APPENDIX (continued 2)

'In Japan, as in other parts of the world, there must necessarily be differences of opinion. We have among our people radical and rapid progressists; conservatives, always making haste slowly, always studying the situation, always moving with great caution and circumspection, often unwisely wasting their opportunities for advancement by too great caution or timid fear; others timid because of the fear that they will lose their property or position by any change; others, the selfish Utopian, who builds an impossible castle, hoping that the foundation stones may be precious jewels, resting in his land only; and, lastly, there are yet a few who are opposed to foreign intercourse, and who believe that its strength lies in closed ports and selfish sufficiency unto themselves.

'To the outsider in Japan all these differences may appear as elements of weakness, when in fact they are elements of strength; and, perhaps, in no country can this be so well appreciated as America, where the strength and success of the Government depends so much on the agitation of questions by the people. The time is coming when Japan will stand among the first in its civilisation and progress. The question with us is: "How can we most rapidly reach this high state of development?" To my mind the best answer is by educating the people and developing the country.

'We are grateful to realise that the American people understand our efforts, and more especially that the distinguished company of gentlemen here assembled understand them. The prevailing sentiment in America, it seems to me, is in favour of the brotherhood of nations; and feeling this when we left Japan, we felt that we were coming among a people who would encourage and assist us in every way possible. We have not been deceived. Every assistance has been rendered us; every facility for study afforded us, and we will return to our country freighted with knowledge, and, as we hope, equal to the test, which we confess is a great one, of putting in motion such reforms and improvements as shall place us upon a footing equal to the best of nations.

'In the years to come it is to be hoped that the intercourse between Japan and America, the sister nations on each side of the great Pacific Ocean, may be founded upon that strong feeling of brotherly love which so unite distant peoples, that through storm and sunshine they will ever be true friends and earnest assistants—co-workers in the great cause of humanity and the development of the world in its moral, social, intellectual, and material aspects.

'In conclusion, I desire to extend to all of the gentlemen here present, and to thousands who are unavoidably absent, my sincere thanks for the great courtesy and kindness which I have received at their hands; and if it shall ever be my pleasure to meet any of you in my country, it will afford me the greatest happiness imaginable to extend to you the warm hand of fellowship, and to give you such a reception as will prove how entirely and truly I appreciate all you have done for me.'

VI

THE COMMERCIAL MORALITY OF THE JAPANESE[1]

In accordance with your request that I should write an answer to Mr. Joseph H Longford on the commercial morality' of the Japanese, which has appeared in the Contemporary Review, I venture to write these lines for your perusal. I do so rather hesitatingly, as I have no desire to enter upon a dispute with that distinguished writer.

There is, it seems to me, a great deal of truth in what Mr. Longford says; but, at the same time, it is, I think, painted blacker on the side of the Japanese and brighter on the side of the foreigners out there than the facts warrant.

To begin with, it is true that in Japan we had the classification of the people into four, viz. soldiers, farmers, artisans, and traders, and thus traders stood the last. From this fact ordinary critics make a hasty conclusion that Japanese traders—in which term big merchants are included—occupied in every respect a position which was inferior even to that of common peasants; but this is not fair. In social matters they often occupied very good positions; in fact, there were many to whom special considerations similar to Samurai were accorded. The above classification has much deeper meaning than a mere social caprice, and it is derived from a theory of political economy of the classical China.

According to that theory, agriculture is considered the foundation of a nation, and commerce is a mere act of transportation of things already made, and, therefore, comparatively of little value. That such a theory should have existed in China is a matter of no surprise, for even in the Europe of a little more than one hundred years ago there flourished physiocracy, the doctrine of which was almost identical with that of the Chinese. The Japanese classification of the former days was considerably due to the influence of that theory, and therefore the relative positions of the Samurai, farmers, artisans, and traders were more of theoretical notion than a social fact. This is a distinction very important to be kept in view when one discusses things Japanese.

That the Samurai as a class despised dealings in matters of profit is an undoubted fact, but a trader's position was not so degraded as Mr. Longford represents. He says:—

'Just as the training and social precedence of his ancestors for hundreds of years and of himself have made the Japanese soldier a model without flaw of loyalty, devotion, and courage, ready to sacrifice at any time life or property for his sovereign and his country, so have oppression and social degradation combined to make the merchant a no less striking model of dishonesty and timidity, unwilling and unable to make the smallest monetary sacrifice for his own or his country's fair fame.'

Surely this is sweeping assertion. If we take individual cases into account, striking characters in the ranks of merchants are abundant in records and in memory. Even in the movement which resulted in the restoration of the present Imperial régime, countless men whose origin belonged to mercantile circles may lay their claim of participation to it. True, they were men who generally cast off their original occupation and enrolled themselves in the ranks of patriots, so that they may be considered as exceptions. But even as a class in the ordinary sense of merchants they scarcely deserve that kind of condemnation. Osaka in former days had some resemblance to free cities of the West, and every one well acquainted with things Japanese knows what a well-developed mercantile system it possessed. So also the so-called Omi merchants. Even with regard to merchants and tradesmen of all parts of the country there was little room for them to be so dishonest as the writer describes. Under the feudal system commercial occupations were almost hereditary. They had almost no freedom of removal from their accustomed abode. Their customers were the children or grandchildren of those who were customers of their fathers or grandfathers. If a merchant under such circumstances made dishonesty his customary trade, and expected prosperity, he would surely be totally disappointed, and would suffer a deserving penalty. Besides, in those days social sanction, from the very nature of the conditions under which they found themselves situated, was most severe. Yes! Merchants and traders of those days were honest, far beyond one can imagine. If any dishonesty or any shortcomings in respect to commercial probity have become observable, it is necessary evil produced by the changed circumstances of the time, chiefly on account of foreign intercourse.

Mr. Longford speaks of the early Japanese traders who flocked to the newly opened ports as being 'without exception adventurers with neither name nor money to lose, with keen wits and the determination to exploit to the utmost.' This is, in a measure, undoubtedly true, and accounts for the lamentable condition which for a long time existed in the trades at the open ports. But this is not the only cause. On the parts of foreign merchants who came out there to trade, there was much to be criticised; I mean to say, they were also mostly adventurers in a measure; they were also inconsiderate, even arrogant. A Western merchant who, leaving China, was passing through Japan, violated intentionally time-honoured etiquette against one of the most powerful 'Daimio,' saying, 'I know how to manage these Orientals,' and was murdered in consequence. It is a good illustration of the kind of conduct of the Europeans of those days towards us; hence no sympathy existed between them and our traders—the dealings were viewed, naturally, very differently from those which they were wont to carry on with their native customers of several generations' standing. Business is business, so the common saying goes, but even in business mutual respect and friendly feeling go a long way. How can a model trade be expected to be created under such circumstances?

Then, again, in Japan commercial goods were, and are still, to a great extent made by hand on small scales. No big industrial factories existed where one could order a large number of articles identical in every respect as one could do in Europe. Foreign traders, not taking these conditions into their serious consideration, often gave similar orders as they were used to do in Europe, and when articles delivered to them were found to be not perfectly identical, they often took advantage of that fact, and gave much trouble to the native contractors, who did not expect to meet with so much severity. There existed also very bad customs among foreign traders; the essence of those customs was known by the name of 'Haiken,' or 'Kankan.' These terms, literally meaning 'to see,' were used to veil the facts of detaining goods at their storehouses, often for an unreasonable length of time; in the meantime ascertaining the commercial conditions of their home, and returning the goods when they found the transaction was not likely to be beneficial to them. Native traders had serious grounds of complaint against those customs. As a matter of fact, at one time the matter was brought to a very acute state, and the native traders began to try to get rid of them by combination, but with little success. I imagine Mr. Longford will remember the incidents which occurred in connection with that matter in Yokohama years ago. I can also state on good authority that there were even some cases wherein foreign traders themselves practised, toward their compatriot at home, some actions which appear not to have been in unison with Western honesty, and taking advantage of our unfortunate reputation attributed the fault to the Japanese when matters were discovered. The notorious case wherein a large foreign firm dealing in silk, who took off the labels of native manufacturers and changed them into a single kind which he liked, was boycotted by them when the matter came to broad daylight, may also be recollected by him. Another thing which foreign traders were wont to do was that they often ordered things direct from small manufacturers at a cost far less than their real value. Japanese merchants often said that they could not compete with foreign traders, inasmuch as foreign merchants often got things at less expense than they themselves could. This is surely an extraordinary phenomenon. But the fact was that those foreign traders often succeeded in making that kind of contract either by giving some tempting inducement at the beginning or canvassing several manufacturers one after another, always showing the last most advantageous offer, and bringing down the price by bargaining in a skilful and cunning manner. Under such circumstances it was not surprising if those contracts were often unfulfilled, simply on account of the inability of fulfilment by the contractors. There was also another circumstance which caused commotion and disorder in all commercial dealing in Japan. It is to be remembered that the new order under the new system of government, especially the abolition of the feudal system, widely changed the accustomed occupations of the Japanese at large. Chances for making wealth and for entering upon various enterprises almost entirely changed their hand. Besides, four hundred thousand families (2,000,000 capita) of Samurai, who gave up their hereditary allowances, now had to make their earnings chiefly by becoming traders or sometimes agriculturists, occupations to which they were entirely unaccustomed. They naturally experienced failure after failure. It was then that a new term, 'Trades of Samurai,' meaning thereby an undertaking which is precarious or even doomed to failure, came into existence. In one sense it was sad to think about, but the fact was so. Under such circumstances one can well imagine that dishonesty, or rather failure of fulfilment of promise, although against one's conscience, it maybe presumed, was often experienced even among our own community. This also might have had some indirect effects upon foreign trade.

