Note 57 — Chapter XXIII · THE NEW ACADEMY.

1 Conf. Diog. ix. 114. Tennemann’s view (Gesch. d. Phil. iv. 190), that Arcesilaus arrived at his conclusions independently of Pyrrho, does not appear to be tenable. ↑

2 Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 10; 6, 5, says that Zeno and Arcesilaus were fellow-pupils under Polemo, and that their rivalry whilst at school was the origin of the later quarrels between the Stoa and the Academy. The same may have been stated by Antiochus, since Cic. Acad. i. 9, 35, ii. 24, 76, appeals to him to prove that they were together at school. Still the assertion is valueless. There can be no doubt that both Zeno and Arcesilaus were pupils of Polemo, but it is hardly possible that they can have been under him at the same time; nor if they were, could the intellectual differences of the two schools be referred simply to their personal relation. ↑

3 Cic. De Orat. ii. 18, 68; Diog. iv. 28; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16; Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220. Clemens, Strom. i. 301, C, calls Arcesilaus the founder of the New (second or middle) Academy. ↑

4 Arcesilaus (see Geffers, De Arcesila, Gött. 1842, Gymn. Progr.) was born at Pitane, in Æolia (Strabo, xiii. 1, 67, p. 614; Diog. iv. 28). His birth-year is not stated; but as Lacydes (Diog. iv. 61) was his successor in 240 B.C., and he was then 75 years of age (Diog. 44), it must have been about 315 B.C. Having enjoyed the instruction of the mathematician Autolycus in his native town, he repaired to Athens, where he was first a pupil of Theophrastus, but was won for the Academy by Crantor (Diog. 29; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2). With Crantor he lived on the most intimate terms; but as Polemo was the president of the Academy, he is usually called a pupil of Polemo (Cic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67; Fin. v. 31, 94; Strabo). On the death of Polemo, he was probably a pupil of Crates; but it is not stated by Diog. 33, or Numen. in Eus. l.c. xiv. 5, 10, that he was a pupil of either Pyrrho, Menedemus, or Diodorus. If Eusebius seems to imply it, he may have misunderstood the statement that he made use of their teaching. Fortified with extraordinary acuteness, penetrating wit, and ready speech (Diog. 30; 34; 37; Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2; Plut. De Sanit. 7, p. 126; Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7; ii. 1, 10, 4; Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 193, 28), learned, especially in mathematics (Diog. 32), and well acquainted with native poets (Diog. 30, who mentions his own attempts at poetry, quoting some of his epigrams), he appears to have early distinguished himself. From Plut. Adv. Col. 26, p. 1121, it appears that in Epicurus’ lifetime, consequently before 270 B.C., he had propounded his sceptical views with great success. Apollodorus, however, appears to have placed his career too early (Diog. 45), in making his ἀκμὴ between 300 and 296 B.C. On the death of Crates, the conduct of the School devolved upon Arcesilaus (Diog. 32), through whom it attained no small note (Strabo, i. 2, 2, p. 15; Diog. 37; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 14). From public matters he held aloof, and lived in retirement (Diog. 39), esteemed even by opponents for his pure, gentle, and genial character (Diog. 37; quoting many individual traits, 44; vii. 171; ix. 115; Cic. Fin. v. 31, 94; Plut. De Adulat. 22, p. 63; Coh. Ira, 13, p. 461. Ælian, V. H. xiv. 96). On his relations to Cleanthes, conf. Diog. vii. 171; Plut. De Adulat. 11, p. 55. He left no writings (Diog. 32; Plut. Alex. Virt. 4, p. 328). ↑

5 Cic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67: Arcesilas primum … ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit: quem ferunt … aspernatum esse omne animi sensusque judicium, primumque instituisse … non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset, disputare. This is, in fact, the calumniandi licentia with which Augustin, herein doubtless following Cicero, c. Acad. iii. 17, 39, charges him, contra omnia velle dicere quasi ostentationis causa. ↑

6 Conf. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv, 6, 12, and above, p. 86, 4. ↑

7 Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 2; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 44. Ritter’s view of the latter passage, that Arcesilaus quoted the diversities of philosophic teaching by way of refuting it (iii. 478), appears to be entirely without foundation. He rather quoted its uniform resemblance by way of overcoming doubt. ↑

8 Cic. De Orat. iii. 18. See p. 530, 1. ↑

9 Sext. Pyrrh. i. 234; Diocles of Cnidus, in Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, 5; Augustin, c. Acad. iii. 17, 38. Geffers regards Arcesilaus as a true follower of the older Academy. ↑

