Part 4 — CHAPTER III. DIRECTIONS FOR SUBJECTS CONCERNING THEIR DUTY TO THEIR RULERS. (continued 2)

Object. If we are not obliged to obey, we are not obliged to suffer; for the law obligeth primarily to obedience, and only secondarily ad pœnam, for want of obedience. Therefore where there is no primary obligation to obedience, there is no secondary obligation to punishment.

Answ. The word obligation, being metaphorical, must in controversy be explained by its proper terms. The law doth first constituere debitum obedientiæ, et propter inobedientiam debitum pœnæ. Here then you must distinguish, 1. Between obligation in foro conscientiæ, and in foro humano. 2. Between an obligation ad pœnam by that law of man, and an obligation ad patiendum by another divine law. And so the answer is this: first, If the higher powers, e. g. forbid the apostles to preach upon pain of death or scourging, the dueness both of the obedience and the penalty, is really null, in point of conscience; however in foro humano they are both due; that is, so falsely reputed in that court: therefore the apostles are bound to preach notwithstanding the prohibition, and so far as God alloweth they may resist the penalty, that is, by flying: for properly there is neither debitum obedientiæ nec pœnæ. Secondly, But then God himself obligeth them not to "resist the higher powers," Rom. xiii. 1-3, and "in their patience to possess their souls." So that from this command of God, there is a true obligation ad patiendum, to patient suffering and non-resistance, though from the law of man against their preaching, there was no true obligation aut ad obedientiam, aut ad pœnam. This is the true resolution of this sophism.

Direct. XXXIV. It is one of the most needful duties to governors, for those that have a call and opportunity, (as their pastors,) to tell them wisely and submissively of those sins which are the greatest enemies to their souls; and not the smallest enemies to their government, and the public peace.[82] All christians will confess, that sin is the only forfeiture of God's protection, and the cause of his displeasure, and consequently the only danger to the soul, and the greatest enemy to the land. And that the sins of rulers, whether personal, or in their government, have a far more dangerous influence upon the public state, than the sins of other men. Yea, the very sins which upon true repentance may be pardoned as to the everlasting punishment, may yet be unpardoned as to the public ruin of a state: as the sad instance of Manasseh showeth. 2 Kings xxiii. 26, "Notwithstanding the Lord turned not from the fierceness of his great wrath, wherewith his anger was kindled against Judah, because of all the provocations that Manasseh had provoked him withal." Chap. xxiv. 3, 4, "Surely at the commandment of the Lord came this upon Judah, to remove them out of his sight for the sins of Manasseh according to all that he did; and also for the innocent blood that he shed, (for he filled Jerusalem with innocent blood,) which the Lord would not pardon." And yet this was after Josiah had reformed. So Solomon's sin did cause the rending of the ten tribes from his son's kingdom: yea, the bearing with the high places, was a provoking sin in kings, that otherwise were upright. Therefore sin being the fire in the thatch, the quenching of it must needs be an act of duty and fidelity to governors; and those that tempt them to it, or soothe and flatter them in it, are the greatest enemies they have. But yet it is not every man that must reprove a governor, but those that have a call and opportunity; nor must it be done by them imperiously, or reproachfully, or publicly to their dishonour, but privately, humbly, and with love, honour, reverence, and submissiveness.

Object. But great men have great spirits, and are impatient of reproof, and I am not bound to that which will do no good, but ruin me.

Answ. 1. It is an abuse of your superiors, to censure them to be so proud and brutish, as not to consider that they are the subjects of God, and have souls to save or lose, as well as others: will you judge so hardly of them before trial, as if they were far worse and foolisher than the poor, and take this abuse of them to be an excuse for your other sin? No doubt there are good rulers in the world, that will say to Christ's ministers, as the Prince Elector Palatine did to Pitiscus, charging him to tell him plainly of his faults, when he chose him to be the Pastor Aulicus.[83]

2. How know you beforehand what success your words will have? Hath the word of God well managed no power? yea, to make even bad men good? Can you love your rulers, and yet give up their souls in despair, and all for fear of suffering by them?

3. What if you do suffer in the doing of your duty? Have you not learned to serve God upon such terms as those? Or do you think it will prove it to be no duty, because it will bring suffering on you? These reasons savour not of faith.

Direct. XXXV. Think not that it is unlawful to obey in every thing which is unlawfully commanded. It may in many cases be the subject's duty, to obey the magistrate who sinfully commandeth him. For all the magistrate's sins in commanding, do not enter into the matter or substance of the thing commanded: if a prince command me to do the greatest duty, in an ill design, to some selfish end, it is his sin so to command; but yet that command must be obeyed (to better ends). Nay, the matter of the command may be sinful in the commander, and not in the obeyer. If I be commanded without any just reason to hunt a feather, it is his sin that causelessly commandeth me so to lose my time; and yet it may be my sin to disobey it, while the thing is lawful; else servants and children must prove all to be needful, as well as lawful, which is commanded them before they must obey. Or the command may at the same time be evil by accident, and the obedience good by accident, and per se. Very good accidents, consequence, or effects, may belong to our obedience, when the accidents of the command itself are evil. I could give you abundance of instances of these things.

Direct. XXXVI. Yet is not all to be obeyed that is evil but by accident, nor all to be disobeyed that is so: but the accidents must be compared; and if the obedience will do more good than harm, we must obey; if it will evidently do more harm than good, we must not do it. Most of the sins in the world are evil by accident only, and not in the simple act denuded of its accidents, circumstances, or consequents. You may not sell poison to him that you know would poison himself with it, though to sell poison of itself be lawful. Though it be lawful simply to lend a sword, yet not to a traitor that you know would kill the king with it, no nor to one that would kill his father, his neighbour, or himself. A command would not excuse such an act from sin.[84] He was slain by David, that killed Saul at his own command, and if he had but lent him his sword to do it, it had been his sin. Yet some evil accidents may be weighed down by greater evils, which would evidently follow upon the not doing of the thing commanded.

Direct. XXXVII. In the question, whether human laws bind conscience, the doubt is not of that nature, as to have necessary influence upon your practice. For all agree, that they bind the subject to obedience, and that God's law bindeth us to obey them. And if God's law bind us to obey man's law, and so to disobey them be materially a sin against God's law, this is as much as is needful to resolve you in respect of practice: no doubt, man's law hath no primitive obliging power at all, but a derivative from God, and under him; and what is it to bind the conscience (an improper speech) but to bind the person to judge it his duty, (conscire,) and so to do it. And no doubt but he is bound to judge it his duty, that that is immediately by human law, and remotely by divine law, and so the contrary to be a sin proximately against man, and ultimately against God. This is plain, and the rest is but logomachy.

