CHAP. VIII. (continued 2)

It is obvious, that in our future wars, we must require not only an efficient steam navy and a fine army, but also that the latter should be in the highest state of discipline, and be led by able officers. Such conduct as that of which our troops were guilty at Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, and on many other occasions, if attempted in these enterprises, to which we must look forward as of frequent occurrence, would most certainly lead to total ruin: sobriety, good conduct, and the strictest obedience to orders cannot then be dispensed with; and the country I hope will be convinced by what has been adduced, that we could not possibly expect to find these necessary qualities in a British army unless raised, organized, and officered in the manner I have ventured to propose. In short, we want an army, similar in point of discipline, though differently enforced, to that which Charles the 12th of Sweden led to constant victory, until the fatal battle of Pultowa. And to our army of reserve I would hold up, as an example, the brave and patriotic behaviour of the Swedish militia, which under General Steinbock, during the absence of Charles at Bender, defeated at Helsingborg, though almost entirely composed of raw recruits, unclothed and badly armed, a regular Danish army that dared to invade their country, and of which, as its rash and extraordinary king was absent, they expected to have made an easy conquest.

But what a contrast to our troops, or indeed to those of any other country, must a victorious Swedish army have been; as we find in the account given of them by the famous Comte de Saxe, who tells us, that the Swedes always kept their ranks and that after the battle of Gadebesck was gained, the first line of these brave troops, with the enemy dead at their feet, did not even dare to stoop down to strip them—such was the discipline established in their regiments—until prayers had been offered up on the field of battle.

It has, as a matter of course, been proposed that men regularly brought up to the sea, should be exempted from serving in our armies; but this can answer no wise purpose, so long as it is in their power to enter the service even of our enemies, or rather of those who may soon become so. A captain of the navy, in one of his works, has lately given us a very melancholy account of the desertion of their country by British seamen; and has also, I believe, assigned the true causes of such defection; but it would be giving up as hopeless and unavailing, every good feeling implanted in the heart of man towards his country, if no exertions are made to recall to their allegiance these brave, thoughtless, but warm-hearted wanderers.

This may not now be easily accomplished, but something ought notwithstanding to be attempted, or else our navy should be rendered independent of the merchant service for supplies of sailors; and the changes which steam is producing in seamanship, must make this the less difficult to be effected, as seamen for steamers can be much sooner formed than those intended for sailing vessels; and allow me to ask, why might not bodies of seamen be raised, so as to become crews for ships of war, for a certain number of years service; and ought there not to be held out to them even superior advantages, as to pension, &c. to what has been spoken of for soldiers; for a navy is of much more importance to Great Britain than an army; and why might not seamen and their officers of all ranks be transferred bodily from ship to ship, as might be found desirable or necessary, without obstinately adhering to the old injurious plan of paying all off, when the ships in which they have served are put, for whatever cause, out of commission; and why might not such a plan render it seldom necessary to have recourse to impressment, which ought never, however, to be altogether abandoned. There might surely be for the navy, as well as for the army, a fixed peace establishment, on a proper and enlarged scale; and in case of a war, if additional crews are wanted for ships of a larger class about to be commissioned, those which until then had been serving in the smaller rates, could be augmented to the required establishments in both officers and men, and new crews for the smaller rates, if still to be employed, could be easily raised by impressment or bounty; but seamen taken by the former, ought invariably to be discharged as soon as their places can be supplied by volunteers; but most of them, if the advantages I have just mentioned are held out to them, will have no wish to leave their ships and comrades, or the officers they have served under; and having had a good foundation of seamen (if I may use the expression) to build upon, excellent crews, increased in numbers, would in a very short time be available for ships of even the largest class.

Although a soldier, I have been much at sea, and I have frequently heard and remarked, that the very best sailors were those trained, especially from boyhood, in our ships of war.