10 Sext. Math. vii. 153. ↑

11 Sext. Math. l.c. 154. ↑

12 Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 27. Zeno asserted: An irresistible or conceptional perception is such an impression of a real object as cannot possibly come from an unreal one. Arcesilaus endeavoured to prove nullum tale visum esse a vero, ut non ejusdem modi etiam a falso posset esse. The same view in Sext. l.c. To these may be added discussions on deceptions of the senses and contradictions in the statements of the senses in Sext. vii. 408, and others attributed to the Academicians. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70: Urgebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret, quæ sensibus viderentur, Zenon autem nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia. To these attacks on Zeno Plut. De An. (Fr. vii.) 1, probably refers: ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν αἴτιον τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὡς Ἀρκεσίλαος. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἴτια φανεῖται. All that is here attributed to Arcesilaus is the assertion that ἐπιστητόν is the cause of ἐπιστήμη, and that it is so when it produces a φαντασία καταληπτική. The connection in which these statements were made by Arcesilaus was probably this: If there is such a thing as knowledge, there must be objects which produce it. These objects, however, do not exist, there being no object which does not admit a false opinion equally well with a true one. ↑

13 Sext. 155: μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ κατάληψις γενήσεται· ἦν γὰρ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσις· μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταλήψεως πάντα ἔσται ἀκατάληπτα. ↑

14 Sext. l.c.; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Adv. Col. 24, 2; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16; 6, 4. By Sext. Pyrrh. i. 233, it is thus expressed: Arcesilaus regards ἐποχὴ as being a good in every case, συγκατάθεσις as an evil. ↑

15 Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45. ↑

16 Cic. Fin. ii. 1, 2; v. 4, 11; De Orat. iii. 18, 67; Diog. iv. 28; conf. Plut. C. Not. 37, 7. ↑

17 Stob. Floril. 82, 4: Ἀρκεσίλαος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔφη τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς ἐοικέναι τοῖς ψηφοπαίκταις (jugglers), οἵτινες χαριέντως παραλογίζονται; and, Ibid. 10 (under the heading: Ἀρκεσιλάου ἐκ τῶν Σερήνου ἀπομνημονευμάτων): διαλεκτικὴν δὲ φεῦγε, συγκυκᾷ τἄνω κάτω. ↑

18 The authority is a very uncertain one, particularly as Arcesilaus left nothing in writing, and the remarks quoted would seem to be more appropriate to the Chian Aristo (see p. 59) than to Arcesilaus. Still, if Chrysippus condemned the dialectic of the Sceptics (according to p. 66, 1), Arcesilaus may very well have condemned that of the Stoics and Megarians. Does not even Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 91, probably following Carneades (see p. 541, 4), object to dialectic, because it furnishes no knowledge? ↑

19 This fact is recognised not only by Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, 4, but by Sext. Pyrrh. i. 232. The difference which the later Sceptics draw between themselves and the Academicians, viz. that they assert the principle of doubt tentatively, whereas the Academicians assert it absolutely, does not apply to Arcesilaus (see p. 533, 1). Even Sextus says the same, but with some diffidence (πλὴν εἰ μὴ λέγοι τις ὅτι κ.τ.λ.). On account of this connection with Pyrrho, the Stoic Aristo called Arcesilaus (following Il. vi. 181): πρόσθε Πλάτων ὄπιθεν Πύῤῥων, μέσος Διόδωρος. Sext. l.c.; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 11; Diog. iv. 33. ↑

20 It has been already seen that this was the key to the position which the Stoics and Epicureans took up against the Sceptics. ↑

21 Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 3, defending Arcesilaus against the attacks of Colotes, says: The opponents of Scepticism cannot show that ἐποχὴ leads to inactivity, for πάντα πειρῶσι καὶ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν ἡ ὁρμὴ γενέσθαι συγκατάθεσις οὐδὲ τῆς ῥοπῆς ἀρχὴν ἐδέξατο τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἀγωγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐφάνη μὴ δεομένη τοῦ προστίθεσθαι. Perception arises and influences the will without συγκατάθεσις. Since this statement was controverted by Chrysippus (Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 12. See above 87, 1), there can be no doubt that it was propounded by Arcesilaus. ↑

22 Sext. Math. vii 158: ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ Βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν ἥ τις οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀποδίδοσθαι, ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τουτέστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ἠρτημένην ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὅτι ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κανονιεῖ τᾶς αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς καὶ κοινῶς τὰς πράξεις τῷ εὐλόγῳ, κατὰ τοῦτό τε προερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατορθώσει· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν περιγίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κινεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς κατορθώμασι, τὸ δὲ κατόρθωμα εἶναι (according to the Stoic definition) ὅπερ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν. ὁ προσέχων οὖν τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει. It is a mistake to suppose, with Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, that, Arcesilaus denied probabilities. ↑

23 In Plut. Tran. An. 9, sub fin. p. 470, he gives the advice rather to devote attention to oneself and ones own life than to works of art and other external things. In Stob. Floril. 95, 17, he says: Poverty is burdensome, but educates for virtue. Ibid. 43, 91: Where there are most laws, there are most transgressions of law. Plut. Cons. ad Apoll. 15, p. 110, has a saying of his as to the folly of the fear of death. Id. De Sanit. 7, p. 126, Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7, records a somewhat severe judgment on adulterers and prodigals. Quite unique is the statement in Tertull. Ad. Nation. ii. 2: Arcesilaus held that there were three kinds of Gods (in other words he divided the popular Gods into three classes): the Olympian, the stars, and the Titans. It implies that he criticised the belief in the Gods. It also appears by the language used in Plut. C. Not. 37, 7, respecting the Stoic theory of a κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλου, that his criticism of dogmatism extended to natural science. ↑