Critics say that commercial probity in China is better than in Japan. It may be true; I shall not dispute. The Chinese are excellent traders, and besides, as every one knows, no such social revolution, as was the case with us Japanese, has ever taken place. That accounts for the difference between Chinese and Japanese traders in the first place, but that is not all. The Chinese are, individually speaking, very docile; they would not think of quarrelling with foreign traders, under whatever humiliating circumstances they might find themselves placed, so long as they could make some profit. But this is very different with us Japanese. Take, for instance, the case of a 'Rikisha' man; if he were a Japanese, and suppose a foreign rider whipped him, as they often do, because he did not run quick enough, the probability is, he would ask to be excused carrying the rider any further, or turn round to the rider and ask for an explanation. He would do so no matter whether or not he would get his fare; but if it were a Chinaman, the probability is that he would calmly suffer the treatment, and proceed just at the rate he could run, his thoughts being concentrated on obtaining as good a fee as he could get, and would be looked upon as an honest man in consequence. This state of things exists in the matter of trade at large. Chinese tradesmen would suffer without anger, any arrogance or unreasonableness of foreign traders, and exert such wonderful patience in order ultimately to attain their objects, whilst Japanese merchants would sooner break the contract than suffer such treatment with such patience. The consequence is that Japanese merchants are viewed in rather a bad light.

The effects of the Great Change, both political and social, have been subsiding already for some time, and the order of things at large has also begun to settle down. The condition of our mercantile circle is, in consequence, much changed; so also the attitude and characters of foreign traders have begun to alter considerably. I am, therefore, most sanguine that all complaints of foreigners against our commercial probity will soon become a thing of the past.

I am sorry to speak about foreigners in this manner, but I am sure impartial observers will admit that what I say is not far from fact. At all events, their conditions were not so bright as Mr. Longford pleases to represent them to have been. Unfair criticisms are not calculated to promote the friendly feeling of nations, and my statements, which I believe no other than those of true fact, are hereby made more for promoting in future the goodwill which has already begun to exist between us and the Western traders of late years.[2]

SUPPLEMENT

There appeared an interesting letter, written by the Manager of the Publication Department of the Times, in the columns of that paper, October 7, 1905. As it has important bearing on the preceding subject, I take the liberty of subjoining it in full.—K.S.

THE CHARACTER OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "TIMES"

Sir,—In last Monday's issue of the Times there was a long letter from the Right Rev. William Awdry, Bishop of South Tokio, Japan, in which he says that 'in general a Japanese would value the promise of an Englishman more than the bond of a Japanese'; and that the Japanese are deficient in a certain group of qualities, including honesty in trade. It seems to me that it would be unfair for the Times to allow such a charge against Japanese integrity, endorsed by a bishop, to go unchallenged, when the Times has, in its own office, records that prove a promise made by a Japanese to be at least as trustworthy as a promise made by an Englishman. During the past eight years the Times has sold, in almost every country in the world, sets of the Encyclopædia Britannica on the instalment plan, giving credit for periods of two, three, and four years. The regularity with which such payments are made is certainly a fair test of the average honesty of any nation, and a much more severe test in the case of Japan than in the case of England, because it is more difficult there than here to enforce payment by legal proceedings. Ninety-five per cent. of the encyclopædias sold in Japan were sold to Japanese, not to foreign residents, and the statements I am about to make refer exclusively to purchases made by the Japanese themselves. In Japan, as elsewhere, each purchaser, when he signs his 'order-form,' promises to pay, on certain dates, certain sums of money. In Japan the monthly payment was 10 yen, equal to about a sovereign, while in this country the amount was a guinea. In Great Britain less than half the payments arrived on the day promised. In Japan less than 1 per cent, of the payments were even one day late, and more than one-half of the payments were made the day before they were due, because the Japanese did not like to run the risk of any accidental delay that might make them even one day late. The cost of collecting these instalment payments in Japan is less than half as much as in England, simply because the Japanese are so punctilious that clerical labour and postage are not expended in reminding them that their payments are overdue. They seem to look upon every debt as a debt of honour, which must not be forgotten for even a day. There is certainly no such delicacy of feeling in this country about commercial transactions.

I find it difficult to believe that the Bishop of South Tokio is right when he says that the Japanese do not trust one another; and I know that he is wrong if he in himself believes, as he implies, that the Japanese are not 'honest in trade.' But I quite admit that Englishmen who have long resided in Japan did not believe that it would be prudent for the Times to adopt in Japan the instalment system of selling books, previously unknown there. When the representative of the Times arrived in Japan to sell the Encyclopædia, he naturally asked English residents there what they thought of the project. With one exception the answer was: 'You cannot sell the Encyclopædia Britannica here because almost every English and American resident has already obtained a copy from England, and, of course, the Japanese will not buy—fortunately for you, because if they did they would not pay.' The only English resident who did not say this said: 'Of course you can sell any number of Encyclopædias to the Japanese, but you will never be able to collect the payments when they have once got the books. No Japanese will pay for the Encyclopædia when he finds he can get it without payment.' In the face of this advice, the instalment plan of sale was adopted, with the results above described. I many add that the Japanese bought five times as many Encyclopædias as were sold in France and Germany combined, fifty times as many as in Russia, more than in any other country except India, Australia, and the United States.

When I see a bishop of the Church of England, who has lived in Japan since 1898, write with so little appreciation of the Japanese, I wonder whether some of our countrymen are not as blind as the Russian statesmen who, in the early days of the war, described the Japanese as 'yellow monkeys,' and as blind as the Ambassador of the Tsar who made the statement in Tokio, before the war, that the mobilisation of one army corps in Russia would frighten the Japanese into immediate submission. No one in the Times office, at any rate, can doubt that the standard of integrity among the Japanese is so high that when young men, who have bought the Encyclopædia, abandoned their employment to go to the front, their families promptly paid the instalments due, under circumstances of the utmost difficulty.—I am, sir, your obedient servant,

The Manager of Your Publication Department.

Printing-house Square, E.C., October 5.

VII

JAPAN AND FOREIGN CAPITAL[1]

Japan, far from becoming antagonistic to the occidental nations, as it was prognosticated by some of the Continental journalists, has given another proof of her readiness for the identification of her economic interests with those of the occidental people.

Hitherto in Japan there has been no law which regulated the mortgaging of a railway, or a mining enterprise, or a factory, together with its working system, as a corporation, that is to say, mortgaging the whole system of a railway, a mining enterprise, or a factory as an economic whole, comprising not only each particular material object but also all the organic components of its working system as the subject matter of mortgage. A radical change has now been effected in the matter.

According to the Japanese laws there are two methods for a commercial company in contracting a debt. One is the ordinary borrowing of money from a creditor, and the other is borrowing in the shape of debentures by public subscription. Now in ordinary borrowing of money the liability may be secured by mortgage, but the debentures could not be secured by mortgage, although of course the liability extends to the whole property of the company.

The first effect of the new change is the provision which enables companies to guarantee debentures by mortgage, and the second effect is the provisions which relate to the creations of economic corporations of railways, mining works, or factories for the special purpose of instituting mortgages of their economic entity.

To make the matter easier to comprehend, I will first explain it with regard to railways.

The permission of the Government originally given to the company is in the nature of a licence or concession which is to be viewed more in the light of a personal matter of the original company, and therefore it could not be a subject matter of a public auction, and therefore according to the old law, if a railway company becomes bankrupt, all the material property, either movable or immovable, would go to new hands, but the licence itself cannot but become extinct with the dissolution of the original company, viz. the original grantee.

This being so, if a railway company fails to fulfil its liability for debenture and goes into bankruptcy, the ultimate result would be that the railway system would be broken up, and the creditors would get their satisfaction only from the sale of each piece of the material property sold by public auction. Even in the case of ordinary debt, whereby all the material property can be mortgaged, the result would be practically the same.

All these inconveniences have now been removed by a series of new laws passed by the last session of the Imperial diet and promulgated on March 13, 1905, by the Imperial Government. The articles of the laws are very numerous and minute, so that it would be unnecessary to dwell upon them here in detail, but the more important parts may be summarised as follows:

(a) The economic entity of a railway company may be constituted a special economic corporation for the purpose of mortgage.[2]

(b) In default of payment of the mortgage liability, the whole, i.e. the corporation, may be subjected to auction. This provides the means for transferring, together with the material properties, the original permission of the Government, namely, the licence, to the purchaser, viz. a new company.

(c) A company, which in reality may be taken as a syndicate, may be formed for advancing money by means of debentures. Such company may acquire legal recognition and may represent the creditors of debentures. It forms a particular kind of commercial company, and is called 'trust company.'

(d) At the option of the creditors, means of compulsory control of the railway in the interest of creditors are also provided for in the laws.

(e) Special provisions are made to meet the cases where the syndicate and investors are of foreign nationality: namely, the means of recognising foreign syndicates by the Japanese Government, and also the means of affording convenience for foreign investors.

(f) Further provisions are made for facilitating the registration of constituting the said corporation, and the registration of the mortgage thereof, for these affairs, as far as railways are concerned, are now entrusted, by the new laws, to the Minister of Communications, to whose control the railways belong, and not to the local courts of law, as is the case with all other kinds of mortgages.

This change of our laws gives very great facility to foreign investors who may be willing to lend money on railway securities.

The case of mining enterprises were similar because they are also based on licences. For them also much the same changes have been effected by the new laws, so that their economic entity may now be mortgaged in the interests of either an ordinary creditor or investors in debentures.

The cases of ordinary factories differ in origin from those of the railways or mines, they not being based on a concession or licence like railway or mining enterprises. But for them also the new laws have made provisions for the means of constituting corporations for the purpose of guaranteeing debenture by mortgage. Provisions have also been made for guaranteeing debenture by mortgaging ships, any definite property either immovable or movable, or any legal claims which are secured by written instruments.

VIII

THE LANGUAGES OF CHINA AND JAPAN

People often ask me if there is any affinity between the Chinese language and ours. I can at once say there is no affinity whatever, but this requires much explanation before I can clearly show it.

The written language of China, viz. ideographs, is the same all over the extensive sphere of China proper, but its pronunciation is different almost in every province. The spoken language of the Chinese is, roughly speaking, the same as the written language, as is the case in the Western nations. Therefore, the Chinese residing in different provinces do not understand each other colloquially, except those educated in the Mandarine Chinese, which is in fact the pronunciation used in Peking amongst the Mandarins and studied by all Mandarins in provinces as well as those in Peking.

