Volume 4 / Part 2 / Book 2 — CHAPTER V. (continued 5)

[9] In this expedition Cortes appears, by the information of Clavigero, II. 152, to have crossed the southern mountains of the Mexican vale, and to have reduced Huastepec, Jautepec, Quauhnahuac, and other towns belonging to the Tlahuicas, who were subject to the Mexican empire; thus judiciously using his endeavours to strengthen his own party and to weaken that of the Mexicans, before proceeding to assail the capital of that powerful empire.--E.

Numerous bodies of Mexicans were lying in wait for us, intending to have attacked us while engaged in the ascent, and now advanced towards us in the plain; but we soon drove them before us, on which they took shelter among some other rocky ridges. We pursued them through some narrow passes among the rocks, and found they had taken shelter in another very strong fortress, similar to that from which we had been repulsed. We desisted for the present, and returned to our former post in search of water, our men and horses having been unable to procure any during the whole of this day. We found some appearance of springs at the foot of the rock, but they had been drawn dry by the great numbers of the enemy, and nothing remained but mud. Being under the necessity of endeavouring to procure water, we returned again to the second fortress, which was about a league and a half from the first, where we found a small village with a grove of mulberry trees, in which we discovered a very scanty spring. The people above discharged their missile weapons on our approach, seeming to be much more numerous than in the former place, and they were so situated that no shot from us could reach them. For some way up the rock, there were evident paths, but it seemed to present insurmountable difficulties against any attack. Fortunately for us there was another rock which commanded that on which the enemy were posted, and within shot, to which all our fire-arms and crossbows were detached, and the rest of our infantry proceeded to climb up the garrisoned rock slowly and with infinite difficulty. The enemy might easily have destroyed us by rolling down fragments of rocks on our heads, but their attention was called off from their main defence by our missiles, though rather at too great distance to produce much effect; yet having killed several of the enemy, they lost heart and offered to submit. On this, Cortes ordered five of their chiefs to come down, and offered to pardon them for their hostile resistance, on condition that they should induce those in the other fortress to surrender, which they accordingly engaged for. Cortes then sent the captains Xaramillo and de Ircio, with the ensign Corral and a party of men, among whom I was, to ascend the rock which had surrendered, giving us orders not to touch a grain of maize. I considered this as full permission to do ourselves all the good in our power. We found this fortress to consist of an extensive plain on the summit of a perpendicular rock, the entrance to which did not exceed twice the size of the mouth of an oven. The whole plain was full of men, women, and children, but they had not a drop of water. Twenty of their warriors had been slain by our shot, and a great many wounded. All their property was packed up in bales, among which there was a considerable quantity of tribute, which had been collected on purpose to be sent to Mexico. I had brought four of my Indian servants along with me, whom I began to load, and four of the natives whom I engaged in my service; but Captain De Ircio ordered me to desist, or he would report me to the general, putting me in mind that Cortes had forbidden us to touch a grain of maize. I answered that I had distinctly heard the orders about the maize, and for that reason I took the bales. But he would not allow me to carry any thing away, and reported me on our return to Cortes, expecting I should receive a reprimand; Cortes, however, observed that he was sorry I had not got the plunder, as the dogs would laugh at us and keep their property, after all the evil they had done us. De Ircio then proposed to return; but Cortes said it was not now time. The chiefs now returned from the other fortress, having induced its garrison to submit; and we returned to Huaxtepec that we might procure water. Our whole force was lodged for the night in the buildings belonging to the noble garden which I formerly mentioned, and I certainly never saw one of such beauty and magnificence. Our general and others who walked over all its extent, declared that it was most admirably disposed, and equalled the most magnificent they had ever seen in Spain.

We marched next day towards the city of Cuernabaca or Quauhnahuac. The Mexicans who occupied that place came out to fight us, but were soon defeated and pursued to Teputztlan or Tepatlan, which we took by storm, and made a considerable booty of Indian women and other spoils. Cortes summoned the chiefs of this place to come in and submit; and on their refusal, and on-purpose to impress the inhabitants of other places with terror, he ordered about the half of this town to be set on fire. At this time, the chiefs of a town called Yauhtepec came to Cortes and made their submission. Next day, we returned to Cuernabaca, which is a large town in a very strong situation, being defended by a deep ravine with a small rivulet, which precludes all access except by two bridges, which the inhabitants had broken down on our approach. Cortes was informed of a ford about half a league above the town which was practicable for the cavalry, to which he marched, by which the main strength of the enemy was drawn off to oppose him. We of the infantry searched for means to pass the ravine, and at length discovered a very dangerous pass by means of some trees which hung over from both sides, by the help of which about thirty of us and a considerable number of our Tlascalan allies got across. Three fell into the ravine, one of whom broke his leg. It was a most terrifying passage, and at one time I was quite blind with giddiness. Having got over and formed, we fell unexpectedly on the flank and rear of the enemy, and being now joined by a party of the cavalry, we soon drove the enemy from the field into the neighbouring woods and rocks. We found considerable property in the town, and we were here all lodged in the buildings of a large garden belonging to the cacique of the district. A deputation of twenty of the chiefs of the Tlahuican nation now waited on Cortes, offering to submit their whole country to his authority, and threw all the blame of their hostilities on the Mexicans.

The object of our next march was against Xochimilco, a large city on the fresh water lake of Chalco, in which most of the houses are built. As it was late before we left Quauhnahuac, and the weather was exceedingly sultry, our troops suffered excessively for want of water, which was not to be procured on our route. Many of our allies fainted, and one of them, and also one of our soldiers died of thirst. Seeing the distress of the army, Cortes ordered a halt in a pine forest, and sent forwards a party in search of relief. As I saw my friend De Oli about to set off, I took three of my Indian servants and followed the party, who endeavoured to persuade me to return; but I was resolute, and De Oli at length consented, telling me I should have to fight my way. At the distance of about half a league our cavalry came to some villages on the side of a ridge of mountains, where they found water in the houses, and one of my servants brought me a large jar full of water. Having quenched my thirst, I now determined to return, as the natives had taken the alarm, and were gathering to attack us. I found Cortes just about to resume the march, and gave him and the officers, who were with him a hearty draught from my jar. The whole army now moved forward to the villages, where a scanty supply of water was procured. It was now near sunset, and the cavalry came in with a report that the whole country had risen against us, on which account we halted here for the night, which was very rainy with much wind, as I well remember, being on the night guard. Several of our soldiers were taken ill here with inflammation of their mouth and throat, owing to their having eaten a species of artichoke to quench their thirst.

We resumed our march early next morning, and arrived about eight o'clock at Xochimilco[10]. I can give no idea of the prodigious force of the enemy which was collected at this place to oppose us. They had broken down the bridges, and fortified themselves with many parapets and pallisades, and many of their chiefs were armed with the swords which we lost during our flight from Mexico, which they had polished very nicely. The attack at the bridge lasted above half an hour, several of our people getting across by swimming, in which attempt some were drowned, and we were assailed at once in front and rear and on both flanks. At length our cavalry got on firm ground, after losing several men, and we drove the enemy before us; but just at this time a fresh reinforcement of at least 10,000 Mexicans arrived, and received the charge of the cavalry with great intrepidity, and wounded four of our men. At this moment the good chesnut horse on which Cortes rode fell under him among a crowd of the enemy, who knocked him down, and great numbers gathering around were carrying him off, when a body of our Tlascalan allies came up to his rescue, headed by the valiant De Oli, and remounted him, after he had been severely wounded in the head. De Oli also received three desperate sword wounds from the enemy. As all the streets of the town were full of Mexican warriors, we had to divide into a number of separate bodies in order to fight them; but we who were nearest the place in which our general was in such danger, being alarmed by the uncommon noise and outcry, hurried there, where they found him and about fifteen of the cavalry in a very embarrassing situation, amid parapets and canals where the horse had no freedom to act. We immediately attacked the enemy, whom we forced to give ground, and brought off Cortes and De Oli. On first passing at the bridge, Cortes had ordered the cavalry to act in two divisions on purpose to clear our flanks: They returned at this time all wounded, and reported that the enemy were so numerous and desperate, that all their efforts wore unavailing to drive them away. At the time the cavalry came in, we were in an enclosed court, dressing our wounds with rags and burnt oil; and the enemy sent in such showers of arrows among us that hardly any escaped being wounded. We all now sallied out upon the enemy, both cavalry and infantry, and made considerable havoc among them with our swords, so that we drove them away and they gave over their attempt to storm our post. Having now some relaxation, Cortes brought our whole force to the large enclosures in which the temples were situated; and on some of us ascending to the top of one of the temples, where we had a commanding view of Mexico and the lake, we perceived about two thousand canoes full of troops coming to attack us. A body of ten thousand men were likewise seen in full march by land for the same purpose, and the enemy had already fully that number in and about the town. We learned from five chiefs whom we had made prisoners, that this immense force was destined to assault our quarters that night; for which reason strong guards were posted at all the places where the enemy were expected to disembark; the cavalry were held in readiness to charge upon them on the roads and firm ground; and constant patroles were kept going about during the night. I was posted along with ten other soldiers to keep guard at a stone and lime wall which commanded one of the landing-places, and while there we heard a noise occasioned by the approach of a party of the enemy, whom we beat off, sending a report to Cortes by one of our number. The enemy made a second attempt, in which they knocked down two of our men; but being again repulsed, they made an attempt to land at a different place, where there was a small gate communicating with a deep canal. The night was extremely dark, and as the natives were not accustomed to fight in the night time, their troops fell into confusion; and instead of making their attack in two opposite places at the same time, they formed in one body of at least 15,000 men.

