Quest. XII., XIII. (continued 3)

The purpose of God, is, indeed, the internal moving cause, or the first ground and reason of the salvation of those who are elected to it; but his power is the more immediate cause of it, so that his purpose is the reason of his exerting this power, and both concurring to the salvation of men, render it certain and necessary. Therefore some distinguish, for the explaining of this, between the determining and powerful will of God; the latter of which, is sometimes called the word of his power, and renders the former effectual; this it must certainly do, otherwise God would be said to will the existence of things, that shall never have a being. In this respect, the purpose of God renders things necessary, which are in themselves contingent, or arbitrary, and would otherwise never come to pass.^[209]

This is a great encouragement to those who are enabled to make their calling and election sure; for their perseverance in grace, notwithstanding all the opposition that they meet with, is the necessary consequence of their election to eternal life. Thus, as we before distinguished predestination into election and reprobation, we have considered the former of these, and we proceed,

Secondly, To speak concerning the doctrine of reprobation;^[210] which is become obnoxious to those on the other side of the question, almost to a proverb; so that if any doctrine is considered as shocking, and to be answered no otherwise than by testifying their abhorrence of it, it is compared to this of reprobation; and, indeed, if it were not a consequence from the doctrine of election to eternal life, that doctrine would not be so much opposed by them. How far some unguarded expressions, or exceptionable methods of explication, may have given 487occasion for this prejudice, it is not to our present purpose to enquire; but we shall take occasion, from thence, to explain it in such a way, as that a fair and unprejudiced disputant will not see just reason to except against it, at least to reproach it, as though it were a doctrine subversive of the divine glory, and to be defended by none but those who seem to have a design to raise prejudices, in the minds of men, against religion in general.

And here we shall take occasion to consider the meaning of the word, as it is contained in, or deduced from scripture, where the same word that is used to signify the execution of this decree, may be applied to express the decree itself. Thus we read of God’s rejecting, or disregarding men, as a punishment of their rebellion against him: and these are compared by the prophet Jeremiah, chap. vi. 30. To reprobate silver, because the Lord hath rejected them; or, as it is in the margin, The refuse of silver; and, in the New Testament, the same word^[212] is sometimes translated reprobates; at other times, disapproved or rejected, 1 Cor. iv. 27. 2 Cor. xiii. 5. Heb. vi. 8. and when this disapprobation, or rejection, respects not only their actions, as contrary to the holy nature of God, but their persons, as punished for their iniquities; and when this punishment is considered as what respects their eternal state, as the objects of vindictive justice, the purpose of God, relating hereunto, is what we call reprobation.

But, that we may more particularly consider the sense of the word, it seems, in scripture, to contain in it two ideas.

1. God’s determining to leave a part of the world in that state of sin and misery, which he from all eternity, fore-knew that they would bring themselves into, or his decreeing not to save them; and, since all will allow that a part of mankind shall not be saved, it cannot reasonably be denied that this was determined by him before-hand; and this is what divines generally call preterition.

2. There is another idea in the word reprobation, which is also contained in scripture, or deducible from it, and that respects the purpose of God to punish those for their iniquities, whom he will not save. Not to be saved, is the same as to be punished with everlasting destruction, from the presence of the Lord, and the glory of his power. And God’s purpose, relating hereunto, is expressed in scripture by his appointing them to wrath, 1 Thess. v. 9. for those sins which he fore-saw they would commit. This is what some call pre-damnation, as taken from that expression of the apostle, Jude, ver. 4, 13. concerning some who had crept into the church unawares, whom he describes as ungodly men, that is, notoriously so, who turned 488the grace of God into lasciviousness, for whom is reserved the blackness of darkness forever; of these he says, that they were before of old, ordained to this condemnation, where God is represented as punishing sinners, in proportion to their crimes; and this is considered as the result of that eternal purpose, which was founded on his fore-sight of their contracting that guilt whereby they would render themselves liable to it.

If this doctrine be thus explained, it will appear agreeable, not only to scripture, but to the divine perfections, and therefore too great a truth to be treated with that abhorrence, with which it generally is, without explaining, distinguishing or fairly entering into the merits of the cause. It is a very easy matter to render any doctrine odious, by misrepresentation, as they on the other side of the question, have done this of reprobation, which we shall briefly consider, and therein take leave to explain it in a different manner, whereby it will appear not only worthy to be defended, as redounding to the glory of God, but a plain and evident truth, founded on scripture.

If this doctrine were to be considered no otherwise, than as it is often represented by them, we should dislike it, as much as they do; for when they pretend that we herein suppose God to be severe and cruel to his creatures, delighting himself in, and triumphing over them, in their misery: and that he decreed, from all eternity, to damn the greatest part of mankind, without any consideration of their sin, as the result of his arbitrary will, or dominion, as he has a right to dispose of his creatures, according to his pleasure, and that as a means to attain this end, as though it were in itself desirable, he leaves them to themselves, blinds their minds, and hardens their hearts, and offers these occasions of, and inducements to sin, which are as stumbling-blocks in their way, and that he determined that his providence should be so conversant about the will of man, as that it should be under a natural necessity, or kind of compulsion, to what is evil, without considering the corruption and depravity of nature, as a vicious habit, which they had contracted; and that all this is done in pursuance of this decree of reprobation.

It is very probable that many who give this account of this doctrine, have no other foundation for it, but the popular outcry of those who are not apprised of the methods that are generally taken to explain and defend it; or else they suppose that it cannot be defended, without being exposed to those exceptions which are contained in the account they give of it. But we shall take no farther notice of this, but proceed to explain and defend it another way. And,

1. As to the former branch thereof, namely, preterition, or God’s passing by, or rejecting those whom he hath not chosen 489to salvation, let it be premised; that God, in his eternal purpose, considered all mankind as fallen, which must be supposed to have been foreknown by him, otherwise he would not be said to be omniscient, and the result of his fore-knowledge is his determining to leave a part of them in their fallen state, in which he might have left the whole world to perish without being liable to the least charge of injustice. This is what we call his rejecting them, and accordingly it is opposed to his having chosen the rest to eternal life. These terms of opposition are plainly contained in scripture: thus it is said, The election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded, Rom. xi. 7. not by God’s leading them into mistakes, or giving them false ideas of things, but they were left to the blindness of their minds, which was the result of their apostasy from God; and elsewhere our Saviour says, Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes, Matt. xi. 25. Thou hast hid, that is, not revealed them; and that either objectively, as respecting those who are destitute of the light of the gospel; or subjectively, as he did not effectually, or savingly enlighten them with the light of life, by revealing Christ in them, as the apostle calls it, Gal. i. 16. and therefore it is as though he had said, thou hast determined not to give to some the means of grace, nor to others the saving efficacy thereof, such as they are partakers of, who are chosen to salvation. Accordingly, he is said to have suffered all nations to walk in their own ways, Acts xiv. 16. that is, not to restrain or prevent the breaking forth of corruption, as he might have done; and elsewhere, to have winked at, chap. xvii. 30. that is, as it may be rendered, over-looked the greatest part of the world, which is no other than his rejecting or passing them by; and in this sense we are to understand that difficult mode of speaking used by the apostle, Whom he will he hardeneth, Rom. ix. 18. by which nothing else is intended but his purposing to leave many to the hardness of their own hearts. God forbid that any one should think that there is a positive act contained in those words, as though God infused hardness into the hearts of any; for the meaning is only this, that he determined to deny heart-softening grace to that part of mankind, whom he had not fore-ordained to eternal life. That there was such a purpose relating hereunto, is evident, because whatever God does in the methods of his providence, is the result of an eternal purpose. This no one, who observes the dispensations of God’s providence, and allows as every one must do, that all that he does was pre-concerted by him, can justly deny.

But that which must be farther enquired into, as to this matter, is, whether God’s determining to pass by a part of mankind, be an act of sovereignty or of justice. And this may also be judged of, by the external dispensation of his providence; so 490far as there is sovereignty, or justice, visible in them, we are to conclude that this purpose, relating thereunto, was the result of one or other of these perfections. In some respects it is an act of sovereignty: As, for instance, that God should give one nation the gospel, or the means of grace, and deny it to another; it is not because he sees any thing in one part of the world, that obliges him thereunto, more than in the other; but the reason is, as was observed in the scripture but now mentioned, because it seemed good in his sight, Matt. xi. 26. Moreover, his giving special grace, whereby some are effectually called and sanctified; and denying it to others, is an act of sovereign pleasure.

