Note 21 — Chapter VI · COLESBERG AND KIMBERLEY

I have tried, as usual, to follow the figures of the “Official History,” although for this period they are inadequate. Sometimes the considered estimate of the historian is given, sometimes the Intelligence estimate on the spot, with or without a warning that it was exaggerated, while in the case of particular operations the estimate is occasionally altogether omitted. It is not stated how much allowance is made for men detached on non-combatant duties, and for that leakage from particular commandos of burghers “on leave” which was such a grave source of weakness for the enemy.

On January 10, when Roberts landed, the historian’s estimate of “total effective strength of Boers in the field” (vol. i., p. 409) is 46,500, thus disposed:

Joubert in Natal 21,000

Schoemann at Colesberg 5,000

Grobelaar around Stormberg 4,000

Cronje at Scholtz Nek 8,000

Ferreira besieging Kimberley 3,000

Snyman besieging Mafeking 2,500

H. Botha on Rhodesian border 1,000

“Reinforcements” 2,000

—-—-

46,500

On February 16 (four days after Roberts began his move) an Intelligence estimate (“somewhat exaggerated”) is given to this effect:

Cronje (including Kimberley force) 12,000 20 guns

A. Cronje (detached by Cronje)^[22] 1,300 2 guns

Near Goemansberg 300 1 gun

Reinforcements (i.e., to Cronje) (“uncertain”) 5,000

Colesberg 8,000 10 guns

Stormberg, etc 2,000

—-—-

28,600

The Natal estimate is omitted, but by reference to the chapters on Natal at the same period the total Boer strength there cannot have been more than 12,000. Add, therefore, 12,000 + the forces of Snyman and H. Botha on January 10, i.e., 3,500, and we get

15,500

—-—-

Total 44,100