The first difference between Chinese and Japanese is that the former is monosyllabic, whilst the latter is polysyllabic. The second difference, which is a natural consequence of the first, is that in Chinese there is no declension of nouns or conjugation of verbs, whilst in Japanese there are conjugations of verbs and a method of the formation of the cases of nouns which is in purport similar to declensions. The third difference is the position or order of words in sentences. The fourth difference is the difference of pronunciation of the Chinese ideographs, viz. characters, even when they are used in our writing in their original shapes.

I will now explain in detail all these points in the succeeding pages.

To begin with, Chinese is monosyllabic, as I said. Each word, which always has one signification, be it a noun or a verb, has only one sound. Thus a harbour in Chinese is kong, whilst it is minato in Japanese; and a man in Chinese is jen, whilst it is hito in Japanese. It is the same with verbs. The sound of each word of Chinese never changes, whatever position it may stand in relation to other words in the same sentence, that is to say, there is no declension and no conjugation. Each word is represented by a distinct ideograph, and, from what I have just said, it follows that the form of the ideographs also never changes, in the same way as the sounds do not change.

In Chinese different shades of meaning as to the actions and agents are expressed by the position of the words, by addition of some other words. In simple sentences, therefore, it resembles English very much; thus, for instance, when a Chinese says: 'John likes Paul,' it is plain, like English, that he who likes Paul is John, and he who is liked is Paul. When a Chinese wishes to express the same idea in the passive voice, he would say, 'Paul by John is liked,' which is the same as 'Paul is liked by John,' Neither has Chinese any preposition like English or French, nor any post-position like Japanese, to designate the cases, except a few which resemble prepositions meaning 'from,' 'to,' and 'by,' but even these are very sparingly employed and by no means with any regularity. When a verb is used as a substantive the form is still identical; thus one identical ideograph, 'like,' may represent a verb 'to like' or a substantive 'liking.' Of course there are many terms designating one thing or one action consisting of more than one sound; such are, however, combinations of two or three distinct words, like the English word 'firearms' or 'seesaw,' and therefore none of them could properly be called one distinct polysyllabic word.

In Japanese, unlike Greek, Latin, or German, there is no proper declension in nouns. In this respect it is more like English or French, but it has a method of forming the cases, so that in this respect it differs from Chinese. Our cases are formed by putting after them the so-called ga—no—ni—wo—thus:

Hana ga saku-Flowers blossom

Hana no Kage-The shade of flowers

Hana ni chikazuku-Approach the flowers

Hana wo Miyo-See the flowers (imperative).

Ga is generally omitted in writing. It is more like the Greek Ge, which is often suffixed to the nominative substantives. Ni is equal to the English to and the French à; but such ideas as the English by or in, or the French en or par, are generally expressed by it. There is another particle wa for the nominative, its position is the same.

Made (until, jusqu'à) and yori or kara (from, de) are also put after the substantives. In fact, all equivalents to English or French prepositions are put after the substantive, and therefore they are more appropriate to be called the post-positions.

In Chinese the idea of time is generally very vague, it is mostly left to the conjecture of the hearers or readers, as the case may be, from the context of the whole sentence. But when it is necessary to express it, it is also done by addition of some words, such as 'already' or 'once.' Thus a Chinese would say, 'John once like Paul,' meaning 'John once liked Paul,' or 'John already come,' meaning 'John has already come.' But this is very different in our language. We have regular declensions of verbs in both the active voice and the passive voice and their form is accordingly changed. Thus, for instance:

Kitaru-come

Kitaran-shall come

Kitarishi-has come

Kitare-come (imperative).

I shall here develop my dissertation a little further, and make some comparison between our language and some of the European languages.

In Japanese there is no gender in nouns, for grammatical purposes, although some words from their very nature signify male or female; thus, for instance, otoko = man, onna = woman, ondori = cock, and mendori = hen. To us it sounds very odd that the Germans give feminine gender to the sun and masculine to the moon, whilst the French do vice versa, or that both the French and German give masculine gender to 'regiment' or 'battalion,' but feminine gender to 'company.' In this respect the English method of dividing into masculine, feminine, and neutral, allowing only on rare occasions, for poetical purpose, personification of inanimate objects, sounds more rational and comprehensible to our ears. It follows, therefore, that our nouns do not modify their forms on account of the gender, and that it is more like English in this respect.

We have, moreover, no number in the nouns. Whereas in European languages nouns which have no number are exceptions and very few, all the nouns in Japanese are without number without any exception. When we wish to express any particular numerical idea, we make use of a numerical adjective in a similar manner as the English would say 'a sheep,' 'ten sheep,' or 'numerous sheep.' Here again we can see that our nouns never change their form on account of the number. It is true, we also put after the nouns ra, tachi, or domo to signify plural, but it is rare, and the style becomes rather clumsy unless it is done very carefully.

Furthermore, there is no gender or number in our verbs. All conjugations are the same whatever gender or number they may relate to. It goes without saying that in Chinese also there is neither gender nor number in its nouns and verbs. It also goes without saying that in Japanese as well as Chinese there is, like English, no gender or number in adjectives. I may also add here that, like Latin, there are no articles either in Chinese or Japanese.

As to the adverbs in Chinese, they are as a rule identical with adjectives, the difference between them being only perceived by the context, although there is a certain form which always gives adverbial signification, and which is done by putting another word after an adjective (there are three or four words which are used for the purpose of thus forming adverbial terms). In Japanese adverbs are formed by suffixing ni and to, like the English ly and French ment. As shizukani (slowly) yuku (goes), and shizushizu to (slowly and slowly) yuku (goes). To may be written toshite according to euphony.

The use of conjunctions in Japanese and Chinese is much similar to that of the Western languages, except that in both Chinese and Japanese it is very commonly understood. Thus where the Europeans say, 'East and West' or 'black and white,' we both, Chinese and Japanese, would simply say, 'West East' or 'white black,' unless we have some particular reasons in giving emphasis to the distinction.

In Chinese the pronouns also have no gender, so also in Japanese. When we particularly wish to designate gender, we say, 'that man' or 'this woman,' which in reality is no longer a pronoun. As to the number of pronouns, it is formed by adding another word after it; but in Chinese this is by no means uniformly done, for in most cases where the meaning is plain enough, the same person as that of the singular number is also used for the plural. It is so especially with regard to the third person, but even in the first person this occurs sometimes, as for instance when two opposing objects, one of which is on one's own side, are collectively spoken of. There is something similar in English as far as the third person is concerned, but the Chinese carry it even into the first person. Thus in English may be written, 'When the enemy attacked us we have repulsed him,' but a Chinese would go further and write, 'When the enemy attacked me, I have repulsed him,' without meaning that he, the writer himself, did it alone, or did it at all, but that the army on his side did it.

In Japanese the number of the pronouns is far more precise than it is in Chinese. One thing which may be novel to the Western readers is that in Chinese there are many different I's and you's, and still more in Japanese. They all signify, when used, a certain difference in degree of politeness. It is one of the difficult points in our colloquial language. I may here note that in the West it is almost impossible to carry on a conversation for a few minutes without making use of so many I's, he's, and you's, but, like Latin, pronouns are used very sparingly in Chinese, still less in Japanese. In Latin the form of the verbs suggests very easily the person which is the substantive understood. In Chinese the context suggests it, while in Japanese the construction of sentences based upon conjugation does it.

Relative pronouns, who, which, qui, que, or dont, do not exist both in Chinese and Japanese. This is one of the great difficulties when we translate Western books. We must write the phrase governed by the relative pronouns as a distinct one or else must employ a clumsy method in rendering the whole sentence.

From what I have stated above, it would appear that Chinese is very simple as far as the analysis of the words is concerned, for they have no declension and conjugation. The difficulty of the students of Chinese does not lie in remembering different forms of declensions and conjugations, but first in remembering so many ideographs, one by one, and secondly to make head and tail of the agglomeration of ideographs, for one can never tell from their form which is a noun and which is a verb, or which is an objective or which is a possessive case. Definite meaning of Chinese sentences could only be appreciated by those who have accustomed themselves by long experience. But even such people often differ in their interpretation of some phrases, by giving different attributive to one or other particular ideograph in a sentence, not only in its meaning but in its position as regards the part of speech. This often occurs in interpretation of classical books. All this, however, does not signify that Chinese is a poor language, because its literal standard is really very highly developed.

The Japanese language is also simple enough as far as the analysis of words is concerned. Nouns never change their forms under any circumstances, except that their cases are made by the use of ga, no, ni, or wo, which is only an addition. Verbs are conjugated, but it is done simply to denote time and voice, and for no other reason. In a word, we may say that Japanese grammar is very easy. The real difficulty of Japanese is in the proper construction of phrases, for it is by it that many shades of meaning are suggested. True it is that this is more or less so with all languages. Difference of the degree of politeness or gracefulness is manipulated by difference of construction everywhere, but the variety of this difference is more complicated in Japanese than in any other language, and it can only be acquired by long practice and observation. This is why all foreigners who study Japanese think it is so easy at the commencement and so difficult after they have made a little progress. Nevertheless, colloquial Japanese is on the whole easy, because one can learn it easily so long as he is not sensitive of nicety or grace. There is in open ports even a new Japanese spoken between foreigners and natives, in which no ga—no—ni—wo is used, or no conjugation of verbs employed, and yet it is perfectly intelligible.

Now as to the difference of the order of words between Japanese and Chinese. Where in English one says, 'I cannot go,' in Chinese one would say, 'I not can go,' whilst in Japanese it would be, 'I go can not.' This order of Japanese has a slight resemblance to German, but the difference lies in that, whilst in German it is chiefly so in subordinate sentences, it is in Japanese uniformly so under any circumstances. In Chinese a verb which governs an object directly or indirectly always precedes the object; thus, like English, a Chinese would say, 'Girls eat cakes,' or 'he goes to Paris,' but in Japanese the verb succeeds; thus a Japanese would say, 'Girls cakes eat,' or 'he Paris to goes.' In this respect of order there is some resemblance between Latin and Japanese.

