salamanca. Send two divisions to hunt the guerrilleros.
52. Mar. 16 ” Col. Lucotte King Joseph Discouraging news from Paris. No men or money for Spain!
In addition to the ciphers, the Scovell papers consist of short diaries of Major Scovell for the Corunna Campaign, and for 1809-10-11-12-13, as also a large bundle of reports and maps of roads and passes in Portugal, all the papers concerning the raising of the Corps of Guides, a number of notes and reports on suggested travelling forges for the artillery and engineers, and some whole or mutilated contemporary Spanish newspapers. There is some curious and interesting information scattered through all of them.
XVI
BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1812
[DETAILS COLLECTED BY MAJOR J. H. LESLIE, R.A.]
I. ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY
The following troops were serving in the Peninsula in 1812:—
Troop. Under Command of Arrived in Peninsula. Designation in 1914.
A Brevet Major H. D. Ross July 1809 ‘A’ Battery, R.H.A.
D Captain G. Lefebure[808] [Later 2nd Captain E. C. Whinyates] March 1810 ‘V’ Battery, R.H.A.
E Captain R. Macdonald August 1811 ‘E’ Battery, R.H.A.
I Brevet Major R. Bull August 1809 ‘I’ Battery, R.H.A.
A, E, and I were serving with Wellington’s main army in 1812, attached respectively to the Light Division, the 7th Division, and the 1st Division of Cavalry (Stapleton Cotton). All three were present at Salamanca, but A was left at Madrid in August with the Light Division, and did not take part in the Burgos Campaign. D was attached to Erskine’s ‘2nd Cavalry Division,’ and served under Hill in Estremadura from the beginning of the year till Hill marched up to Madrid in October.
II. ROYAL (FOOT) ARTILLERY
A.
The seven companies shown in the following tables were serving in the Peninsula in 1812 with the field army.
Note.—In 1812 there were ten battalions of Royal (Foot) Artillery, the companies of which were always designated by the name of the commanding officer, whether he was actually present with his company or no.
Batalion. Under Command of Arrived in Peninsula. Designation in 1914.
1st Captain J. May[809] March 1809 2nd Battery, R.F.A.
4th Captain S. Maxwell October 1810 72 Company, R.G.A.
5th Captain F. Glubb[810] March 1809 48 Company, R.G.A.
8th Brevet Major R. W. Gardiner April 1811 78 Company, R.G.A.
8th Captain R. Lawson August 1808 87th Battery, R.F.A.
8th Captain J. P. Eligé[811] [Later, Captain T. A. Brandreth] October 1810 Reduced in 1819.
9th Captain R. Douglas March 1812 45th Battery, R.F.A.
Of these, Gardiner’s company was attached to the 1st Division, Maxwell’s to the 2nd, Douglas’s to the 3rd, Lawson’s to the 5th, Eligé’s to the 6th. May’s company accompanied the main army without guns, in charge of the Reserve ammunition train.
Glubb’s company was attached to the heavy 18-pounders and 24-pounder howitzers of the Reserve Artillery.
Gardiner’s, Douglas’s, Lawson’s, and Eligé’s [now temporarily under 2nd Captain W. Greene, Eligé having been killed at the Salamanca forts] companies were present at Salamanca, as was also the Reserve Artillery, but the last-named was not engaged.
Maxwell’s company was with Hill in Estremadura from January till the march to Madrid in September-October. Part of it was present at the capture of Almaraz on 19 May.
B.
The following additional companies were in Portugal in 1812, but did not join the field army:—
Batalion. Under Command of Arrived in Peninsula. Designation in 1914.
6th Brevet Major H. F. Holcombe April 1811 102 Company, R.G.A.
1st Captain A. Bredin September 1808 37th Battery, R.F.A.
6th Captain G. Thompson March 1809 18th Battery, R.F.A.
5th Captain H. Stone March 1812 92 Company, R.G.A.
6th Captain W. Morrison October 1812 51 Company, R.G.A.
Of these Holcombe’s company was employed at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. The other companies present at these leaguers were Glubb’s and Lawson’s at Rodrigo, and Glubb’s and Gardiner’s at Badajoz.