Direct. XXXVIII. The question is much harder, whether the violation of every human penal law be a sin against God, though a man submit to the penalty. (And the desert of every sin is death.) Master Richard Hooker's last book unhappily ended, before he gave us the full reason of his judgment in this case, these being the last words: "Howbeit, too rigorous it were, that the breach of every human law should be a deadly sin: a mean there is between those extremities, if so be we can find it out—."[85] Amesius hath diligently discussed it, and many others. The reason for the affirmative is, because God bindeth us to obey all the lawful commands of our governors; and suffering the penalty, is not obeying; the penalty being not the primary intention of the lawgiver, but the duty; and the penalty only to enforce the duty: and though the suffering of it satisfy man, it satisfieth not God, whose law we break by disobeying. Those that are for the negative, say, That God binding us but to obey the magistrate, and his law binding but aut ad obedientiam, aut ad pœnam, I fulfil his will, if I either do or suffer: if I obey not, I please him by satisfying for my disobedience. And it is none of his will, that my choosing the penalty should be my sin or damnation. To this it is replied, That the law bindeth ad pœnam, but on supposition of disobedience; and that disobedience is forbidden of God: and the penalty satisfieth not God, though it satisfy man. The other rejoins, That it satisfieth God, in that it satisfieth man; because God's law is but to give force to man's, according to the nature of it. If this hold, then no disobedience at all is a sin in him that suffereth the penalty. In so hard a case, because more distinction is necessary to the explication, than most readers are willing to be troubled with, I shall now give you but this brief decision.[86] There are some penalties which fulfil the magistrate's own will as much as obedience, which indeed have more of the nature of a commutation, than of penalty: (as he that watcheth not or mendeth not the highways, shall pay so much to hire another to do it: he that shooteth not so oft in a year, shall pay so much: he that eateth flesh in Lent, shall pay so much to the poor: he that repaireth not his hedges, shall pay so much:) and so in most amercements, and divers penal laws; in which we have reason to judge, that the penalty satisfieth the lawgiver fully, and that he leaveth it to our choice. In these cases I think we need not afflict ourselves with the conscience or fear of sinning against God. But there are other penal laws, in which the penalty is not desired for itself, and is supposed to be but an imperfect satisfaction to the lawgiver's will, and that he doth not freely leave us to our choice, but had rather we obeyed than suffered; only he imposeth no greater a penalty, either because there is no greater in his power, or some inconvenience prohibiteth; in this case I should fear my disobedience were a sin, though I suffered the penalty. (Still supposing it an act that he had power to command me.)

Direct. XXXIX. Take heed of the pernicious design of those atheistical politicians, that would make the world believe, that all that is excellent among men, is at enmity with monarchy, yea, and government itself; and take heed on the other side, that the most excellent things be not turned against it by abuse.

Here I have two dangers to advertise you to beware: the first is of some Machiavelian, pernicious principles, and the second of some erroneous, unchristian practices.

For the first, there are two sorts of atheistical politicians guilty of them. The first sort are some atheistical flatterers, that to engage monarchs against all that is good, would make them believe that all that is good is against them and their interest. By which means, while their design is to steal the help of princes, to cast out all that is good from the world, they are most pernicious underminers of monarchy itself. For what readier way to set all the world against it, than to make them believe that it standeth at enmity to all that is good. These secret enemies would set up a leviathan to be the butt of common enmity and opposition.

The other sort are the professed enemies of monarchy, who in their zeal for popular government, do bring in all that is excellent, as if it were adverse to monarchy. 1. They would (both) set it at enmity with politicians. 2. With lawyers. 3. With history. 4. With learning. 5. With divines. 6. With all christian religion. 7. And with humanity itself.

Object. I. The painters of the leviathan scorn all politics, as ignorant of the power of monarchs, except the atheistical inventions of their own brains. And the adversaries of monarchy say, The reading of politics will satisfy men against monarchy; for in them you ordinarily find that the majestas realis is in the people, and the majestas personalis in the prince; that the prince receiveth all his power from the people, to whom it is first given, and to whom it may be forfeited and escheat: with much more of the like, as is to be seen in politicians of all religions.

Answ. 1. It is not all politics that go upon those principles: and one mistake in writers is no disgrace to the true doctrine of politics, which may be vindicated from such mistakes. 2. As almost all authors of politics take monarchy for a lawful species of government, so most or very many (especially of the moderns) do take it to be the most excellent sort of unmixed government. Therefore they are no enemies to it.

Object. II. For lawyers, they say, That, 1. Civilians set up reason so high, that they dangerously measure the power of monarchs by it; insomuch, that the most famous pair of zealous and learned defenders of monarchy, Barclay and Grotius, do assign many cases, in which it is lawful to resist princes by arms, and more than so.[87] 2. And the common lawyers, they say, are all for the law, and ready to say as Hooker, Lex facit regem; and what power the king hath, he hath it by law, The bounds are known, p. 218. He is singulis major, et universis minor, &c.

Answ. 1. Sure the Roman civil laws were not against monarchy, when monarchs made so many of them. And what power reason truly hath, it hath from God, whom none can over-top; and that which reason is abused unjustly to defend, may be well contradicted by reason indeed. 2. And what power the laws of the land have, they have by the king's consent and act: and it is strange impudence to pretend, that his own laws are against him. If any misinterpret them, he may be confuted.

Object. III. For historians, say they, Be but well-versed in ancient history, Greek and Roman, and you shall find them speak so ill of monarchy, and so much for popularity, and liberty, and magnifying so much the defenders of the people's liberty against monarchs, that it will secretly steal the dislike of monarchy, and the love of popular liberty into your minds.[88]

Answ. It must be considered in what times and places the ancient Greek and Roman historians did live.[89] They that lived where popular government was in force and credit, wrote according to the time and government which they lived under; yet do they extol the virtues and heroic acts of monarchs, and often speak of the vulgar giddiness and unconstancy. And for my part, I think he that readeth in them those popular tumults, irrationalities, furies, unconstancies, cruelties, which even in Rome and Athens they committed, and all historians record, will rather find his heart much alienated from such democratical confusions. And the historians of other times and places do write as much for monarchy, as they did for democracy.

Object. IV. Some of them revile at Aristotle and all universities, and say, That while multitudes must be tasters and pretenders to the learning which they never can thoroughly attain, they read many dangerous books, and receive false notions; and these half-witted men are the disturbers of all societies. Do you not see, say they, that the two strongest kingdoms in the world, are kept up by keeping the subjects ignorant. The Greek and Latin empires were ruined by the contention of men that did pretend to learning. The Turk keepeth all in quiet by suppressing it: and the pope confineth it almost all to his instruments in government, and keepeth the common people in ignorance; which keepeth them from matter of quarrel and disobedience.[90]

Answ. I hope you will not say, that Rome or Athens of old did take this course. And we will not deny, but men of knowledge are more subject to debates, and questionings, and quarrels about right and wrong, than men of utter ignorance are. Beasts fall not out about crowns or kingdoms, as men do. Dogs and swine will not scramble for gold, as men will do, if you cast it among them: and it is easier to keep swine or sheep, than men; and yet it is not better to be swine or sheep, than men; nor to be governors of beasts, than men. Dead men are quieter than the living, and blind men will submit to be led more easily than those that see; and yet it is not better to be a king of brutes, or blind men, or dead men, than of the living that have their sight. A king of men that have many disagreements, is better than a king of beasts that all agree. And yet true knowledge tendeth to concord, and to the surest and constantest obedience.

Object. V. But their chief calumniations are against divines. They say, That divines make a trade of religion; and under pretence of divine laws, and conscience, and ecclesiastical discipline, they subjugate both prince and people to their will, and set up courts which they call ecclesiastical, and keep the people in dependence on their dictates, and teach them to disobey upon pretence that God is against the matter of their obedience; and also by contending for their opinions, or for superiority and domination over one another, they fill kingdoms with quarrels, and break them into sects and factions, and are the chief disturbers of the public peace.[91]

Answ. We cannot deny that carnal, ignorant, worldly, proud, unholy pastors, have been and are the great calamity of the churches: but that is no more disgrace to their office, or to divinity, than it is to philosophy or reason, that philosophers have been ignorant, erroneous, divided, and contentious; nor than it is to government, that kings and other rulers have been imperfect, bad, contentious, and filled the world with wars and bloodshed. Nay, I rather think that this is a proof of the excellency of divinity: as the reason of the aforesaid imperfections and faultiness of philosophers and rulers, is because that philosophy and government are things so excellent, that the corrupt, imperfect nature of man, will not reach so high, as to qualify any man to manage them, otherwise than with great defectiveness; so also divinity, and the pastoral office, are things so excellent and sublime, that the nature of lapsed man will not reach to a capacity of being perfect in them. So that the faultiness of the nature of man, compared with the excellency of the things to be known and practised by divines, is the cause of all these faults that they complain of; and nature's vitiosity, if any thing, must be blamed. Certainly, the pastoral office hath men as free from ignorance, worldliness, pride, and unquietness, as any calling in the world. To charge the faults of nature upon that profession, which only discovereth, but never caused them, yea, which would heal them, if they are to be healed on earth, judge whether this dealing be not foolish and injurious, and what will be the consequents if such unreasonable persons may be heard. And therefore, though leviathan and his spawn, among all that is good, bring down divines, and the zealots for democracy have gloried of their new forms of commonwealths, as inconsistent with a clergy, their glory is their shame to all but infidels. Let them help us to take down and cure the ignorance, pride, carnality, worldliness, and contentiousness of the clergy, and we will be thankful to them; but to quarrel with the best of men for the common pravity of nature, and to reproach the most excellent science and function, because depraved nature cannot attain or manage them in perfection, this is but to play the professed enemies of mankind.