[10] This beautiful city was the largest in the vale of Mexico, after the capital and the royal residences of Tezcuco and Tlacopan, and was famous for its floating gardens, whence it derived its name, signifying flower gardens in the Mexican language.--Clavig. II. 155.

When our report reached Cortes, he came to us attended by nine or ten of the cavalry, and as he did not answer my challenge, I and my comrade Gonzalo Sanchez, a Portuguese from Algarve, fired three or four shots at them; on which knowing our voices, Cortes observed to his escort, that this post did not require to be inspected, as it was in charge of two of his veterans. He then observed that our post was a dangerous one, and continued his rounds without saying any more. I was afterwards told that one of the soldiers of Narvaez was whipped this very night for negligence on his post. As our powder was all expended, we were ordered to prepare a good supply of arrows for the crossbows, and were employed all the rest of the night in heading and feathering these, under the direction of Pedro Barba, who was captain of the crossbow-men. At break of day the enemy made a fresh attack and killed one Spaniard, but we drove them back, killing several of their chiefs, and took a great many prisoners. Our cavalry had been ordered out to charge the Mexicans, but finding them in great force, they sent back for assistance. The whole of our army now sallied forth and completely defeated the enemy, from whom we took several prisoners. From these men, we learned that the Mexicans intended to weary us out by reiterated attacks, on which account it was resolved to evacuate the place next day. In the mean time, having information that the town contained much wealth, we got some of the prisoners to point out the houses in which it was contained, which stood in the water of the fresh water lake, and could only be approached by small bridges over the canals, leading from a causeway. A considerable number both of our men and of the allies went to these houses, from which they brought away a great deal of booty in cotton cloth and other valuable articles, and this example was followed by others. While thus employed, a body of Mexicans came upon them unexpectedly in canoes, and besides wounding many of our men, they seized four soldiers alive, whom they carried off in triumph to Mexico; and from these men Guatimotzin learnt the smallness of our number, and the great loss we had sustained in killed and wounded. After questioning them as much as he thought proper, Guatimotzin commanded their hands and feet to be cut off, and sent them in this mutilated condition through many of the surrounding districts, as an example of the treatment he intended for us all, and then ordered them to be put to death.

On the ensuing morning we had to sustain a fresh attack, as had regularly been the case during the four days we remained in Xochimilco, but which we now determined to quit. Before commencing our march, Cortes drew up the army in an open place a little way out of the town, in which the markets were held, where he made us a speech, in which he expatiated on the dangers we had to encounter in our march, and the strong bodies of the enemy we might expect to oppose our retreat, and then warmly urged us to leave all our plunder and luggage, that we might not be exposed to danger in its defence. We remonstrated, however, that it would be a cowardly act to abandon what we had so hardly won, declaring that we felt confident of being able to defend our persons and property against all assailants. He gave way, therefore, to our wishes, and arranged the order of our march, placing the baggage in the centre, and dividing the cavalry and crossbows between the van and rear guards, as our musketry was now useless for want of powder. The enemy harassed us by continual assaults all the way from Xochimilco to Cuyocan, or Cojohuacan, a city on the borders of the lake, near one of the causeways leading to Mexico, which we found abandoned, and where we took up our quarters for two days, taking care of our wounds, and making arrows for our crossbows. The enemy which had especially obstructed us on this march, consisted of the inhabitants of Xochimilco, Cuyocan, Huitzilopochco, Iztapalapa, Mizquic, and five other towns, all of considerable size, and built on the edge of the lake, near one another, and not far from Mexico. On the third morning we marched for Tlacopan or Tacuba, harassed as usual by the enemy, but our cavalry soon forced them to retire to their canals and ditches. During this march, Cortes attempted to lay an ambush for the enemy, for which purpose he set out with ten horsemen and four servants, but had nearly fallen into a snare himself. Having encountered a party a Mexicans who fled before him, he pursued them too far, and was suddenly surrounded by a large body of warriors, who started out from an ambuscade, and wounded all the horses in the first attack, carrying off two of the attendants of Cortes to be sacrificed at Mexico, the rest of the party escaping with considerable difficulty. Our main body reached Tacuba in safety, with all the baggage; but as Cortes and his party did not appear, we began to entertain suspicions of some misfortune having befallen him. On this account, Alvarado, De Oli, Tapia, and I, with some others, went to look for him in the direction in which we had last seen him. We soon met two of his servants, who informed us of what had happened, and were shortly afterwards joined by Cortes, who appeared extremely sad, and even shed tears.

When we arrived at our quarters in Tacuba, which were in some large enclosed courts, it rained very heavily, and we were obliged to remain exposed for about two hours. On the weather clearing up, the general and his officers, with many of the men who were off duty, went up to the top of the great temple of Tacuba, whence we had a most delightful prospect of the lake, with all its numerous cities and towns, rising as it were out of the water. Innumerable canoes were seen in all directions, some employed in fishing, and others passing with provisions or merchandize of all kinds. We all gave praise to God, who had been pleased to render us the instruments for bringing the numerous inhabitants of so fine a country to the knowledge of his holy name; yet the bloody scenes which we had already experienced in Mexico, filled us with melancholy for the past, and even with some apprehension for the future. These recollections made Cortes exceedingly sad, regretting the many valiant soldiers he had already lost, and the brave men whom he might still expect to fall before he could be able to reduce the great, strong, and populous city of Mexico to submission[11]. Our reverend Father Olmedo, endeavoured to console him, and one of our soldiers observed, that such was the fortune of war, and that our general was in a very different situation from Nero, when he contemplated his capital on fire. Cortes replied, that he felt melancholy while reflecting on the fatigues and dangers we should still have to pass through; but that he should soon take effectual measures for bringing the great object in view to a speedy conclusion. Having no particular purpose to serve by remaining in Tacuba, some of our officers and soldiers proposed to take a view of the causeway where we had suffered so severely on the fatal night of our flight from Mexico; but this was considered dangerous and imprudent. We accordingly proceeded on our march by Escapozalco, which was abandoned by the enemy on our approach, to Terajoccan, which was also deserted, and thence to Coatitlan or Guatitlan, where we arrived excessively fatigued, as it never ceased raining during the whole of that day. We took up our quarters in that place for the night, which was excessively rainy; and, though the enemy gave us some alarms during the night, I can testify that no proper watch was kept, owing to the inclemency of the weather, as my post was not visited either by rounds or corporal. From Coatitlan, we continued our march by a deep miry road, through four or five other towns, all abandoned, and arrived in two days at Aculman or Oculman, in the territory of Tezcuco, where we received the pleasing intelligence that a reinforcement had arrived to us from Spain. Next day we proceeded to Tezcuco, where we arrived worn out with wounds and fatigue, and even diminished in our numbers.

[11] Diaz mentions a poem circulated at the time, as beginning in reference to the melancholy of Cortes on this occasion, somewhat in the following strain: In Tacuba was Cortes, with many a gallant chief; He thought upon his losses, and bow'd his head with grief.

Soon after our return to Tezcuco, a conspiracy was formed for the assassination of our general, at the head of which was one Antonio de Villafana, an adherent of Velasquez, and some of the other soldiers who had come over with Narvaez, but whose names I do not choose to mention, and the conspirators had even communicated their plan to two principal officers, whom I will not name, one of whom was to have been appointed captain-general on the death of Cortes. They had even arranged matters for the appointment of alguazil-major, alcaldes, regidor, contador, treasurer, veedor, and others of that kind, and of captains and standard-bearer to the army, all from among the soldiers of Narvaez. All the principal adherents of Cortes were to have been put to death, and the conspirators were to have divided our properties, arms, and horses, among themselves. This business was revealed to Cortes, only two days after our return to Tezcuco, by the repentance of one of the conspirators, whom he amply rewarded. The general immediately communicated the intelligence to Alvarado, De Oli, Sandoval, Tapia, Luis Marin, and Pedro de Ircio, who were the two alcaldes for the time, also to me, and to all in whom he reposed confidence. We all accompanied Cortes, well armed, to the quarters of Villafana, where he found him and many others of the conspirators, and took him immediately into custody. The others endeavoured to escape, but were all detained and sent to prison. Cortes took a paper from the bosom of Villafana, having the signatures of all his accomplices; but which he afterwards pretended that Villafana had swallowed, to set the minds of the conspirators at rest, as they were too numerous to be all punished in the present weak state of our army. Villafana was immediately tried, and made a full confession; and his guilt being likewise clearly established by many witnesses, the judges, who were Cortes, the two alcaldes, and De Oli, condemned him to die. Having confessed himself to the reverend Juan Diaz, he was hanged from a window of the apartment. No more of the conspirators were proceeded against; but Cortes thought it prudent to appoint a body guard for his future security, selected from among those who had been with him from the first, of which Antonio de Quinones was made captain.

