Note 58 — Chapter XXIII · THE NEW ACADEMY.

(β) Theological views of the Stoics attacked. Not content with attacking the conclusiveness of the arguments upon which the Stoics built their belief in a God, the scepticism of the Academy sought to demonstrate that the idea of God itself is an untenable one. The line of argument which Carneades struck out for this purpose is essentially the same as that used in modern times to deny the personality of God. The ordinary view of God regards Him as an infinite, but, at the same time, as a separate Being, possessing the qualities and living the life of an individual. To this view Carneades objected, on the ground that the first assertion contradicts the second; and argues that it is impossible to apply the characteristics of personal existence to God without limiting His infinite nature. Whatever view we may take of God, we must regard Him as a living Being; and every living being is composite, having parts and passions, and is therefore destructible.58 Moreover, every living being has a sense-nature. Far, therefore, from refusing such a nature to God, Carneades attributed to Him, in the interest of omniscience, other organs of sense than the five we possess. Now, everything capable of impressions through the senses is also liable to change, sensation, according to the definition of Chrysippus, being nothing more than a change of soul. Every such being must therefore be capable of pleasure and pain, without which sensation is inconceivable. Whatever is capable of change is liable to destruction; whatever is susceptible to pain is also liable to deterioration, pain being caused by deterioration, and is also liable to destruction.59 As the capacity for sensation, so too the desire for what is in harmony with nature, and the dislike of what is opposed to nature, belong to the conditions of life. Whatever has the power of destroying any being is opposed to the nature of that being, everything that lives being exposed to annihilation.60 Advancing from the conception of a living being to that of a rational being, all virtues would have to be attributed to God as well as bliss. But how, asks Carneades, can any virtue be ascribed to God? Every virtue supposes an imperfection, in overcoming which it consists. He only is continent who might possibly be incontinent, and persevering who might be indulgent. To be brave, a man must be exposed to danger; to be magnanimous, he must be exposed to misfortunes. A being not feeling attraction for pleasure, nor aversion for pain and difficulties, dangers and misfortunes, would not be capable of virtue. Just as little could we predicate prudence of a being not susceptible of pleasure and pain; prudence consisting in knowing what is good, bad, and morally indifferent. But how can there be any such knowledge where there is no susceptibility to pleasure or pain? Or how can a being be conceived of capable of feeling pleasure, but incapable of feeling pain, since pleasure can only be known by contrast with pain, and the possibility of increasing life always supposes the possibility of lessening it? Nor is it otherwise with intelligence (εὐβουλία). He only is intelligent who always discovers what will subserve his purpose. If, however, he must discover it, it cannot have been previously known to him. Hence intelligence can only belong to a being who is ignorant about much. Such a being can never feel sure that sooner or later something will not cause his ruin. He will therefore be exposed to fear. A being susceptible of pleasure and exposed to pain, a being who has to contend with dangers and difficulties, and who feels pain and fear, must inevitably, so thought Carneades, be finite and destructible. If, therefore, we cannot conceive of God except in this form, we cannot conceive of Him at all, our conception being self-destructive.61