From all that I have said it is plain that there is no affinity between Chinese and Japanese so far as construction is concerned, but I may go further. There is no resemblance whatever suggestive of same origin between any Chinese and Japanese word, except those whose introduction into Japan at later ages is clearly known.

In speaking of the Japanese language in the foregoing pages, I have made no difference between the colloquial and the written one, but in fact there is much difference between them which requires some notice here. Even in the West written phrases can be, and are often, much shortened than spoken ones; but in Japan this difference is carried almost to the extreme, so much so, that they assume almost entirely different shape, the phrases of the spoken language being unsparingly curtailed in those of the written one. Of course, there are some old books which were written like the colloquial, and of late years much movement is made for an assimilation of the written and spoken languages, making the written one approach the spoken one. But as the matter stands at present the difference is still very great.

I am afraid my explanation is becoming too minute and consequently tedious, but I presume I must complete it. In the writings, too, there are in Japan two systems, one of which consists of our own phonetic letters, and the other consists of a mixture of our phonetic letters and Chinese ideographs. Unfortunately, the latter system is in common use. It is done in the following manner. The order of the words is not changed, but nouns and verbs, for instance, are written in the original ideographs with the significance of the cases or conjugations, which are written in the phonetic letters succeeding these ideographs. Let me take an example in the English word 'telegraphed' or 'telegraphing,' and let us write 'telegraph' in the original Greek letters, writing 'ed' or 'ing,' which is the part of the pure English, in the ordinary English letters. This will give you an idea of our using Chinese ideographs in our sentences. But our method is still more complicated. Besides the above examples we read very often the ideographs thus used, not according to their pronunciation but according to so-called 'kun' of the word, which is in reality a translation. In English books the term 'viz.' is used and is read as 'namely.' Here 'namely' is not pronunciation but translation. This is an example similar to our 'kun' of a word. When to read by pronunciation and when to read by 'kun' entirely depends upon the construction of the phrases, but one thing is certain, and it is that in Japan one has to know both the pronunciation and 'kun' of Chinese ideographs.

The Japanese pronunciation of Chinese ideographs is not the same as any kind of the modern Chinese pronunciation, and therefore even one simple word expressed by an ideograph is unintelligible between a Chinese and a Japanese, though they understand when it is written. In China the pronunciation of ideographs underwent much change; besides it has varied according to localities. In Japan the pronunciation of those Chinese ideographs, which is comparatively ancient, has been preserved on account of our possessing phonetic letters, by the use of which the preservation has been effected. But then there are two kinds of pronunciation of those ideographs, on account of its introduction into Japan at different periods from the different localities. This is an additional difficulty we have in reading Chinese characters used in Japan, though the usual customs where to use one or where the other are usually plain to educated people.

Japanese phonetics consist of fifty letters.[1] Five of them are vowels, being equal to a, e, i, o, u, and each of the rest represents the sound of two Roman characters, i.e. a consonant and a vowel; thus, for instance, the sound of ka or ke is represented by a single letter without spelling.

I said above that the modern Chinese pronunciation is different from the ancient one. It goes without saying that the style of phraseology is much changed, even in a greater measure than the modern English writing is different from that of the Elizabethan epoch. The Chinese, which has been studied in Japan indeed very commonly, is the ancient one, i.e. classical Chinese, and we are familiar with classical Chinese even more than the Chinese themselves. As a system of writing, that of the pure Japanese, which consists of phonetic letters, is in its quality far superior to the other one, which is in our common use, nay, even superior to the proper Chinese system itself. Our phonetic system, however, has not made sufficient progress on account of the introduction of the Chinese system, to which we had paid too high value and devoted too much attention, the result being the mixture of Chinese ideographs in our phonetic system, that is to say, the other system just mentioned. Even in the West there is some similarity to this. Take, for instance, some modern English books. One would scarcely find a few lines in which a large number of words which are Latin or sometimes Greek in origin is not contained. Are there not even now names for new inventions coined from Greek or at least from Latin? And is not all this due to the fact that such words sound more scholastic or else more concise or accurate? If it were not so, why does one call a horseless carriage 'automobile' instead of 'self-moving carriage'? Fortunately for the Western nations, however, there is no difficulty in transcribing Greek or Latin words in their modern letters, inasmuch as those letters are similar to, in fact evolved from, the Greek and Latin letters, and therefore, when once a Greek or Latin word is employed, it is easy to get naturalised, as it were. But, unfortunately for us, the Chinese method is ideographs, and our own is phonetic, and one cannot be directly transcribed from the other, except that either it be translated or merely phonetically represented, which in truth presents much ambiguity. For this reason the original ideographs themselves have come to be interposed between the phonetic letters as I have illustrated above, and the ideographs so interposed have never become thoroughly 'naturalised,' from the very nature of the case. Thus one would see that as far as the mechanical side is concerned, the deep study of Chinese has given much drawback to Japan. On the mental side, however, I may say that it has helped us in enriching our thoughts for many centuries, inasmuch as there is rich treasure for ethical teaching in the classical Chinese, although this is not the place for me to dwell on that topic.

I may add a few words. Philological researches of different Asiatic languages are still very incomplete, but I understand from what is stated by experts that there is some resemblance between our language and those of Korea, Manchuria, and indeed Mongolian tribes: first, in that all those languages are monosyllabic like ours; second, in the order of words in forming sentences. Moreover, it is said that there were already discovered several words which are much similar to ours. No satisfactory statement could be made as yet, but it would be a matter of no common interest if further researches be made. It goes without saying that there is much similarity, so it is said, between ours and the language of the Inoes, who are rapidly disappearing from the surface of the earth, despite our taking care of them. They once occupied the greater part of Japan and were a brave race. It is no wonder that there is that similarity in the tongues, though it is a matter of question whether they left their words behind them or we gave them those words. For example, Kami, which in the colloquial Japanese means god, superior, or upper part of anything, is Kamui in Ino, the meaning being the same. This word, then, must surely belong to the same origin. There are also many names of rivers and mountains in Japan which, beyond doubt, are of Ino origin.

IX

ONCE MORE ON JAPAN AND FRANCE[1]

The French and the Japanese have some sort of resemblance in their character, and therefore they are not wholly antagonistic to each other by nature. France once committed a great error, it is true, together with another country, in backing Russia against Japan after the Sino-Japanese war, but Japan has forgiven her for it, and has even forgotten it long since. It therefore mainly depends on France if the friendly relationship subsisting between her and Japan shall be maintained.

There are two things which we have to examine in this connection: first, the question of Indo-China; second, the effect of the Franco-Russian alliance upon Far Eastern affairs.

Much has been talked about Japan's having designs upon Indo-China. It is, in truth, nothing more than a resuscitation in part of the old bogey of the Yellow Peril. According to that bogey, Japan is to pick quarrels with every civilised nation, and is ultimately to swallow up the whole world. Nothing can be more absurd than that; but at times it has been made use of by the Russians and Russophiles with a certain amount of success. To me it appears almost amazing that so great a psychological incongruity should exist simultaneously in the minds of some of the Occidentals, in that, while they exhibit almost unreasonable contempt of the Orientals on the one hand, they give credit for almost superhuman potentiality to the same people on the other. Whatever this may be, the question of Indo-China resolves itself into this:

The yellow peril alarmists began to talk about Japan as being intent upon seizing Indo-China. The Colonial party of France has utilised this theme for the promotion of its own object, and the Russophiles have utilised it for inciting the public to hate and detest Japan in favour of Russia. Surely an act of gross injustice and cowardice! For, as a matter of fact, on the part of Japan there is no such intention whatever. Indo-China is very different from Korea and Manchuria in respect of its relative position to Japan. There is nothing worth mentioning politically, strategically, historically, or economically in the mutual relations between Japan and Indo-China. All this I have shown in the utmost detail in an article which I have contributed and published in a well-known French review. Sensible French people have now begun to see the truth of it, so that they have almost ceased to pay serious attention to the false alarms of the yellow peril agitators. Indeed, the France of to-day appears to be very different from the France of this time last year. The lapse of one year has been sufficient to disclose many falsehoods by which the public was once taken in. It has also disclosed the relative merit of Russia and Japan in many things. Which government—the Russian or the Japanese—is the more enlightened? Which troops—the Russian or the Japanese—are more humane and orderly? Which people—Russia or Japan—is more compact as a nation? Which of them—Russia or Japan—has better ethics and morality? In which of them—Russia or Japan—are laws better administered and more loyally adhered to? In which of them—Russia or Japan—are philanthropical works, such as the Red Cross Society, better organised and more honestly carried out? Above all, in which of them—Russia or Japan—does the justice of its cause in the present war lie? All these things have now become very widely known to the public, hence the difference of their attitude. I do not think France ever will be foolish enough to stretch forward her fists against Japan on account of the yellow peril bogey concerning Indo-China. I am rather in hope that the day will come when those Russophiles will repent the mistake they made when they abused Japan contrary to the dictates of justice and equity.

The second question, namely, the effect of the Franco-Russian alliance upon Far Eastern affairs, is rather a delicate one to discuss. On the whole, however, I can say this:

Considering the delicate position in which she is placed, France has managed things well to the extent that we have not much to complain of (except one important matter, which I will elucidate presently). True it is that she has made many unfair accusations against us with regard to the commencement of the war and also with regard to the yellow peril bogey, but then the same, if not a harsher thing, has also been done or said in some other quarters where we might have expected more impartiality. Her general conduct as a neutral has not been very satisfactory. But then we remember that in some other quarters also very bitter pills were given us to swallow, altogether beyond our reasonable anticipation. We put up with all this unfairness, because we are quite confident that sooner or later the time will come when the world will clearly see how undeserving we are of such calumny.

The important exception I made above is the question of French neutrality concerning the treatment of the Baltic Fleet. In this respect Japan has grave reasons to complain of what France has been doing. As the whole world knows, the Russian Fleet has been obtaining abundant facilities from France all the way along from European waters to those of the Far East. It was abusing French hospitality in Madagascar for a very long period. Japan repeated her protest, or at least called French attention from time to time. When France pleaded her innocence at Madagascar on the pretext that the fleet was outside the territorial waters of France, Japan, relying on incontestable proof to the contrary, remonstrated. France was very tardy in executing what she said she would do, but Japan showed much patience, almost beyond common endurance. The same thing began to be repeated in the waters of Indo-China, the very door of the seat of the war. However moderate and good-natured Japan may be, this was more than she could endure. This was the real cause of the strain of an event which has been recently threatening the continuance of friendly relations between France and Japan.