At this period an order was issued for bringing in all our prisoners to be marked, being the third time since we came to the country. If that operation were unjustly conducted the first time, it was worse the second, and this time worse than ever; for besides the two fifths for the king and Cortes, no less than thirty draughts were made for the captains; besides which, all the handsome females we had given in to be marked, were stolen away, and concealed till it became convenient to produce them.

As the brigantines were entirely finished, and the canal for their passage into the lake was now sufficiently wide and deep for that purpose, Cortes issued orders to all the districts in our alliance, near Tezcuco, to send him, in the course of ten days, 8000 arrow-shafts from each district, made of a particular wood, and as many copper heads. Within the appointed time, the whole number required was brought to head-quarters, all executed better than even the patterns. Captain Pedro Barba, who commanded the crossbows, ordered each of his soldiers to provide two cords and nuts, and to try the range of their bows. Cortes ordered all the cavalry to have their lances new-headed, and to exercise their horses daily. He sent likewise an express to the elder Xicotencatl at Tlascala, otherwise called Don Lorenzo de Vargas, to send 20,000 of the warriors of Tlascala, Huixotzinco and Cholula; and he sent similar orders to Chalco and Tlalmanalco; ordering all our allies to rendezvous at Tezcuco on the day after the festival of the Holy Ghost, 28th April 1521. And on that day, Don Hernandez Ixtlilxochitl of Tezcuco, was to join us with all his forces. Some considerable reinforcements of soldiers, horses, arms, and ammunition had arrived from Spain and other places, so that when mustered mustered on the before-mentioned day by Cortes, in the large enclosures of Tezcuco, our Spanish force amounted to the following number: 84 cavalry, 650 infantry, armed with sword and buckler, or pikes, and 194 musketeers and crossbow-men, in all 928 Spaniards. From this number he selected 12 musketeers or crossbow-men, and 12 of the other infantry, for rowers to each of the vessels, in all 312 men, appointing a captain to each vessel; and he distributed 20 cannoneers through the fleet, which he armed with such guns as we had that were fit for this service. Many of our men had been formerly sailors, yet all were extremely averse from acting as rowers on the present occasion; for which reason the general made inquiry as to those who were natives of sea-ports, or who had formerly been fishers or seafaring men, all of whom he ordered to the oars; and though some of them pled their gentility as an exemption, he would hear of no excuse. By these means he obtained 150 men for this service, who were in fact in a much better situation than we who bore the brunt and danger of the war on land, as will appear in the sequel. When all this was arranged, and the crews embarked along with their commanders, each brigantine hoisted a royal standard, and every one a distinguishing flag. Cortes likewise gave the captains written instructions for their guidance, dividing them into squadrons, each of which was to co-operate with a particular leader of the land forces.

Cortes now issued the following general orders to the army: 1. No person to blaspheme the Lord Jesus, his Virgin Mother, the Holy Apostles, or any of the Saints, under heavy penalties. 2. No soldier to maltreat any of our allies in their persons or properties. 3. No soldier to be absent from quarters on any pretence. 4. Every soldier to keep his arms, both offensive and defensive, in the best order. 5. No soldier to stake his horse or arms in gaming. 6. No soldier to sleep out of his armour, or without his arms beside him, except when disabled by wounds or sickness. Lastly, the penalty of death was denounced for sleeping on guard, for a sentinel quitting his post, for absence from quarters without leave, for quitting the ranks in the field, or for flight in battle.

At this time our allies of Tlascala arrived under the command of Xicotencatl the younger, who was accompanied by his two brothers. Some of the warriors of Huexotzinco and Cholula came along with the Tlascalans, but not in any great numbers[12], yet the alacrity of our allies was such that they joined us a day previous to that which was appointed by Cortes. They marched in with great military parade, each of the chiefs carrying a standard with their national device, a white spread eagle, and they were all in high spirits, shouting out, Castilla! Castilla! Tlascala! Tlascala! From the arrival of their van, till the rear came in, took up three hours. Cortes received them with great courtesy, promising to make them all rich on their return to their native country, and dismissed them with many compliments to their respective quarters.

[12] Clavigero, II. 159, carries the number of allies which joined Cortes on this occasion, to more than 200,000 men. In his enumeration of the several divisions of the army appointed for the investment of Mexico, Diaz makes the Indian allies very little more than 24,000 warriors.--E.

Cortes made the following arrangement of our land army for the investment of Mexico, distributing our forces in three separate divisions, under the respective commands of Alvarado, De Oli, and Sandoval, reserving to himself to act where his presence might be most necessary, and taking in the mean time the command of the fleet. Pedro de Alvarado, under whom I served, had 150 infantry, 30 cavalry, 18 musketeers and crossbow-men, and 8000 Tlascalans, and was ordered to take post at Tacuba, having three captains under his command, his brother Jorge de Alvarado, Pedro Guttierrez, and Andres de Monjara, having each a company of 50 infantry, with a third of the musketeers and crossbow-men, the cavalry being commanded by Alvarado in person.--Christoval de Oli commanded the second division, having under him Andres de Tapia, Francisco Verdugo, and Francisco de Lugo, with 175 infantry, 30 cavalry, 20 musketeers and crossbows, and 8000 of our Indian allies. This division was ordered to take post at Cuyoacan or Cojohuacan.--The third division, under the command of Gonzalo de Sandoval, who had under him captains Luis Marin and Pedro de Ircio, consisted of 150 infantry, 24 cavalry, 14 musketeers and crossbows, and above 8000 Indian warriors, was to take post at Iztapalapa. The division of Alvarado and De Oli were ordered to march from Tezcuco by the right, going round the northern side of the lake, and the third, under Sandoval, by the left, to the south end of the lake; and his march being much shorter, he was ordered to remain in Tezcuco until Cortes should sail out with the fleet[13].

[13] Diaz mentions, that about this time intelligence came to Tezcuco, that three of our soldiers who had been left by Pizarro to search for mines in the country of the Zapotecas had been put to death by the Mexicans, one only, named Barrientos, having escaped to Chinantla, where he was protected by the natives.--E.

Before setting out on their march, Alvarado and De Oli directed our Indian allies to go on a day before us, that we might not be interrupted by their numbers, and ordered them to wait for us when they reached the Mexican territory. While on their march, Chichimecatl remarked that Xicotencatl, the commander in chief of the Tlascalans was absent; and it was found that he had secretly gone off from Tezcuco for Tlascala on the preceding night, in order to take possession of the territory and property of Chichimecatl, thinking this a good opportunity during the absence of that chief and his warriors, and being in no apprehension of any opposition, now that Maxicatzin was dead. Chichimecatl returned immediately to Tezcuco, to inform Cortes of what had taken place; and our general sent five chiefs of Tezcuco and two Tlascalan chiefs, to request Xicotencatl to return. He answered, that if his old father and Maxicatzin had listened to him, they would not have been now domineered over by Cortes and the Spaniards, and absolutely refused to go back. On this haughty answer being reported to Cortes, he immediately sent off an alguazil with four horsemen and five Tezcucan chiefs, ordering them to seize and hang Xicotencatl wherever they could find him. Alvarado interceded strongly for his pardon, but ineffectually; for though Cortes seemed to relent, the party who arrested Xicotencatl in a town subject to Tezcuco, hung him up by private orders from Cortes, and some reported that this was done with the approbation of the elder Xicotencatl, father to the Tlascalan general. This affair detained us a whole day, and on the next the two divisions of Alvarado and De Oli marched by the same route, halting for the night at Aculma or Alcolman, a town belonging to the state of Tezcuco, where a very ruinous quarrel was near taking place between our two commanders and their divisions. De Oli had sent some persons before to take quarters for his troops, and had appropriated every house in the place for his men, marking them by setting up green boughs on the terraces; so that when Alvarado arrived with his division, we had not a single house for us to lodge in. Our soldiers were much irritated at this circumstance, and stood immediately to their arms to fight with those of De Oli, and the two commanders even challenged each other; but several of the more prudent of the officers on both sides interposed, and a reconciliation was effected, yet Alvarado and De Oli were never afterwards good friends. An express was sent off immediately to apprize Cortes of this misunderstanding, who wrote to all the people of any influence in the two divisions, greatly condemning the circumstances of this disagreement, which might have produced fatal consequences to our whole army, and earnestly recommended a reconcilement. We continued our march for two days more, by several Mexican cities, which were abandoned by their inhabitants; and passing through Coatitlan, Tenajoccan and Itzcapuzalco, where our allies waited for us, we proceeded for Tacuba, otherwise called Tlacopan.

SECTION XIII.

Narrative of Occurrences from the commencement of the Siege of Mexico to its Reduction, and the Capture of Guatimotzin.