Object. VI. These atheists or infidels also do spit their venom against christianity and godliness itself, and would make princes believe, that the principles of it are contrary to their interest, and to government and peace: and they fetch their cavils, 1. From the Scripture's contemptuous expressions of worldly wealth and greatness. 2. From its prohibition of revenge and maintaining our own right. 3. From the setting it above all human laws; and by its authority and obscurity, filling the minds of men with scrupulosity. 4. From the divisions which religion occasioneth in the world: and, 5. From the testimonies of the several sects against each other. I shall answer them particularly, though but briefly.

Object. I. Say the infidel politicians, How can subjects have honourable thoughts of their superiors, when they believe that to be the word of God, which speaketh so contemptuously of them?[92] As Luke vi. 24, "Woe to you that are rich! for ye have received your consolation." Jam. v. 1-3, "Go to now, ye rich men, weep and howl for your miseries that shall come upon you." Ver. 5, 6, "Ye have lived in pleasure on earth, and been wanton—Ye have condemned and killed the just."—Luke xii. 21. Chap. xvi. the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, is spoken to make men think of the rich as miserable, damned creatures. Ezek. xxi. 25, "Thou profane, wicked prince of Israel." Prov. xxv. 5, "Take away the wicked from before the king." Prov. xxix. 12, "If a ruler hearken to lies, all his servants are wicked:" the contempt of greatness is made a part of the christian religion.

Answ. 1. As if there were no difference between the contempt of riches and worldly prosperity, and the contempt of government. He is blind that cannot see that riches and authority are not the same: yea, that the overvaluing of riches is the cause of seditions, and the disturbance of governments, when the contempt of them removeth the chief impediments of obedience and peace. 2. And may not governors be sufficiently honoured, unless they be exempted from the government of God? and unless their sin must go for virtue? and unless their duty, and their account, and the danger of their souls, be treacherously concealed from them? God will not flatter dust and ashes; great and small are alike to him. He is no respecter of persons: when you can save the greatest from death and judgment, then they may be excepted from all those duties which are needful to their preparation. 3. And is it not strange, that God should teach men to contemn the power which he himself ordaineth? and which is his own? Hath he set officers over us, for the work of government, and doth he teach us to despise them? There is no show of any such thing in Scripture: there are no principles in the world that highlier advance and honour magistracy, than the christian principles, unless you will make gods of them, as the Roman senate did of the Antonines, and other emperors.

Object. II. How can there be any government, when men must believe that they must not resist evil, but give place to wrath, and turn the other cheek to him that smiteth them, and give their coat to him that taketh away their cloak, and lend, asking for nothing again? Is not this to let thieves and violent, rapacious men rule all, and have their will, and go unpunished? What use is there then for courts or judges? And when Christ commandeth his disciples, that though the kings of the nations rule over them, and exercise authority, and are called benefactors, yet with them it shall not be so.[93]

Answ. These were the old cavils of Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian; but very impudent. As though love and patience were against peace and government. Christ commandeth nothing in all these words, but that we love our neighbour as ourselves, and love his soul above our wealth, and that we do as we would be done by, and use not private revenge, and take not up the magistrate's work: and is this doctrine against government? It is not magistrates, but ministers and private christians, whom he commandeth not to resist evil, and not to exercise lordship, as the civil rulers do. When it will do more hurt to the soul of another, than the benefit amounteth to, we must not seek our own right by law, nor must private men revenge themselves. All law-suits, and contentions, and hurting of others, which are inconsistent with loving them as ourselves, are forbidden in the gospel. And when was government ever disturbed by such principles and practices as these? Nay, when was it disturbed but for want of these? When was there any sedition, rebellion, or unlawful wars, but through self-love, and love of earthly things, and want of love to one another? How easily might princes rule men, that are thus ruled by love and patience!

Object. III. Christianity teacheth men to obey the Scriptures before their governors, and to obey no law that is contrary to the Bible; and when the Bible is so large, and hath so many passages hard to be understood, and easily perverted, some of these will be always interpreted against the laws of men; and then they are taught to fear no man against God, and to endure any pains or death, and to be unmoved by all the penalties which should enforce obedience; and to rejoice in this as a blessed martyrdom, to the face of kings; and those that punish them, are reproached as persecutors, and threatened with damnation, and made the vilest men on earth, and represented odious to all.[94]

Answ. The sum of all this objection is, That there is a God. For if that be not denied, no man can deny that he is the Universal Governor of the world; and that he hath his proper laws and judgment, and rewards and punishments, or that magistrates are his ministers, and have no power but from him; and consequently, that the commands, and threats, and promises of God, are a thousand-fold more to be regarded, than those of men.[95] He is a beast, and not a man, that feareth not God more than man, and that feareth not hell more than bodily sufferings: and for the Scriptures, 1. Are they any harder to be understood than the law of nature itself? Surely the characters of the will of God in natura rerum, are much more obscure than in the Scriptures. Hath God sent so great a messenger from heaven, to open to mankind the mysteries of his kingdom, and tell them what is in the other world, and bring life and immortality to light, and yet shall his revelation be accused as more obscure than nature itself is? If an angel had been sent from heaven to any of these infidels by name, to tell them but the same that Scripture telleth us, sure they would not have reproached his message with such accusations. 2. And are not the laws of the land about smaller matters, more voluminous and difficult? And shall that be made a reproach to government? And for misinterpretation, it is the fault of human nature, that is ignorant and rash, and not of the Scriptures. Will you tell God, that you will not obey him, unless he will make his laws so, as no man can misinterpret them? When or where were there ever such laws? God will be God, and Judge of the world, whether you will or not; and he will not be an underling to men, nor set their laws above his own, to avoid your accusations. If there be another life of joy or misery, it is necessary that there be laws according to which those rewards and punishments are to be adjudged. And if rulers oppose those who are appointed to promote obedience to them, they must do it at their perils; for God will render to all according to their works.