According to some French papers, the view is held that France has not infringed her duty as a neutral, but Japan does not coincide. The French contention is that, according to the French law of neutrality, there is no time limit for affording asylum to a belligerent ship, and therefore, whatever length of time Russian ships may spend in French waters, France is under no obligation to tell them to quit the place (so long as they are not accompanied by prizes), and also they may be supplied with victuals and even coals. Japan contends that this is not a just interpretation of the laws of nations. Japan's view may be formulated as follows:

1. The twenty-four hours rule may not be a condition universally accepted, but justice and equity demand that in its spirit it should be followed by all nations. It has already been adopted by many nations, including Russia herself; as a matter of fact, the world has come to view it as though it were already a rule universally accepted, and it behoves every civilised nation to promote its adoption, or at least a practice similar to it in spirit, for the sake of consolidating international morality, viz. justice and equity. At the time when Russian ships, after the sea-battle of August 10th last year, sought asylum in the waters of Kiao-Chow and Saigon, both the German and French authorities respectively hastened to dismantle them, because the ships would not leave the place indicated at the prescribed time; this was done in exact accordance with the spirit of international law, and in reality it amounted almost to the same thing as observing the twenty-four hours rule. Why should France now say that no time limit can be made in the case of the Baltic Fleet, which requires all the more vigilance than would the case of a few solitary ships?

2. The so-called French law of neutrality is not in fact a law in the strict sense of the term. It is a sort of an instruction issued in the beginning of the present war by the French Minister of Marine, although based upon a similar document issued at the time of the Spanish-American war. It is immaterial whether or not it is a law in the strict sense, but we cannot deem it has a just rule if it were to be interpreted as has been done by some of the French papers. True it is that in that document no time is mentioned, but does it mean that France has to or must allow all belligerent ships to stay in her waters whatever length of time they like? Certainly not, I should think. If it is so, why should France adhere to that sort of interpretation even when its adherence is obviously contrary to justice and equity?

3. Even if we admit for a moment that the French rule as interpreted by those papers be applicable to the cases of some solitary ships seeking asylum; it is certainly not applicable to cases like that which we now have in view, because no such case as that of the Baltic Fleet has ever been within the contemplation of those who framed such a rule. As a matter of fact, however, it would be inapplicable even to the cases of a few solitary ships if it were to be interpreted in the way that was done by those journals.

4. Even admitting for a moment that the interpretation of those French journals is correct as far as the strict letter of the rule is concerned, it does not give them the right to say that their doings are internationally correct. It must be known that in the laws of nations the spirit of international morality, namely, justice and equity, has greater weight than municipal laws, lex loci. If this were not so, how was it that England had to apologise to Russia a long time ago for an act—personal seizure of an ambassador—which had been done in a civil matter perfectly in accordance with her law? Therefore the mere fact that France has her own law of neutrality (in fact no law in a strict sense) is no defence for her doings unless its justice and equity can be maintained in the eyes of the law of nations. I may further add that the above is the raison d'être why prize courts of different countries make it their theory, unlike ordinary civil or criminal courts, that they administer prima facie the law of nations and not lex loci. It is another raison d'être why matters relating to neutrality, prizes, and cognate matters are generally dealt with in the shape of instructions (in other words, interpretations of the law of nations), and not in the shape of a law of the land in the strict sense. Japan, therefore, cannot submit to the ruling of those French instructions as interpreted by those journals, inasmuch as she does not think it internationally just and equitable.

5. And, moreover, that part of the French instruction which those journals so habitually quote is not the only part which has an important bearing on the question. In the instruction it is also mentioned that no belligerent may use a French port for purposes of war (dans un but de guerre); and also that belligerents sojourning in such ports may not make use of them as the base of operations of any kind against the enemy. Japan's insistence is that France should adhere to that spirit. My wonder is why those French papers which try to uphold one part of the instruction should totally ignore other parts of the same instruction.

6. The theory of asylum in the case of the ships is not so rigid as the case of an army. I admit it. Japan does not demand that it should be made on the seas as rigid as it is on land. But it must never be allowed to go beyond the limit which justice and equity allow. I take the theory of asylum on the seas to be this: No neutral is justified in helping either of the combatants, but the nature of the seas is such that the neutral may give a certain grace of time to combatant vessels which seek shelter in its neutral waters, before it proceeds to dismantle,—(no immediate internment as in the case of the land force),—and it may also give them certain victuals—even a certain amount of coals—as it would also be contrary to humanity if they were to hang about, or to cause starvation of the men on board in mid-voyage on account of the mere lack of coal or food. Beyond this, the spirit of the law of nations is that a neutral ought to allow nothing. Can any one boldly assert that the theory of asylum can be applied with fairness to a case like that of the Baltic Fleet, which is far from seeking asylum, but is deliberately endeavouring to administer coups to its adversary and proceeding to the very seat of war. If he can do so, where is the justice and equity of the so-called law of nations, which the Occidentals boast of, not without just title, and claim that it forms one of the essential parts of Christian morality?

7. As to the talk about the three-mile limit of the territorial waters, there is already much divergency of opinion even amongst the jurists. To put it forth as a defence in a case like that of the Baltic Fleet affairs seems to me too puerile. The matter, however, becomes all the more grave when even that limit is not observed, and it has been constantly ignored by the Baltic Fleet.

Such are the views which we Japanese have taken in the matter. Some French journals (erroneously basing their assertions on the views I have personally expressed) say that Japan has taken up English views of international law in opposition to the Continental views, so that France ought not to yield to Japan's protest. This contention is not correct. We do not hold these views because they are English ones: we do so because they are in our opinion the only views which are internationally just and equitable. We are now fighting against a foe so formidable, as the whole world knows, that to us it is a matter of life and death. We have sufficient patience and fortitude, but we cannot run the risk of sacrificing our very existence without some protest when we think that we are not being treated with justice and equity.

I am glad to add that the views we hold seem to have come at last to be shared by the more responsible part of the French amongst the governmental circle, as well as by the general public. The newspapers which are still sticking to their old contention are very few in number, and they seem to have some particular reasons of their own. I can never think a nation like France could consciously and wilfully offend against justice and equity, and the only thing we anxiously hope for is that the declaration of the French Government may be honestly and effectually followed up. Whatever may be one's intention, the drift of events often creates unlooked-for incidents, and that too often against one's will, when it is too late to avoid the consequences. Let all parties concerned be careful in this matter of vital importance.

X

JAPAN AND EUROPE[1]

You ask my opinion on the future of the Yellow Peril cry. From an ethical point of view it is an unjust and unreasonable accusation. From a practical point of view it is idle and useless talk.

I have spoken and written on these particular points so often that I do not feel inclined to reiterate any more. I will, however, consider the matter from a different point of view and solicit any answer which may be advanced against my conviction. I do not do this from any thought of vanity; I should be very sorry if it were ever taken in that sense. I would simply ask those who agitate and cry the Yellow Peril, the means they would suggest for the adopting of their propaganda, if their words are not to be empty ones.

Suppose any country wanted to subjugate Japan, and should want to send an army to fight on the soil of Japan, what number of men do they think would suffice? No general in the whole world would, I am sure, be bold enough to undertake the task with under one million men. I have reason to believe even that number would not suffice, but for a moment let it be that number. What country in the world can send that number over the broad ocean? Germany, France, England, or America? Russia seems to have the greatest chance, being nearer to Japan. But her experience is already known.

Suppose the idea of a land campaign be abandoned, and only a fleet be sent to intimidate Japan by sea battles, or by harassing her commerce. There would certainly be a better chance for any of the Occidental fleets than for the armies, in coping with the forces of Japan. Above all, I frankly admit that England would be the most formidable foe in that respect. But excepting England, is there any other country that can say with certainty that it can easily crush the Japanese navy? Is it Germany? is it France? or is it—America?

But supposing our navy were crushed; what next? It would, of course, be a very ugly thing for us, but it would not mean the subjection of Japan. Our sea-coast towns may be bombarded, our commerce may be harassed, but Japan will still subsist within her soil, for she can live without depending on any other country for food. And, besides, disturbance of commerce would not be a loss only to her.

Moreover, any country which should embark on such an enterprise would have need to think it over twice (or, indeed, three or four times) before undertaking it, and to calculate the probable benefit it could get therefrom, and the probable expenses it would incur; not to speak of the result of any possible failure. It may be presumed that Japan would not tamely be intimidated by any action undertaken by any country which is not based on justice and equity, and which, therefore, is not open to reason.

Further, is there any country which would willingly embark on such an enterprise single-handed? I think not. The reason is too obvious for me to elucidate.

Putting aside altogether any question of justice and equity, if such an enterprise is to be embarked upon at all, it would have to be by common action of all the Western Powers, somewhat similar to that when the combined forces of Europe rose against France some hundred years ago.

But let me ask if such a thing is possible under the present circumstances? The claims of Japan to the kind consideration of humanity have already become so widely spread that she could no longer be trampled upon easily. Man is, after all, a rational being. Do the writers of the articles on the Yellow Peril (articles which even now repeatedly make their appearance) not know the fact that even in France there is a large number of people who have recently purchased Japanese bonds, not to speak of Germany, where those bonds have been openly floated by banks of high standing? Even if all the governments of the West should be willing to agree to such an enterprise, I do not think the people at large would move with them.

Japan is modest enough, Japan is honest enough. Why does she deserve a general ostracism? She might become, it is possible, a Power of the world. She might become, it is possible, more civilised on the lines of occidental civilisation, after which she strives so earnestly. Are these to be blamed as her sins?

