Note 50 — Chapter V · LOGIC OF THE STOICS.

Compare besides p. 87, 2, Cic. Acad. i. 11, 41: [Zeno] visis (= φαντασίαις) non omnibus adjungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quæ propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quæ viderentur: id autem visum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehensibile (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία). Ibid. ii. 12, 38: ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere … non potest objectam rem perspicuam non approbare. Conf. Fin. v. 26, 76: percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quidquam posse percipi nisi tale rerum, quale falsum esse non possit. Diog. vii. 54; Sext. Math. vii. 227: κριτήριον τοίνον φασὶν ἀληθείας εἶναι οἱ ἄνδρες οὗτοι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. It was a departure from the older Stoic teaching, to refuse, as the later Stoics did, to allow a conceptional notion to be considered a test of truth, except with the proviso that no contrary proof could be adduced against its truth. Sext. 253: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωϊκῶν κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν ταύτην φαντασίαν· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα, since cases could be imagined in which a faulty view presented itself with the full force of truth. This was equivalent to overthrowing the whole doctrine of a criterion; for how could it be known in any particular case that there was not a negative instance? But it is quite in harmony with the Stoic teaching for a later Stoic (Ibid. 257) to say of conceptional perception: αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργὴς οὖσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μονονουχὶ τῶν τριχῶν, φασι, λαμβάνεται κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς δεομένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτῃ προσπίπτειν, κ.τ.λ. Hence Simpl. Phys. 20, b: ἀνῄρουν τὰ ἄλλα … πλὴν τὰ ἐναργῆ. ↑