But on the other hand, God is said sometimes, in the external dispensations of his providence, to leave men to themselves, to give them up to their own hearts lust, in a judicial way, which supposes not only the commission of sin, but persons being obstinate and resolutely determined to continue in it. Thus God saith concerning his people; Israel would none of me; so I gave them up to their own hearts’ lusts, and they walked in their own counsels, Psal. lxxxi. 11, 12. and the Psalmist says elsewhere, Add iniquity to their iniquity, Psal. lxix. 27. which words I would rather consider as a prediction than a prayer, or as an expression of the church’s acquiescence in God’s righteous judgments, which they had ground to conclude, that he would inflict on an impenitent, incorrigible people; these are expressed, by adding iniquity to iniquity, not as though he designed to infuse any habit of sin into them, for that is inconsistent with the holiness of his nature; but that he would reject, and leave them to themselves, in a judicial way, as a punishment inflicted on them for their iniquities, the consequence whereof would be their own adding iniquity to iniquity. Thus, in different respects, the purpose of God, in passing by a part of mankind, may be considered, either as the result of his sovereign pleasure, or as an act of justice.

2. We shall now proceed to consider the other branch of reprobation, which some call pre-damnation, or (to use the scripture-expression before referred to) God’s fore-ordaining those who shall not be saved, to that condemnation, which they shall fall under, as exposing themselves to it by their own wickedness; which is nothing else but his determining, from all eternity, to punish those, as a judge, who should, by their own crimes, deserve it, and thereby to vindicate the holiness of his nature and law. Here let it be observed, that when this doctrine is reproached or misrepresented, it is described as an act of divine sovereignty, but that we are as ready to deny and oppose as they are, since, according to the description we have given of it, it can be no other than an act of justice; for, if to 491condemn, or punish, be an act of justice, then the decree, relating hereunto, must be equally so, for one is to be judged of by the other. If God cannot punish creatures as such, but as criminals and rebels, then he must be supposed to have considered them as such, when, in his eternal purpose, he determined to punish them. No man can style this an act of cruelty, or severity in God, but those who reckon the punishing of sin to be so, and are disposed to charge the Judge of all with not doing right, or offering an injury to his creatures, when he pours forth the vials of his wrath on them, who, by their bold and wilful crimes, render themselves obnoxious thereunto.

Here let it be considered, that God, in his actual providence, is not the author of sin, though he suffer it to be committed in the world. And, since his permitting, or not hindering it, cannot be said to be the cause of its being committed, there being no cause thereof, but the will of man; it follows, from hence, that God’s punishing sin, is not to be resolved into his permission of it, as the cause thereof, but into the rebellion of man’s will, as refusing to be subject to the divine law; and thus God considered men, when, in his eternal purpose, he determined to condemn those, whose desert of this punishment was foreseen, by him, from all eternity. And is this a doctrine to be so much decried?

I cannot but wonder the learned author, whom I have before referred to, as opposing this doctrine,^[213] should so far give into the common and popular way of misrepresenting it, unless he designed, by this way of opposing it to render it detested; when he speaks concerning them, mentioned in Jude, ver. 4. who were before, of old, ordained to this condemnation, he says, “This cannot be meant of any divine ordination, or appointment of them, to eternal condemnation, because it cannot be thought, without horror, that God doth thus ordain men to perdition, before they had a being.” If he had expressed his horror and resentment against God’s ordaining men to perdition, as creatures, it had been just; but to express this detestation against God’s ordaining men to perdition, who are described as these are, is to expose this doctrine without reason; and it is still more strange that he should cast this censure upon it, when he owns in his farther explication of this text, “That God ordaineth none to punishment but sinners, and ungodly men, as these persons here are styled, and that these were men of whom it was before written, or prophesied, that they should be condemned for their wickedness;” since there is not much difference in the method of reasoning, between saying that the condemnation of sinners, for their wickedness, was before written, or prophesied, and saying, that God fore-ordained them to eternal punishment.

492I am sensible that many are led into this mistake, by supposing that we give a very injurious and perverse sense of that text, in which the doctrine of reprobation is contained, which, it may be, has occasioned this reproach to be cast upon it. For when the apostle says, in Rom. ix. 22. What if God willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, some suppose that we understand this text, as though these vessels of wrath were, from all eternity, prepared for destruction by God, and that his eternal purpose, is his fitting them for it, as intending to bring about that end, viz. his destroying them. But if any have expressed themselves in such a way, as is equivalent thereunto, let them be accountable for their own sense of the text; though this I may say, that some, even of them, who give into the Supralapsarian way of explaining the doctrine of predestination, have not understood it in this sense;^[214] and the sense which I would give of it is this, that those, whom the apostle speaks of as vessels of wrath, are persons whom God had rejected, and from the foresight of the sins which they would commit, he had appointed them to wrath, which is an expression the apostle uses elsewhere, 1 Thess. v. 9. but they were appointed to wrath, not as creatures, but as sinners; they are described as fitted to destruction, not by God’s act, but their own, and that is the reason of their being fore-ordained to it.^[215]

There is another scripture, which is generally cited by those who treat on this subject, that we are to use the utmost caution in explaining, lest we give just occasion, to those who oppose it, to express their abhorrence of it, as inconsistent with the divine perfections, namely, what the apostle says concerning those that were not elected, whom he calls the rest of the Jewish nation, in Rom. xi. 7-10. that they were blinded, and that God had given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear; and he speaks of their table 493being made a snare, and a trap and a stumbling-block, and a recompense to them; let their eyes be darkened, that they may not see, and bow down their back always. The sense which they, who misrepresent this doctrine, suppose that we put upon this scripture, is, that they, who are reprobated, have, as a consequence thereof, occasions of sin laid in their way, some things designed to blind their minds, cast a mist before their eyes, and so lead them out of the way, and other things, that prove a snare to them, a trap, and occasion of sin, and all this with a design to bring about that damnation which God had ordained for them, in this decree of reprobation; which sense of this scripture never was, nor could be given, by any one, who has a due regard to the divine perfections.

And shall this doctrine be judged of hereby, when it is very hard to find any, how unguarded soever they are in their modes of speaking, that understand this text as they represent it? We shall therefore consider what is probably the meaning of this scripture, with which the doctrine we have laid down is very consistent. It is not to be understood as though God were the author of these sins, which they are said to be charged with; but this blindness and stupidity, which is called, A spirit of slumber as it is connected with the idea of their being rejected of God, and his determining not to give them the contrary graces, is considered, as the consequence, not the effect thereof, and that not the immediate, but the remote consequence thereof, in the same sense as stealing is the consequence of poverty, in those who have a vicious inclination thereunto. Thus when a person, who has contracted those habits of sin, that tend to turn men aside from God, is destitute of preventing and restraining grace, the consequence thereof, is, that these corruptions will break forth with greater violence; and God is not obliged to give this grace to an apostate, fallen creature, much less to one who has misimproved the means of grace, by which a multitude of sins might have been prevented; so that nothing is intended hereby but this, that they are left to themselves, and permitted to stumble and fall, and to commit those abominations, which, if they had not been thus judicially left, would have been prevented, and as the consequence thereof, they run into many sins, which they might have avoided; for though we suppose that it is not in a man’s own power, as destitute of the grace of God, to bring himself into a regenerate or converted state, (as will be farther considered, in its proper place) nevertheless, we do not deny but that men might, in the right use of the gifts of nature, avoid many sins, which they, who are said to be thus blinded, and hardened, run into, and so increase their guilt and misery, especially where they are not prevented by the grace of God, which he may, without any impeachment of 494his providence, deny to those whom he has not chosen to eternal life, as he might, had he pleased, have denied it to the whole world, and much more to those who have not improved the common grace, which they received, but have, through the wickedness of their nature, proceeded from one degree of sin unto another.

There is another scripture, which, some suppose we understand in such a sense, as gives the like occasion of prejudice to many against this doctrine, in 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12. For this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness; the meaning whereof is this, that God suffered them to be deluded, who, in the following verse, are represented as not receiving the love of the truth; not that God was the author of these delusions, or deceived them by a false representation of things to them, or by exciting or inclining them to adhere to the suggestions of those who lie in wait to deceive; but, since he did not design to give them grace under the means of grace, or to enable them to receive the truth in the love thereof, which he was not obliged to do to any, much less to those who rebelled against the light that had been already given them; hereupon, through the blindness of their own minds, they became an easy prey to those who endeavoured to ensnare or delude them; so that the decree of God only respects his denying preventing grace to those, who, through the corruption of their own nature, took occasion, from thence, to run greater lengths in their apostasy from, and rebellion against God. And as for that mode of speaking here used, that God shall send them strong delusions, that only respects his will to permit it, and not his design to delude them.