Having thus, by the occupation of Tacuba, commenced the investment of the great and populous city of Mexico, we soon found the enemy around us in great numbers; and as the first operation, it was determined on the following day, that our divisions should march to Chapoltepec to destroy the aqueduct at that place, by which the city of Mexico was supplied with fresh water. We set out accordingly with our allies, and although the enemy attacked us on our march, we repelled them and succeeded in our object of cutting off the pipes, so that from that time the city of Mexico was deprived of fresh water. It was now determined to endeavour to penetrate to the city of Mexico by the causeway of Tacuba, or at least to attempt getting possession of the first bridge on that causeway; but on our arrival there, the prodigious number of boats which covered the water on both sides, and the multitude of Mexican troops which thronged the causeway to oppose us, was perfectly astonishing. By the first flight of arrows which they discharged against us, three of our men were slain and thirty wounded; yet we advanced to the bridge, the enemy retiring before us, as if by a concerted stratagem, so that we were exposed on both flanks, on a narrow road only twenty feet wide, as a butt for the innumerable arrows of the Mexicans in the canoes, and neither our musquetry nor crossbows were of any avail against the people in the canoes, as they were effectually protected by high wooden screens. The horses of our cavalry were all wounded, and when at any time they made a charge upon the enemy, they were almost immediately stopt by barriers and parapets which the enemy had drawn across the causeway for the purpose, and from whence they defended themselves with long lances. Likewise, when the infantry advanced along the causeway, instead of abiding our attack, the enemy threw themselves into the water and escaped by swimming or into their canoes, returning incessantly to the attack. We were thus engaged for more than an hour to no useful purpose, the enemy continually increasing in number, by reinforcements from every part of the lake; and our allies, instead of being serviceable, only encumbered the causeway and hindered our movements. Finding that we were unable any longer to resist the multitude of enemies who assailed us perpetually from the water, and almost with entire impunity, we determined to retreat to our quarters in Tacuba, having eight of our men slain and above fifty wounded, and were closely followed up and much harassed by the enemy during our retreat. De Oli laid the blame of the disaster of this day on the rashness of Alvarado.

Next day[1], though we were all extremely solicitous for the two captains to remain together, De Oli proceeded with his division to take possession of Cojohuacan, according to the orders he had received from Cortes; but this separation was assuredly extremely ill judged; as, if the enemy had known the smallness of our numbers at the two stations, they might have fallen upon and destroyed us separately, during the four or five days that we remained divided before the arrival of Cortes with the brigantines. In all that time we never ventured to make any more attempts against the Mexican causeways, but the enemy frequently sent bodies of their troops to the main land to make attacks on our quarters, on which occasions we always drove them away.

[1] According to Clavigero, II. 162, the 30th of May 1521, on which day Cortes dated the commencement of this memorable siege.--E.

Sandoval with his division did not leave Tezcuco until the fourth day after the feast of Corpus Christi[2], when he marched through a friendly country by the south side of the lake, and arrived without interruption in front of Iztapalapa. Immediately on his arrival, he commenced an attack on the enemy, and burnt many of the houses in that part of the town which stood on the firm land; but fresh bodies of Mexican warriors came over in canoes and by the causeway of Iztapalapa to relieve their friends in the town, and made a determined resistance against Sandoval. While the engagement was going on, a smoke was observed to arise from a hill above the town, which was answered by similar signals at many other points around the lake, which were afterwards found to have been made to apprize the enemy of the appearance of our flotilla on the lake. On this, the efforts of the enemy against Sandoval were much relaxed, as their canoes and warriors were recalled to oppose our naval force; and Sandoval was thus enabled to take up his quarters in a part of the town of Iztapalapa; between which and Cojohuacan the only means of communication was by a causeway or mound dividing the lake of Chalco from that of Mexico or Tezcuco, which passage was at that time impracticable in the face of the enemy.

[2] Corpus Christi fell that year, according to Clavigero, on the 30th May, so that the occupation of Iztapalapa, by which the investment of Mexico was completed, was on the 3d of June.

"Before proceeding to the narrative of the siege of Mexico, it may be proper to give some account of the situation of the city of Mexico, and the mounds or causeways by which it communicated with the land at the several posts which were occupied by Cortes for its investment[3]. The city of Mexico was built partly on an island and partly in the water, at the west side of a considerable salt lake, named sometimes the lake of Tezcuco, and sometimes the lake of Mexico, and appears to have been about a mile from the firm land. It communicated with the land by three mounds or causeways; that of Tepejacac on the north, about three miles long, measuring from the great temple in centre of Mexico; that usually called of Iztapalapa on the south, nearly five miles in length; and that of Tacuba or Tlacopan on the west, about two miles long, likewise measuring from the temple; but at least a mile may be abstracted from each of these measurements, on account of the extent of the city from the great temple to the commencement of the causeways. About the middle of the southern causeway called that of Iztapalapa, another causeway branched off obliquely to the south-east, to the town of Cojohuacan; and at the place where these two causeways united stood the town of Xoloc, partly on the sides of the causeways, but chiefly in the water intersected by canals and ditches. Besides these three grand causeways for communicating with the land, there was a smaller mound about two miles south from the causeway of Tacuba, from a town named Chapoltepec, along which the aqueduct, or pipes, for supplying Mexico with fresh water was carried; but this appears to have been too narrow for allowing any passage, at least the Spaniards do not seem to have availed themselves of it, in their long and arduous endeavours to force their way into Mexico. Near the south-west angle of the salt lake of Mexico, it communicated by a narrow neck or strait with the fresh water lake of Chalco; and at their junction a mound or causeway had been constructed across, to prevent the admixture of the salt and fresh lakes, having a town called Mexicaltzinco at the eastern extremity of this mound. Iztapalapa stood in the western end of the peninsula, between the lakes of Mexico and Chalco, but on the borders and in the waters of the former. The whole fertile vale of Mexico or Anahuac, around these two lakes, and some others to the north of the great lake, was thickly planted with cities, towns, and villages, and highly cultivated, containing and giving subsistence to a prodigious population. The extent of this extraordinary valley, elevated nearly 8000 feet above the level of the sea, is about 50 miles from north to south, and forty miles from east to west; being surrounded on every side by ridges of lofty mountains, some of them perpetually covered with snow, and rising to about 10,000 feet in perpendicular elevation above the ocean."

[3] The whole of this topographical account of Mexico and its approaches is added by the editor, and has been placed in the text, distinguished by inverted commas, as too long for a note. A plan is added, constructed from a comparison of the maps in Diaz and Clavigero, both evidently drawn without any actual survey, and corrected by means of the excellent map of the vale of Mexico given by Humboldt. By means of a great drain, made considerably posterior to the conquest, the lake has been greatly diminished in magnitude, insomuch that the city is now above three miles from the lake; so that the accurate map of Humboldt does not now serve for the ancient topography of Mexico and its near environs.--E.

When Cortes brought out his fleet of brigantines upon the lake, he went in the first place to attack an insular rock close beside Mexico, on which a vast number of the inhabitants of that city and other places in the neighbourhood had taken shelter. Immediately on perceiving his intentions, their whole force collected from every part of the lake, and proceeded against him in not less than 4000 large canoes full of warriors. On perceiving this immense number of boats coming to attack him, Cortes withdrew with his brigantines into an open part of the lake, ordering his captains to wait patiently for a breeze of wind which then began to blow. As the enemy supposed that this movement proceeded from fear, they immediately closed up around the flotilla with shouts of triumph. The wind now sprung up, and the whole fleet made sail through the throng of canoes, plying their oars at the same time, and run down and overset great numbers of the Mexican canoes, compelling all the rest to fly for shelter to the recesses and shallows on the borders of the lake. After this, Cortes made sail to Cojohuacan[4], where he was again attacked by the Mexicans, both by means of their canoes on the water, and from their temples on the land: But Cortes brought four guns to bear upon them, by which he did considerable execution. During this action his powder magazine blew up, owing to some mismanagement of the gunners, by which many of his people were wounded. This unfortunate accident obliged him to detach his smallest brigantine to Sandoval for a supply of ammunition. He remained at Cojohuacan for two days with the flotilla, repairing the injury his ship had sustained from the explosion.

[4] It is hard to guess which way the brigantines could get there, as by the maps both of Diaz and Clavigero, the great double causeway of Xoloc or Iztapalapa, ought to have completely prevented his penetrating to that part of the lake. It was probably Xoloc against which this attack was made, and Diaz may have mistaken the name after an interval of fifty-one years; for so long intervened between the siege of Mexico in 1521, and 1572, when he informs us his history was concluded.--E.

When we were assured that the flotilla was out upon the lake, Alvarado marched out with our division to the causeway of Tacuba, as far as the bridge, in which we were constantly engaged with the enemy to very little purpose, except that we repaired the passes in our rear as we advanced, and did not now suffer the cavalry to come upon the causeway, as we had found by experience that they were of very little service, and besides that their horses were exposed to much danger. Finding that he could not sufficiently annoy the enemy in his present post at Iztapalapa, where the Mexicans had possession of the houses which were built in the water, Sandoval advanced by a causeway to a more commanding situation[5]. When this was noticed from Mexico, a large detachment of warriors came over in canoes, with orders to cut the causeway in the rear of our troops. Cortes observed this, and immediately made sail with his vessels to the relief of Sandoval, giving orders at the same time to De Oli to march a body of troops by the causeway for the same purpose. Having relieved Sandoval by these means, Cortes ordered him to remove with his division from Iztapalapa to Tepeaquilla or Tepejacac, where the church of our Lady of Guadalupe now stands, in which many wonderful miracles have been performed.

