Note 136 — LECTURE VIII THE UNCONSCIOUS

For a good account of the history of the theory of unconscious ideas in philosophy see Hartmann’s “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” where the following quotations may be found: “To have ideas and yet not to be conscious of them—there seems to be a contradiction in that—for how can we know that we have them if we are not conscious of them? Nevertheless, we may become aware indirectly that we have an idea, although we be not directly cognizant of the same.” (Kant, Anthropology, sec. 5.) And again: "Innumerable are the sensations and perceptions whereof we are not conscious although we must undoubtedly conclude that we have them, obscure ideas as they may be called (to be found in animals as well as in man). The clear ideas, indeed, are but an infinitely small fraction of these same exposed to consciousness. That only a few spots on the great chart of our minds are illuminated may well fill us with amazement in contemplating this nature of ours. (Ibid.)

“Now unconscious ideas” are such “as are in consciousness without our being aware of them” (Herbart).

It is interesting to notice how Kant’s statement might well be substituted for that of Myers’ of his “Subliminal.” It is difficult to understand the peculiar antagonistic attitude of certain theoretical psychologists to the theory of subconscious (coconscious) ideas in view of the history of this theory in philosophy. They seem to have forgotten their philosophy and not to have kept pace with experimental psychology.