There is another scripture to the same purpose, in Psal. lxxxi. 12. So I gave them up unto their own heart’s lust, and they walked in their own counsels; the meaning of which is, that God left them to themselves, and then lust, or the corrupt habits of sin, which they had acquired, conceived, and, as the apostle James speaks, brought forth sin, chap i. 15. or greater acts of sin, which exposed them to a greater degree of condemnation; and all this is to be resolved into God’s permissive will, or purpose, to leave man, in his fallen state, to himself, which he might do, without giving occasion to any to say, on the one hand, that he is the author of sin; or, on the other, that he deals injuriously with the sinful creature.

And to this we may add our Saviour’s words concerning the Jews, in John xii. 39, 40. Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should 495heal them. The sense which they, who misrepresent this doctrine, suppose we put upon them, and conclude, that no other is consistent with the argument we are maintaining, is, that the unbelief, which the Jews are charged with, was principally, if not altogether, resolved into God’s eternal purpose, to blind their eyes, and harden their hearts, namely, by some positive act, as a cause producing this effect, with this view, that they should not be converted, and saved, that thereby his decree to condemn them, might take effect. It is no wonder to find persons prejudiced against this doctrine, when set in such a light; but as this is very remote from the explication we have given thereof, so our Saviour’s design, in this text, is to give an account why those miracles, which he wrought before the Jews, were ineffectual for their conviction; the more immediate cause whereof was the blindness of their mind, and the hardness of their hearts, inasmuch as they had shut their eyes against the light, and, through the corruption of their nature, had hardened their own hearts. As to what God is said to have done, in a judicial way, agreeable to the mode of speaking here used, when it is said, He hath hardened their hearts, it imports nothing else but his leaving them to the hardness of their own hearts, or denying them heart-softening grace, which would have been an effectual remedy against it. And may not God deny his grace to sinners, without being charged as the author of sin, or the blame thereof devolved on him, and not themselves? And, since this judicial act of providence cannot but be the result of an eternal purpose, is there any thing, in this decree, that reflects on his perfections, any more than there is in the execution thereof?

There is another scripture, in Prov. xvi. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil; from whence they infer, that the doctrine of reprobation, which they suppose to be founded on a perverse sense given of it, includes in it the divine purpose to make man to damn him; for they conclude that we understand it in that sense; and they proceed a little farther than this, and pretend that we infer from it, that God made men wicked, or that he made them wicked for his glory, as if he had need of sinful man for that end. I should never have thought that so vile a consequence could be drawn from this doctrine, if the learned writer, before mentioned, had not told the world that we infer this from it;^[216] and, to give countenance to this suggestion, he quotes a passage out of Dr. Twiss;^[217] his words are these: “That all, besides the elect, God hath ordained to bring them forth into the world in their corrupt mass, and to permit them to themselves, 496to go on in their own ways, and so finally to persevere in sin; and, lastly, to damn them for their sin, for the manifestation of the glory of his justice on them.”

I am not ashamed to own my very great esteem of this excellently learned and pious writer, who was as considerable for that part of learning, which his works discover him to have been conversant in, as most in his day; though I cannot think myself obliged, in every respect, to explain this doctrine as he does; and Dr. Whitby knew very well, that if such an inference, as what we have been speaking of, were to be deduced from the writings of any, who maintain the doctrine of reprobation, it must be from one who gives into the Supralapsarian way of explaining it; and this expression, which, it may be, was a little unguarded, seems to bid as fair for it as any other he could have found out: But any one that reads it, without prejudice, and especially that compares it with what is connected therewith, would not suppose that any thing is intended hereby, that gives the least ground to conclude that God made men wicked for the manifestation of his justice. The most obnoxious part of this quotation, is, God ordained to bring forth into the world the non-elect, in their corrupt mass, that is, that persons, who are every day born into the world, are the seed of corrupt and fallen man, and so have the habits of sin propagated with their nature, which many other divines have endeavoured to maintain. What my sentiments are concerning this matter, I shall rather choose to insist on, under a following answer, in which we shall be lead to speak of the doctrine of original sin, and of that corruption of nature, which is the consequence of it; therefore, passing this by, there is nothing, in what remains of this quotation, but what is very defensible, and far from making God the author of sin; for we may observe, that all he says, concerning the providence of God relating to this matter, is only, that he permits, or leaves them to themselves, and he supposes them finally to persevere in sin, without which they cannot be liable to damnation, or the display of the justice of God therein; and if the author, who brings this quotation, had duly considered the words immediately before, he might have seen the reason to have saved himself the trouble of making this reflection upon it; for Dr. Twiss, who, though a Supralapsarian, says, “That he reckons that controversy, relating to the order of God’s decrees, to be merely Apex Logicus, as he calls it, a logical nicety;” and adds, “That his opinion about it is well known, namely, that God doth not ordain any man to damnation, before the consideration of sin;” and, a few lines after, he says, “That God, of his mere pleasure, created all, but, of his mere pleasure, he damneth none; but every one that is damned, is damned for his sin, and that wilfully committed, and contumaciously 497continued in by them that come to ripe years.” And if nothing more than this is intended by the doctrine of reprobation, it ought not to be so misrepresented, with a design to cast an odium upon it.

But to return to the scripture but now mentioned: When God is said to have made the wicked for the day of evil, the meaning is not that man’s damnation was the end designed by God, in creating him, for there are some other ideas that intervene between God’s purpose to create and condemn him; he must be considered not barely as a creature, but as a sinner; now, as God did not create man that he might sin, he could not be said to create him, that he might condemn him. Accordingly, the sense which some give of this text, is, that God is said to have made all things for himself, to wit, for his own glory. And inasmuch as some will be ready to object, that God will have no glory from the wicked, who oppose his name and interest in the world; the answer to this is, that in them, from whom he shall have no glory, as a Saviour, he will, notwithstanding, be glorified as a Judge; which judicial act, though it be deferred for a time, while his long-suffering waits upon them, yet it shall fall heavily on them, in the day of evil: which is very remote from that supposition, that God made man to damn him. And there is a sense given of it by some, who are on the other side of the question, which seems equally probable, or agreeable to the mind of the Holy Ghost, and is not in the least subversive of the doctrine we are maintaining, namely, “That the Lord disposeth all things throughout the world, to serve such ends as he thinks fit to design, which they cannot refuse to comply withal; for if any man be so wicked as to oppose his will, he will not lose their service; but when he brings a public calamity upon a country, employ them to be the executioners of his wrath: Of this there was a remarkable instance in the destruction of Jerusalem, by the Roman soldiers, whom our Saviour used, to punish his crucifiers, not that they undertook that war out of any design or desire to do our blessed Saviour right, but out of an ambition to enslave the world; yet God made use of them for another design, as public executioners, by whom he punished the ungodly^[218].” So the Assyrian is said, in Isa. x. 5, 6. to be the rod of God’s anger, and to be sent against the people of Israel, and to lead them captive, and therein to tread them down, like the mire in the streets^[219]. And as to what concerns the purpose 498of God, on which these judicial proceedings depend, this is to be judged of by the execution thereof, as is evidently to be inferred from thence. And this is the sense in which we understand the doctrine of reprobation, as in the foregoing argument.

Thus we have endeavoured to prove the doctrine of election and reprobation, and defend it from the reproaches and misrepresentations cast upon it by considering it, not only as agreeable to the divine perfections, but as founded on scripture. We shall therefore proceed,

VI. To enquire, whether the contrary doctrine as defended by some, be not derogatory to the divine perfections, and therefore does not contain greater absurdities; or, if expressions of detestation were a sufficient argument to set it aside, whether we have not as much reason to testify our dislike that way, as they have against the doctrine we are maintaining? As to that part of the charge brought against us, as though we represented God as severe and cruel to his creatures; or that it is inconsistent with his goodness to suppose that he leaves any to themselves in their fallen state, so as not to give them the means of grace, when he knew that being destitute thereof, they could not believe, and so would fall short of salvation, pursuant to his eternal purpose relating thereunto: can this be said to be inconsistent with his goodness, any more than all his other displays of vindictive justice? If they suppose that it is, we might easily retort the argument upon them since they will not assert, that the whole race of fallen man shall be saved; and, if so, must we not suppose that God certainly fore-knew this, otherwise where is his infinite understanding? And if he knew that this would be the consequence of their being born, and living in the world, where is his goodness in bringing them into it? If it be said that they have a free-will to choose what is good, and so had a power to attain salvation; therefore their not attaining it, is wholly owing to themselves. Suppose this were taken for granted, without entering on that subject at present; yet it must be farther enquired whether they will allow that God fore-know that they would abuse this freedom of will, or power to make themselves holy or happy; and, if so, could he not have prevented this? Did he make a will that he could not govern or restrain? Could he not have prevented the sin that he knew they would commit? And, if he could, why did he not do it, and thereby prevent their ruin, which he knew would be the consequence hereof? So that if men are disposed to find fault with the divine dispensation, it is no difficult matter to invent some methods of reasoning to give umbrage to it; and, indeed this objection is not so much against God’s fore-ordaining what comes to pass, as it is a spurning at his judicial hand, and finding fault with the equity of his proceedings, when he 499takes vengeance on sinners for their iniquities; or charging severity on God, because all mankind are not the objects of his goodness, and consequently not elected to eternal life.