[5] Perhaps along the mound or causeway of Mexicaltzinco; by which he approached towards the great causeway of Xoloc, and the position of De Oli at Cojohuacan.--E.

As it was impossible for our troops to advance on the causeways, unless their flanks were secured from attacks by water, the flotilla was appointed to this service in three divisions, one of which was attached to each of the three detachments of our land force: Four brigantines being allotted to Alvarado, six to De Oli, and two to Sandoval[6]; twelve in all, the thirteenth having been found too small for service, and was therefore laid up, and her crew distributed to the rest, as twenty men had been already severely wounded in the several vessels. Alvarado now led our division to attack the causeway of Tacuba, placing two brigantines on each flank for our protection. We drove the enemy before us from several of their bridges and barricades; but after fighting the whole day, we were obliged to retreat to our quarters at night, almost all of us wounded by the incessant showers of stones and arrows of the enemy. We were continually assailed on the causeway, by fresh troops of warriors, carrying different banners or devices; and our brigantines were excessively annoyed from the terraces of the houses which stood in the water; and as we could not leave a party to keep possession of what we had acquired during the day, the enemy repossessed themselves of the bridges at night, and repaired and strengthened their parapets and other defences. In some places they deepened the water, digging pits in the shallow places, and placing the canoes in ambush, which they secured against the approach of our brigantines by means of pallisades under water. Every day we were employed in the same manner, driving the enemy before us, and every night we returned to our quarters to bind up our wounds. The cavalry were of no service, on account of the barricades defended by long lances; and the soldiers even did not choose to risk their horses, as their price at this time was from eight hundred to a thousand crowns. One Juan, a soldier from Catalonia, used to heal our wounds by charms and prayers, which by the mercy of God recovered us very fast; and this being observed by our allies, all their wounded men applied to Juan, who had more business on his hands than he was able for. But whether whole or wounded, we were obliged to go out daily against the enemy, as otherwise our companies would have been reduced to less than half their strength. Our ensign was disabled almost every day, as he could not at the same time carry his colours and defend himself from the enemy. We were abundantly supplied with corn, but were much in want of refreshments for the wounded men; our chief resource being tunas or Indian figs, cherries while in season, and a plant called quilities by the natives. The situation of the other two attacks was precisely similar to ours. Every day, when we marched to the attack, a signal was made from the great temple of Tlaltelolco, the great division of Mexico nearest Tacuba, on which the enemy rushed out against us, and were continually relieved by fresh troops, marching out in succession. Finding that we gained nothing by these daily attacks, we changed our plan of operations. On our causeway there was a small open space, on which stood some buildings for religious worship, where we formed a lodgment, and established a post, leaving our cavalry and allies to secure our rear in Tacuba, whence we were supplied with provisions. Though very badly lodged in this place, as every shower of rain came in upon us, we maintained this post and advanced a little towards the city every day, filling up the trenches which intersected the causeway, and pulling down the houses on each side, and using their materials to strengthen our defences. We found it extremely difficult to set the houses on fire, nor could the flames communicate from house to house, as all the houses were separated by canals and ditches. During this operation we were subjected to great danger, as the enemy destroyed us from their terraces when we endeavoured to swim over from the causeway to these detached houses.

[6] Though not mentioned by Diaz, this necessarily implies that one of the bridges of each causeway must have been taken possession of by the Spaniards, to allow the brigantines to get through into those parts of the lake which were intersected by the causeways.--E.

In this manner we gained some ground every day, which we secured by parapets and other defences, and preserved during the night. Every evening at sunset, the company which was first for duty, was entrusted with the advanced post, to which they sent forty men; the second company sent an equal number at midnight, and the relieved guard did not quit their post, but had to remain sleeping on the ground; the third company did the same the same two hours before day-break, and the second now lay down to sleep, so that we now had 120 men on guard. Sometimes our whole detachment had to remain under arms the whole night, especially on the following occasion: We learnt from some of our prisoners, that the Mexicans intended to force our post by a great effort, which would have frustrated the other two attacks. For this purpose, all the warriors of nine towns around the lake, including those of Tacuba, Izcapuzalco, and Tenajocan, were by a joint attack upon our rear to carry off our baggage and destroy our bakery in Tacuba, while the Mexicans were to assail us in front on the causeway. We immediately communicated this intelligence to our cavalry and allies at headquarters, warning them to keep on the alert. In pursuance of this plan, we were attacked both in front and rear for several successive nights, from midnight to day-break. Sometimes the enemy came on with a prodigious noise of shouting and military instruments, and at other times stole upon us in profound silence; but their night attacks were never made with so much resolution as those during the day. Yet we were harassed to death with continual watching, fatigue, and wounds, and constantly exposed to cold winds and almost incessant rain. Our post was reduced to a mere splash of mud and water, and our only food was maize and miserable herbs. When we complained, the only comfort given us by our officers, was that such is the fortune of war. Yet all our efforts, fatigues, and privations, were of little avail; as the parapets we destroyed and the ditches we filled up during the day, were uniformly replaced next night by the enemy.

The destruction of the aqueduct of Chapoltepec, from which so much had been expected, by cutting off the water which supplied the city of Mexico, was unavailing, neither could we starve them into a surrender, as they were regularly supplied with every thing they wanted by means of their canoes from the towns around the lake. In order to prevent this, two of our brigantines were ordered to cruize every night on the lake, to intercept these supplies. This measure answered the purpose in some degree, but not effectually, as some of the canoes escaped into the city every night. At this time the Mexicans laid a plan to surprise our two cruizing brigantines. Having concealed thirty of their largest piraguas among some tall reeds on the borders of the lake, they sent several canoes, as if carrying provisions, to decoy our vessels into the snare, and even fixed a number of large wooden piles under water at the place to which our vessels were to be inveigled. On the appearance of the decoy-canoes, our two vessels made immediately towards them, the canoes rowing away towards the ambush followed by our brigantines. As soon as they arrived at the place, the thirty piraguas immediately surrounded them, and wounded every officer, soldier, and mariner on board, by their first flight of arrows. Our vessels could not move on account of the piles, and the enemy continued the assault with the utmost vigour. One of the captains, named Portilla, was slain, and Captain Pedro Barba, the commander of our crossbows, died of his wounds. This ambush completely succeeded, as the two brigantines fell into the hands of the enemy. They belonged to the principal division of our flotilla, which was commanded by Cortes in person, who was much exasperated by the loss; but he soon repayed the enemy in their own way. He constantly sent out some vessels every night to scour the lake, and on one occasion they brought in some prisoners of consequence, from whom he learnt that the enemy had formed another ambuscade of forty large piraguas and as many canoes. He now laid a plan to turn their schemes against themselves; for which purpose he sent six vessels one night with muffled oars, to conceal themselves in a water-cut at the edge of the lake, covered with bushes and tall reeds, about a quarter of a league from the ambushment of the enemy. A single brigantine was then sent out early in the morning, as if in search of the canoes which carried provisions to Mexico, and having the prisoners on board to point out the place where the enemies fleet lay concealed. The enemy sent as before some loaded canoes to decoy the brigantine towards the ambush, and our vessel pursued them until near the place, where it lay-to, as if fearful to approach. The Mexican fleet now sallied out upon them, and our brigantine rowed away towards the place where the six others were concealed, closely followed up by the enemy. When arrived near enough, the brigantine fired two shots as a signal, on which the other vessels pushed out against the enemy, running down many of their vessels, dispersing all the rest, and making a great number of prisoners. This sickened them at ambushments, and from henceforwards they did not attempt to cross the lake in their canoes so openly.