To me the Yellow Peril cry, which is so often revived in some quarters of the Continent, is either a sort of what we call 'guchi,' that is to say, useless repetition of complaint of some unreasonable disappointment, or a perpetuation of wicked instigation and selfish intention. In either case, it is not at all a laudable action; indeed, I may say it is wasteful calumny for no material good will come of it inasmuch as its object can never be achieved from the very condition of the world. The people who entertain that idea would be doing far better service to their country, to the progress of civilisation, to the general cause of humanity, if only they put aside such a silly notion, and busy themselves in teaching their fellow country-folks to accustom themselves to the changed circumstances of the time. It would be a far more manly and noble act if they revised their old notions, which in a measure may be called prejudice.

As to ourselves, the Japanese, we shall only be glad if we can enjoy a peaceful and harmonious life in the happy family of the world, as we are determined to do, in spite of all the obstacles which may be laid before us.

XI

THE INDO-CHINA QUESTION[1]

INTERVIEW WITH THE BARON SUYEMATSU

The eminent statesman, Baron Suyematsu, kindly dictated in English to one of our editors answers relating to certain questions with regard to the relation between Japan and Europe, especially France and Germany.

With the disclosure of the alleged Kodama report in view, how far may one give credit to the alleged Japanese plan of invasion of Indo-China?

I know all that has been written in France on the subject. All those rumours appear to me to have come originally from Russia, and to have been put into circulation in order to excite French opinion against Japan, in other words, it is nothing else than a mere repetition of the Yellow Peril cry.

Japan does not covet Indo-China. I have shown elsewhere that the French colonies in the Far East have no perceptible influence upon the situation of Japan, either from a political or an economical point of view. Japan has sufficient to do at home, she does not want to plunge into external adventures, such as meddling with Indo-China or picking a quarrel with a country like France. You may be sure that it would be more politic for France to cultivate amicable relations with Japan than irritate her by such accusations. Even if those accusations honestly represent the true sentiment of the French, the Japanese would only take them for malicious manœuvres directed to aid Russia, and they could not produce any good impression on the minds of the Japanese.

Is there any reason to believe that the so-called Kodama report was forged in Russia rather than in France?

I have demonstrated elsewhere that the document which was recently made public and attributed to Kodama containing some military indications on the plan of an invasion of Indo-China is a perfect forgery. I have exposed elsewhere several technical errors therein which would never appear in an authentic official document. But whether it is authentic or not, I do not attach any importance to the matter, from a political point of view at least. It is the duty of all the military and naval authorities to keep themselves ready for any emergency. For example, France ought to keep herself always prepared for any possible difficulties which may arise on her frontiers in the east, and in the south, and on the western coasts; the same with Germany, with Austria, with Italy, even with the United States.

It appears to me that, if the general staff-office of France or of Germany, or the military or naval authorities of any country whatever, were to remain without the least knowledge as to what measure should be taken in case of a danger, they would be neglecting their duty to their country. I can then say that all the Japanese officers, both in the army and in the navy ought to study constantly the measures which Japan should take in any emergency. I believe it is the same in every country in Europe. This, however, does not belong to the sphere of practical politics. It is the duty of statesmen and politicians to maintain a friendly relationship with all other countries as far as possible; and, consequently, to keep absolute control over their armies and navies. The army and navy ought to serve as instruments and machines in their hands, and not they, the civilians, become the instruments of the army and navy. You may be quite assured that in Japan the army and navy are the machines of the statesmen, and that the statesmen are not their machines.

Can the fabrication of the so-called Kodama report be demonstrated by a precise fact?

I shall not say whence the document emanated. I believe it was composed by some one who does not lack a certain knowledge of Japan, but who has drawn false deductions from his knowledge of similar matters of other countries. Here is the best example. The document speaks of the native contingents of Formosa. Now there exist no such forces in Formosa. The garrisons of Formosa are sent there from Japan. On the other hand, in the colonies belonging to other countries there are generally troops formed of native contingents. It is notably so in French colonies. The author of the document in question, reasoning from these facts, thought that it ought to be the same with Formosa.

Has Japan any fear of another alteration of the Treaty of Shimonoseki being imposed upon her?

The combined action of Russia, Germany and France, for imposing on Japan an alteration of the Treaty of Shimonoseki appears to us to have been a great error on their parts. I can positively say that there are many eminent persons in Germany and in France who regret that action. Even in Russia, in certain quarters, a belief seems to be entertained that, but for the fault then committed, the present misfortunes would not have happened. As to ourselves, we are not hypnotised by the errors then committed by those three powers. We intend to remain friends of France, of Germany, and even of Russia, in spite of the injustice we have suffered, provided, of course, those powers wish to keep friendship.

We do not overlook the possibility of another combination which those powers may have an idea of forming against us, and it behoves us to be watchful. Nevertheless, to tell you my candid opinion, it is scarcely possible that a similar intervention should be renewed. I do not think France would push her docility so far as to follow Germany a second time. It would be necessary that Germany should set the example, aided by Russia and France, to come out to the Far East, especially because the Russian fleets have ceased to exist. I admit that the German fleet is strong, but I do not believe it is powerful enough for one to say with certainty that it can easily crush Japan. At all events, what pretext has Germany to enter into war in the Far East? Among other things also she would have to count on the opinion and sentiments of two countries at least, I mean England and the United States. I do not, therefore, consider a new combination possible. Japan cannot be intimidated by mere barking.

If, however, Europe should choose to take such a course, we should gravely reflect. I do not believe your country for example would ever undertake an expedition against Japan. You have disapproved a small expedition to Tonkin and we are a little more serious than the Tonkinese. France might no doubt, if her honour demanded it, judge it worth the pain to engage in a war with Japan, but under no other circumstance do I believe her disposed to take such a part.

Japan will always continue to advance on the lines of occidental civilisation. I do not see the reason which will prevent Japan from acting in concert with France or Germany, provided of course these powers do not enter upon an action which may appear to her altogether unjust or iniquitous, in which case she may not be able to march with them hand-in-hand.

Would Japan be offended by France introducing civilisation into Indo-China?

We are not at all opposed to your introducing Western civilisation into your colonies. On the contrary we shall be quite contented, but in introducing your civilisation into your colonies you have to be prepared that it signifies an amelioration of the condition of the natives. If it were so, why should we make the least objection? But in the hypothesis that the introduction of civilisation has in view neither amelioration of the condition of the natives nor progress of commerce and industry, we might then conceive a sort of suspicion. Supposing that you augment the garrisons, the fortifications, the naval forces, one would see in it nothing but an expansion of your military power and not an introduction of civilisation in the sense understood in France. Even in that case we would not raise objections, unless it were done with a view to menace us; but here I shall offer you a suggestion. Is it really worth your while to develop there incessantly your military and naval forces in order to oppose Japan? Would not the enterprise be rather costly? Would it not be infinitely better to employ your energy in cultivating a good understanding between your country and ours instead of rivalling each other by crossing armaments?

XII

THE AUSTRALIAN QUESTION[1]

AN INTERVIEW

Baron Suyematsu gave a Daily News representative his opinion of the 'Spectre of Japan' as conceived by many Europeans. The Japanese Baron, a burly, cheerful man, laughed heartily as he dealt with the alarmist fears of the 'Yellow Peril.'

Our talk began over Mr. Bruce Smith's notice of motion in the Australian Parliament.

'Yes, I have seen the proposal,' said Baron Suyematsu, 'and I am very glad an Australian representative has taken up the question. He proposes to amend the Immigration Restriction Act so as to permit Japanese to enter the Commonwealth. The reason given is that Japan has placed herself in the front rank of nations, has granted religious freedom, has established consulates, and become the honoured ally of Great Britain. I understand that Australian papers are saying there is no chance of the motion being carried. I care not whether the motion is carried or not this time. Of one thing I am certain—it will be carried eventually.

'What reason has Australia for shutting out the Japanese?'

'The dread of cheaper labour and of the "Yellow Peril," as it is called. Whatever there be in that, it certainly does not apply to the Japanese. This is already being realised in Australia, as Mr. Bruce Smith's motion shows. The Japanese are making it clear that they have to be regarded by Europeans in a different light from the rest of Asiatics. Europeans consider themselves superior to all other races. I do not blame them for thinking that, for of modern civilisations theirs is certainly the best. But with the exception of the British people, Europeans have not yet realised that modern Japan is built up on European methods. She has no more to do with the so-called "Yellow Peril" than America has. She takes her place by the side of the other powers, with very much the same civilisation as theirs. England having been the first to recognise the new Japan, I am certain her colonies will soon follow. That is why I feel it is only a question of time before Australia excludes Japan from its Restriction Act.'

A MISTAKEN IDEA

'Yet Australia has been talking freely enough about the Japanese menace.'

'I know. It is quite a mistaken idea of the Australians that if Japan triumphs in the present war she would be a menace to Australia. They say that if we win we shall be masters of the East and the paramount power in Eastern waters. What, they ask, is to become of Australia, if we take it into our heads to make a descent upon their shores?'

Baron Suyematsu again laughed boisterously, as one who can afford to make merry at an extravagant idea.

'The whole thing is so utterly preposterous,' he went on, 'that it would not be worth considering were it not typical of what is being said all over Europe. Our fight for national existence against Russia has been misconstrued everywhere. We seem to have filled the Western world with all sorts of vague fears, France is saying that we shall soon deprive her of Indo-China. Germany declares we have designs on Kiao-chau. The Dutch say that Java is no longer safe from our machinations. Never was such nonsense talked of a country which, after all, is but fighting to preserve its national existence.'

'And you say Japan has no intention of arming the Asiatics against the Europeans?'

'The whole idea is absurd. Japan wishes to become one with the European nations. I might even say she aspires to become a member of the European family. It is a mistake to think that Japan is going to form a Pan-Asiatic Association. Japan is the only country in the East that can rise on European lines. Her example could not be followed by other Asiatic countries. We are said to be the successors of the Tartars, at one time the disturbers of the world's peace. Nothing of the kind. Russia would be more fittingly the successor of the Tartars. The Tartar races have been merged in the Russian Empire.