24 Conf. p. 529, 3 sub fin. ↑

25 Geffers, De Arcesilæ Successoribus (including Carneades): Gött. 1845. Arcesilaus was succeeded by Lacydes of Cyrene, who died 240 B.C., after presiding over the School for 26 years. In his lifetime (probably shortly before his death) he entrusted it to the care of the Phocæans Telecles and Euandros (Diog. iv. 59–61). The statements made in Diog. l.c., Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, Plut. De Adul. 22, p. 63, Ælian, V. H. ii. 41, Athen. x. 438, a. xiii. 606, C, Plin. H. N. x. 22, 51, refer to individual peculiarities which he appears to have had. They must be received with caution, particularly the gossip which Diog. 59 mentions casually and Numenius dwells upon with intolerable garrulity. Diog. calls him ἀνὴρ σεμνότατος καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγους ἐσχηκὼς ζηλωτάς· φιλόπονός τε ἐκ νέου καὶ πένης μὲν, εὔχαρις δ’ ἄλλως καὶ εὐόμιλος. To his admirers belongs Attalus I. of Pergamum. A visit to his court was however declined in skilful language (Diog. 60, which Geffers, p. 5, clearly misunderstands). In doctrine, he deviated little from Arcesilaus, and, having been the first to commit to writing the teaching of the New Academy (Suid. Λακ.: ἔγραψε φιλόσοφα καὶ περὶ φύσεως—the latter is somewhat extraordinary for a Sceptic), he was by some mistake called its founder (Diog. 59). According to Diog. vii. 183, see p. 46, 1, he appears to have taught in the Academy during Arcesilaus’ lifetime. Panaretus (Athen. xii. 552, d; Æl. V. H. x. 6), Demophanes, and Ecdemus or Ecdelus (Plutarch. Philopon. 1; Arat. 5, 7) are also called pupils of Arcesilaus. The most distinguished pupil of Lacydes, according to Eus. xiv. 7, 12, was Aristippus of Cyrene, also mentioned by Diog. ii. 83. Another, Paulus, is mentioned by Timotheus, in Clemens, Strom. 496, D. His successors were Telecles and Euander, who jointly presided over the School. Euander, however, according to Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Diog. 60, Eus. l.c., survived his colleague, and was followed by Hegesinus (Diog. 60; Cic. l.c.) or Hegesilaus (as he is called by Clemens, Strom. p. 301, C). who was the immediate predecessor of Carneades. Respecting these individuals nothing is known beyond the names. ↑

26 Carneades, the son of Epicomus or Philocomus, was born at Cyrene (Diog. iv. 62; Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p. 838; Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 5), and died, according to Apollodorus (Diog. 65), 129 B.C., in his 85th year. Lucian, Macrob. 20, assigns to him the same age. With less probability Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Valer. Max. viii. 7, 5, extend his age to 90, making his birth-year 213 B.C. Later admirers find it remarkable that his birthday, like Plato’s, occurred on the Carnean festival (Plut. Qu. Conv. viii. 1, 2, 1). Little is known of his life. He was a disciple and follower of Hegesinus, but at the same time received instruction in dialectic (Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 98) from the Stoic Diogenes, and studied philosophic literature with indefatigable zeal (Diog. 62), more particularly the writings of Chrysippus (Diog. 62; Plut. Sto. Rep. 10, 44; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 13). In 156 B.C. he took part in the well-known association of philosophers, and produced the greatest impression on his Roman hearers by the force of his language and the boldness with which he attacked the current principles of morals. Shortly before his death, probably also at an earlier period, he became blind (Diog. 66). He left no writings, the preservation of his doctrines being the work of his pupils, in particular of Clitomachus (Diog. 66, 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 98; 32, 102). Respecting his character, we may gather from a few expressions that, whilst vigorous in disputation (Diog. 63; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10), he was not wanting in a repose of mind which was in harmony with his principles (Diog. 66). That he was a just man, notwithstanding his speech against justice, we can well believe (Quintil. xii. 1, 35).

The quotation in Diog. 64 (ἡ συστήσασα φύσις καὶ διαλύσει) does not indicate fear of death, but simple resignation to the course of nature. Still less does his language on Antipater’s suicide, and also what is quoted in Stob. (Floril. 119, 19) that he made a faint-hearted attempt to imitate him which he afterwards abandoned. It was only a not very clever way of ridiculing an action which appeared to Carneades eminently mad. ↑

27 Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12; Lucian, Macrob. 20. ↑