Our three divisions of the land army continued to pursue their plan for gradually advancing along the causeways. Always as we gained ground, we pulled down the houses on each side, filling up the ditches or canals which intersected the causeways, and strengthening our posts; in which, and in all the operations of the war, we were excellently seconded by our brave Tlascalan allies. On our attack, the Mexicans broke down one of the bridges in the rear of their own barricades and parapets, leaving one narrow passage at a place where the water was very deep as a decoy, and even dug trenches and pitfalls where the water was more shallow, placing pallisades in the deep water to prevent the approach of our vessels, and constructing parapets on both sides of the breach. They had also a number of canoes in readiness to sally out upon us on a concerted signal. When all these preparations were in readiness, they made a combined attack upon us in three several directions. One body advanced towards our rear from the side of Tacuba, a second directly on our front along the causeway from the city, and the third by the ruins of the houses which we had destroyed. We repulsed the enemy on all sides; and one party of us, having forced them from the works at the broken bridge, crossed the water up to our necks at the place they had left open for us, and rashly pushed on to an open place where there were some large temples and towers. We were here assailed on all sides by fresh troops from the houses and terraces, and those whom we pursued faced about and fought us in front. We now found it necessary to retreat, which we did with the utmost order till we came to the pass at the broken bridge, which was occupied by the enemy in canoes; and as the others pressed upon our rear, we were forced to throw ourselves into the lake and to get over any way we could. Those who could not swim got entangled among the concealed ditches and pits in the shallow water, where the enemy closed in upon us, wounding the whole party, and even taking five of our soldiers alive. The vessels which came to our relief were unable to approach, on account of the pallisades, and they lost two of their soldiers on this occasion. It was wonderful we were not all destroyed at this dangerous pass. At one time I was laid hold of by a number of the enemy; but God gave me strength to disengage my arm, and with the assistance of my good sword, I extricated myself from their grasp. Though wounded, I escaped to the dry ground, where I fainted and remained for some time insensible, owing to my great exertions and the loss of blood. When the enemy had me in their clutches, I recommended myself to the aid of God and his blessed Mother, and they heard my prayer: Glory be to them for all their mercies! From the time that we had cleared the flanks of our post by the destruction of the houses, Alvarado had brought a part of his cavalry thither; and one of them, who had crossed along with us at the broken bridge, lost both his horse and his own life. Fortunately all the rest were then with Alvarado in Tacuba; for if they had been with us they must have all been destroyed from the tops of the houses and temples, as the action took place almost within the city of Mexico. The enemy was much elated by the success of this day, and continued to assail our posts day and night. Cortes was much displeased at the defeat we had sustained, which he attributed to our having neglected his orders; which were always to fill up the cuts in the causeway as we advanced, by means of timber and rubbish.

In the space of four days, counting from our late defeat, we filled up the great aperture at the broken bridge, and established our advanced post at this place, but lost six of our soldiers in the course of this operation. The enemy established a post directly in front of us, which they secured by a ditch and parapet, so as to protect themselves from our shot. They made a large fire in front of their post, by which they were concealed from our view, except when they had occasion to renew the fire, which was sometimes extinguished by the frequent heavy rains which prevailed at this season. They kept profound silence on guard, except when interrupted by loud whistling, which they used as signals. Every morning we marched against the enemy, with whom we fought during the whole day, and retreated to our post towards evening, covered with wounds. Before retreating, we sent back our allies, whose numbers embarrassed us in the narrow causeway, and then fell back step by step, flanked by our armed brigantines, and firing on the enemy as they pressed upon us during the retreat.

About this time, the inhabitants of the cities on the lake grew weary of the long protracted warfare, and sent deputations to our general, offering to submit themselves to his authority, and declaring that they had been constrained by the Mexicans to persist hitherto in their hostilities against us. Cortes received them very graciously, and assured them of his protection, providing that they should conduct themselves properly for the future, and give him their assistance by supplying canoes and provisions to our army, and in the construction of barracks for the troops. They readily promised all this, but performed very badly. Cortes had huts built for his detachment[7]; but the rest of us remained exposed to the weather, which was exceedingly severe and distressing, as it rained almost incessantly during June, July, and August.

[7] Though not especially mentioned by Diaz, it appears that Cortes had taken the immediate command of the detachment of De Oli, at Cojohuacan, which formed the southern attack.--E.

Our detachment on the causeway of Tacuba continued our approach towards Mexico, filling up every ditch and canal as we advanced by means of the materials of the houses which we destroyed; and we every day gained possession of temples or houses, which stood apart from each other, and of the bridges by which they communicated. To avoid jealousy, our three companies took the duties of working and fighting alternately, our allies giving most important assistance in pulling down the houses and filling up the ditches and cross-cuts of the causeway. Every evening the whole of our men stood to their arms, and we sent off our allies before us, before retreating to our post for the night. During all this time, Sandoval, who carried on his approach from Tepejacac, was obliged to sustain continual attacks from the enemy; as likewise was Cortes, who now commanded at the third attack.

On his side there was an out-post of the Mexicans, at a place where one of the apertures in the causeway was too deep to be forded, and which had been strongly fortified by the enemy. He made a successful attack on this place, where he commanded in person, although the enemy made a brave resistance both by land and water; but he was obliged to retire at night without filling up the ditch, and he lost four Spaniards killed, and had above thirty wounded, the pass being commanded from the terraces of several houses in the water, and his brigantines were unable to get forward to protect his flanks, owing to the piles which the enemy had fixed under water. Guatimotzin and his Mexicans defended themselves with amazing bravery and resolution, trusting to wear us out and destroy us by continual assaults. On the 21st of June, the anniversary of the day of our first entry into Mexico, the enemy assailed us at every point of all our three attacks, both by land and water, in front, flanks, and rear, about two hours before day. The number fit for duty at our post on the causeway of Tacuba was 120 men, and all the allies attached to our detachment, were as usual off the causeway during the night. It was with the utmost difficulty that we were able to resist and repulse the enemy, of whom a great number were killed and wounded, losing two of our own soldiers. The enemy repeated their assaults on all the posts for two other nights successively; and on the third morning, just at day-break, they concentrated their whole force and made a desperate attack on our post. If our allies had been with us we should have been all lost. On this occasion our cavalry saved our rear, and our brigantines did signal service by clearing our flanks. After a most severe and long doubtful contest, we beat off the enemy and made four of their chiefs prisoners, eight of our soldiers being slain in this tough affair. I fear my readers may be tired of this constant repetition of battles, which my duty of historian compels me to relate: But if I were to give an account of every action which took place during the ninety-three days in which we were engaged in the siege of this great, strong, and populous city, every day and night of which time brought a perpetual succession of battles and assaults, my work would be without end, and would more resemble Amadis de Gaul and other romances of chivalry than a true history, which it really is.

Cortes became impatient of delay, and proposed in a council of war to make a general assault on the city, marching at once by all the three causeways, and uniting our whole force in the great square, whence we could command all the streets leading to that centre of Mexico. Some of the members of the council objected greatly to this plan, giving the preference to our present system of advancing gradually, filling up the ditches as we proceeded, and destroying the houses to make roads and defences of their materials. They alleged that if we were to succeed in forcing our way into the great square, we should in our turn be besieged in the heart of the city, exactly as we had been before our flight from Mexico, and be involved in much greater difficulties than now; as the enemy would be enabled to environ us with their whole force by land and water, and would cut off all possibility of our retreat, by cutting through the causeways. But Cortes, after hearing all these well founded reasons, still adhered to his own plan, and issued orders for the whole army, including the allies, to attack the city next day, and to use our utmost efforts to get possession of the great square. On the next morning therefore, having recommended ourselves to God in the solemn service of the mass, all our three detachments marched to attack the posts of the enemy on their several fronts. In our attack commanded by Alvarado, most of the Spaniards were wounded at the first ditch and parapet of the enemy; one Spaniard was slain, and above a thousand of our allies were killed or wounded. In the attack commanded by Cortes in person, he carried every thing before him at first, and having driven the enemy from a post where the water was very deep and the causeway very narrow, he imprudently pushed on after the enemy followed by the Indian allies. The enemy induced him by frequent halts and feigned resistance to continue the pursuit, having even narrowed the causeway on purpose, and Cortes negligently omitted to fill up the deep ditch which he had passed. When the enemy perceived that our general had fallen into the snare which they had laid for him, they attacked him with fresh troops in front, while numerous canoes filled with warriors issued out at an appointed signal and assailed him both on the flanks and rear, his brigantines being unable to approach for his defence by the pallisades under water. Retreat became now indispensably necessary, which was at first conducted with perfect regularity; but when they came to the narrow part of the causeway, which was all covered with mud and water, the retreat changed to an absolute flight, our people flying from the enemy with their utmost speed, without even attempting to defend themselves. Cortes used every effort to rally his men, but all in vain, and was wounded in the leg at the narrow pass by some of the enemy from the canoes. At this pass, six of our horses were killed, and seventy-two Spaniards were carried off alive. At this moment six Mexican chiefs seized Cortes, but by the will of God, Christoval de Olea, that valiant soldier, and another brave man named Lerma flew to the rescue of our general. De Olea killed four of the chiefs with his own hand, and gallantly lost his life in defence of Cortes, while Lerma narrowly escaped. Other brave soldiers arrived at this moment to his aid, among whom was Quinones the captain of his guards. By these men he was lifted out of the water and hurried off from among a crowd of the enemy. At this critical moment, Guzman his majordomo, brought up a horse on which our wounded general was mounted. The enemy followed up their success with increasing ardour, Cortes and the shattered remains of his troops, retreating to their quarters with the utmost difficulty, pursued to the last by the Mexicans.