Object. IV. Doth not experience tell the world, that christianity every where causeth divisions, and sets the world together by the ears? What a multitude of sects are there among us at this day; and every one thinketh that his salvation lieth upon his opinion! And how can princes govern men of so contrary minds, when the pleasing of one party is the losing of the rest? We have long seen that church divisions shake the safety of the state. If it were not that few that are called christians are such indeed, and serious in the religion which themselves profess, there were no quietness to be expected; for those that are most serious, are so full of scruples, and have consciences still objecting something or other against their obedience, and are so obstinate in their way, as thinking it is for their salvation, that all ages and nations have been fain to govern them by force as beasts, which they have called persecution.[96]

Answ. 1. There is no doctrine in the world so much for love, and peace, and concord as the doctrine of Christ is. What doth it so much urge and frequently inculcate? What doth it contain but love and peace from end to end? Love is the sum and end of the gospel, and the fulfilling of the law. To love God above all, and our neighbours as ourselves, and to do as we would be done by, is the epitome of the doctrine of Christ and his apostles. 2. And therefore christianity is only the occasion, and not the cause of the divisions of the earth. It is men's blindness and passions and carnal interests rebelling against the laws of God, which is the make-bate of the world, and filleth it with strife. The wisdom from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits; it blesseth the peace-makers and the meek. But it is the rebellious wisdom from beneath, that is earthly, sensual, and devilish, which causeth envy and strife, and thereby confusion and every evil work, James iii. 15-17; Matt. v. 6-8. So that the true, genuine christian is the best subject and peaceablest man on earth. But seriousness is not enough to make a christian; a man may be passionately serious in an error; understanding must lead and seriousness follow. To be zealous in error is not to be zealous in christianity; for the error is contrary to christian verity. 3. As I said before, it is a testimony of the excellency of religion that it thus occasioneth contention. Dogs and swine do not contend for crowns and kingdoms, nor for sumptuous houses or apparel; nor do infants trouble the world or themselves with metaphysical, or logical, or mathematical disputes; idiots do not molest the world with controversies, nor fall thereby into sects and parties. Nor yet do wise and learned persons contend about chaff, or dust, or trifles. But as excellent things are matter of search, so are they matter of controversy, to the most excellent wits. The hypocritical christians that you speak of, who make God and their salvation give place to the unjust commands of men, are indeed no christians, as not taking Christ for their sovereign Lord; and it is not in any true honour of magistracy that they are so ductile, and will do any thing, but it is for themselves, and their carnal interest; and when that interest requireth it, they will betray their governors, as infidels will do. If you can reduce all the world to be infants, or idiots, or brutes, yea, or infidels, they will then trouble the state with no contentions for religion or matters of salvation. But if the governed must be brutified, what will the governors be? 4. All true christians are agreed in the substance of their religion; there is no division among them about the necessary points of faith or duty. Their agreement is far greater than their disagreement; which is but about some smaller matters, where differences are tolerable; therefore they may all be governed without any such violence as you mention. If the common articles of faith, and precepts of christian duty, be maintained, then that is upheld which all agree in; and rulers will not find it needful to oppress every party or opinion save one, among them that hold the common truths. Wise and sober christians lay not men's salvation upon every such controversy; nor do they hold or manage them unpeaceably to the wrong of church or state, nor with the violation of charity, peace, or justice. 5. Is there any of the sciences which afford not matter of controversy? If the laws of the land did yield no matter of controversy, lawyers and judges would have less of that work than now they have. And was there not greater diversity of opinions and worship among the heathens than ever was among christians? What a multitude of sects of philosophers and religions had they! And what a multitude of gods had they to worship! And the number of them still increased as oft as the senate pleased to make a god of the better sort of their emperors when they were dead. Indeed one emperor, (of the religion of some of these objectors,) Heliogabalus, bestirred himself with all his power to have reduced all religion to unity, that is, he would have all the worship brought to his god to whom he had been priest: saith Lampridius in his life, Dicebat Judæorum et Samaritanorum religiones et christianam devotionem, illuc transferendam, &c. And therefore he robbed, and maimed, and destroyed the other gods, id agens ne quis Romæ Deus nisi Heliogabalus coleretur. But as the effect of his monstrous, abominable filthiness of life was to be thrust into a privy, killed, and dragged about the streets, and drowned in the Tiber; so the effect of his desired unity, was to bring that one god or temple into contempt, whereto he would confine all worship. The differences among christians are nothing in comparison of the differences among heathens.[97] The truth is, religion is such an illustrious, noble thing, that dissensions about it, like spots in the moon, are much more noted by the world, than about any lower, common matters. Men may raise controversies in philosophy, physic, astronomy, chronology, and yet it maketh no such noise, nor causeth much offence or hatred in the world; but the devil and corrupted nature have such an enmity against religion, that they are glad to pick any quarrel against it, and blame it for the imperfections of all that learn it, and should practise it. As if grammar should be accused for every error or fault that the boys are guilty of in learning it; or the law were to be accused for all the differences of lawyers, or contentions of the people; or physic were to be accused for all the differences or errors of physicians; or meat and drink were culpable because of men's excesses and diseases. There is no doctrine or practice in the world, by which true unity and concord can be maintained, but by seriousness in the true religion. And when all contention cometh for want of religion, it is impudence to blame religion for it, which is the only cure. If rulers will protect all that agree in that which is justly to be called the christian religion, both for doctrine and practice; and about their small and tolerable differences, will use no other violence but only to compel them to live in peace, and to suppress the seditious, and those that abuse and injure government or one another; they will find that christianity tendeth not to divisions, nor to the hinderance or disturbance of government or peace. It is passion, and pride, and selfishness that doth this, and not religion; therefore let these and not religion be restrained. But if they will resolve to suffer none to live in peace, but those that in every punctilio are all of one opinion, they must have but one subject that is sincere in his religion, (for no two will be in every thing of the same apprehension, no more than of the same complexion,) and all the rest must be worldly hypocrites, that while they are heartily true to no religion, will profess themselves of any religion which will serve their present turns; and these nominal christians will be ready to betray their rulers, or do any mischief which their carnal interest requireth.[98]

Object. V. What witness need we more than their own accusations of one another?[99] For the papists, how many volumes have the protestants written against them as enemies to all civil government; alleging even the decrees of their general councils, as Later. sub Innoc. III. Can. 3. And for the protestants, they are as deeply charged by the papists, as you may see in the "Image of both Churches," and "Philanax Anglicus," and abundance more. For Calvin and the presbyterians and puritans, let the prelates tell you how peaceable they are. And the papists and puritans say that the prelatists are of the same mind, and only for their own ends pretend to greater loyalty than others. There are no two among them more famous for defending government, than Hooker and Bilson. And what Hooker saith for popular power, his first and eighth books abundantly testify: and even Bishop Bilson himself defendeth the French and German protestant wars; and you may judge of his loyal doctrine by these words, p. 520, "Of Christian Subjection:" "If a prince should go about to subject his kingdom to a foreign realm, or change the form of the commonwealth from impery to tyranny, or neglect the laws established by common consent of prince and people, to execute his own pleasure; in these and other cases which might be named, if the nobles and commons join together to defend their ancient and accustomed liberty, regimen, and laws, they may not well be counted rebels."[100]