28 His School held him in such esteem, that it considered him, together with Plato, because of his birthday (unless the idea grew out of his name), to be a special favourite of Apollo. Tradition says that an eclipse of the moon (Suid. Καρν. adds an eclipse of the sun) commemorated his death; συμπάθειαν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, αἰνιττομένου τοῦ μεθ’ ἥλιον καλλίστου τῶν ἄστρων (Diog. 64). Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p. 838, says of him: οὗτος δὲ τῶν ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας ἄριστος φιλοσόφων ὁμολογεῖται. There was only one opinion among the ancients as to the force of his logic, and the power and attraction of his eloquence. These gifts were aided by unusually powerful organs (see the anecdotes in Plut. Garrul. 21, p. 513; Diog. 63). Conf. Diog. 62; Cic. Fin. iii. 12, 41; De Orat. ii. 38, 161; iii. 18, 68; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10; Numen. in Eusebius, Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 2 and 5; Lactant. Inst. v. 14; Plut. Cato Maj. 22. The latter, speaking of his success at Rome, says: μάλιστα δ’ ἡ Καρνεάδου χάρις, ἧς δύναμίς τε πλείστη καὶ δόξα τῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἀποδέουσα … ὡς πνεῦμα τὴν πόλιν ἠχῆς ἐνέπλησε. καὶ λόγος κατεῖχεν, ὡς ἀνὴρ Ἕλλην εἰς ἔκπληξιν ὑπερφυὴς, πάντα κηλῶν καὶ χειρούμενος, ἔρωτα δεινὸν ἐμβέβληκε τοῖς νέοις, ὑφ’ οὗ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν καὶ διατριβῶν ἐκπεσόντες ἐνθουσιῶσι περὶ φιλοσοφίαν. ↑

29 Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16. ↑

30 See p. 536, note. ↑

31 Sext. Math. vii. 159: ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος. ὁ δὲ Καρνεάδης οὐ μόνον τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀντιδιετάσσετο περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου. In Math. ix. 1, Sextus charges the School of Carneades with unnecessary diffuseness in discussing the fundamental principles or every system. The Stoics were, however, the chief object of his attack. Cic. Tusc. v. 29, 82; N. D. ii. 65, 162; Plut. Garrul. 23, p. 514; Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 17, 39. ↑

32 Sext. l.c.: καὶ δὴ πρῶτος μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ κοινὸς πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶ λόγος καθ’ ὃν παρίσταται ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, οὐ λόγος οὐκ αἴσθησις οὐ φαντασία οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συλλήβδην διαψεύδεται ἡμᾶς. ↑

33 Sext. l.c. 160–163. ↑

34 Conf. Sext. vii. 403; Cic. Acad. ii. 15, 47; 28, 89—where Carneades is undoubtedly meant, although he is not mentioned by name. For the other sceptical arguments which Cicero mentions tally with those which Sextus attributes to Carneades, and Cicero makes Antiochus refute them, who was the immediate adversary of Carneades. ↑

35 According to Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 40; 26, 83, the Academic system of proof rests on the four following propositions: (1) that there are false notions; (2) that these cannot be known, i.e. be recognised as true; (3) that of two indistinguishable notions, it is impossible to know the one and not the other; (4) that there is no true notion by the side of which a false one cannot be placed indistinguishable from it. The second and third of these propositions are not denied at all, and the first is only denied by Epicurus in regard to impressions on the senses. Hence all importance attaches to the fourth proposition, to which Sextus, vii. 164 and 402, and Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 4, look as the most important argument. ↑

36 Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 42: Dividunt enim in partes et eas quidem magnas: primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quæ ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt (the συνήθεια against which Chrysippus already directed severe attacks. See p. 46, 2; 91, 2). Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne ratione quidem et conjectura ulla res percipi possit. Hæc autem universa etiam concidunt minutius. ↑

37 Sext. vii. 409; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 84; 7, 19; 25, 79; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 5. Therewith is probably connected the statement in Galen, De Opt. Doct. c. 2, vol. i. 45, K, that Carneades persistently denied the axiom that two things that are equal to a third are equal to one another. His assertion probably comes to this, that it may be possible to distinguish two things as unequal, which cannot be distinguished from a third, that therefore two things may appear equal to a third without being or appearing equal to one another. ↑

38 Sext. 402 and 408. ↑

39 The fallacy called ψευδόμενος is carefully investigated in Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 95 (by Carneades as he says, 98), as an instance in point. ↑

40 Sext. 416; Cic. l.c. 29, 92. Since Chrysippus tried to meet the chain-argument, it may be supposed that this fallacy had been used by Arcesilaus against the Stoics. ↑

41 Sext. vii. 164; Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 5, 11. ↑

42 Sext. 165. ↑

43 Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 91, who here appears to be following Philo, and, subsequently, Carneades as well. Carneades also gives utterance to a similar view of dialectic in Stob. Floril. 93, 13 (conf. Plut. C. Not. 2, 4), comparing it to a polypus consuming its own tentacles. It is able, he conceives, to expose fallacies, but not to discover truth. ↑

44 Cic. Acad. ii. 36, 117. Carneades is not mentioned by name, but there can be no doubt that the reference is to some Academician, and it is probable that it was the work of Carneades. ↑

45 Diog. iv. 62. ↑

46 Cic. N. D. i. 2, 5, after a brief description of the Stoical views of Gods: Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem. ↑

47 Cic. N. D. i. 23, 62; iii. 4, 11. Here, too, Carneades is not mentioned by name, but the reference to him is made clear by Cicero’s remark that he is quoting the Academic view. ↑