But passing by this, we shall proceed to consider how, in several instances, the methods used to oppose the doctrine, which we are maintaining, are attended with many absurd consequences, derogatory to the divine perfections; which farther discovers the unreasonableness of their opposition to it; particularly,

1. It represents God as indeterminate, or unresolved what to do, which is the plain sense of their asserting that he has not fore-ordained whatever comes to pass. To suppose him destitute of any determination, is directly contrary to his wisdom and sovereignty, and it would argue that there are some excellencies and perfections belonging to intelligent creatures, which are to be denied to him, who is a God of infinite perfection: but if, on the other hand, they suppose that every thing, which comes to pass, is determined by him; nevertheless, that his determinations, as they respect the actions of intelligent creatures, are not certain and peremptory, but such as may be disannulled, or rendered ineffectual as taking his measures from the uncertain determinations of man’s will; this is, in effect to say, that they are not determined by God; for an uncertain determination, or a conditional purpose, cannot properly be called a determination. Thus for God to determine, that he that believes shall be saved, without resolving to give that faith which is necessary to salvation, is, in effect, not to determine that any shall be saved; for, since they suppose that it is left to man’s free-will to believe or not, and liberty is generally explained by them, as implying that a person might, had he pleased, have done the contrary to that which he is said to do freely; it follows that all mankind might not have believed, and repented, and consequently that they might have missed of salvation, and then the purpose of God, relating thereunto, is the same as though he had been indeterminate, as to that matter. But, if, on the other hand, they suppose that to prevent this disappointment, God over-rules the free actions of men, in order to the accomplishment of his own purpose, then they give up their own cause, and allow us all that we contend for; but this they are not disposed to do; therefore we cannot see how the independency of the divine will can be defended by them, consistently with their method of opposing this doctrine.

Again, if it be supposed, as an expedient to fence against this absurd consequence, that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and that his determinations were the result thereof, and, consequently, that the event is as certain as the divine fore-knowledge, this is what is not universally allowed of by 500them; for many are sensible that it is as hard to prove, that God fore-knew what must certainly come to pass, without inferring the inevitable necessity of things, as it is to assert that, he willed or determined them, whereby they are rendered eventually necessary. And if they suppose that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and, particularly, that they would convert themselves, and improve the liberty of their will, so as to render themselves objects fit for divine grace, without supposing that he determined to exert that power and grace, which was necessary thereunto; this is to exclude his providence from having a hand in the government of the world, or to assert that his determinations rather respect what others will do, than what he will enable them to do, which farther appears to be inconsistent with the divine perfections.

2. There are some things, in their method of reasoning, which seem to infer a mutability in God’s purpose which is all one as to suppose, that he had no purpose at all relating to the event of things: Thus, in opposing the doctrine of election, they refer to such-like scriptures as these, namely, that God will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth, 1 Tim. ii. 4. applying this act of the divine will to every individual, even to those who shall not be saved, or come to the knowledge of the truth; and they understand our Saviour’s words, How often would I have gathered thy children together as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not? Behold your house is left unto you desolate, Mat. xxiii. 37, 38. as implying, that God purposed to save them, but was obliged afterwards, by the perverseness of their actions, to change his purpose. What is this, but to assert him to be dependent and mutable?

3. They, who suppose that salvation is not to be resolved into the power and will of God, must ascribe it to the will of man, by which we determine ourselves to perform those duties, which render us the objects of divine mercy; and then what the apostle says, It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy, Rom. ix. 16. would hardly be intelligible, or a defensible proposition; and when it is said, We love him, because he first loved us, 1 John iv. 19. the proposition ought to be inverted, and it should rather be said, He loved us, because we first loved him; and that humbling question, which the apostle proposes, Who maketh thee to differ, 1 Cor. iv. 7. should be answered, as one proudly did, I make myself to differ.

4. As to what concerns the doctrine of discriminating grace, which cannot well be maintained, without asserting a discrimination in God’s purpose relating thereunto, which is what we call election; if this be denied, there would not be so 501great a foundation for admiration, or thankfulness, as there is, or for any to say, as one of Christ’s disciples did, speaking the sense of all the rest, Lord, how is it, that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world, John xiv. 22. Nor is there so great an inducement to humility, as what will arise from the firm belief, that, when no eye pitied the poor helpless and miserable sinner, he was singled out of a ruined and undone world, among that remnant whom God first designed for, and then brought to glory.

VII. We shall now consider those methods of reasoning, by which the contrary doctrine is defended, and enquire into the sense of those scriptures, which are generally brought for that purpose; and shall endeavour to make it appear, that they may be explained, in a different way, more consistently with the divine perfections. It is plain that the main design of those, who oppose the doctrine of election, is to advance the goodness of God; and, since all mankind cannot be said to be equally partakers of the effects of this goodness, inasmuch as all shall not be saved, they suppose that God has put all mankind into a salvable state; and, accordingly, as the gospel-overture is universal, so God’s purpose to save, includes all to whom it is made; but the event, and consequently the efficacy of the divine purpose relating hereunto, depends on the will of man; and, that there may be no obstruction which may hinder this design from taking effect, God has given him a power to yield obedience to his law, which, though it be not altogether so perfect as it was at first, but is somewhat weakened by the fall; yet it is sufficient to answer the end and design of the gospel, that is to bring him to salvation if he will, and the event of things is wholly put on this issue; so that, though there be not an universal salvation, there is a determination in God to save all upon this condition. How far this is inconsistent with the divine perfections has been already considered; and we are farther to enquire, whether there be any foundation for it in scripture, and what is the sense of some texts, which are often brought in defence thereof.

One text referred to, is, those words of the apostle, in 1 Tim. ii. 4. Who will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth; and another scripture, to the same purpose, in 2 Pet. iii. 9. The Lord is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance; and several others, from whence they argue the universality of the divine purpose relating to the salvation of mankind, or that none are rejected, or excluded from it, by any act of God’s will, and consequently that the doctrine of election and reprobation is to be exploded, as contrary hereunto.

That the sense of these scriptures cannot be, that God designed 502that all men should be eventually saved, or come to the knowledge of the truth, so that none of them should perish, is evident, from many other scriptures, that speak of the destruction of ungodly men, which, doubtless, will be allowed by all; therefore it follows, that the meaning of these two scriptures, is not that God purposed, or determined, what shall never come to pass, which is inconsistent with the glory of his wisdom and sovereignty, as has been before observed; but they are to be understood with those limitations, which the word all, which refers to the persons mentioned, as designed to be saved, is subject to in other scriptures; as will be more particularly considered, when we treat of universal and particular redemption, under a following answer^[220]. And therefore, at present, we need only observe, that these scriptures may be set in a true light, that the word all is oftentimes taken for all sorts of men, or things; as when it is said, that of every thing that creepeth upon the earth, there went in two and two unto Noah into the ark, Gen. vii. 8, 9. that is all the species of living creatures, not every individual; so, Acts x. 12. in the vision that Peter saw of the sheet let down from heaven, in which there were all manner of four-footed beasts^[221], &c. and it is said concerning our Saviour, that he went about, healing all manner of sickness, and all manner of diseases among the people^[222]; and elsewhere God promises, that he will pour out his Spirit on all flesh, Acts ii. 17. that is, persons of all ages and conditions, young and old.