At first, seamen might be taken wherever they could be found, to man our ships; but if a system of this kind were adopted—and of course many points connected with it would require to be well weighed—there could not be a doubt but our ships would soon be very superiorly manned by perfectly trained seamen, who could use cannon, mortars, &c. with proper effect; and if they were only treated with kindness, which I have no doubt they would be, and paid fairly and liberally, the navy would have a most decided advantage over our merchant service, and men would gladly enter the former in preference to the latter.

A considerable proportion of the crews for the several classes of ships, should even at the commencement of the system be boys; and it might naturally be expected, that they would not only grow up in a complete knowledge of their duties as sailors, but also become, like soldiers, strongly attached to their officers, in whom they could have confidence, and from whom they were not, under any circumstances, to be separated. Of course, such permanent seamen would require occasionally, and especially after long voyages, to be allowed to visit their families and friends; leave of absence from their ships, ought, whenever it was possible, to be liberally granted to them; and such men, when on shore, would know how to conduct themselves with propriety; for on board, I should conclude that due attention was paid to their religious and common education.

But I must not forget that there is one serious objection to this plan being adopted, however advantageous it might be to the navy, not on account of its being suggested by a soldier, but it would do away with much patronage, which those in power do not like to relinquish.

Much has been said of the hardships experienced by mates, and the class of petty officers of the navy in general; but this is a subject into which I cannot, and ought not, to enter. But let us look a little into other matters, and try to comprehend what interest it takes, even to have one's son made a midshipman—then to get a captain to take him with him for the three years he may be afloat—then another captain must be found to take him for three years more under his wing, or else we must have excellent interest indeed, if we can contrive to get him forward without nursing captains; and all this time we have been obliged to allow him sufficient for his messing, and to enable him to appear dressed like an officer and a gentleman. In some ships this cannot be done under sixty pounds a year. Then he probably comes home to us a stout light-hearted fellow, who has already passed his examinations for a lieutenancy, and would give the world to be made one; but to effect this (for any services he may have performed are of no importance) takes a vast deal of interest. This at last accomplished; again patronage is required to get him afloat for some years longer. But although now an experienced officer, what interest it must take to have him made a commander. And then how much more to get him appointed to a ship. In short, nothing but patronage or interest from beginning to end will answer, or ever did answer in our navy; and the reader need not therefore be surprised at my feeling next to hopeless, that all this will ever be overturned, to suit what will no doubt, be held up to the world as the effusions of a madman. Be this, however, as it may, (and I leave it to the good sense of the country to settle the matter with patrons,) a captain now commanding one of our frigates, in a conversation I had with him on subjects of this kind, mentioned, that he calculated it would cost him about £1,200., over and above his pay, &c. to keep his table, and to meet other unavoidable expenses, and that too, with strict attention to economy, for the three years he calculated upon being actively employed; and I am aware that it took a good deal of interest on his part, to get the ship he now commands.

Our navy, I believe, has but little, if any, fixed system for its guidance. Every captain of a ship carrying on its duties or discipline, and managing almost everything according to his own views, or as taught by experience. Ought this to be permitted, and should not certain regulations be established to prevent his running into extremes, even in zeal for the credit of his ship, in appearance, discipline, or even in points which in themselves may be good, if not carried so far as to become from their frivolity vexatious to those under his command, and which I have seen occasion much punishment, which might have been better avoided. In short, ought a captain not to be restrained by established system, almost in a similar manner to that by which I propose to prevent the injurious effects of whim or caprice in commanding officers of regiments.