48 Conf. Cic. N. D. iii. 5, 11. ↑

49 The Academician in Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120. That these arguments were used by Carneades is clear from Plut. in Porphyr. De Abst. iii. 20, where, traversing the arguments of the Stoics, he justifies the existence of vermin, poisonous plants, and beasts of prey. In answer to Chrysippus’ assertion, that the final cause of a pig is to be killed, Carneades argues: A pig, therefore, by being killed, must attain the object for which it was destined; it is always beneficial for a thing to attain its object—therefore it must be beneficial to a pig to be killed and eaten. ↑

50 Cic. N. D. iii. 25, 65–70. It is here presumed that the leading thoughts in Cicero’s description belong to the School of Carneades. ↑

51 Ibid. 31, 76. ↑

52 Ibid. 32, 79. ↑

53 Cic. N. D. iii. 32, 80. ↑

54 Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120; N. D. iii. 11, 28. ↑

55 Cic. N. D. iii. 8, 21; 10, 26; 11, 27. ↑

56 Ibid. 10, 25. ↑

57 L.c. ↑

58 Cic. N. D. iii. 12, 29; 14, 34. ↑

59 Cic. N. D. iii. 13, 32. More fully Sext. Math. ix. 139–147. Here too Carneades is expressly mentioned. But were he not mentioned the agreement of the argument with that given by Cicero would show that the same person was being referred to. ↑

60 Cic.; Ibid. Further proofs of the transient nature of all earthly beings are there given. ↑

61 Sext. Math. ix. 152–175, quotes the same argument for σωφροσύνη, and so does Cic. N. D. iii. 15, 38. Neither mentions Carneades by name, but since both writers introduce these proofs in the same position in a longer argument, in which Carneades is expressly mentioned both before and after, there can be no doubt that to him they refer. ↑

62 Sext. ix. 176. The argument has a look of sophistry about it. It alludes to the important question which engaged so much attention in the middle ages, viz. How is the universal related in Deity to the individual? Are goodness and reason a law for God independent of His will or not? ↑

63 As Epicurus did. See p. 468, 3. ↑

64 Sext. 178. ↑

65 Sext. l.c. 148–151; 180. That Sextus here refers to Carneades is clear from his agreement with Cic. N. D. 12, 29–31; 14, 34. Cicero introduces his remarks with the words: Illa autem, quæ Carneades afferebat, quemadmodum dissolvitis? Sextus himself seems to refer not only individual arguments, but the whole series of them, to Carneades, when he continues, 182: ἠρώτηνται δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καρνεάδου καὶ σωριτικῶς τινες κ.τ.λ. ↑

66 Sext. 182–190. More fully in Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 43. Sextus also observes, 190: καὶ ἄλλους δὴ τοιούτους σωρείτας ἐρωτῶσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι θεούς. ↑

67 To him, or probably to his School, belongs the learned argument given by Cic. N. D. iii. 21, 53, to 23, 60, in which he proves the want of unity in traditional myths by the multiplicity of Gods of the same name. The whole drift of this argument shows that it was borrowed from some Greek treatise. ↑

68 See Cic. Divin. i. 4, 7; 7, 12. ↑

69 Ibid. ii. 3, 9. ↑

70 Ibid. v. 13; but Carneades is not here mentioned by name. ↑

71 Ibid. i. 13, 23; 49, 109. ↑

72 Cic. l.c. and Divin. ii. 21, 48. ↑

73 Cic. l.c. ii. 11, 27. ↑

74 Cic. De Fato, 11, 23; 14, 31. The freedom of the will, he there says, may be asserted even granting that every motion is referred to a cause, for it is not necessary that this law should hold good of the will. He will therefore confine it to bodily motion, and not allow to it unconditional validity. ↑

75 Lact. Instit. v. 14, following Cic. De Rep. iii. 4; Plut. Cato Maj. c. 22; Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35. ↑

76 Lactant. l.c. 16; Cic. De Rep. iii. 8–12; 14; 17; Fin. ii. 18, 59. On the above casuistical cases see De Off. iii. 13; 23, 89, and above, p. 299, 2. Probably Carneades was the cause of the study of casuistry among the later Stoics. ↑

77 Cic. Acad. ii. 34, 108; conf. 31, 98. In Id. Att. xiii. 21, he compares this ἐποχὴ to the drawing up of a charioteer, or to the guard of a pugilist. No doubt it is with reference to ἐποχὴ that Alex. Aphr. De An. 154 a, says: The Academicians consider ἀπτωσία the πρῶτον οἰκεῖον, πρὸς ταύτην γάρ φασιν ἡμᾶς οἰκείως ἔχειν πρώτην, ὥστε μηδὲν προσπταίειν. ἀπροσπτωσία or ἀπροπτωσία is, according to the Stoic definition (Diog. vii. 46) = ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μή. It consists, therefore, in not giving a hasty assent to any proposition. According to the Sceptics, this is only possible, and you are only then safe from error, when you give assent to none whatever. ἀπροσπτωσία becomes then identical with ἐποχὴ or ἄγνοια, which Max. Tyr. Diss. 35, 7, speaks of as the ultimate end of Carneades. Hence Carneades, as Arcesilaus had done before him, spoke for and against every subject without expressing a decided opinion. Cic. N. D. i. 5, 11; Acad. ii. 18, 60; Divin. ii. 72, 150; Rep. iii. 5, 8; Tusc. v. 4, 11; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12. ↑