There are many instances of the like nature in scripture, which justify this sense of the word all; and it seems plain, from the context, that it is to be so taken in the former of the scriptures, but now referred to, when it is said, God will have all men to be saved; for he exhorts, in ver. 1. that prayer and supplication should be made for all men, that is, for men of all characters and conditions in the world, and, in particular, for kings, and all that are in authority, and thereby he takes occasion to resolve a matter in dispute among them, whether those kings that were tyrants and oppressors, ought to be prayed for, when he tells them, that all sorts of men are to be prayed for; and the reason of this is assigned, namely, because God will have all men, that is, all sorts of men, to be saved.

Moreover, they whom God will save, are said to be such as shall come, that is, as he will bring to the knowledge of the truth. Now it is certain, that God never designed to bring every individual to the knowledge of the truth; for, if he did, his purpose is not fulfilled, or his providence runs counter to 503it, for every individual of mankind have not the gospel; therefore it follows, that since God did not purpose that all men should come to the knowledge of the truth, the foregoing words, Who will have all men to be saved, are not to be understood in any other sense, but as signifying all sorts of men. Neither can it well be proved, whatever may be attempted in order thereto, that the following words, which speak of Christ’s being a Mediator between God and men, intend, that he performs this office for every individual man, even for those that shall not be saved; for then it would be executed in vain for a great part of them, as will be farther considered in its proper place; therefore we must conclude, that, in the former of these scriptures, nothing else is intended, but that God determined to give saving grace to all sorts of men.

And as for the latter, in which the apostle Peter says, that God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance; there the word all is expressly limited, in the context, as referring only to those who are elect and faithful; and therefore he says, including himself among them, that the Lord is long-suffering to us-ward. Now if we observe the character which he gives of the church, to which he writes, in the beginning of both his epistles, (which, as he says, in ver. 1. of this chapter, were directed to the same persons) it is as great as is given of any in scripture; and they are distinguished from those profane scoffers, who walked after their own lusts, and other ungodly men, whose perdition he speaks of, as what would befal them in the dissolution of the world, by fire, in the day of Judgment; and they are described not only as elect unto obedience, and as having obtained like precious faith with the apostles, but they were such as God would keep, through faith, unto salvation; therefore the apostle might well say, concerning them, that God determined that none of them should perish, without advancing any thing that militates against the doctrine we are maintaining.

Object. The apostle, in this verse, speaks of God, as willing that all should come to repentance; therefore they are distinguished from that part of the church, who had obtained like precious faith, and were included in the character that he gives of some of them, in both his epistles, which infers their being then in a state of salvation; therefore the word, all, in this text, is not subject to the limitation before mentioned, but must be applied to all the world, and consequently the meaning is, that God is not willing that any of mankind should perish, but that all should come to repentance.

Answ. The apostle, in this text, speaks of God’s deferring the day of judgment, and perdition of ungodly men, and so exercising his long-suffering towards the world in general; not 504that he designed to bring them all to repentance hereby, for that would be to intend a thing which he knew should never come to pass: But the end of his patience, to the world in general, is, that all whom he designed to bring to repentance, or who were chosen to it, as well as to obedience, and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus, should be brought to it.

There are other arguments, which they bring in defence of their sense of the doctrine of election, as supposing that it is not peremptory, determinate, or unchangeable, and such as infers the salvation of those who are the objects thereof, taken from those scriptures, which, as they apprehend, ascribe a kind of disappointment to God; as when he says, in Isa. v. 4. concerning his vineyard, to wit, the church of the Jews, Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes? and our Saviour’s words, in Luke xiii. 6. that he sought fruit on the fig-tree, meaning the church of the Jews in his day, but found none; and, speaking concerning Jerusalem, he says, in Matth. xxiii. 37, 38. How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! Behold, your house is left unto you desolate; therefore they conclude, that God’s purpose, or design of grace, may be defeated; so that these, and many other scriptures, not unlike to them, are inconsistent with the doctrine of election, as ascertaining the event, to wit, the salvation of those who are chosen to eternal life; which leads us, particularly to consider the sense thereof.

As to the first of them, in which God says, by the prophet, What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes? He condescends therein to speak of himself after the manner of men, as he often does in scripture, and is said to look for what might reasonably have been expected, as the consequence of all the means of grace, which he had vouchsafed to them; the reasonableness of the thing is called his looking for it, as though he should say, it might have been expected, from the nature of the thing, that they, who had been laid under such obligations, should express some gratitude for them, and so have brought forth some fruit, to the glory of God. And those words, which seem to attribute disappointment to him, when it is said, I looked, &c. signifying nothing else but the ingratitude of the people, that they did not walk agreeably to the obligations they were under; not that God was really disappointed, for that would militate against his omniscience. He knew, before he laid these obligations on them, what their behaviour would be; therefore, had he eyes of flesh, or seen as man seeth, their behaviour would have tended to disappoint him; but there is no 505disappointment in the divine mind, though the sin reproved in the people be the same as though it had had a tendency to defeat the divine purpose, or disappoint his expectation.

As for that other scripture, in which it is said, that he sought fruit on the fig-tree, but found none, that is to be explained in the same way, he sought fruit, that is, it might reasonably have been expected, but he found none, that is, they did not act agreeably to the means of grace which they enjoyed. Therefore neither this, nor the other scripture, does in the least argue, that the purpose of God was not concerned about the event, or that he did not know what it would be; for, as his providential dispensation gives us ground to conclude, that he determined to leave them to themselves, so he knew beforehand that this, through the corruption of their nature, would issue in their unfruitfulness, otherwise he is not omniscient. Therefore it follows, that neither of these scriptures have the least tendency to overthrow the doctrine of the certainty and peremptoriness of the divine purpose.

As to what our Saviour says, relating to his willingness, to have gathered Jerusalem, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but they would not, it may be taken, without the least absurdity attending the sense thereof, as referring to the end and design of his ministry among them; and it is as though he should say, your nation shall be broken, and you scattered, as a punishment inflicted on you for your iniquities, and this destruction would have been prevented, had you believed in me; so that all that can be inferred from hence, is, that Christ’s ministry and doctrine were attended with that convincing evidence, being confirmed by so many undoubted miracles, that their unbelief was not only charged on them as a crime, but was the occasion of their ruin; or (as it is said in the following words) of their houses being left unto them desolate. And this might have been prevented, by their making a right improvement of that common grace, which they had; for though it be not in man’s power,^[223] without the special influence of divine grace, to believe to the saving of the soul; yet I know no one who denies that it is in his power to do more good, and avoid more evil, than he does, or so far to attend to the preaching of the gospel, as not to oppose it with that malice and envy as the Jews did; and, had they paid such a deference to Christ’s ministry, as this amounted to, they would not have been exposed to those judgments which afterwards befel them; for it is one thing to say, that men, by improving common grace, can attain salvation, and another thing to conclude, that they might have escaped temporal judgments thereby.

506Therefore, if it be enquired, what was God’s intention in giving them the gospel? the answer is very plain: It was not that hereby he might bring them all into a state of salvation, for then it would have taken effect; but it was, as appears by the event, to bring those, that should be saved among them, to that salvation, and to let others know, whether they would hear, or whether they would forbear, that God had a right to their obedience, and therefore that the message which the Redeemer brought to them, ought to have met with better entertainment from them, than it did. And if it be farther enquired, whether, provided they had believed, their ruin would have been prevented? This is an undoubted consequence, from our Saviour’s words; but yet it does not follow, from hence, that it was a matter of uncertainty with God, whether they should believe or no; for it is one thing to say, that he would not have punished them, unless they rejected our Saviour; and another thing to suppose that he could not well determine whether they would reject him or no. So that the purpose of God must be considered, as agreeing with the event of things, and the design of Christ’s ministry, as being what it really was; yet he might, notwithstanding, take occasion to charge the Jews’ destruction upon their own obstinacy.

There are many other scriptures, which they bring to the like purpose, which I pass over, because the sense they give of them differs not much from that, in which they understand the scriptures before-mentioned, and their reasoning from them, in opposition to this doctrine is the same, and the same answer may be given to it.

However, I cannot but observe, that as, from some scriptures, they attribute disappointment to God, they represent him, from others, as wishing, but in vain, that it had happened otherwise, and as being grieved at the disappointment; so they understand those words, in Psal. lxxxi. 13, 14. Oh! that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways! I should soon have subdued their enemies, and turned my hand against their adversaries; and that, in Luke xix. 42. If, or, Oh! that thou hadst known, even thou at least, in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes.