Answ. 1. If it be clear that christianity as to its principles, is more for love, and concord, and subjection, than any other rational doctrine in the world, then if any sect of christians shall indeed be found to contradict these principles, so far they contradict christianity: and will you blame religion because men contradict it? or blame Christ's doctrine because men disobey it? Indeed every sect that hath something of its own to make a sect, besides christian religion, which maketh men mere christians, may easily be guilty of such error as will corrupt the christian religion. And as a sect, they have a divided interest which may tempt them to dividing principles; but none more condemn such divisions than Christ. 2. And indeed, though a christian as such is a credible witness; yet a sect or faction as such, doth use to possess men with such an envious, calumniating disposition, that they are little to be believed when they accuse each other! This factious zeal is not from above, but is earthly, sensual, and devilish; and therefore where this is, no wonder if there be strife, and false accusing, and confusion, and every evil work. But as these are no competent witnesses, so whether or no they are favoured by Christ, you may judge if you will read but those three chapters, Matt. v. Rom. xii. James iii. I may say here as Bishop Bilson in the place which is accused, p. 521. "IT IS EASY FOR A RUNNING AND RANGING HEAD TO SIT AT HOME IN HIS CHAMBER AND CALL MEN REBELS, HIMSELF BEING THE RANKEST." 3. For the papists I can justify them from your accusation, so far as they are christians; but as they are papists let him justify them that can. Indeed usurpation of government is the very essence of popery; for which all other christians blame them; and therefore there is small reason that christianity should be accused for them. 4. And for the protestants, both episcopal and disciplinarians, the sober and moderate of them speak of one another in no such language as you pretend. For the episcopal, I know of none but railing papists, that accuse them universally of any doctrines of rebellion: and for the practices of some particular men, it is not to be alleged against their doctrine. Do you think that Queen Elizabeth, to whom Bishop Bilson's book was dedicated, or King Charles, to whom Mr. Hooker's book was dedicated, took either of them to be teachers of rebellion? It is not every different opinion in politics that proveth men to be against subjection. He that can read such a book as Bilson's for "Christian Subjection against Antichristian Rebellion," and yet deny him to be a teacher of subjection, hath a very hard forehead. For the controversies, I shall say no more of them here, but what I have said before to Mr. Hooker. And as for Calvin and the disciplinarians, or puritans, as they are called, they subscribe all the confessions for magistracy, and take the same oaths of allegiance and supremacy, as others do; and they plead and write for them: so that for my part I know not of any difference in their doctrine. Hear what Bishop Andrews saith, (who was no rebel,) in his "Tortura Torti," p. 379, 380. Calvinus autem ut papam regem; ita regem papam non probavit; neque nos quod in papa detestamur, in rege approbamus; at et ille nobiscum, et nos cum illo sentimus, easdem esse in ecclesia christiana regis Jacobi partes, quæ Josiæ fuerunt in Judaica; nec nos ultra quicquam fieri ambimus—: that is, "But Calvin neither liked a pope-king, nor a king-pope; nor do we approve of that in the king, which we detest in the pope. But he with us, and we with him, do judge, that King James hath as much to do in the christian church, as Josias had in the Jewish church; and we go not about to get any more." And after, Sub primatus nomine, papatum novum rex non invehit in ecclesiam; sic enim statuit, ut non Aaroni pontifici, ita nec Jeroboamo regi, jus ullum esse conflatum a se vitulum populo proponendi, ut adoret, (id est,) non vel fidei novos articulos, vel cultus divini novas formulas procudendi: that is, "The king doth not bring into the church a new papacy, under the name of primacy; for thus he judgeth, (or determineth,) that neither Aaron the priest, nor Jeroboam the king, had any right to propose the calf which they had made, to the people to be adored; that is, neither to hammer (or make) new articles of faith, or new forms of divine worship." And p. 379, 380. Quos vero puritanos appellat, si regium primatum detestantur, detestandi ipsi. Profitentur enim, subscribunt, jurant indies; sed et illi quod faciunt ingenue faciunt, et societatem in hoc Torti, ipsumque adeo Tortum, tanquam mendacem hominem, (et alibi de aliis, et hic de se,) ac sycophantem egregium detestantur: that is, "And for those he calleth puritans, if they detest the king's supremacy, they are to be detested; for they daily profess, subscribe, and swear to it; and what they do, they do ingenuously; and they detest the society of Tortus in this, and Tortus himself, as a lying man, (elsewhere of others, and here of themselves,) and an egregious sycophant." By these testimonies judge what protestants think of one another in point of loyalty.

5. And why are not all the other christians taken into your enumeration? the Armenians, Abassins, and all the Greek churches? whom the papists so frequently reproach as flatterers or servile, because they still gave so much to their emperors. Have you any pretence for your accusation as against them? Unless perhaps from the tumults which Alexandria in its greatness was much addicted to, which is nothing to the doctrine of christianity, nor to the practice of all the rest.

Christianity is most for loyalty and subjection.

Having answered these cavils of the late atheistical or infidel politicians, I shall next show, though briefly, yet by plentiful evidence, that christianity and true godliness is the greatest strength of government, and bond of subjection, and means of peace, that ever was revealed to the world: which will appear in all these evidences following.

1. Christianity teacheth men to take the higher powers as ordained of God, and to obey them as God's ministers or officers, having an authority derived immediately from God; so that it advanceth the magistrate as God's officer, as much higher than infidels advance him, (who fetch his power no higher than force or choice,) as a servant of God is above a servant of men; which is more than a man is above a dog.[101]

2. Christianity telleth us that our obedience to magistrates is God's own command, and so that we must obey him by obeying them. And as obedience to a constable is more procured by the king's laws than by his own commands, so obedience to a king is far more effectually procured by God's laws than by his own. If God be more above a king, than a king is above a worm, the command of God must be a more powerful obligation upon every understanding person, than the king's. And what greater advantage can a king have in governing, than to have subjects whose consciences do feel themselves bound by God himself, to obey the king and all his officers.

Object. But this is still with exception, if it be not in things forbidden of God; and the subjects are made judges whether it be so or no.

Answ. And woe to that man that grudgeth that God must be obeyed before him; and would be himself a god to be obeyed in things which God is against! The subjects are made no public judges, but private discerners of their duties; and so you make them yourselves: or else they must not judge whether the king or a usurper were to be obeyed; or whether the word of a king or of a constable, if they be contradictory, is to be preferred. To judge what we must choose or refuse is proper to a rational creature: even brutes themselves will do something like it by instinct of nature, and will not do all things according to your will. You would have us obey a justice of peace no further than our loyalty to the king will give leave: and therefore there is greater reason that we should obey the higher powers no further than our loyalty to God will give leave.[102] But if men pretend God's commands for any thing which he commandeth not, magistrates bear not the sword in vain, and subjects are commanded by God not to resist. If they punish them rightfully, God will bear the rulers out in it; if they punish them wrongfully or persecute them for well doing, God will severely punish them, who so wronged his subjects, and abused the authority which he committed to their trust.

3. The christian religion bindeth subjects to obedience upon sorer penalties than magistrates can inflict; even upon pain of God's displeasure, and everlasting damnation, Rom. xiii. 2, 3. And how great a help this is to government it is so easy to discern, that the simpler sort of atheists do persuade themselves, that kings devised religion to keep people in obedience with the fears of hell. Take away the fears of the life to come, and the punishment of God in hell upon the wicked, and the world will be turned into worse than a den of serpents and wild beasts; adulteries, and murders, and poisoning kings, and all abomination, will be freely committed, which wit or power can think to cover or bear out! Who will trust that man that believeth not that God doth judge and punish?

4. The christian religion doth encourage obedience and peace with the promise of the reward of endless happiness (cæteris paribus); heaven is more than any prince can give. If that will not move men, there is no greater thing to move them. Atheism and infidelity have no such motives.

5. Christianity teacheth subjects to obey not only good rulers but bad ones, even heathens themselves, and not to resist when we cannot obey. Whereas among heathens, princes ruled no longer than they pleased the soldiers or the people; so that Lampridius marvelled that Heliogabalus was no sooner butchered, but suffered to reign three years: Mirum fortasse cuipiam videatur Constantine venerabilis, quod hæc clades quam retuli loco principum fuerit; et quidem prope triennio, ita ut nemo inventus fuerit qui istum a gubernaculis Romanæ majestatis abduceret, cum Neroni, Vitellio, Caligulæ cæterisque hujusmodi nunquam tyrannicida defuerit.[103]

6. Christianity and godliness do not only restrain the outward acts, but rule the very hearts, and lay a charge upon the thoughts, which the power of princes cannot reach. It forbiddeth to curse the king in our bedchamber, or to have a thought or desire of evil against him; it quencheth the first sparks of disloyalty and disorder; and the rule of the outward man followeth the ordering of the heart; and therefore atheism, which leaveth the heart free and open to all desires and designs of rebellion, doth kindle that fire in the minds of men, which government cannot quench; it corrupteth the fountain; it breaketh the spring that should set all a going; it poisoneth the heart of commonwealths.[104]

7. Christianity and godliness teach men patience, that it may not seem strange to them to bear the cross, and suffer injuries from high and low; and therefore that impatience which is the beginning of all rebellion being repressed, it stayeth the distemper from going any further.

