Note 96 — PART III. THE BATTURE AT NEW-ORLEANS.
Reading edition
Since this was written, I have seen the case of Smart v. the magistrates, town council and community of Dundee, reported in 8 Brown's Reports of Appeals in parl. 119. This was an appeal from the court of Session in Scotland, to the H. of Lords. The crown of Scotland had in very ancient times, granted to the Corporation of Dundee, on the river Tay, the borough, with all the lands and pertinents, the privileges, profits, customs, ports, and liberties of the river on both sides, as freely in all respects as is possessed by the borough of Edinburgh over that of Leith, and in a word, as it seems, every right, power and trust which the crown could grant.—Smart, the proprietor of a lot bounded on one side per fluxum maris, or the sea flood, admitting that the sovereign, as trustee for the public, has a right to prevent all such appropriation of the sea shore, or the banks of navigable rivers as would impede navigation, render it dangerous or hurt the interests of commerce, either inland or foreign, and that all private persons or corporations, having a grant of a port and harbor, possess, to a certain extent, the same privileges as derived from the sovereign within a defined space, still he insisted on the right of the adjacent proprietor to ground gained from the sea by its recess, or by his own industry in embanking, or by any other opus manu factum, not prejudicial to navigation or the established rights of others. On the other hand the corporation claimed by their grant, a right to the seashore adjacent to the town, in trust for the benefit of the community, to make harbors, basons, and works for securing them, market places, wharves, wood yards, and other repositories for the accommodation of the trade, and, for these different works, to take in scites from the water by embankment, in short, as standing in place of the crown, that they succeeded to all the cares and powers of the crown, in the territory and its waters, for the public good; and, for that object, were now engaged in making an embankment adjacent to the Appellant's lot, for the benefit of navigation and commerce. They admit the general doctrine of the riparian right to the soil which may be acquired from a sea or river, by its receding naturally, or by industry: but that this does not apply to the site of a tenement within a burgh, where the corporation is entitled to all the soil not expressly granted away: that the words, 'per fluxum maris' are but words of description, which were accurate too at the date of the grant, but have since become otherwise by a change of character in the boundary, not in the area granted. They are a limitation of the subject of the grant in the same way as a road would be, which, if removed farther off, would not carry the granted subject with it; or as the tenement of another would be; and make it an ager limitatus, not an ager arcifinius; the particular boundaries being named, not to limit the coterminous property, but the property granted. The Appeal was accordingly dismissed by the House of Lords. No arguments of counsel, other than the written pleadings, nor reasons of the Lords, are reported: but, from this case, (crowded as it is with circumstances, many of which are irrelevant to the merits of the question, and of those relevant not the words but the condensed substance is here given,) the book says, that the general principle to be gathered is that 'where the sea flood is stated as the boundary of premises granted on the shore of a sea-port being an incorporated borough, this does not give the grantee a right to follow the sea, or to the land acquired from it, or left by it where it has receded, in prejudice of the corporation having, by their charter, a right vested in them to the whole territory of the burgh.' And consequently, in prejudice of the king, or public, where no such grant has substituted others in their place: and it authorizes a strong inference that the English, like the Roman law, restrains the right of alluvion to the prædium rusticum, not admitting it on the shores bordering the city.