After our first attack, in which we defeated the enemy and drove them from their post, we were met by fresh bodies of the enemy, marching in great parade, bearing rich plumes of feathers and ornamented standards. On coming near, they threw down before us five bleeding heads, saying these were the heads of Cortes and his officers, and that we should soon meet the same fate. They then marched up, and fought us hand to hand with the utmost valour, insomuch that we were at length compelled to retreat. As usual, we gave orders to our allies to clear the way, by retreating before us; but the sight of the bloody heads had done this effectually, and not a man of them remained on the causeway to impede our flight. Our cavalry made several charges this day, but our great safety depended upon two guns which raked the whole causeway, and were admirably managed by Pedro Morena, an excellent officer, whose services this day were singularly useful, as the whole causeway was crowded by the enemy. Before we arrived at our quarters, and while pursued by the enemy, we heard the shrill timbals and mournful sound of the great drum from the summit of the temple of the god of war. The priests were then sacrificing the hearts of ten of our companions to their accursed idols, and the sound of their dismal drum, which might be heard at almost three leagues off, might be imagined to be the music of the infernal deities. Soon after this, the horn of Guatimotzin was heard, giving notice to the Mexican officers either to make prisoners of their enemies, or to die in the attempt. It is utterly impossible to describe the fury with which they assailed us on hearing this dreadful signal, though the remembrance is still as lively as if now passing before me: I can only say, that it was the good pleasure of God that we got back in safety to our post; praised be his mercy now and for ever. Amen! We were ignorant of the fate of our other detachments. Sandoval was more than half a league from us, and Cortes still farther. The melancholy sight of the heads of our countrymen, and the loss of one of our brigantines in which three of our soldiers were slain, filled us with melancholy, and we almost thought that we had reached the last hour of our lives. Our captured vessel was afterwards recovered by Captain Xaramillo. In the action of this day, Captain Caravajal, a most gallant officer, had the honour of being the first who broke through the enemies pallisades with his vessel: He now lives in La Puebla, and has been ever since entirely deaf, having lost his hearing this day by excessive exertion.

Most of the soldiers in the detachment of Cortes were wounded, a good many slain, and a great number taken prisoners, so that on his arrival in his quarters, where he was immediately attacked, his men were little able to defend themselves. To add to their distress, the enemy threw into their post four bleeding heads, saying they were those of Alvarado, Sandoval, and two other officers, in order to impress the soldiers of Cortes with the belief that the two other detachments had been as roughly handled as their own. On beholding this horrid spectacle, Cortes was severely agitated, and his heart sunk within him; yet he kept up appearances, encouraging his men to stand to their arms and defend their post against the enemy. He now sent Tapia with three others on horseback to our quarters, to ascertain our situation. They were attacked on their way by several bodies of the enemy, who had been sent out by Guatimotzin to obstruct our communications; but they forced their way through, and found us engaged with the Mexicans.

On his side, Sandoval went on victoriously till the defeat of Cortes, when the enemy sent a powerful reinforcement against him, by whom he was very vigorously assailed; and in the first assault they killed two of his men and wounded all the rest, Sandoval himself receiving three wounds, one of which was on the head. As they had done at the other posts, they threw down six bleeding heads, pretending they were the heads of Cortes and his principal officers, and threatening Sandoval and his men with a similar fate. Sandoval was not to be intimidated, and encouraged his men to behave themselves bravely; yet, seeing no chance of ultimate success, he brought his people back to their quarters, many of them being wounded, but having only two slain. After this, though severely wounded himself, he left the command of his quarters with Captain Luis Marin, and set out on horseback to have an interview with Cortes. Like Tapia, he was frequently attacked by the enemy on the road, yet made his way to Cortes, whom he addressed with condolence and astonishment, asking the occasion of his severe misfortune. Cortes laid the blame on Alderate, for neglecting to fill up the bad pass where the enemy threw his men into confusion; but the treasurer denied the charge, saying that Cortes had not given any such orders, but hurried on his men after the feigned retreat of the enemy. In fact Cortes was much blamed for his rashness, and for not sending the allies soon enough out of his way. About this time, Cortes was agreeably surprised by the arrival of two of his brigantines, which he had given over for lost. Cortes requested Sandoval to visit our quarters at Tacuba, being unable to go there himself, as he was apprehensive the brunt of the attack might now fall upon our post. Sandoval arrived about the hour of vespers, when he found us occupied in repelling the enemy, some of them having attacked us by the causeway, and others from the ruined houses. I and several other soldiers were at this time up to our middles in the water, engaging the enemy in defence of a brigantine which had run aground, and of which the enemy were endeavouring to gain possession. Just as Sandoval arrived, we got her afloat by a great exertion, after the enemy had slain two of her crew and badly wounded all the rest. The enemy continued their attack with the utmost violence, and Sandoval received a blow on the face with a stone. He called out to us to retreat; and as we did not fall back as fast as he wished, he repeated his orders, asking us if we wished to have all the cavalry destroyed. We then retreated to our post, and though the two guns under Moreno frequently swept the causeway, the execution they made did not prevent the enemy from pursuing us to our works.

We remained for some time at our quarters comparatively at rest, recounting the events which had occurred at our post, and listening to a relation of what had taken place at the two others. On a sudden, we were struck by the horrifying sound of the great drum, accompanied by the timbals, horns, and trumpets of the temple of the god of war: And, shocking to tell! we could distinctly see our unfortunate companions who had been made prisoners, driven by blows to the summit of the diabolical temple. On their arrival at the platform, we could see the miserable victims decorated for sacrifice, with plumes of feathers on their heads, and fans in their hands, when they were forced to dance to the infernal music before the accursed idols. After this, we saw them stretched on their backs on the stone of sacrifice, where their hearts were cut out alive, and presented yet palpitating to the damnable gods of the enemy, and their bodies drawn by the feet down the steps. "O merciful GOD of Heaven," said we among ourselves, "suffer not that we too may be sacrificed by these wretches!" My readers may conceive how poignant were our reflexions at this horrible scene, more especially as we were utterly unable to afford the smallest aid to our poor friends, whom we saw thus butchered before our eyes. At this moment the enemy assailed our post in great force; but we maintained it with determined resolution, and drove them back with much loss. During this assault, they reviled us, saying that their gods had promised to deliver the whole of us into their hands, and they threw over some of the mangled remains of the horrible repast they had made on our countrymen, sending round other portions among the neighbouring towns, as a bloody memorial of their victory over us. Sandoval and Tapia, on their return to Cortes, reported the valiant manner in which we defended our post; and Sandoval mentioned me in particular with approbation, saying many handsome things of me, which it would be improper for me to repeat, though the facts were perfectly well known to all the army.

Our new allies on the lake had suffered considerably from the resentment of the enemy, who had taken from them above half their canoes: Yet some continued firm in their alliance with us, out of hatred to the Mexicans; and others satisfied themselves with looking on, without attempting to molest us. In consequence of our recent losses, having lost near eighty men, killed and prisoners, and seven horses, and almost all the rest of us being wounded, Cortes issued orders to cease from our attacks for four days. But the enemy continued their attacks daily, and even gained ground, making new ramparts and ditches. We had a deep ditch and very defensible ramparts in front of our post; and during this cessation from offensive operations, the whole of our infantry kept guard on the causeway every night, flanked by our brigantines, one half of our cavalry patroling in Tacuba, and the other half on the causeway to protect our rear. Every morning we prepared ourselves to resist the attacks of the enemy, who continued every day to sacrifice some of our miserable companions. During their daily and incessant attacks, they reviled us, saying, that their gods had promised to permit them to destroy us all within eight days; yet that our flesh was too bitter to be eaten: And truly I believe that this was miraculously the case. The threats of the Mexicans, and their declaration that their gods had promised to deliver us into their hands in eight days, had such an effect upon our allies, combined with the bad appearance of our affairs, that they almost entirely deserted from us about this time. The only one who remained with Cortes, was Suchel, otherwise called Don Carlos, brother to our ally the prince of Tezcuco, with about forty followers. The chief of Huexotzinco remained in the camp of Sandoval with about fifty of his warriors; and the brave Chichimecatl, with the two sons of Don Lorenzo de Vargas of Tlascala, and about eighty Tlascalans, continued with us in the quarters of Alvarado. When they were asked the reason of the desertion of their countrymen, they said, that the Mexican gods had predicted our destruction, and the younger Xicotencatl had foretold from the first we should all be put to death; they saw that many of us were killed and all wounded, and they had already had above twelve hundred of their own number slain; And, considering us all devoted to inevitable ruin, they had fled to avoid sharing our fate. Though Cortes secretly thought there was too much reason in what they alleged, he yet assumed a cheerful appearance of perfect security as to the ultimate result of the enterprize, and used his utmost endeavours to reassure our remaining friends, turning the hopes and predictions of the Mexicans and the promises of their false gods into ridicule, and had the good fortune to persuade our few remaining friends to abide with us. The Indian Don Carlos, or Suchel of Tezcuco, who was a brave warrior and a wise man, strongly represented to our general that he had hitherto acted on a most erroneous plan, especially considering the relative situations of us and the enemy. "If you cut off their means of procuring water and provisions," he observed, "how is it possible that the many xiquipils[8] of warriors can subsist? Their provisions must be at last expended: The water of their wells is salt and unwholesome, and their only resource is from the present rainy season. Combat them, therefore, by means of hunger and thirst, and do not throw away your own force by unnecessary violence." Cortes embraced Suchel, thanking him for his salutary advice; which indeed had already more than once occurred to ourselves, but we were too impatient to act with so much prudence. Our general began therefore to act upon this new system, so judiciously recommended by our friend of Tezcuco, and sent orders to all the detachments to confine themselves entirely to the defensive for the next three days. As the canoes of the enemy were numerous, our brigantines never ventured singly on the lake; and as they had now found out the way to break through the pallisades of the enemy, by using both sails and oars when favoured by the wind, we became absolute masters of the lake, and were able to command all the insulated houses at any distance from the city; and as the brigantines could now break through the pallisades of the enemy, they could always secure our flanks, while we were engaged in filling up the ditches in our front, which we did effectually in a very few days, Cortes even assisting in person to carry beams and earth for that purpose.