8. Christianity teacheth men self-denial as a great part of their religion;[105] and when selfishness is mortified, there is nothing left to be a principle of rebellion against God or our superiors. Selfishness is the very predominant principle of the ungodly; it is only for themselves that they obey when they do obey; no wonder therefore if the author of Leviathan allow men to do any thing when the saving of themselves requireth it. And so many selfish persons as there be in a kingdom, so many several interests are first sought, which for the most part stand cross to the interests of others: the godly have all one common centre; they unite in God, and therefore may be kept in concord; for God's will is a thing that may be fulfilled by all as well as one; but the selfish and ungodly are every one his own centre, and have no common centre to unite in, their interests being ordinarily cross and inconsistent.

9. Christianity teacheth men by most effectual arguments, to set light by the riches and honours of the world, and not to strive for superiority; but to mind higher things, and lay up our treasure in a better world, and to condescend to men of low degree. It forbiddeth men to exalt themselves lest they be brought low; and commandeth them to humble themselves that God may exalt them; and he that knoweth not that pride and covetousness are the great disquieters of the world, and the cause of contentions, and the ruin of states, knoweth nothing of these matters. Therefore if it were but by the great urging of humility and heavenly-mindedness, and the strict condemning of ambition and earthly-mindedness, christianity and godliness must needs be the greatest preservers of government, and of order, peace, and quietness in the world.[106]

10. Christianity teacheth men to live in the love of God and man. It maketh love the very heart, and life, and sum, and end of all other duties of religion. Faith itself is but the bellows to kindle in us the sacred flames of love. Love is the end of the gospel, and the fulfilling of the law. To love all saints with a special love, even with a pure heart and fervently, and to love all men heartily with a common love; to love our neighbour as ourselves; and to love our very enemies; this is the life which Christ requireth, upon the penalty of damnation; and if love thus prevail, what should disturb the government, peace, or order of the world?

11. Christianity teacheth men to be exact in justice, distributive and commutative; and to do to others as we would they should do to us: and where this is followed kings and states will have little to molest them, when gens sine justitia est sine remige navis in unda.

12. Christianity teacheth men to do good to all men as far as we are able, and to abound in good works, as that for which we are redeemed and new made; and if men will set themselves wholly to do good, and be hurtful and injurious to none, how easy will it be to govern such!

13. Christianity teacheth men to forbear and to forgive, as ever they will be forgiven of God, and the strong to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please themselves, but one another to their edification; not to be censorious, harsh, or cruel, nor to place the kingdom of God in meats, and drinks, and days, but in righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost; to bear one another's burdens, and to restore them with the spirit of meekness that are overtaken in a fault, and to be peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality and hypocrisy, and to speak evil of no man; and where this is obeyed, how quietly and easily may princes govern![107]

14. Christianity setteth before us the perfectest pattern of all this humility, meekness, contempt of worldly wealth and greatness, self-denial and obedience, that ever was given in the world. The eternal Son of God incarnate, would condescend to earth and flesh, and would obey his superiors after the flesh, in the repute of the world; and would pay tribute, and never be drawn to any contempt of the governors of the world, though he suffered death under the false accusation of it. He that is a christian, endeavoureth to imitate his Lord: and can the imitation of Christ, or of his peaceable apostles, be injurious to governors? Could the world but lay by their serpentine enmity against the holy doctrine and practice of christianity, and not take themselves engaged to persecute it, nor dash themselves in pieces on the stone which they should build upon, nor by striving against it provoke it to fall on them and grind them to powder, they never need to complain of disturbances by christianity or godliness.[108]

15. Christianity and true godliness containeth, not only all those precepts that tend to peace and order in the world, but also strength, and willingness, and holy dispositions for the practising of such precepts. Other teachers can speak but to the ears, but Christ doth write his laws upon the heart; so that he maketh them such as he commandeth them to be: only this is the remnant of our unhappiness, that while he is performing the cure on us, we retain a remnant of our old diseases, and so his work is yet imperfect: and as sin in strength is it that setteth on fire the course of nature, so the relics of it will make some disturbance in the world, according to its degree; but nothing is more sure than that the godliest christian is the most orderly and loyal subject, and the best member (according to his parts and power) in the commonwealth; and that sin is the cause, and holiness the cure of all the disorders and calamities of the world.

16. Lastly, Consult with experience itself, and you will find, that all this which I have spoken, hath been ordinarily verified.[109] What heathenism tendeth to, you may see even in the Roman government (for there you will confess it was at the best). To read of the tumults, the cruelties, the popular unconstancy, faction, and injustice; how rudely the soldiers made their emperors, and how easily and barbarously they murdered them, and how few of them from the days of Christ till Constantine did die the common death of all men, and escape the hands of those that were their subjects; I think this will satisfy you, whither men's enmity to christianity tendeth: and then to observe how suddenly the case was altered, as soon as the emperors and subjects became christian (till in the declining of the Greek empire, some officers and courtiers who aspired to the crown did murder the emperors): and further to observe, that the rebellious doctrines and practices against governors, have been all introduced by factions and heresies, which forsook christianity so far before they incurred such guilt; and that it is either papal usurpation (which is in its nature an enemy to princes) that hath deposed and trampled upon emperors and kings, or else some mad enthusiastics that overrun religion and their wits, that at Munster, (and in England some lately,) by the advantage of their prosperity, have dared to do violence against sovereignty; but the more any men were christians and truly godly, the more they detested all such things; all this will tell you that the most serious and religious christians, are the best members of the civil societies upon earth.

II. Having done with the first part of my last direction, I shall say but this little of the second; let christians see that they be christians indeed, and abuse not that which is most excellent to be a cloak to that which is most vile. 1. In reading politics, swallow not all that every author writeth in conformity to the polity that he liveth under. What perverse things shall you read in the popish politics (Contzen, and abundance such)! What usurpation on principalities, and cruelties to christians, under the pretence of defending the church, and suppressing heresies!

2. Take heed in reading history that you suffer not the spirit of your author to infect you with any of that partiality which he expresseth to the cause which he espouseth. Consider in what times and places all your authors lived, and read them accordingly with the just allowance. The name of liberty was so precious, and the name of a king so odious to the Romans, Athenians, &c., that it is no wonder if their historians be unfriendly unto kings.

3. Abuse not learning itself to lift you up with self-conceitedness against governors! Learned men may be ignorant of polity; or at least unexperienced, and almost as unfit to judge, as of matters of war or navigation.

4. Take heed of giving the magistrate's power to the clergy, and setting up secular, coercive power under the name of the power of the keys: and it had been happy for the church if God had persuaded magistrates in all ages to have kept the sword in their own hands, and not have put it into the clergy's hands, to fulfil their wills by:[110] for, 1. By this means the clergy had escaped the odium of usurpation and domineering, by which atheistical politicians would make religion odious to magistrates for their sakes. 2. And by this means greater unity had been preserved in the church, while one faction is not armed with the sword to tread down the rest: for if divines contend only by dint of argument, when they have talked themselves and others aweary they will have done; but when they go to it with dint of sword, it so ill becometh them, that it seldom doth good, but the party often that trusteth least to their reason, must destroy the other, and make their cause good by iron arguments. 3. And then the Romish clergy had not been armed against princes to the terrible concussions of the christian world, which histories at large relate, if princes had not first lent them the sword which they turned against them. 4. And then church discipline would have been better understood, and have been more effectual; which is corrupted and turned to another thing, and so cast out, when the sword is used instead of the keys, under pretence of making it effectual: none but consenters are capable of church communion: no man can be a christian, or godly, or saved against his will; and therefore consenters and volunteers only are capable of church discipline: as a sword will not make a sermon effectual, no more will it make discipline effectual: which is but the management of God's word to work upon the conscience. So far as men are to be driven by the sword to the use of means, or restrained from offering injury to religion, the magistrate himself is fittest to do it. It is noted by historians as the dishonour of Cyril of Alexandria, (though a famous bishop,) that he was the first bishop that like a magistrate used the sword there, and used violence against heretics and dissenters.