As for the sense of these, and such-like scriptures, it is no more than this, that the thing which they refused to perform, was, in itself, most desirable, or a matter to be wished for, and not that God can be said to wish for a thing that cannot be attained. And when our Saviour laments over Jerusalem, as apprehending their destruction near at hand, whether the words are to be considered in the form of a wish, that it had been otherwise, or an intimation, that if they had known the things of their peace, their destruction would not have ensued, it is 507only to be understood as a representation of the deplorableness of their condition, which, with a tenderness of human compassion, he could not speak of, without tears: Yet we are not to suppose that this mode of expression is applicable to the divine will; so that, when the misery of that people is hereby set forth, we are not to strain the sense of words, taken from human modes of speaking, so far, as to suppose that the judicial acts of God, in punishing a sinful people, are not the execution of his purpose relating thereunto.

Again, when the Spirit is said to be grieved, Eph. iv. 30. or resisted, Acts vii. 15. nothing else is intended hereby, but that men act in such a way, as that, had the Spirit of God been subject to human passions, it would have been matter of grief to him. But far be it from us to suppose that the divine nature is liable hereunto, or that any disappointment can attend his purposes, which has a tendency to excite this passion in men. And when he is said to be resisted, it is not meant as though his will, or design, could be rendered ineffectual, but it only implies, that men oppose what the Spirit communicated by the prophets, or in his word. This a person may do, and yet it may be truly said, that the counsel of the Lord standeth for ever, the thoughts of his heart to all generations, Psal. xxxiii. 11.

VIII. We shall proceed to consider several objections that are made against the doctrine we have endeavoured to maintain, and what reply may be given to them. Some have been occasionally mentioned under several foregoing heads, and there are others which require a distinct reply.

Object. 1. That the doctrine of absolute Election and Reprobation was altogether unknown by the Fathers in the three first centuries, and that it was first brought into the Christian world by Augustin; before whose time, the only account we have of it, is, that God foreknowing who would live piously, or believe and persevere to the end, accordingly predestinated them to eternal life, or determined to pass them by, and so is said to have rejected them.^[224]

Answ. This objection, were it literally true, cannot have any tendency to overthrow this doctrine, in the opinion of those, who depend not on the credit of Augustin, as defending it, on the one hand, nor are staggered by the opposition made to it by some of the Fathers, who lived before his time, on the other; and therefore we might have passed it by, without making any reply to it. However, since it contains a kind of insult, or boast, which will have its weight with some, it may be expected that a few things should be said, in answer to it.

We will not deny but that the Fathers, before the Pelagian heresy was broached in the world; expressed themselves, in many parts of their writings, in so lax and unguarded a manner 508concerning the doctrines of predestination, free-will, and grace, that, had they lived after those doctrines began to be publickly contested, one would have thought that they had verged too much towards Pelagius’s side; but, since they were not the subject-matter of controversy in those ages, it is no wonder to find them less cautious in their modes of expressing themselves, than they might otherwise have been; and therefore it is a just observation, which one^[225] makes of this matter, that they had to do with the Manichees, and some of the heathen, who supposed that men sinned by a fatal necessity of nature, as though there were no wicked action committed in the world, but some would be ready to excuse it, from the impotency or propensity of human nature to sin, which rendered it, as they supposed, unavoidable; and others took occasion, from hence, to charge God with being the author of sin. It is very probable the Fathers, in those ages, were afraid of giving countenance to this vile opinion, and therefore they were less on their guard, in some respects, than they would have been, had they been to encounter with Pelagius, or his followers.

And indeed, Augustin himself, before he took occasion to enquire more diligently into the state of this controversy, gave into the same way of expressing his sentiments about the power of nature, or the grace of God, as some others of the Fathers had done, and concluded that faith was in our power, as well a duty incumbent on us, but afterwards retracted such modes of speaking as the result of more mature deliberation.^[226] But notwithstanding though he expressed himself in a different way from them, yet he often takes occasion, from some passages which he purposely refers to in their writings, to vindicate them as holding the same faith, though not always using the same phrases. And, after he had thus defended Cyprian and Ambrose, in that respect, he puts a very charitable construction on their unguarded way of expressing themselves, and says, that this arose from their not having any occasion to engage in that controversy, which was on foot in his day.^[227] The same might be said to Gregory Nazianzen, Basil, Chrysostom, and several others, whom some modern writers defend from the charge of favouring the Pelagian scheme, by referring to some places in their writings, in which they acknowledge, that the 509salvation of men is owing to the grace of God, whereby all occasions of glorying are taken away from the creature,^[228] or expressions used by them to the like purpose. And the learned Vossius, though he acknowledges, that the Fathers, before Augustin, expressed themselves in such a way, as is represented in the objection, yet he vindicates them from the charge of verging towards the Pelagian, or Semi-Pelagian heresy; inasmuch as he concludes, that when they speak of God’s predestinating men to eternal life, on the foresight of good works, they only intend those good works, which God would enable them to perform; and this will clear many of those expressions which they use, from this imputation.^[229] But if all these endeavours to establish our claim to those Fathers, who lived before Augustin, as not being opposers of this doctrine, appear to be to no purpose, yet this will not weaken the truth thereof; for we suppose it to be founded on scripture, and several consequences plainly deduced from it, and therefore it doth not want the suffrage of human testimony to support it.

But if it be said, that this is a very desirable thing as doubtless it is, we might consider this doctrine, as obtaining very much in, and after Augustin’s time, being examined and defended by very considerable numbers of men, who have transmitted it down to posterity, throughout the various ages of the church. Notwithstanding, by whomsoever it is defended, or opposed, we lay no great stress on human authority, as a judicious divine well observes^[230]. We shall therefore proceed to consider some other objections, which it will be more necessary for us to give a particular answer to.

Object. 2. To the doctrine of God’s purpose’s ascertaining all events, it is objected that he has not determined the bounds of the life of man, but that it may be lengthened, or shortened, by the intervention of second causes. This is nothing else but the applying one branch of this controversy, relating to the decrees of God, to a particular instance. And it was very warmly debated in the Netherlands, towards the beginning of the last century.^[231] This objection is managed in a popular way, and is principally adapted to give prejudice to those who are disposed to pass over, or set aside, these necessary distinctions, which, if duly considered, would not only shorten the debate, but set the matter in a clearer light, which we shall endeavour to do; but shall first consider their method of reasoning on 510this subject, and the sense they give of some scriptures, which as they suppose, give countenance to this objection.

They therefore thus argue, that if the term of life be immoveably fixed by God, then it is a vain thing for any one to use those means that are necessary to preserve it, and the skill of the physician, as well as the virtue of medicine, is altogether needless; and the good advice which is often given to persons, to take heed that they do not shorten their lives by intemperance, will be to no purpose; for they have a reply ready at hand, namely, that they shall live their appointed time, do what they will. And that, which is still more absurd, is, that if a person attempts to lay violent hands upon himself, it will be to no purpose, if God has determined that he shall live longer; or if he has determined that he shall die, then he is guilty of no crime, for he only fulfils the divine purpose.

They add, moreover, that this not only renders all our supplications to God to preserve our lives, or to restore us from sickness, when we are in danger of death, needless; but our conduct herein is a practical denial of the argument we maintain; for what is this, but to suppose that the bounds of life are unalterably fixed.

As to what concerns the countenance, which they suppose, scripture gives to this objection, they refer us to those places in which the life of man is said to be lengthened or shortened; accordingly, there are promises of long life given to the righteous who love God, and keep his commandments, Exod. xx. 12. Deut. iv. 40. 1 Kings iii. 14. and Solomon says expressly, The fear of the Lord prolongeth days; but the years of the wicked shall be shortened, Prov. x. 27. and elsewhere he speaks of the wicked’s dying before their time, Eccl. vii. 17. and the Psalmist says, that bloody and deceitful men shall not live out half their days, Psal. lv. 23.

They also refer to that scripture in which Martha tells our Saviour, that if he had been with her brother Lazarus, before his death, he had not died, John xi. 21. which either contradicts the argument we are maintaining, or else Martha was mistaken; which, had she been, our Saviour would have reproved her, for asserting that which was false.

Moreover, they add, that when the old world was destroyed in the deluge, and so died before their time, they might have prolonged their lives, had they repented in that space of time, wherein Noah as a preacher of righteousness, gave them warning of this desolating judgment, and Christ, by his Spirit, in him, preached to them, as the apostle says, 1 Pet. iii. 20. which, doubtless, was with a design to bring them to repentance, and save them from this destruction.

