Note 4 — Chapter V · LOGIC OF THE STOICS.

Our information on this head is very small. In the words: ῥητορικὴ verba curat et sensus et ordinem, a division of rhetoric is implied by Seneca, which differs in little, except in the position of the chief parts, from that of Aristotle. A fourth part is added to the three others by Diog. 43—on Delivery—εἶναι δ’ αὐτῆς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἴς τε τὴν εὕρεσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν φράσιν, καὶ εἰς τάξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. Diogenes also claims for the Stoics the Aristotelian distinction between three ways of speaking—συμβουλευτικὸς, δικανικὸς, ἐγκωμιαστικός—and four parts in a speech: προοίμιον, διήγησις, τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους, ἐπίλογος. Definitions of διήγησις and παράδειγμα are given from Zeno by the anonymous author in Spengel, Rhet. Gr. i. 434, 23; 447, 11. The same author (Ibid. 454, 4) says that, according to Chrysippus, the ἐπίλογος must be μονομερής. The Stoic definition of rhetoric has been already given, p. 70, 1. Another—τέχνη περὶ κόσμου καὶ εἰρημένου λόγου τάξιν—is attributed to Chrysippus by Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 1. Cic. Fin. iv. 3, 7, observes, in reference to the Stoic rhetoric, and in particular to that of Chrysippus, that such was its nature that si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat—that it dealt in nothing but words, being withal scanty in expressions, and confined to subtleties. This neglect of the truly rhetorical element appears already in the quotations from Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 2. We have not the slightest reason to complain, as Prantl does, p. 413, of the purely rhetorical value of dialectic with the Stoics. ↑