5. Above all, abuse not the name of religion for the resistance of your lawful governors: religion must be defended and propagated by no irreligious means. It is easy before you are aware, to catch the fever of such a passionate zeal as James and John had, when they would have had fire from heaven to consume the refusers and resisters of the gospel: and then you will think that any thing almost is lawful, which doth but seem necessary to the prosperity of religion. But no means but those of God's allowance do use to prosper, or bring home that which men expect: they may seem to do wonders for awhile, but they come to nothing in the latter end, and spoil the work, and leave all worse than it was before.

Direct. XL. Take heed of mistaking the nature of that liberty of the people, which is truly valuable and desirable, and of contending for an undesirable liberty in its stead.[111] It is desirable to have liberty to do good, and to possess our own, and enjoy God's mercies, and live in peace: but it is not desirable to have liberty to sin, and abuse one another, and hinder the gospel, and contemn our governors. Some mistake liberty for government itself; and think it is the people's liberty to be governors: and some mistake liberty for an exemption from government, and think they are most free, when they are most ungoverned, and may do what they list: but this is a misery, and not a mercy, and therefore was never purchased for us by Christ. Many desire servitude and calamity under the name of liberty: optima est reipublicæ forma, saith Seneca, ubi nulla libertas deest, nisi licentia pereundi. As Mr. R. Hooker saith, lib. viii. p. 195, "I am not of opinion, that simply in kings the most, but the best limited, power is best, both for them and the people: the most limited is that which may deal in fewest things: the best, that which in dealing is tied to the soundest, perfectest, and most indifferent rule, which rule is the law: I mean not only the law of nature and of God, but the national law consonant thereunto: happier that people whose law is their king in the greatest things, than that whose king is himself their law."

Yet no doubt but the lawgivers are as such, above the law as an authoritative instrument of government, but under it as a man is under the obligation of his own consent and word: it ruleth subjects in the former sense; it bindeth the summam potestatem in the latter.

Direct. XLI. When you have done all that you can in just obedience, look for your reward from God alone. Let it satisfy you that he knoweth and approveth your sincerity. You make it a holy work if you do it to please God; and you will be fixed and constant, if you take heaven for your reward (which is enough, and will not fail you); but you make it but a selfish, carnal work, if you do it only to please your governors, or get preferment, or escape some hurt which they may do you, and are subject only in flattery, or for fear of wrath, and not for conscience sake. And such obedience is uncertain and unconstant; for when you fail of your hopes, or think rulers deal unjustly or unthankfully with you, your subjection will be turned into passionate desires of revenge. Remember still the example of your Saviour, who suffered death as an enemy to Cæsar, when he had never failed of his duty so much as in one thought or word. And are you better than your Lord and Master? If God be all to you, and you have laid up all your hopes in heaven, it is then but little of your concernment (further than God is concerned in it) whether rulers do use you well or ill, and whether they interpret your actions rightly, or what they take you for, or how they call you; but it is your concernment that God account you loyal, and will judge you so, and justify you from men's accusations of disloyalty, and reward you with more than man can give you. Nothing is well done, especially of so high a nature as this, which is not done for God and heaven, and which the crown of glory is not the motive to.

I have purposely been the larger on this subject, because the times in which we live require it, both for the settling of some, and for the confuting the false accusations of others, who would persuade the world that our doctrine is not what it is; when through the sinful practices of some, the way of truth is evil spoken of, 2 Pet. ii. 2.

Tit. 2. A fuller resolution of the cases, 1. Whether the laws of men do bind the conscience? 2. Especially smaller and penal laws?

The word conscience signifieth either, 1. In general according to the notation of the word, The knowledge of our own matters; conscire; the knowledge of ourselves, our duties, our faults, our fears, our hopes, our diseases, &c. 2. Or more limitedly and narrowly, The knowledge of ourselves and our own matters in relation to God's law and judgment; Judicium hominis de seipso prout subjicitur judicio Dei, as Amesius defineth it.

2. Conscience is taken, 1. Sometimes for the act of self-knowing. 2. Sometimes for the habit. 3. Sometimes for the faculty, that is, for the intellect itself, as it is a faculty of self-knowing. In all these senses it is taken properly. 4. And sometimes it is used (by custom) improperly, for the person himself, that doth conscire; or for his will (another faculty).

3. The conscience may be said to be bound, 1. Subjectively, as the subjectum quod, or the faculty obliged. 2. Or objectively, as conscire, the act of conscience, is the thing ad quod, to which we are obliged.

And upon those necessary distinctions I thus answer to the first question.

Prop. 1. The act or the habit of conscience is not capable of being the subject obliged; no more than any other act or duty: the act or duty is not bound, but the man to the act or duty.

2. The faculty or judgment is not capable of being the object, or materia ad quam, the thing to which we are bound. A man is not bound to be a man, or to have an intellect, but is made such.

3. The faculty of conscience (that is, the intellect) is not capable of being the immediate or nearest subjectum quod, or subject obliged. The reason is, Because the intellect of itself is not a free-working faculty, but acteth necessarily per modum naturæ further than it is under the empire of the will; and therefore intellectual and moral habits are by all men distinguished.

4. All legal or moral obligation falleth directly upon the will only: and so upon the person as a voluntary agent; so that it is proper to say, The will is bound, and The person is bound.

5. Improperly and remotely it may be said, The intellect (or faculty of conscience) is bound, or the tongue, or hand, or foot is bound; as the man is bound to use them.

6. Though it be not proper to say, That the conscience is bound, it is proper to say, That the man is bound to the act and habit of conscience, or to the exercise of the faculty.

7. The common meaning of the phrase, that we are bound in conscience, or that conscience is bound, is that we are bound to a thing by God, or by a divine obligation, and that it is a sin against God to violate it; so that divines use here to take the word conscience in the narrower theological sense, as respect to God's law and judgment doth enter the definition of it.

8. Taking conscience in this narrower sense, to ask, Whether man's law as man's do bind us in conscience, is all one as to ask, Whether man be God.[112]

9. And taking conscience in the large or general sense, to ask, Whether man's laws bind us in conscience subjectively, is to ask, Whether they bind the understanding to know our duty to man? And the tenor of them will show that, while they bind us to an outward act, or from an outward act, it is the man that they bind to or from that act, and that is, as he is a rational, voluntary agent; so that a human obligation is laid upon the man, on the will, and on the intellect, by human laws.

10. And human laws, while they bind us to or from an outward act, do thereby bind us as rational free agents, knowingly to choose or refuse those acts; nor can a law which is a moral instrument any otherwise bind the hand, foot, or tongue, but by first binding us to choose or refuse it knowingly, that is, conscientiously, so that a human bond is certainly laid on the mind, soul, or conscience, taken in the larger sense.