'I am sure,' added Baron Suyematsu, in a final word, 'that Europe will soon find its fears about the "spectre of Japan" are all ill-founded. England, I am glad to believe, never had those fears, and before long I hope to see her colonies in the same frame of mind. I hope the Commonwealth Parliament will lead the way.'

XIII

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AND AMERICA[1]

AN INTERVIEW

'Our people,' said Baron Suyematsu, 'like the British people, favour the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. They also favour its extension. The nature of such extension demands careful thought, of course. I will not go into details, but I will say that a more effectual alliance is desirable from the standpoints of both England and Japan, and I also think from the standpoint of America. Japan's interest is too obvious to require mention; but England's interest, in my opinion, is equally real. Russia and England are in contact throughout Asia and friction is constant. England needs strengthening against Russia and also against other powers active in the Orient.

MONROE DOCTRINE OF THE PAST

'America's relation to this problem is more difficult. Monroeism is thought to stand in the way. I appreciate the delicacy of venturing to discuss the policy of a nation other than my own, but I feel that Americans are too sensible to resent an honest expression of opinion. Monroeism is not part of the constitution, but the dictum of a statesman. This dictum was made when our planet was very large, before the development of steam and electricity. The nations were isolated and insulated by distance and non-communication.

'At that time American theory and practice relative to foreign affairs were in harmony. America was actually self-contained, but to-day the world is a tiny ball and America's flag and America's interests are on every sea. America is sovereign in Hawaii and the Philippines, and yet the American people cling to the idea of leaving distant matters alone. Nevertheless the state department is widely and intelligently active.

AMERICAN INTEREST WORLD-WIDE

'Theoretically you do not participate, actually your participation bears upon international events everywhere. Witness Secretary Hay's initiative respecting the Jews, as well as despatch after despatch aimed at Russian aggression in Manchuria. The world's interests are becoming woven into a solid fabric. Great nations cannot escape the responsibility this involves. American theory and practice, in my judgment, will go on diverging until the notion of non-participation will be merely an antiquated abstraction.

'Therefore I refuse to regard as hopeless the idea of an American-Anglo-Japanese alliance, guaranteeing the peaceful development of the vast resources of the Far East. Such an alliance exists essentially now—an alliance springing from cognate ideas, wishes, purposes and principles. This is the best possible foundation for that formal compact which the evolution of industry and commerce seems to me unmistakably to foreshadow.'

NOTE TO DIALOGUE V.

Since the bulk of the present work went to press, I came across the following communication printed in the Outlook. I take the liberty of subjoining it herewith, without any vain intention of flaunting the virtues of my countrymen.—K.S.

JAPANESE CHARACTER

To the Editor of the OUTLOOK

SIR,—I have received during the last few weeks letters bearing such eloquent testimony to the nobility of Japanese character that I am sending you some extracts in the hope of your publishing them. The letters are from a friend of mine, who with her husband has lived in Yokohama for many years, and can therefore speak with considerable authority. The first extract is about the soldiers themselves—

Mine you know is a busy life, and I found work among the military hospitals and also among the brave wives of the soldiers so fascinating that from the New Year till early June I let all social duties slip, so much so that I had a nervous breakdown in June, and since then have had to go very slow.

We had a splendid time at our seaside cottage at Negishi this afternoon, any amount of our dear brown soldiers round us. There are five hundred quartered in that fishing village just now; they were resting, bathing, boating, washing their clothes or cooking their chow, but never a rude word or an uncouth action; no rowdyism, but all as civil, quiet, good-tempered, and alert as possible; they are a marvel; and my children go in and out among them and love them, like I do! I could kill white idiots when I hear them speak of those fine fellows as 'an inferior race.' Ye gods! 'inferior' with never a camp follower to their name, and rapine unknown even after the fiercest fight! What European race can show a record like that? I wish I could be home for six months and tell what the soldiers and their wives are—what miracles of cheerful patience and manly dignity the wounded men are as they lie hacked and maimed, sometimes till almost all semblance of manhood is gone, yet never a murmur does any one hear from their lips—no, not if they are armless, legless, and even blind. And you would not dare condole with them! They say and believe they 'are greatly honoured.' When they embrace Christianity, they shame the brightest Christian among us, and I come away from visiting the hospitals feeling so small, so humble, yet at peace with all the world. We have very, very much to learn from this great people.

This second extract, about a soldier's wife, may come home to your readers even more:—

I allow two families a small sum of money every week. One case is that of a young woman, under twenty years of age, who has a child and an aged parent to keep, and her husband went to the war a few weeks ago, leaving her penniless and on the verge of having another baby. A few days ago, when I went to take her weekly money, she refused to take it, saying she had got a little work to do and could now manage without any help, as there were so many in much greater need of help than herself; and she would not take the money, though she was earning even less than I was allowing her. That is what I call a real heroine.

How many at work amongst our poor last winter could give such evidence to character as that?—I am, sir, yours, etc.

ENGLISHWOMAN.

NOTE TO DIALOGUE VIII.

Before the preceding pages had been printed two events worth mentioning here took place. One is the lamented death of Sir Henry Irving. The other is the public discussion which took place under the auspices of the London Shakespeare League, on the best method of presenting Shakespeare's plays on the modern stage. On the latter subject perhaps I may add a word. While in Japan the tendency is to introduce women-players into the company of male players, and improvement of scenery is much sought after on European lines, both of which are due to the occidental influence, it is curious to notice that exactly reverse movements, namely the dispensing with the female players and the returning back to the primitive simplicity of stage properties, are advocated in England by competent persons with regard to the representation of Shakespeare. I extract below among others a passage of the speech of Mr. Bernard Shaw on the occasion of the discussion referred to above:—

When Mr. Gilbert said that he would like to see the women's parts played by boys, he was not uttering a jest. In some of the performances at Westminster School, he had seen boys in women's parts much more effective than any professional actress. If women players had been proposed to Shakespeare, he would not only have been scandalised, but he would have pointed out that it was impossible to get the force from women that was obtained from boy actors.

NOTE TO THE ARTICLE ON 'COMMERCIAL MORALITY'

In the October number of the Anglo-Japanese Gazette (London) is published a criticism by Mr. Curtis, editor and proprietor of the Kobe Herald, on 'the ridiculously sweeping assertions,' as he calls it, made by Mr. Longford in his article. I subjoin herewith a passage which relates to Mr. Longford's assertion that a 'cordon' is drawn by the Japanese round the trading centres of Yokohama and Kobe, and that foreign merchants are suffering under the 'thraldom':—

Well, let me say that no sane, fair-minded man who knows anything whatever of his subject would ever dream of accusing the whole Japanese people of a lack of commercial morality. All this talk about a cordon being drawn round the treaty ports is rubbish. No such barrier exists, save perhaps in the imagination of a few who cannot shake off the prejudices and disabilities of the past. The idea sounds absurd to me, knowing, as I do know, that all the go-ahead firms have been doing their utmost for some time past to open up connections in the principal cities. Mr. Longford seems to think that business is conducted in Japan to-day just as it was twenty years ago. He apparently does not know that some foreign houses have trusted clerks or travellers all over the country; that some foreign business men run up to Osaka and Tokio daily; and that business journeys to Maidzuru—the great, fortified naval base on the Sea of Japan—Nagoya Sasebo, Hiroshima, and other important centres, are matters of everyday experience now.

In the same number of the same journal is also published an important article from the pen of Sir Tollemache Sinclair, Bart., concerning Bishop Awdry's letter published in the Times. Sir Tollemache strongly repudiates the accuracy of the bishop's charge of dishonesty and immorality against the Japanese, which Sir Tollemache calls the bishop's 'utterly erroneous accusations,' basing his contention upon an elaborate comparison of the statistical facts of Japan and many other nations relating to several important subjects having bearing on the question. Among other things, he writes:—

This clerical censor, who endeavours to find a mote in his Japanese brother's eye, but does not see the beam in his English brother's eye, cut the ground from under his own feet on the subject of the imaginary dishonesty of Japanese traders, for he tells us that a house was built for him by Japanese tradesmen admirably without any contract, and at a moderate expense; and I should like to know, if any Englishman did the same thing in England, whether he would not be unmercifully fleeced. Bishop Awdry says he is a friend of the Japanese, but they will probably say to him, after reading his letter, 'Save us from our friends, as to our enemies we will take care of them ourselves.'

And he winds up the article with these words:—

What excuse has he to offer for the gross and discreditable and unfounded insults which he has heaped on the heads of those under whose protection, and in the enjoyment of whose hospitality, he resides.... In short, it may justly be said of the letter written by this superfluous bishop, 'what is true is not new, and what is new is not true.'