78 Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28. ↑

79 Sext. Math. vii. 166: ἀπατούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτός [ὁ Καρνεάδης] τι κριτήριον πρός τε τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τὴς εὐδαιμονίας περίκτησιν δυνάμιν ἀπαναγκάζεται καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸν περὶ τούτου διατάττεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99 (of Clitomachus): Etenim contra naturam esset, si probabile nihil esset, et sequitur omnis vitæ … eversio. Ibid. 101; 32, 104: Nam cum placeat, eum qui de omnibus rebus contineat se de assentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit ejusmodi visa, quibus ad actionem excitemur, etc. Hence the assurance (Ibid. 103; Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 234) that the Academicians do not wish to go into the question of perception. They accept it as a phenomenon of consciousness and a basis of action, but they deny that it strictly furnishes knowledge. The senses are ὑγιεῖς, but not ἀκριβεῖς. ↑

80 Sext. and Cic. l.c. ↑

81 Sext. l.c. 167–170. ↑

82 Ibid. 171–173; or, as it is expressed by Cicero, Acad. ii. 24, 78: It is possible nihil percipere et tamen opinari. It is of no importance that Philo and Metrodorus said Carneades had proved this statement, whereas Clitomachus had stated, hoc magis ab eo disputatum quam probatum. Acad. ii. 48, 148; 21, 67, attributes the statement to Carneades, without any qualification, adding only: Adsensurum (aliquando, as the latter passage adds) non percepto, i.e. opinaturum sapientem. ↑

83 Conf. Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 11, 26 (undoubtedly in point of matter and probably in terms following Cicero): Id probabile vel verisimile Academici vocant, quod nos ad addendum sine adsensione potest invitare. Sine adsensione autem dico, ut id quod agimus non opinemur verum esse aut non id scire arbitremur, agamus tamen. To the same effect, Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12: Carneades declared it impossible to withhold judgment on all points, and asserted πάντα μὲν εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα, οὐ πάντα δὲ ἄδηλα. Conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 17, 54, where the objection is raised to the new Academicians: Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod nolunt; ea dico incerta, quæ ἄδηλα Græci. ↑

84 Sext. l.c. 173; 175–182; Pyrrh. i. 227; conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 11, 33; 31, 99; 32, 104. ↑

85 Sext. l.c. 173; 181. ↑

86 Ibid. 176; 183. ↑

87 Ibid. 184. ↑

88 Sext. l.c. 174; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99. ↑

89 Cic. l.c. 32, 103; 48, 148. This explanation does away with the charge of inconsistency which is brought against Carneades in Cic. Acad. ii. 18, 59; 21, 67; 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3), on the ground that he allowed, in contradistinction to Arcesilaus, that the wise man will sometimes follow opinion, and will give his assent to certain statements. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 7, even asserts that he expressed his own convictions to his friends in private; but this assertion is no more true of him than of Arcesilaus (see p. 531, 3), as may be seen from the passage on p. 557, 2. ↑

90 Sext. Pyrrh. i. 226: ἀγαθὸν γάρ τί φασιν εἶναι οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὶ καὶ κακὸν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ὃ λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον; καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὁμοίως. ↑

91 See p. 553, 2; 554, 4. ↑

92 Here the question arises, Whence does the Sceptic derive his conviction as to probabilities in morals? and as perception is not available for the purpose, Geffers concludes (De Arc. Successor. 20) that Carneades assumed a peculiar source of conviction in the mind. For such an assumption, however, our authorities give no proof. It cannot be gathered from the hypothetical language respecting the freedom of the will in Cic. De Fato, ii. 23. See p. 551, 2. Nor is it, indeed, necessary that Carneades, who never pretended to hold any psychological theory, should have had any opinion on the subject. Supposing he did have it, he might have appealed to experience quite as readily or more so than the Stoics, and have been content with the fact that certain things are far more agreeable or disagreeable, and either promote or disturb happiness. ↑

93 Cic. Fin. v. 6, 16, to 8, 23; conf. Tusc. v. 29, 84; Ritter, iii. 686, has hardly expressed with accuracy Carneades’ division, or he would not have accused it of being inaccurate and superficial. ↑

94 Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139. ↑

95 Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 131: Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui iis rebus, quas primas natura conciliavisset (οἰκειοῦν). Similarly Fin. v. 7, 20; Tusc. v. 30, 84. This view differs from that of the Stoics, because it makes the highest Good consist not in natural activity as such, but in the enjoyment of natural goods. ↑

96 Cic. Fin. ii. 11, 35: Ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri (pleasure), alter Hieronymi (freedom from pain), Carneadis tertius (the satisfaction of natural instincts). Conf. Ibid. v. 7, 20; 8, 22. ↑