11. Taking conscience in the stricter sense, as including essentially a relation to God's obligation, the full sense of the question plainly is but this, Whether it be a sin against God to break the laws of man? And thus plain men might easily understand it. And to this it must be answered, That it is in two respects a sin against God to break such laws or commands as rulers are authorized by God to make; 1. Because God commandeth us to obey our rulers: therefore he that (so) obeyeth them not, sinneth against a law of God. God obligeth us in general to obey them in all things which they are authorized by him to command; but their law determineth of the particular matter; therefore God obligeth us (in conscience of his law) to obey them in that particular. 2. Because by making them his officers, by his commission he hath given them a certain beam of authority, which is divine as derived from God; therefore they can command us by a power derived from God: therefore to disobey is to sin against a power derived from God. And thus the general case is very plain and easy, How man sinneth against God in disobeying the laws of man, and consequently how (in a tolerable sense of that phrase) it may be said, that man's laws do or do not bind the conscience, (or rather, bind us in point of conscience,) or by a divine obligation. Man is not God; and therefore, as man, of himself can lay no divine obligation on us. But man being God's officer, 1. His own law layeth on us an obligation derivatively divine (for it is no law which hath no obligation, and it is no authoritative obligation which is not derived from God). 2. And God's own law bindeth us to obey man's laws.

Quest. II. But is it a sin to break every penal law of man?

Answ. 1. You must remember that man's law is essentially the signification of man's will; and therefore obligeth no further than it truly signifieth the ruler's will.

2. That it is the act of a power derived from God; and therefore no further bindeth, than it is the exercise of such a power.

3. That it is given, 1. Finally for God's glory and pleasure, and for the common good (comprehending the honour of the ruler and the welfare of the society ruled). And therefore obligeth not when it is, (1.) Against God. (2.) Or against the common good. 2. And it is subordinate to God's own laws, (in nature and Scripture,) and therefore obligeth not to sin, or to the violation of God's law.[113]

4. You must note that laws are made for the government of societies as such universally; and so are fitted to the common case, for the common good. And it is not possible but that a law which prescribeth a duty which by accident is so to the most, should meet with some particular subject to whom the case is so circumstantiated as that the same act would be to him a sin: and to the same man it may be ordinarily a duty, and in an extraordinary case a sin. Thence it is that in some cases (as Lent fasts, marriages, &c.) rulers oft authorize some persons to grant dispensations in some certain cases: and hence it is said, that necessity hath no law.

Hereupon I conclude as followeth:

1. It is no sin to break a law which is no law, as being against God, or not authorized by him, (as of a usurper, &c.) See R. Hooker, Conclus. lib. viii.

2. It is no law so far as it is no signification of the true will of the ruler, whatever the words be: therefore so far it is no sin to break it.

3. The will of the ruler is to be judged of, not only by the words, but by the ends of government, and by the rules of humanity.

4. It being not possible that the ruler in his laws can foresee and name all exceptions, which may occur, it is to be supposed that it is his will that the nature of the thing shall be the notifier of his will, when it cometh to pass; and that if he were present, and this case fell out before him, which the sense and end of the law extendeth not to, he would say, This is an excepted case.

5. There is therefore a wide difference between a general law, and a personal, particular mandate; as of a parent to a child, or a master to a servant; for this latter fully notifieth the will of the ruler in that very case, and to that very person. And therefore it cannot be said that here is any exception, or that it is not his will; but in a universal or general law, it is to be supposed that some particular excepted cases will fall out extraordinarily, though they cannot be named; and that in those cases, the ruler's will dispenseth with it.

6. Sometimes also the ruler doth by the mere neglect of pressing or executing his own laws, permit them to grow obsolete, and out of use; and sometimes he forbeareth the execution of them for some time, or to some sort of persons; and by so doing, doth notify that it was not his will that at such a time, and in such cases, they should oblige. I say not that all remissness of execution is such a sign; but sometimes it is: and the very word of the lawgiver may notify his dispensation or suspending will. As for instance, upon the burning of London, there were many laws (about coming to parish churches, and relief of the poor of the parish, and the like) that the people became uncapable of obeying; and it was to be supposed, that the ruler's will would have been to have excepted such cases if foreseen; and that they did dispense with them when they fell out.

7. Sometimes also the penalty of violating a law, is some such mulct or service, which the ruler intendeth as a commutation for the duty, so that he freely leaveth it to the choice of the subject which he will choose. And then it is no sin to pay the mulct, and omit the action; because it crosseth not the lawgiver's will.

8. Sometimes also the law may command this principally for some men's sake, which so little concerns others, that it should not extend to them at all, were it not lest the liberty of them should be an impediment to the obedience of others, and consequently of the common good. In which case, if those persons so little concerned, do but omit the action secretly, so as to be no scandal or public hurt, it seemeth that they have the implicit consent of the rulers.

9. Sometimes particular duties are commanded with this express exception, "Unless they have just and reasonable impediment." As for coming every Lord's day to church, &c.; which seemeth to imply, that (though in cases where the public good is concerned, the person himself shall not be judge, nor at all as to the penalty, yet that) in actions of an indifferent nature in themselves, this exception is still supposed to be implied, "unless we have just and reasonable impediments," of which in private cases, as to the crime, we may judge.

10. I need not mention the common, natural exceptions: as that laws bind not to a thing when it becometh naturally impossible; or cessante materia, rel capacitate subjecti obligati, &c.

11. Laws may change their sense in part by the change of the lawgiver; for the law is not formally to us his law that is dead and was once our ruler, but his that is alive and is now our ruler. If Henry the Eighth make a law about the outward acts of religion, (as for coming to church, &c.) and this remain unrepealed in King Edward's, Queen Mary's, Queen Elizabeth's, King James's days, &c., even till now; as we are not to think that the lawgivers had the same sense and will, so neither that the law hath the same sense and obligation; for if the general words be capable of several senses, we must not take it as binding to us in the sense it was made in, but in the sense of our present lawgivers or rulers, because it is their law.

12. Therefore if a law had a special reason for it at the first making, (as the law for using bows and arrows,) that reason ceasing, we are to suppose the will of the lawgiver to remit the obligation, if he urge not the execution, and renew not the law.

13. By these plain principles many particular difficulties may be easily resolved, which cannot be foreseen and named, e. g. the law against relieving a beggar bindeth not, when he is like to die if he be not relieved; or in such a case as after the burning of London, when there was no parish to bring him to. A law that is but for the ordering of men's charity, (to soul or body, by preaching or alms,) will not disoblige me from the duties of charity themselves, in cases where Scripture or nature proveth them to be imposed by God. A law for fasting will not bind me, when it would be destructive to my body; even on God's sabbaths duties of mercy were to be preferred to rest and sacrifices.

14. If God's own laws must be thus expounded, that When two duties come together, and both cannot be done, the lesser ceaseth at that time to be a duty, and the greater is to be preferred, man's laws must also be necessarily so expounded: and the rather, because man's laws may be contradictory, when God's never are so, rightly understood.

15. Where the subject is to obey, so far he must discern which of the laws inconsistent is to be preferred; but in the magistratical execution, the magistrate or judge must determine.

E. g. One law commandeth that all the needy poor be kept on the parish where they were born or last lived. Another law saith, that nonconformable ministers of the gospel, who take not the Oxford oath, shall not come within five miles of city or corporation, (though they were born there,) or any place where they have been preachers. In case of necessity what shall they do? Answ. Whither they shall go for relief, they must discern as well as they can; but whither they shall be carried or sent, the magistrate or constable must discern and judge.

Also whether he shall go with a constable that by one law bringeth him to a place, which by the other law he is forbid on pain of six months' imprisonment in the common gaol to come to? Answ. If he be not voluntary in it, it is not his fault: and if one bring him thither by force, and another imprison him for being there, he must patiently suffer it.

16. But out of such excepted cases, the laws of our rulers (as the commands of parents) do bind us as is afore explained; and it is a sin against God to violate them.

17. Yea, when the reason of the law reacheth not our particular case and person, yet when we have reason to judge, that it is the ruler's will that all be bound for the sake of some, and the common order and good will be hindered by our exemption, we must obey to our corporal detriment, to avoid the public detriment, and to promote the public good.