In June Holcombe’s and Thompson’s companies were sent round by sea to the east coast of Spain, and there joined the Anglo-Sicilian expedition of General Maitland, with which they continued to serve.
C.
At the beginning of 1812, there were present at Cadiz, Cartagena, and Tarifa, doing garrison duty, the following companies under Lieut.-Col. A. Duncan:—
Batalion. Under Command of Arrived in Peninsula. Designation in 1914.
5th Captain H. Owen January 1810 60 Company, R.G.A.
9th Captain P. J. Hughes January 1810 Reduced in 1819.
10th Captain W. Roberts March 1810 63 Company, R.G.A.
10th Major A. Dickson April 1810 21 Company, R.G.A.
10th Captain W. Shenley April 1810 11 Company, R.G.A.
Of these Hughes’s company was detached to Tarifa, and took a brilliant part in its defence in Dec. 1811-Jan. 1812. The rest were in Cadiz and the Isle of Leon. Owen’s and Dickson’s companies (the latter until July 1812 being commanded by Captain R. H. Birch, whose own company of the 10th battalion was at Gibraltar, as Dickson, with the rank of Major, was serving with the Portuguese Army) marched from Cadiz to Madrid with Skerrett’s column at the end of September 1812, and in October joined Wellington’s main field army. Hughes’s, Roberts’s, and Shenley’s companies remained in garrison at Cadiz, and Campbell’s was divided between Cartagena and Tarifa.
D.
At Alicante, under General Maitland, there were present during the later months of the year not only Holcombe’s and Thompson’s companies, which had come round from Lisbon, but also the two following British companies from Sicily:—
Batalion. Under Command of Arrived in Peninsula. Designation in 1914.
8th Captain J. S. Williamson August 1812 40th Battery, R.F.A.
4th Captain R. G. Lacy December 1812 25 Company, R.G.A.
III. KING’S GERMAN LEGION ARTILLERY
Of the three companies of the Legionary Artillery in the Peninsula only one (No. 4) was with the field army, that of Captain F. Sympher, attached to the 4th Division. This unit was present at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and also at the battle of Salamanca.
Captain K. Rettberg’s (No. 1) and Captain A. Cleeves’s (No. 2) companies were doing garrison duty in the Lisbon forts; but Rettberg himself, with a detachment of two officers and thirty men of his company, came up to the siege of Badajoz in March-April.
IV. PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY
[The details are taken from Major Teixeira Botelho’s Subsidios.]
Only three field batteries accompanied the allied field army during the campaign of 1812, though seven had been at the front in 1811. These batteries were:—
Captain J. da Cunha Preto’s 6-pounder [from the 1st regiment] and Captain W. Braun’s 9-pounder [from the 2nd regiment] batteries, both attached to General Hamilton’s Portuguese division, which always acted with Hill in Estremadura, and Major S. J. de Arriaga’s 24-pounder howitzer battery, which formed part of the Artillery Reserve, and accompanied Wellington’s own army to Badajoz, Salamanca, and Burgos. This company came from the 1st (Lisbon) regiment.
But in addition the 2nd or Algarve regiment supplied one company, under Captain J. C. Pereira do Amaral for the siege of Badajoz.
The 4th or Oporto regiment gave two companies (200 men) under Captain J. V. Miron for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and one (70 men) under Captain William Cox for the siege of Badajoz. Cox’s company was sent round to Alicante in June, along with the British companies of Holcombe and Thompson, and joined Maitland’s Anglo-Sicilian corps for the rest of the war.
Another company of the 4th regiment under Captain D. G. Ferreri formed the divisional artillery of Silveira’s Militia corps, and was present at the blockade of Zamora in June-July 1812.
The 1st or Lisbon regiment sent a company under Captain M. A. Penedo to Alicante, along with the company of Cox mentioned above from the 4th regiment. It also supplied one company under Lieutenant A. da Costa e Silva for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.
The 3rd or Elvas regiment supplied three companies, under the command of Major A. Tulloh[814], for the siege of Badajoz—they were those of Captains A. V. Barreiros, J. Elizeu, and J. M. Delgado.