[8] On some former occasions the xiquipil has been already explained as denoting eight thousand men.--E.

Every night of this period during which we remained on the defensive, the enemy continued their infernal ceremonies, sacrificing some of our unfortunate companions, which we could distinctly see as their temple was brightly illuminated; the accursed drum continually stunned our ears, and the shrieks and yells of the multitudes who surrounded the temple were at times perfectly diabolical. Christoval de Guzman was the last executed, who remained eighteen days in their hands. We learned every minute circumstance respecting these horrible sacrifices from our prisoners, who told us, that after each successive sacrifice, their war god renewed his promise of delivering us all into their power. Sometimes, even during this period, the enemy employed some of our own crossbows against us, obliging our unfortunate companions who were in their custody to shoot them off; but our post was protected by the excellent management of the two guns by Morena, and we every day advanced, gaining possession of a bridge or a parapet. Our brigantines also were of infinite service, as they were continually intercepting the canoes which carried water and provisions to the enemy, and those which were employed in procuring a certain nutritive substance from the bottom of the lake, which, when dry, resembles cheese. Twelve or thirteen days had now elapsed after the time when the Mexican priest had predicted we had only eight days to live. Our allies, therefore, recovered their courage when they saw the fallacy of the prediction, and at the requisition of our steady friend Suchel, two thousand warriors of Tezcuco returned to our quarters, with whom came Pedro Farfan and Antonio Villareal, who had been left by Cortes at that city. About the same time, many bodies of warriors returned to us from Tlascala and other places in our alliance. After their return, Cortes called the chiefs together, to whom he made a speech; partly reprimanding them for having abandoned us, and partly encouraging their future fidelity by confident hopes of victory, and promises of reward, and concluded by earnestly admonishing them not to put any of their Mexican prisoners to death, as he wished to negociate peace with Guatimotzin.

Though the heavy rains which fell at this season were both incommodious and distressing to us, they operated in our favour, as the enemy always relaxed their efforts against us during their continuance. By slow but steady perseverance, we had now considerably advanced into the city at all the three attacks, and had even reached the wells of brackish water which the enemy had dug, and which we now destroyed. Our cavalry could now act freely through the whole space which we had gained, as we had carefully levelled the causeway behind us, destroying all the houses on each side from which we could be annoyed, and carefully fortified our several fronts. Cortes deemed the present conjuncture favourable for offering peace to the Mexicans, and proposed to three of our principal prisoners to carry a message to Guatimotzin to that effect; but they declined the commission, alleging that he would put them to death. They were at length prevailed upon to comply, and were instructed to represent to Guatimotzin in the name of Cortes: "That from respect to the family of the great Montezuma, and that he might prevent the destruction of the capital and the loss of so many lives, he was willing to enter into a treaty of peace and amity; desiring Guatimotzin to reflect that he and his people were now cut off from all supplies of water and provisions; and that all the nations who had formerly been the vassals of Mexico, were now in alliance with the Spaniards." A great deal more was added, to the same effect, all of which was perfectly understood by the messengers. Before they went into the city, they required a letter from Cortes, to serve them as a token of credence; with which they waited on their sovereign, weeping and lamenting themselves bitterly, as they knew the danger to which they were exposed. At first, Guatimotzin and his principal chiefs were filled with rage and indignation at the proposal; but he at last consented to call a council of all the princes, chiefs, and principal priests of the city, before whom he laid the message of Cortes, and even expressed his own inclination to come into terms of peace, considering the inefficacy of their resistance, the desertion of their allies, and the miseries to which the people were reduced. The priests obstinately opposed every idea of peace. They represented the hostile conduct of the Spaniards to their nation ever since they first came into the country; their profanation of the temples and idols of their gods; their injurious treatment of the great Montezuma, and of all the other princes who had fallen under their power; the death of the two sons of Montezuma, the seizure of the royal treasures, and the destruction of the city. They reminded Guatimotzin of his own martial fame, which would be sullied and disgraced by submission; insisting, that all the offers of Cortes were only insidiously meant to enslave and circumvent; and concluded by repeating the assurances of victory which they had received from their gods. Guatimotzin yielded to these arguments, and declared his resolution to fight to the last: He gave orders, therefore, to husband their provisions with the utmost frugality, to use their utmost endeavours to procure supplies under night, and to sink new wells in various parts of the city. Our army had remained two days quietly in their posts, waiting an answer to our pacific message. On the third, we were furiously assailed on all points by large bodies of the enemy, who rushed upon us like lions, closing up as if utterly regardless of their lives, and using their utmost efforts to make us prisoners; all the while, the horn of Guatimotzin being continually sounded, to inspire them with fury. For seven days we were thus continually assailed: After watching all night, we had to go into action every morning at day-break; and having fought the whole day, we retired in the evening to a miserable regale of maize calces, with tunas or Indian figs, herbs, and agi or pepper. Our recent pacific offer was employed as a subject of contempt, for which they reproached us as cowards; saying that peace belonged only to women, arms and war to brave men.

It has been already mentioned, that the horrible fragments of our wretched companions had been sent round the provinces of the Mexican empire, to encourage them to rise in support of the sovereign and his capital. In consequence of this, a great force assembled from Matlatzinco, Malinalco, and other places about eight leagues from Mexico, which was intended for an attack on our rear, while the Mexicans should attack us in front. On the assemblage of this force, they committed horrible ravages on the country in our rear, seizing numbers of children in order to sacrifice them to their idols. To disperse this hostile assemblage, Andres de Tapia was detached with twenty cavalry and an hundred infantry, and effectually executed his commission, driving the enemy back to their own country with great loss. Soon after his return, Cortes sent Sandoval with a detachment to the assistance of the country around Quauhnahuac, or Cuernabaca. Much might be said of this expedition, were I to enter into a detail: but it may suffice, that it was more like a peaceable triumph than a warlike expedition, yet proved of most excellent service to us, as Sandoval returned accompanied by two chiefs of the nation against which he was sent[9]. Cortes, after these successes, sent a second message to Guatimotzin, reminding him of the distresses to which his people were reduced, and expressing great anxiety to save the city of Mexico from destruction, which could only be done by immediate submission; and to convince him that all hopes of assistance from his former allies were now at an end, he sent this message by the two chiefs who had accompanied Sandoval. Guatimotzin refused any answer, but sent back the chiefs unhurt. The enemy continued their daily assaults upon the advanced works of our several attacks, increasing even in their fury if possible, and exultingly exclaiming, Tenitotz re de Castila? Tenitotz axa a! "What says the king of Castile? What does he now?"

[9] Clavigero, II. 180, supplies the brevity used by Diaz on this occasion. He says that the chiefs of the districts of Matlatzinco, Malinalco, and Cohuixco came to Cortes and entered into a confederacy with him against Mexico; by which means, added to his former alliances, he was now able to have employed "more warriors against Mexico than Xerxes did against Greece." Clavigero everywhere deals in monstrous exaggeration, while Diaz is uniformly modest, and within due bounds of credibility. Even in the few miracles of which Diaz makes mention, his credulity is modestly guarded by devout fear of the holy office.--E.

We still continued to advance towards the centre of Mexico, regularly destroying the houses on both sides of us, and carefully fortifying our advanced post; and we now perceived a considerable relaxation in the efforts of the enemy, who were not so eager as formerly to open up the ditches; yet they continued to attack us with the utmost fury, as if courting death. But we too had now serious cause of alarm, as our gunpowder was almost entirely expended. At this critical moment, and most fortunately for us, a vessel arrived at Villa Rica with soldiers and ordnance stores, all of which, together with the men, were immediately sent to Cortes by Rangel, who commanded at Villa Rica. This vessel belonged to an armament which had been fitted out by Lucas Vasquez de Aillon, and which had been destroyed or dispersed near Florida. On the arrival of this reinforcement, Cortes and all the army determined to make a grand push for the great square in that part of the city called Tlaltelolco, as it would become an excellent place of arms, on account of some principal temples and other strong buildings which were there situated. For this purpose, each of our divisions continued their daily efforts to advance in our usual cautious manner. Cortes got possession of a small square in which were some temples, on the beams of which many of the heads of our sacrificed companions were placed, their hair and beards being much grown. I could not have believed this, if I had not myself seen them three days afterwards, when our party had worked their way to the same place, after having filled up three canals. In twelve days afterwards, they were all reverently buried by us in that place where the Church of the Martyrs is now built.