And when Abraham pleaded with God in the behalf of Sodom, 511God tells him, that if he found but ten righteous persons in the city, he would spare it for their sake, Gen. xviii. 32. which is inconsistent with his determination, that they should all die by an untimely death, if the bounds of their lives had been fixed.

And lastly, they refer to that scripture, in which God first told Hezekiah, that he should die, and not live, and afterwards, that he would add to his days fifteen years, Isa. xxxviii. 1. compared with 5.

Answ. To prepare our way for a reply to this objection, let us consider that the contrary side of the question, which we are maintaining, is equally supported by express texts of scripture: thus it is said His days are determined, the number of his months are with thee; thou hast appointed him bounds that he cannot pass, Job xiv. 5. than which, nothing can be more express, where he speaks concerning that decree of God, which respects all mankind, without exception, and sets forth his absolute sovereignty, and the irreversibleness of his purpose herein; and the apostle Paul, in reasoning with the Athenians concerning the decree and providence of God in whom we live, move, and have our being says, that he hath determined the times before appointed, and fixed the bounds of their habitation, Acts xvii. 26. As he has placed men upon the earth, by his decree and providence, so he has determined not only the place where they should live, but the time of their continuance in the world. This was no new doctrine; for the heathen had been instructed in it by their own philosophers and therefore the apostle speaks their sense, especially that of the stoicks, about this matter.^[232] When he mentions the times are determined, it is not to be understood of the seasons of the year, which God has fixed to return in their certain courses, but the seasons appointed for every work, or for every occurrence of life; and, among the rest, the time of life, and of serving our generation therein, as Solomon expressly says, in Eccl. iii. 1, 2. To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose; a time to be born, and a time to die. Several other scriptures might be brought to the same purpose, as a farther proof hereof, namely, those in which God has foretold the death of particular persons, 2 Sam. xii. 14. 1 Kings xiv. 12. chap. xxii. 28.

Moreover, if the providence of God is conversant about all the actions of men, and the hairs of their head are all numbered, Matt. x. 30. so that the smallest changes in life do not come by chance, but are subject thereto; then certainly the time of 512life must be subjected to his providence, who is styled, Our life, and the length of our days, Deut. xxx. 20. He must therefore certainly be considered as the sovereign Arbiter thereof, which doctrine none that own a providence, can, with any shadow of reason, gainsay; so that this doctrine is agreeable not only to several scriptures, but to the very nature and perfections of God.

This being premised we return to the arguments laid down against it, and the scriptures cited to give countenance to them. It is certain, that two contradictory propositions cannot be both true in the same sense; and the scriptures, which are exactly harmonious, as well as infallibly true, no where contradict themselves. Therefore we must consider what answer may be given to the objections before-mentioned; and, that our work herein may be shortened, we may observe, that the bounds of life are twofold; either such as men might have lived to, according to the common course of nature if nothing had intervened to ruin the constitution, or no disease, or violent death, had broken the thread of life before; or that time which God has ordained that men shall live, whether it be longer or shorter: the former of these respects the lengthening or shortening of life, by the influence of second causes; and, in this respect, we do not suppose that the terms of life are immoveably fixed, but that in some, it is longer, and, in others shorter; for it is certain, that by intemperance, or other methods, men may shorten their days; or, by laying violent hands on themselves, not live the time that otherwise they would have done. But if we consider the over-ruling, or disposing providence of God, as conversant about this matter, there is nothing happens without the concurrence thereof. Therefore persons, who shorten their days by intemperance, do this by the permissive providence of God; though he be not the author of their intemperance, which is sinful, yet he permits, or determines not to hinder it, and consequently though he has fixed the bounds of life, which can neither be lengthened or shortened, yet knowing what men will do, in a natural way, to shorten them, he determines that this shall put an end to their lives.^[233] And when we read, in scripture, of God’s delivering him, who dies a violent death, into his hands, who is the immediate cause of it, Exod. xxi. 13. God is not the author of the sin of the murderer; yet providence is not wholly to be exempted from that action, so far as it is not sinful, but purely natural, or the effect of power; and, when this is said to have a tendency to shorten the life of man, it does not detract from the time that he had 513in his own purpose affixed to it. We must also consider, that his decree and providence respects the means, as well as the end, which are always inseparably connected, and equally subject thereunto.

These things being premised, we proceed more particularly to answer the arguments brought against this doctrine. And,

1. When it is said, that God’s fixing the bounds of life, renders all means for the preservation thereof unnecessary, that depends upon a false supposition, namely, that God does not ordain the means as well as the end. If God had determined that persons shall live, he has determined to give them the supports of life, and to prevent every thing that might tend to destroy it; so, on the other hand, when he takes them away, by a disease, this is ordained by him, as a means conducive thereunto. If health is to be supported, or recovered, by means, and thereby life preserved, God has ordained that these means shall be used, as well as the end attained.

2. As to persons shortening their lives by intemperance, this has a natural tendency to do it; so that, though God be not the author of the sin, he certainly knows, before-hand, what methods the sinner will take to hasten his end, and leaves him to himself; so that, though the sin be not from God, the punishment, which is the consequence thereof, may truly be said to be from him, and therefore this was determined by him.

And when it is farther objected, that they, who destroy their health, or lay violent hands on themselves, cannot be said to sin in so doing, because they do that which tends to fulfil the divine will, provided God has determined the fatal event; herein they oppose this doctrine, without taking the words in the same sense in which it is maintained; for it is well known, that the will of God is sometimes taken for that prescribed rule that he has given us, which is the matter of our duty, in which sense we readily allow, that he that fulfils it, cannot be said to sin. But, besides this, it is sometimes taken for his purpose to permit sin; or, to give the sinner up to his own heart’s lusts, to act that which he hates, and is resolved to punish. In this sense, the sinner is said to do that which God would not have suffered him to do, had he willed the contrary; but it is a very groundless insinuation, to suppose that this exempts him from the guilt of sin.

3. To say, that God’s fixing the bounds of life, is inconsistent with our praying, that our lives may be prolonged, or that we may be delivered from sickness, or death, when we are apprehensive that we are drawing nigh to it, is no just consequence; for as we do not pray that God would alter his purpose, when we desire any blessing of him, but suppose this to be hid from us, and expect not to know it any otherwise than by the 514event; so a person, who prays to be delivered from sickness, or death, is not to address the divine Majesty, as one who presumptuously, and without ground, supposes that God has decreed that he shall immediately die, but as one who hopes, or who has no ground to conclude otherwise, but that he will make it appear, by answering his prayer, that he has determined to spare his life. For the secret purpose of God, relating to the event of things, is no more to be a rule of duty, inasmuch as it is secret, than if there had been no purpose relating thereunto; but yet it does not follow from hence, that this matter is not determined by him.

4. As to those scriptures, that seem to give countenance to this objection, they may, without the least absurdity, be understood consistently with other scriptures, which have been before produced, whereby it is proved, that God has fixed, or determined the bounds of life. As for those promises, which God has made of a long life, to those that love him, and keep his commandments, the meaning thereof is this, that he will certainly bestow this blessing, either in kind or value, on those whose conversation is such as is therein described; this none can deny, who rightly understand the meaning of that scripture, in which it is said, that godliness hath the promise of the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come, 1 Tim. iv. 8. But, so far as it affects the argument we are maintaining, we must consider, that that efficacious grace, whereby we are enabled to love God, and keep his commandments, is as much his gift, and consequently the result of his purpose, as the blessing connected with it; therefore if he has determined that we shall enjoy a long and happy life in this world, and to enable us to live a holy life therein; if both the end and the means are connected together, and are equally the objects of God’s purpose, then it cannot justly be inferred from hence, that the event, relating to the lengthening or shortening our lives, is not determined by him.

As for those scriptures that speak of the wicked’s dying before their time, or not living half their days, these are to be understood agreeably to that distinction before-mentioned, between men’s dying sooner, than they would have done according to the course of nature, or the concurrence of second causes thereunto, in which sense it is literally true, that many do not live out half their days; and their dying sooner than God had before determined. May not the sovereign Disposer of all things inflict a sudden and immediate death, as the punishment of sin, without giving us reason to conclude that this was not pre-concerted, if we may so express it, or determined beforehand?

As for that other scripture, referred to in the objection, in which Martha tells our Saviour, that if he had been with Lazarus, 515when sick, he had not died, she does not suppose Christ’s being there, would have frustrated the divine purpose, for then, he would, doubtless, have reproved her for it; whereas, in reality, he did not come to visit him, because he knew that God had purposed that he should die, and be afterwards raised from the dead; so that this does not argue that he has not fixed the bounds, or term of life.