I am aware that I must look forward to every possible objection being thrown in the way of what I have presumed to suggest for the benefit of both our navy and army; and I fully expect some will say that all this is very well, but what do you intend to do with the numbers of retired officers, now on the lists of both services? In the first place, to expect me to answer every objection is not a little unreasonable; and in the next, I am convinced it cannot be anticipated, that one-tenth of such ancients can ever again be called into active service, I therefore suppose the country must continue, under any circumstances, to furnish the pittance now doled out to them, as long as most of them shall live; but even to balance this continued charge upon the country, and which cannot be avoided, have I not, amongst other items, shown that we can call out our army, and keep it up hereafter in a much more efficient state than it ever was, without any expense in the shape of bounty? Now the bounty for at least 100,000 men, taking the army in all its branches, at a low establishment, amounts to something; yet we shall not take this into account, but let us say (whilst I have no intention of recapitulating all the modes I have mentioned, by which savings can be effected), that we want annually 20,000 recruits, according to our present system, to keep it up to its peace establishment, in which calculation I consider that I am borne out by the returns of the number of men raised for Her Majesty's service in Great Britain and Ireland. Then suppose that each of these recruits stands the country in only five pounds (but in time of war it could not be done for much more) a-head for bounty, &c. we should thus save something considerable; let this sum be therefore allowed to go annually towards providing for retired officers, who it may be apprehended will continue a burden upon the country for a few years longer. But alas! climate, wounds, &c. under the effects of which many of these poor but gallant fellows are suffering, will not admit of our having very long an opportunity of evincing our gratitude to them for past services.

Colonel Pasley, one of our ablest and most scientific officers, I believe, about the year 1807, wrote a most useful work, calling the attention of the country to a plan he proposed for carrying the war, which had even then been of unusually long duration, into the north of Europe, where landing an army, it was, as he suggested, to have proceeded gradually, as joined by the troops which could be assembled in the countries that lay between the point selected and France, till Napoleon could be at last assailed upon his own ground. His work produced a considerable sensation at the time, but Spain and Portugal, very opportunely, presented themselves to us, and in which the very game recommended by Colonel Pasley was successfully played. I hope, therefore, I may be allowed to observe, that it is much to be regretted, it has not struck Colonel Pasley, that a work coming from him, elucidating some of the subjects I have reluctantly ventured to touch upon, especially those connected with Russia, and a new boundary line for our North American territories, would be well received by statesmen, military men, and the country in general; all of whom must allow that an efficient and highly disciplined army and navy are now wanted by Great Britain, and that no time should be lost in acquiring them. If these essential objects were once attained, would it not be wiser for us to look more to our own interests, and with a view to securing our internal tranquillity and national industry, than to what we have so little to say to; and would it not be better, if we did not allow ourselves to be led away and entangled in intricate Russian, Austrian, and Turkish policy? This ought certainly to be carefully watched by us; but it should never be permitted so to embarrass us, as to prevent our being able at all times to direct our attention and powerful means to objects of much more importance to us as a great maritime empire, possessing the finest and most valuable colonies in the world. It is also to be hoped that the brave people of France and Great Britain have at length seen the madness of having wasted centuries in unceasing rivalry and jealousy, and likewise the folly of tearing each other to pieces, to the delight of countries which would glory in seeing both so humbled as to suit their own boundless ambitious views. What is Constantinople, and even all Turkey, Egypt, and such countries, to us, farther than our commercial relations with them are concerned, in comparison to Great Britain retaining her superiority upon the ocean, and which pre-eminence was acquired, in former wars, at the cost of so much blood and treasure, and which enabled her to extend her enlightening influence, religious and commercial blessings all over the world. Let Austria and other states, which must immediately feel the effects of Russian acquisitions of territory from the Turkish dominions, take measures to guard against the consequences to arise out of such acquirements, especially as the aspect of the times most clearly indicates that the very storms, we are taught to look for, are now gathering in that quarter, and the awful effects attendant upon their bursting upon the world cannot probably by any human means be prevented from ever reaching us. Ought not we, therefore, if possible, to be prepared? Should not Great Britain at all times look with a jealous eye from her vast Eastern Empire towards Russia, so as to be ready for such events as may happen? Should not the question be asked—what has Russia, not a maritime nation, in view, in forming and keeping up such fleets as we are told she now possesses in the Baltic and in the Black Sea? For with the numerous and well-trained armies at her command, she can have nothing to apprehend from her neighbours, nor from us. Encroachments upon other nations can therefore be her only object. If Russia will not regard our remonstrances as to her unnecessary, and to other nations dangerous naval preparations for war, the safety and honour of Great Britain require, that such diversions should be made, as must compel her to look to her own already enormous acquisitions from her weaker neighbours. For instance, a little assistance from us would soon enable Circassia, and other countries to the south of Russia, to give ample employment to her overgrown armies. Poland, if fully assured of aid, from France especially (for France is as much interested in Russia being kept in check as we are), could be easily roused at the same time to assert her freedom, and to revenge her wrongs. It could not be very difficult to form, under the powerful protection of Great Britain, a coalition of the Northern States, whose frontiers are now bounded by Russia, and which only exist as kingdoms through Russian sufferance, with the view of insuring their independence. Wars thus created, through her ambition, by exhausting her resources, would effectually put an end to her power of subjugating other nations; and if the standard of a war arising out of opinions, which such measures would most likely produce, was once unfurled in that extensive empire, in which the lofty ideas of a proud, turbulent and wealthy nobility would to a certainty come into contact with the hitherto suppressed feelings of millions of enslaved serfs, there is no possibility of calculating in what such a war might terminate, for there is no middle class in Russia which could act as a check to both.