97 Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139: Ut Calliphontem sequar, cujus quidem sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam videretur. Callipho is reckoned among those who consider honestas cum aliqua accessione—or, as it is said, Fin. v. 8, 21; 25, 73; Tusc. v. 30, 85, voluptas cum honestate—the highest Good. ↑

98 Plut. Tranq. An. 16, p. 475. ↑

99 Cic. Tusc. iii. 22, 54. Let it be observed that this view of Carneades is specially placed under the head of conviction on probabilities. It is said, he attacked the proposition, videri fore in ægritudine sapientem patria capta. The other statements of Carneades on ethics, such as that in Plut. De Adulat. 16, p. 51, have nothing characteristic about them. ↑

100 See p. 279. ↑

101 Plut. C. Not. 27, 14; Stob. Ecl. ii. 134. Plutarch, however, only quotes it as the opinion of individuals. It appears more probable that it was an opinion of Chrysippus which Antipater defended against Carneades. Carneades even practically attributes it to the Stoics. ↑

102 Cic. Fin. iii. 12, 41: Carneades tuus … rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit, in omni hac quæstione, quæ de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum. ↑

103 Fin. iii. 17, 57. ↑

104 Cic. Tusc. iii. 25, 59. ↑

105 Ibid. v. 29, 83: Et quoniam videris hoc velle, ut, quæcumque dissentientium philosophorum sententia sit de finibus, tamen virtus satis habeat ad vitam beatam præsidii, quod quidem Carneadem disputare solitum accepimus, etc. ↑

106 He explicitly says, Fin. v. 7, 18, that as each one defines the highest good, so he determines the honestum (the καλὸν, virtue). The view of the Stoics, he says, places the honestum and bonum in activity aiming at what is according to nature; adding that, according to the view which places it in the possession of what is according to nature, the prima secundum naturam are also prima in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. ↑

107 See p. 560, 3, and Plut. Tranq. An. 19, p. 477, where, however, the greater part seems to belong to Plutarch. ↑

108 Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35. See above 536, 1, end. ↑

109 Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 44: Hæc Carneades aiebat, non ut Deos tolleret—quid enim philosopho minus conveniens?—sed ut Stoicos nihil de Diis explicare convinceret. In this sense the Academician in Cicero (i. 22, 62) frequently asserts, that he would not destroy belief in God, but that he finds the arguments unsatisfactory. Likewise Sextus, Pyrrh. iii. 2: τῷ μὲν βίῳ κατακολουθοῦντες ἀδοξάστως φαμὲν εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ σέβομεν θεοὺς καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτοὺς φαμέν. ↑

110 Ritter, iii. 730, 694. ↑

111 Clitomachus was a native of Carthage. Hence he is called by Max Tyr. Diss. 10, 3, ὁ Λίβυς. He originally bore the name of Hasdrubal. At home he devoted himself to study, and wrote several treatises in his mother tongue (τῇ ἰδίᾳ φωνῇ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ἐφιλοσόφει). When 40 years of age (according to Steph. Byz. De urbe Καρχηδὼν; 28), he came to Athens, was initiated by Carneades into Greek philosophy, and devoted himself to it with such zeal and success (Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17; 31, 98; Athen. ix. 402, c) that he became esteemed as a philosopher and voluminous writer (Diog. iv. 67). Treatises of his are mentioned by Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 98; 32, 102; Diog. ii. 92. He died (according to Stob. Floril. vii. 55) by suicide, not before 110 B.C. (as Zumpt remarks, Ueber d. philosoph. Schulen in Ath., Abh. d. Berl. Akad., Jahrg. 1842. Hist. Philol. Kl. p. 67), since, according to Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45, L. Crassus, during his quæstorship, which falls at the earliest in this year, met him at Athens. He must then have been very old. ↑

112 Diog. iv. 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 32, 102. ↑

113 As the peculiar observation in Diog. iv. proves: (ἀνὴρ ἐν ταῖς τρισὶν αἱρέσεσι διαπρέψας, ἔν τε τῇ Ἀκαδημαϊκῇ Περιπατητικῇ καὶ Στωϊκῇ). ↑

114 According to Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17; De Orat. i. 11. 45; Orator, 16, 51, Charmadas was a pupil of Carneades, whom he followed not only in teaching but also in method. He must have survived Clitomachus, since he taught at the same time with Philo. See p. 566, 1. Philo, however, according to Clitomachus, undertook the presidency of the School (Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 9). According to Cic. De Orat. ii. 88, 360. Tusc. i. 24, 59, he was remarkable for a good memory. ↑

115 Cic. De Orat. i. 18, 84: Charmadas asserted, eos qui rhetores nominabantur et qui dicendi præcepta traderent nihil plane tenere, neque posse quenquam facultatem assequi dicendi, nisi qui philosophorum inventa didicissent. Sext. Math. ii. 20, also mentions the hostile attitude of Clitomachus and Charmadas towards rhetoricians, and says that both he and the School to which he belonged were engaged in disputes with them. His fellow-disciple Agnon drew up a treatise, according to Quintil. ii. 17, 15, entitled ‘Charges against the rhetoricians.’ Ritter’s inferences, that Charmadas recommended philosophy as the only way to eloquence, and thus betrayed the object of the philosophical doctrine of probability, iii. 695, make far too much of a casual expression which means no more than what the Stoics, and before them Plato, had said. ↑

