Note 23 — PART II.

The question, whether virtue is one or many (often raised without receiving any decisive solution), is connected with the more general one, whether the one (τὸ ἕν) can be manifold or the manifold one. From the Dialectic, it must be clear, that on this point Plato came to the conclusion that virtue must both be regarded as one, and in another respect also as many. In a moral point of view, however, this question of the unity of virtue must be taken in quite another sense; for as all good is considered as a due measure and proportion, no single virtue, by itself and apart from the rest, can be truly virtuous. Hence Plato often describes some single virtue as comprising in itself the sum of all virtues. Thus, Justice is often used for virtue in general, because no action, which is not also just, can be virtuous;—and similarly with wisdom, temperance, and valour. In the Protagoras, too, Plato adds a fifth virtue— ὁσιὸτης, or piety, and in the Republic (iii. 402, b.) he mentions liberality and magnanimity.magnanimity.