INDEX

Adoption, the custom of, 9. Advance Japan, Morris's, 84. Age, ways of counting, 72. Aïda, the opera, 48. Ainslie, Dr. Daniel, his mission to Nagasaki, 144, 145. Aizu, Lord of, 52. America's sympathy for Japan, 148. American Press, views of war with Russia given to the, 192. Anglo-French, Russo-Japanese entente, 127, 136. Anglo-Franco Diplomacy in Japan, 266-272. Anglo-Japanese Alliance and America, an interview, 325, 326. Army, the Japanese, 47, 188, 189. — state of, after fighting, 188. Army and Navy, organisation of, 255. Arisugawa, Prince, 78. Art, Japanese, 12, 63, 100. Ashikaga, 199. Aston, Dr., 107. Australian Question, the, 323-324. Bank of Japan, 224, 225. 'Black Room President,' the, 9. Books on Japan, 84. Bracken, a talk about, 91, 92. British East India Company, 144. Buddhist Sects, 32, 33. Budha, Amida, 32. Bukum, 106. Bushido, 6, 33, 41-47, 115, 134, 189. — discourse on, 103. — history of the term, 104, 105. — its literature, 106, 107. Bushiku, 107. Bushi-Zoku, 106. Calendar, the Japanese, 70-72. Calumnies on Japan, 71. Card-playing, 175-179. Cards, description of, 175-179. Character of the Japanese, 144. Chastity, 74, 75. Chauvinism, fear of, 188. Chess-playing in China, 168; in Japan, 168-173. Chiku-ba-sho, 106. China, the difficulty of reform in, 200. — the future of, 198. — and Russia, secret treaty between, 137. Chinese jurisprudence, 241. — banking system, 226. Chivalry, Japanese, 41, 42, 43. Chokai, Gunboat, 31. Chosiu, 196, 199, 201, 202, 212, 227, 232, 235. — troops, 190, 191. Christianity and Japan, 120, 128. Chrysanthemums, the culture of, 162. Climate in Japan, 161-163. Code of honour, the Japanese, 182, 183. Commerce and industry of Japan described, 220-226. Commercial morality of the Japanese described, 291-298. Communication, means of, in Japan, 222. Corea, 49. Currency, Japanese, 224. Daidoji Yiuzan, 106. Daimio explained, 108. — and Samurai, difference between, 108. Danjiuro, 246. Deaf and dumb, the treatment of, 68, 69. Death, the Japanese conception of, 132, 134. Deutsche Revue, 129. Diet, the, 157, 252-254. Difficulty of distinguishing R and L, 78, 79. Duels, 109. Dwellings, details of, 57-59. Earrings, remarks on, 188. Eating fruit without peeling, 93 Education in Japan, 135. — the system of, 258-266. — common and military, 182. Elementary Lessons on Budo, 106. England, her political attitude, 4. England and America, relations between, with regard to Japan, 136, 137. English Press views on Japanese character, 193, 194. — sympathy for Japan, 148. Feeling and sentiment in Japan, 133. Feudal system in Japan, 201-218. Fiction, Japanese, 7. Fighting, modes of, 228-232. Finance of the Imperial Government at the beginning of the Great Change, 214-217. Financial and Economical Annual, 101. Financial system, progress of, 224-226. Firearms, the first use of, in Japan, 229. Flowers, art of arrangement of, 21. — sale of, 65. Food, Japanese, 49. Forecast on the issue of the war, 3-5, 38. France and her women, 72. — relations with England, 4. French Nationalists and Socialists with regard to Japan, 153-155. Fushimi, battle of, 227. Garden, a Japanese, described, 13, 14. Geishas, their life, 8. German policy, 4. 'Go,' the game of, 168, 169. Government, the Japanese, 51, 52. — described, 251. 'Great Change,' the, 147-150. Greek and Roman comedies, 7. — customs, 7. Greek inspiration, 38. Griffis, the Rev. W.E., 84. Hakodate, 196. Hana-karuta, 177. Hanawa, 68. Hearn, Lafcadio, 74, 75, 76, 84, 123. — life of, 76. — remarks on, 85, 86. Hetaira, 7. Hideyoshi, 206. Hirosé, Commandant, 29, 160. — Mrs., her letter to an English Admiral, 30. Hizen, 283. Hogen Monogatari, 105. House of Representatives, 51. Imperial Army Department, 191. — Government and military reform, 226. Imperial Japan, 84. Imperial succession, 250. — Troops, 226. Independent Review, 135. Indo-China Question, 319-323. Inouyé, Count, 159. — a sketch of his life, 280-281. Intermarriages, Japanese, 159. International Conventions and Japan, 129. Irving, Sir Henry, and the Japanese stage, 246. Ito, Marquis, 24, 50, 95, 122, 159, 190. — an old speech by, 285-291. — a sketch of his life, 272-279. Izawa Hanrioshi, 107. Jane Eyre and Japan, 11. Japan after the war, 190 — Emperor of, his powers, 249, 250. — and America, relations between, 137. — and Europe, relations between, 317. — and foreign capital, 299-301. — and Russia, a priest's views on, 131. Japan Times, 165. Japanese, the age of, 15. — as correspondents, 243, 244. — love tale, a, 9, 10. — reform, how brought about, 200-204. — tariff, 220. — Vendetta, 110, 111. Jiujitsu, discourse on, 95-99. — and wrestling, a comparison of, 97. — the Willow Mind style, 99. Kagoshima, 236, 237, 238; — bombardment of, 231, 235. Kaibara Yekken, 106. Kataki-uchi, 110. Katsura, Count, 281. Kawakami, 247. Kawasé, 190. Kido, 190, 191, 203, 205. Kikugoro, 246. Kiusiu, 163, 212. Kioto, 205, 227, 228. Kite flying, 167. Kites, 167. Koizumi Yakumo, 76. Kokkwa, a monthly on Art, 100, 102. Komura, Baron, 136. Kumazawa Banzan, 106. Kuroda, 283. Kuropatkin, General, 77. Kwanto, plain of, 163. Lady's opinion on Japanese women, A, 72, 73. Languages, remarks on, 94. Languages of China and Japan, 301-310. Lays of Ancient Rome, 29, 30. Le Matin, 35. Lectures by Yamaga Soko, 106. Legislation, evolution of, 240, 241. Lines on hailstones, 67. Little, Archibald, 124. Local administration, 255. Loti, Pierre, 180. Macaulay, 29, 30. Maritana, the opera, 248. Marriage ceremonies, description of, 15-29. Massage, 69. Matoni, Monsieur, 27, 35, 59. Matrimony, preliminary inquiries in respect to, 19, 20. Matsukata, career of, 281. Mikado's Empire, 84. Military organisation, 46. — training, 45, 46. — for boys, 184. — service, hereditary, abolished, 190. Mongolian troops, 49. Moon scenes, 67, 68. Morality of Japan, compared with other nations, 116, 117. Mothers and wives, Japanese, 29, 89. Music, Japanese, 102. Nagasaki, 167. Nakaodo, a, 15, 16. Nakaye-toju, 106. Names, Japanese, 77. Napoleon, 18, 19, 29, 46, 53, 109. National banks, 255. Nationality, abuse of Japanese, 160. Navigation in the Japan Sea, 222. Navy, the Japanese, 46; — its history, 194-197. Nelson, 183. Neutrality question, the, 311-316. 'New Commoners,' and the history of their emancipation, 47, 48, 51. Night fêtes in Japan, 63, 64. Nobility, the Japanese, 52, 83; — methods of addressing, 83. Nogi, General, and religion's meaning, 130. Notions of pardon and forgiving, 31-32. Nozu, General, 238. Occidental Civilisation, 119-121, 142. — vulgarity, 124. Okubo, 203, 204, 205, 233, 236. Okuma, Count, 220; — a sketch of the life of, 282-284. Osaka, 223. Oyama Marshal, 52, 238. Paris, 1-15. — a motor ride round, 14. — by night, 143. Peace prospects, observations of, 125, 126. Physique, the Japanese, 61. Political attitude of England, 4. Political organism of Japan, 249-258. Port Arthur, 29, 137. Press, the, and the war, 3, 4. Printing, the art of, 101. Pronunciation of Japanese, 79-82. Public baths, 180, 181. Questions and Answers on Bun and Bu, 106. Raffles, Sir Stamford, his appreciation of Japan, 144. Railways, construction of, 222. Red Cross Society, 129. Religion in Japan, 41, 42, 130, 131. — discussions on, 128. Religion, Japanese meaning of, 130. Restoration, the Japanese, 52, 53. Revenge, Japanese, 109. Revolution, discussion on the Japanese, 149. Risen Sun, the, 90. Rodjestvensky, Admiral, 77. Romance, Japanese, 8. 'Ronin,'110. Roosevelt, President, 136, 137, 148. — and jiujitsu, 60, 61. — his partiality towards Japan, 137. Russia, Emperor of, 114. — and Japan, a priest's views on, 131. Russian defeat, the cause of, 184, 185. Russian views of the Japanese, 129. Russo-Japanese War, outbreak of, 137, 138. Russophile papers, 71. Sada-Yakko, 247. Sadanji, 246. Saga, prince of, 283. Saigo, 203, 227, 233, 236-239. Saionji, a sketch of the life of, 284. Samurai, 43, 45, 50, 98, 103, 118, 190, 202, 204, 211, 215, 234. — and Daimio, difference between, 108. — and fighting, 110, 112. — explained, 107. — discipline of the, 17. — the soul of, 112. — mother illustrated by a drama, 9, 10. Satcho, two powerful clans, 203, 227, 239, 240. Satow, Sir E., 103, 107. Satsuma, 201, 203, 211, 212. — formation of the, 212. — war, 224. — the cause of, 233. Scenery of Japan, 55. Sekigahara, battle of, 212. Self-Help, Smiles's, 183. Semitic sympathy, 38. Shido, 106. Shikwan, 245-246. Shimadai, 21. Shimazu Saburo, 235, 237. Shintoism, its sensitiveness to pollution, 50. Shipbuilding yards, origin of, 195-198. Shiwa Yoshimasa, 106. Shizoku, the title, 47, 106. Shogun, 204, 207, 210. Shogunate, the, 195, 198, 199, 201, 227. — financial system of, 213. — troops, 191. Simonoseki, treaty of, 140. Singing insects, 65, and note. Sino-Japanese war, 5, 226. Sketches of some chief figures of actual Japan, 272-285. Snow scenes, 65, 66. Social morality, discussion on, 115-124. Social condition of Japan, 239-240. Socialism and Japan, discussion on, 147-155. Sotsuibushi, or Police-master-general, 208. Sports, Japanese, 164-169. Stage, the Japanese, 245, 247. 'Standard of Living,' an essay, 122, 123. Stoessel, General, 114. Summer resorts of foreigners, 163. Sumoo, 97. Superstition, Japanese, 186, 187. Swords, 111-113. Taira, the, 208. Takasago, 21-22, 24. Takasugi, 190. Takeda Shingen, 228. Telegraphs in Japan, 223. Telephones in Japan, 223. Things Japanese (1898), 103. Togo, Admiral, 193. Tokio, 30, 55, 63, 64, 81, 97, 113, 150, 167, 191, 195, 222. — the history of, 56, 57. — the patois of, 80. Tokugawa, 199, 200, 234. — régime, 231. — Feudatories under, 209, 211. Tolstoy, Count Leo, 127. Trans-Siberian Railway, 34. Trip to Japan, details concerning, 33, 36. Tsu-shima, battle of, 126. Uta-Karuta, 175. Utamaro, 100. Washington, George, 182. Weapons, Japanese, 229-232.