Note (return) — SA@NKARA'S INTRODUCTION (continued 4)

Against this doctrine we argue as follows.—If you Sânkhyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point out that a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like—things which according to circumstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain—are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external (i.e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look, we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent principle like the pradhâna is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradhâna also (when modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause (of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such as potters, &c.317 Nor (if remembering this latter point) do we enter into conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary, are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent cause exists.—For the reason detailed in the above, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the 'orderly arrangement' (of the world), a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.—The word 'and' (in the Sûtra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhâna cannot be inferred, viz. 'on account of the non-possibility of endowment,' &c. For it cannot be maintained318 that all outward and inward effects are 'endowed' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states, while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a different nature (i.e. as outward things), and moreover as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c.319 And, further, although the sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on320.—(Turning to the next Sâ@nkhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhâna from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such as roof and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of the pradhâna, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several antecedents321; for they also are limited322.—Further323, it is impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence presides.