Note 35 — Chapter V · LOGIC OF THE STOICS.

Sext. l.c. continues: ἀληθὲς γάρ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἀντικείμενόν τινι, καὶ ψεῦδος τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ μὴ (this μὴ is obviously redundant as appears from Math. viii. 85, 88; xi. 220, where the same definition is given without the μὴ) ἀντικείμενόν τινι, ὅπερ ἀσώματον ἀξίωμα καθεστὼς νοητὸν εἶναι· every sentence containing an assertion or negative, and therefore being opposed to every other. Ibid. viii. 70: ἠξίουν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ κοινῶς ἐν λεκτῷ τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος· λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασὶ τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον· λογικὴν δὲ εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ’ ἣν τὸ φαντασθὲν ἔστι λόγῳ παραστῆσαι. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἐλλιπῆ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῆ (conceptions and propositions; conf. Diog. vii. 63) … προσαγορεύουσι δέ τινα τῶν αὐτοτελῶν καὶ ἀξιώματα, ἅπερ λέγοντες ἤτοι ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα. Ibid. 74; Diog. vii. 65: ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν, ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος (see Cic. Tusc. I. 7, 14) ἢ πρᾶγμα (better λεκτὸν as Gell. N. A. xvi, 8, 4 reads) αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῴ· ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησιν ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅροις. Aristotle had already observed that the distinction between false and true first appears in judgment. See Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 156, 2; 157, 1. ↑