Note 91 — Chapter V · LOGIC OF THE STOICS.

(δ) The categories of variety and variety of relation. The two remaining categories include everything which may be excluded from the conception of a thing on the ground of being either non-essential or accidental. In as far as such things belong to an object taken by itself alone, they come under the category of variety (πὼς ἔχον); but when they belong to it, because of its relation to something else, they come under the category of variety of relation (πρός τί πως ἔχον). Variety includes all accidental qualities, which can be assigned to any object independently of its relation to any other object.91 Size, colour, place, time, action, passion, possession, motion, state, in short, all the Aristotelian categories, with the exception of substance, whenever they apply to an object independently of its relation to other objects, belong to the category of variety92 (πὼς ἔχον). On the other hand, those features and states which are purely relative—such as right and left, sonship and fatherhood, &c.—come under the category of variety of relation (πρός τί πως ἔχον); and from this category the simple notion of relation (πρὸς τὶ) must be distinguished. Simple relation (πρὸς τὶ) is not treated as a distinct category, since it includes not only accidental relations, but also those essential properties (ποιὰ) which presuppose a definite relation to something else—such as knowledge and perception.93