Note 98 — Chapter V · LOGIC OF THE STOICS.

In Diog. 66; Sext. Math. viii. 70; Ammon. De Interp. 4, a (Schol. in Arist. 93, a; 22, b, 20); Simpl. Cat. 103, α; Boëth. De Interp. 315; Cramer, Anecd. Oxon. iii. 267, conf. I. 104, a distinction is drawn between ἀξίωμα (a judgment), ἐρώτημα (a direct question, requiring Yes or No), πύσμα (an enquiry), προστακτικὸν, ὁρκικὸν, ἀρατικὸν (wishes), εὐκτικὸν (a prayer), ὑποθετικὸν (a supposition), ἐκθετικὸν (as ἐκκείσθω εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ), προσαγορευτικὸν (an address), θαυμαστικὸν, ψεκτικὸν, ἐπαπορητικὸν, ἀφηγηματικὸν (explanatory statements), ὅμοιον ἀξιώματι (a judgment with something appended, as: ὡς Πριαμίδῃσιν ἐμφερὴς ὁ βουκόλος! by Sextus called Πλεῖον ἢ ἀξίωμα). Ammon. in Waitz, Arist. Orig. i. 43, speaks of ten forms of sentences held by the Stoics, mentioning, however, only two, προστακτικὸς and ἐβκτικός (so reads the MS. Waitz suggests ἐφεκτικὸς, more probably it is εὐκτικός). Diog. 191, mentions treatises of Chrysippus on interrogatory and hortatory sentences. On the relation of an oath to ἀξίωμα light is thrown by Simpl. l.c., also by Chrysippus’ distinction between ἀληθορκεῖν and εὐορκεῖν ψευδορκεῖν and ἐπιορκεῖν in Stob. Floril. 28, 15. ↑