116 In addition to Clitomachus and Charmadas, Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, mentions Agnon and Melanthius of Rhodes, the former of whom is also referred to by Quintilian. (See Athen. xiii. 602, d.) Cicero adds that Metrodorus of Stratonice passed for a friend of Carneades; he had come over from among the Epicureans (Diog. x. 9) to join him. This Metrodorus must neither be confounded with Metrodorus of Skepsis, the pupil of Charmadas (see p. 566, 1), nor with the Metrodorus distinguished as a painter, 168 B.C., whom Æmilius Paulus brought to Rome (Plin. H. N. xxxv. 11, 135). The former must have been younger, the latter older, than Metrodorus of Stratonice. A pupil of Melanthius (Diog. ii. 64), and also of Carneades in his later years (Plut. An Seni. s. ger. Resp. 13, 1, p. 791), was Æschines of Naples, according to Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45, who was likewise a distinguished teacher in the Academic School towards the close of the second century. Another pupil, Mentor, was by Carneades forbidden the School, because he was caught with his concubine (Diog. iv. 63; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 7). ↑

117 Exc. Vatic. xii 26: καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων [τῶν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ] τινὲς βουλόμενοι περί τε τῶν προφανῶς καταληπτῶν εἶναι δοκούντων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων εἰς ἀπορίαν ἄγειν τοὺς προσμαχομένους τοιαύταις χρῶνται παραδοξολογίαις καὶ τοιαύτας εὐποροῦσι πιθανότητας, ὥστε διαπορεῖν, ἀδύνατόν [l. εἰ δυνατόν] ἐστι, τοὺς ἐν Ἀθήναις ὄντας ὀσφραίνεσθαι τῶν ἑψομένων ὠῶν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, καὶ διστάζειν, μή πω καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ διαλέγονται περὶ τούτων οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἄλλων ἄρ’ ἐν οἴκῳ κατακείμενοι τούτους διατίθενται τοὺς λόγους· ἐξ ὧν δι’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς παραδοξολογίας εἰς διαβολὴν ἤχασι τὴν ὅλην αἵρεσιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ καλῶς ἀπορούμενα παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς ἀπιστίαν ἦχθαι, καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ἰδίας ἀστοχίας καὶ τοῖς νέοις τοιοῦτον ἐντετόκασι ζῆλον, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἠθικῶν καὶ πραγματικῶν λόγων μηδὲ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἐπίνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι, δι’ ὧν ὄνησις τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσι, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀνωφελεῖς καὶ παραδόξους εὑρεσιλογίας κενοδοξοῦντες κατατρίβουσι τοὺς βίους. In the time of Carneades, whose cotemporary was Polybius, to whom the language as to the enthusiasm of youth for Sceptical teaching refers, such depreciatory remarks could not have been made of the Academy. The historical value, therefore, of the whole passage is suspicious. It bears besides the mark of exaggeration so strongly that it is of no greater use for giving a view of the Academy than are the caricatures of opponents for conveying an idea of modern German philosophy. ↑

118 Among these pupils the tendency to lay stress on the doctrine of probabilities in relation to Scepticism was already strong. Proof may be found not only in the accounts already given us of Clitomachus and Æschines, but also in the circumstance that many of the older writers made the fourth Academy date from Philo and Charmadas, the fifth from Antiochus (Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16). At a still earlier date, Metrodorus is said to have departed from the platform of Carneades. Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 18, 41, after speaking of Antiochus and his renunciation of Scepticism, says: Quamquam et Metrodorus id antea facere tentaverat, qui primus dicitur esse confessus, non decreto placuisse Academicis, nihil posse comprehendi, sed necessario contra Stoicos hujus modi eos arma sumsisse. Probably Augustin borrowed this passage from a lost treatise of Cicero; hence it may be relied upon. The Metrodorus referred to is probably Metrodorus of Stratonice (see p. 564, 5), mentioned by Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16. Metrodorus of Skepsis might also be suggested (Strabo, xiii. 155, p. 609; xvi. 4, 16, p. 775; Plut. Lucull. 22; Diog. v. 84; Cic. De Orat. ii. 88, 360; 90, 365; iii. 20, 75; Tusc. i. 24, 59; Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 24, 89; Quintil. x. 6, 1; xi. 2, 22; Müller, Hist. Gr. iii. 203), who first learned rhetoric at Chalcedon, afterwards entered the service of Mithridates, and was put to death by his orders, B.C. 70, at an advanced age. Cic. De Orat. iii. 20, 75, calls him an Academician; and he is mentioned, Ibid. i. 11, 45, as a pupil of Charmadas. The language quoted by Augustin may have come from the treatise περὶ συνηθείας (Strabo, p. 775). He is otherwise only known as a rhetorician and politician. The same uncertainty prevails as to the Metrodorus referred to in Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3). We do not know who he is, but it may be inferred that it is the same Metrodorus who is mentioned by Augustin. ↑