A few of the steam expeditions, which were before alluded to, would quickly settle such questions, and curtail the deliberations of diplomatists, and convince the world—that it is both dangerous and impolitic to rouse Great Britain, or to give her cause of alarm about the superiority of her navy upon the ocean. "Ships, colonies and commerce," ought to be inscribed upon the banner of Britain, and our chief efforts and views, should at all times be directed to these, to us as a nation, important objects, whilst at the same time every possible encouragement should be given to our own agriculture; for we must never depend upon the continent of Europe, or upon any other part of the world, for bread—if we are ever obliged to do so, we must no more talk or even think of war.

I do not, like some men, look upon history to be as worthless as an old almanack, for by it we are taught many useful lessons; and whatever their opinions may be of history, popery, or even of prophecy, I avow myself to be one of those who attach some importance to what is handed down to us, especially in Scripture. Yet, without almost touching upon such subjects, we may find, that a great maritime power will seemingly soon be required, to act a most prominent part in the world, when events will undoubtedly occur to command the attention and excite the fears of mankind in general. As to what power may be intended to perform this conspicuous part, it would be most presumptuous and even impious to conjecture; and such is the rapid fall and rise of nations, that all calculations in this respect must be as vain as unprofitable.

The grand object which ought never for a moment to be lost sight of, is to have Great Britain ready for coming events. Let her vast resources be, as far as necessary, called forth in time. Let the attention of Government be wisely directed to providing such a number of steamers of all classes, as to render competition on the part of other countries hopeless; and why might not engagements be entered into with wealthy companies and individuals, so as to induce them to employ, in mercantile and other pursuits, steam vessels of such a construction, that they could, in cases of emergency, be instantly fitted up and armed with guns of long range for war; for very few, of those now in use, can be made efficient in this respect. To accomplish this could not be attended with any great expense to the country, especially if advantages, as to exemption of vessels so constructed from various charges, to which all are now liable, are held out to the owners; and this would make it unnecessary at once to provide such a number of war-steamers as might otherwise be requisite; and thus Government could, at any moment, know where to find ships of all classes fit for immediate service, on board of which, crews, such as I have ventured to speak of, could be employed with every advantage to the country. Lastly, let our army be also perfectly organized, and in all respects prepared for a new and more rapid mode of warfare; and, under Providence, we may not only be still the most powerful of maritime nations, but also the means of promoting the tranquillity and happiness of the world in general.

THE END.

G. NORMAN, PRINTER, MAIDEN LANE, COVENT GARDEN.