Again, as for that argument, to support this objection, taken from the destruction of the world in the flood, or that of Sodom, by fire from heaven, that they might have prolonged their lives, had they repented, we do not deny but that this would have been the consequence thereof, but then their repentance would have been as much determined by God, as their deliverance from that untimely death, which befel them.

The last scripture mentioned, in which God, by the prophet Isaiah, tells Hezekiah, that he should die, and not live; notwithstanding which, fifteen years were added to his life, which is very frequently insisted on, by those who deny the unalterable decree of God, relating to life and death, as that which they apprehend to be an unanswerable argument to support it: to this it may be replied, that when God says, Set thine house in order, for thou shalt die, and not live, he gave Hezekiah to understand, that his disease was what we call mortal, namely, such as no skill of the physician, or natural virtue of medicine, could cure, and therefore that he must expect to die, unless God recovered him by a miracle; and Hezekiah, doubtless, took the warning in this sense, otherwise it would have been a preposterous thing for him to have prayed for life, as it would have been an affront to God, to have desired to have changed his purpose. But God, on the other hand, designed, by this warning, to put him upon importunate prayer for life; therefore when he says, I will add to thy days fifteen years, the meaning is only this, though thou mightest before have expected death, my design in giving thee that intimation, was, that thou shouldest pray for life, which might be given thee by a miracle, and now I will work a miracle, and fulfil, in this respect, what I before purposed in adding to thy life fifteen years.

Object. 3. It is farther objected, against the doctrine of election and reprobation, and particularly the immutability of God’s purpose therein, that it tends to establish a fatal necessity of things, and overthrow that known distinction that there is between things, as necessary, or contingent, as though nothing in the whole series of causes and effects could happen otherwise than it does, and God himself were confined to such a method of acting, that it was impossible for him to have done the contrary; which is nothing else but the Stoical doctrine of fate applied to, and defended by some scriptures, though it be contrary to others, which speak of the uncertainty of future events.

516Thus God speaks of the Jews, turning from their iniquities, and his bestowing pardoning mercy, as the result thereof, as an uncertain event, when he says, in Jer. xxxvi. 3. It may be that the house of Judah will hear all the evil, which I purpose to do unto them, that they may return every man from his evil way, that I may forgive their iniquity and their sin. So when God gave the Jews a sign, immediately before the captivity, taken from the prophet Ezekiel’s personating one that was removing his stuff, or household-goods, as signifying, that the nation in general should soon remove to other habitations, when carried captive into Babylon, he adds, upon this occasion, It may be they will consider, though they be a rebellious house, Ezek. xii. 3. And the prophet Zephaniah exhorts the people to seek righteousness and meekness, and, as the consequence thereof, says, It may be ye shall be hid in the day of the Lord’s anger, Zeph. ii. 3. And the apostle speaks of the uncertainty of the divine dispensations of grace, when he advises Timothy, in meekness, to instruct those that oppose themselves, if God, peradventure, will give them repentance, to the acknowledging of the truth, 2 Tim. ii. 25. which is directly contrary to the unalterable necessity of events, depending upon the divine purpose, according to the doctrine of election.

Answ. 1. As to the former part of this objection, in which this doctrine is pretended to have taken its rise from, and to be agreeable to, that of the Stoics, concerning fate and destiny, it will not be much to our purpose to enquire what was the opinion of that sect of philosophers concerning it; and, indeed, it will be difficult to fix on a just sense thereof, in which they all agree. Some are of opinion, that many of them intended nothing else thereby, but the immutability of God’s purposes, but the dispensation of his providence, being a necessary execution thereof; and when he is said to be bound by the laws of fate, they mean, that he cannot act contrary to what himself has determined.^[234] And, had it been universally explained by them in this sense, it would not have done them much service, who oppose the doctrine of election, to have compared it therewith; for it would only have proved the agreeableness of the doctrine of the immutability of God’s purpose, relating to all events, to the light of nature, as some of the heathen were thereby instructed in it. But since this does not appear to be the sense of all the Stoicks about the doctrine of fate, but some of them understood it in the same sense as it is represented in the objection, this we cannot but militate against, and assert the doctrine of election to be very remote from it.

Therefore we need only, in answer to this part of the objection, 517explain what we mean, when we maintain the necessity of events, as founded on the will of God. We are far from asserting that there is a necessary connexion between second causes, and their respective effects, in which some are produced arbitrarily, by the will of intelligent creatures; and when we call any thing a necessary cause, producing effects, according to its own nature, we suppose that this is agreeable to the order, or course of nature, which was fixed by God. All that we pretend to prove, is the dependence of things on the divine will, and the necessity of God’s purposes taking effect; so that that which is arbitrary or contingent, which might be, or not be, as depending on, or relating to second causes, is eventually necessary, as it is an accomplishment of the divine purpose. Therefore we always distinguish between things being contingent, with respect to us, and their being so, with respect to God; and, consequently, though it may be, or peradventure, may be applied to the apparent event of things, these words can never be applied to the fulfilling of the divine will; and this leads us to consider the latter part of the objection; therefore,

2. As to the scripture’s speaking concerning the uncertainty of future events, in those places mentioned in the objection, these, and all others of the like nature, in which such a mode of speaking is used, may be explained, by distinguishing between what might reasonably have been expected to be the event of things, supposing men had not been given up to the blindness of their mind, and hearts, to act below the dictates of reason, without consulting their own safety and happiness, or expressing their gratitude to God; and what would be the real event of things, which God was not pleased to reveal, and therefore was unknown to them. Thus, when the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel represented the repentance and reformation of Israel as an uncertain event, as well as their forgiveness, and deliverance from the captivity, connected with it, in such dubious terms, It may be they will consider and return, every man from his evil way; it implies, that this was what might have been reasonably expected by men, though it was no matter of uncertainty to the heart-searching God, who knoweth the end from the beginning, and perfectly foresees what will be the event of things, which, in various respects, are under the direction of his providence. Though it could hardly be thought, by men, that such an admonition should be treated with such contempt, yet God knew how they would behave themselves; there was no peradventure with respect to his judgment thereof; he knew that they would not repent, otherwise he would have inclined their wills, and effectually have persuaded them to exercise this grace, and thereby have prevented his expectation, or determination, from being disappointed, or frustrated.

518If it be objected, that, according to this sense of the text, the prophet’s message to the people would have been to no purpose, and his ministry, among them, exercised in vain; or that it was contrary to the wisdom and goodness of God to make this overture to them, when he knew it would not be complied with.

To this it may be replied, that the great God is not bound to decline the asserting his right to man’s obedience, or requiring that which is a just debt to him, though he knew that they would not comply with his demand thereof; and, indeed, this objection cannot be maintained, without supposing, that, when the gospel is preached to man, the glory of the divine wisdom and goodness therein cannot be secured, unless we conclude either that God doth not know whether man will embrace it, or no, which is contrary to his omniscience; or that he determines, that all, to whom the gospel is preached, shall embrace it, which is contrary to matter of fact. But there may be a medium between both these, which vindicates the divine perfections, in ordering that the gospel should be preached, and thereby asserting his sovereignty, and unalienable right to their obedience; accordingly, there might be a small remnant among them, in whom God designed that this message should take effect. And will any one say, that because the goodness of God was not herein demonstrated to all, that therefore no glory was brought to that perfection?

And if it be farther said, that supposing there were some who turned from their evil ways, the captivity, which was threatened, was not hereby prevented, and therefore the promise, relating thereunto, did not take place; to this it may be replied; that as God did not give them ground to expect this blessing, unless this repentance should be more universal, than it really was, so he had various ways to testify his regard to those who should receive advantage by this message, for whose sake it was principally intended.

As for that other scripture, in which God advises his people to seek righteousness and meekness, and, as the consequence hereof, says, it may be ye may be hid in the day of the Lord’s fierce anger; the meaning is, that they, who were enabled to exercise these graces, should either have some instances of temporal deliverance vouchsafed to them; or if not, that they should have no reason to complain that the exercise thereof was altogether in vain.

As for that scripture, in which the apostle bids Timothy to exhort those that oppose the gospel, if, peradventure, God would give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth; the meaning is, that it was uncertain to Timothy whether God would give this grace or no; and therefore he must preach the 519gospel, whatever were the event thereof: Nevertheless, it was no matter of uncertainty, with respect to God, who must be supposed to know what grace he designs to bestow, and therefore the event of things may be dubious to us, and yet be certain with respect to him.